

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything"

Beptanov V.B.

The shots replicate
everything: The
harsh truth about the war of 1941-1945.

Major and serious atrocities are often referred to as brilliant and, as such, are recorded
on the tablets of History.

M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin
Introduction

First came the ghost - the ghost of Communism. The first to record this phenomenon in 1848
were the outstanding scientist-mediums Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, armed with the most advanced
and unmistakable theory of their own composition. The ghost roamed Europe, shaking the chains
borrowed from the proletariat, assured that the workers had no fatherland, suggested that they "unite", enroll in
the ranks of the graveyard of the bourgeoisie and "destroy everything that hitherto guarded and ensured
private property." The prophecies of the communist Spirit were set forth by two friends, who are also classics
of a new type of ideology, in the famous Manifesto.

The manifesto, which outlined a new, communist "world outlook" with "brilliant clarity and
brightness", called on all the oppressed to forcibly overthrow the existing social and political system, establish the
dictatorship of the proletariat, and destroy classes and private property. Following this, according to the
authors, sooner or later, Communism inevitably had to come - the highest and final stage in the development of
human society, heaven on earth: factories - for workers, land - for peasants, women - in common use.

The international proletarian anthem - "The Internationale" - defined a clear program of action and
the ultimate goal of the communist movement:

We will destroy the whole world of violence

To the bottom and then

We are ours, we will build a new world,
Who was nothing, he will become everything.

True, along with passages about the "conquest of democracy", the Manifesto slipped through
terms like "expropriation", "lespotism", "confiscation of property" - of course, exclusively in relation to "exploiters",
but also "industrial armies", in which for the convenience of building a new world, it was
proposed to mobilize the liberated proletarians.

It is preferable to make a revolution in advanced industrial countries where

the proletariat is the most concentrated and organized. Therefore, for a long time communists of all stripes, including Russian Social Democrats, tried to rouse the workers to a just cause in some Germany or Switzerland. But the weakest link "in the imperialist chain" was the Russian Empire.

On October 25, 1917, left-wing radicals seized power in Russia.

They immediately christened the coup d'état, carried out on German lengi by the bayonets of the "internationalists" and the sailors stupefied with idleness, "proletarian dictatorship", their own power - "the power of the workers and peasants" and on behalf of the latter began to exterminate both, as well as all those who disagree.

Seven decades of the history of the world's first socialist state show that its domestic policy exactly corresponded to the three points of the "International": destruction, construction, appointment to office.

What was the relationship between the proletariat and the writers who never worked anywhere?

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IN AND. Ulyanov (Lenin), Caucasian abrek V.I. Dzhugashvili (Stalin), Polish militant F.E. Dzerzhinsky, cosmopolitan journalist L.D. Bronstein (Trotsky) or Yekaterinburg "mafia" Ya.M. Sverdlov - it's hard to say.

Why did they do all this?

Is it really just to eat to satiety of chum salmon caviar, which even 20 years later Trotsky, driven by Stalinist wolfhounds into the Mexican outback, recalled with nostalgia: "...this unchanged caviar is painted not only in my memory the first years of the revolution"?

What's next?

Rob all the citizens? Restore feudalism in a single country? On the mountain to all the bourgeoisie to inflate the world fire? What difference does it make, the main thing is the Power itself. This is what Lenin wrote to the members of the Central Committee a day before the coup: "The seizure of power is a matter of insurrection; its political purpose will become clear after the capture.

As early as the end of the 10th century, Georges Danton, a figure in the great French revolution, gave a clear and intelligible definition: "A revolution is simply a redistribution of property." Simply put, the basis of the worldview of any revolutionary is Sharikov's "select and divide."

Indeed, in the first place in Lenin's program of action was the item on the "expropriation of the expropriators." It means total robbery. In the future, the population was promised a bright future, toilets made of gold and cooks who would govern the state. In the meantime - "plunder the loot", destroy the "world of violence."

The simplest thing is to destroy. True-believing Marxists, defenders of the oppressed and disadvantaged, saviors of the Fatherland, confidently determined what exactly needed to be destroyed.

The "world of violence" included: all members of the ruling dynasty, the government and the state apparatus, the army and navy, the gendarmerie and the police, border and customs guards, the church, all owners of capital, all owners of large, medium and small enterprises, estates of nobles, merchants, Cossacks and clergy in full force, including babies, a large part of the peasantry (the rich, then beep "kulaks", as well as the middle peasants and the notorious "podkulakniks"), "bourgeois" writers, poets, philosophers, scientists, journalists and the intelligentsia in general, works of art created "for the needs of the exploiters", etc. and so on. In a word, everything that makes up the content of such concepts as the state, history, culture, traditions, national pride.

As a result, a lot had to be destroyed and destroyed, because those "who were nothing, but became everything" had rather specific views, in the complete absence of such "bourgeois" concepts as conscience and morality:

"We do not believe in eternal morality and expose the deception of all sorts of fairy tales about morality... For us, morality is subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat."

Under the noise of general robbery with the help of the Cheka and the "overflowing energy of the masses", the Bolsheviks quickly established in the country the "highest form of statehood" - the power of the Soviets.

But what could be offered to the country instead of a monarchy or a bourgeois republic?
Lenin and his company?

In April 1918, in the article "Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power", Vladimir Ilyich briefly outlined his model of an ideal society:

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"The first step in the emancipation of the working people ... is the confiscation of the land, the introduction of workers' control, the nationalization of banks. Next steps there will be nationalization of factories and plants, the forced organization of everything of the population into consumer societies, which are at the same time marketing societies products, the state monopoly of trade in grain and other necessary products ...

..from labor service in application to the rich, the Soviet government will have to move, or rather, at the same time will have to set the task of applying

corresponding principles to the majority of working people, workers and peasants.

Ever since Khrushchev's revelations of the cult of personality, we have been told that Lenin drew up the recipes for building communism, while Stalin hid them and distorted Lenin's ideas. A vile slander against Comrade Stalin! No one hid anything, on the contrary, we were forced to take notes in the lessons on the history of the CPSU: the forced organization of society, bread rations and labor service are the main conditions on the way to the liberation of workers from "capitalist penal servitude."

Further more interesting:

"As for punitive measures for non-compliance with labor discipline, THEY SHOULD be stricter. Punishment up to and including imprisonment is necessary. Dismissal from the factory can also be used, but its nature is completely changed. Under the capitalist system, dismissal was a violation of the civil deal. Now, when labor discipline is violated, especially when labor service is introduced, a criminal offense is already committed (!), And a certain punishment must be imposed for this.

Those guilty of violating discipline "should be able to find, prosecute and punish mercilessly."

Here is the emancipation of labor! Later, Stalin, developing the positions of the "founder", assigned the peasant to the collective farm, the worker to the enterprise for life, and how he knew how to "find" and "punish" is just a song!

Naturally, the most advanced party, headed by the "leader of the world proletariat," must, naturally, carry out the proletarian dictatorship and organize forcibly. But as

same! That's what they fought for!

Couldn't there be less dictatorship? It is impossible in any case. "... unquestioning obedience to a single will is absolutely necessary.

And our whole task, the task of the Party of Communists ... is to stand at the head of the exhausted and wearily looking for a way out masses, to lead them along the right path, along the path of labor discipline, along the path of coordinating the tasks of holding a meeting on working conditions and the tasks of unquestioning obedience to the will of the Soviet leader, the dictator in working hours...

..need an iron hand...

Subordination, and, moreover, unquestioningly, to the sole orders of Soviet leaders, dictators, elected or appointed ... equipped with dictatorial powers."

That's the whole "dictatorship of the proletariat."

(By the way, Karl Friedrichovich Marx-und-Engels, denouncing capitalist exploitation, wrote:

"The masses of workers, crowded in the factory, organized like soldiers, like

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privates of the industrial army, they become under the supervision of a whole hierarchy of non-commissioned officers and officers. They are not only the slaves of the bourgeois class; daily and hourly they are enslaved by the machine, the overseer and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself.

The latter, according to the classics, is especially offensive. But it is worth changing an individual manufacturer for an individual proletarian dictator, and calling him a people's commissar (or director), and the workers are no longer slaves, but the most free people, and even the owners of this factory and these machines).

Where, under such sensitive guidance, was the "exhausted mass" to come? What was the end goal?

Here is the answer:

"If we were able to realize state capitalism in a short amount of time (7!), it would be a victory. Only state capitalism, only a thorough organization of accounting and control, only the strictest organization and labor discipline will lead us to socialism. And without this there is no socialism...

State-monopoly capitalism is the most complete material preparation for socialism, it is the threshold of it, it is that step on the historical ladder between which (the step) and the step called socialism there are no intermediate steps.

In other words, the writer Vladimir Soloukhin clearly formulated the same thing.

(1924-1997):

"To carry out full accounting and control over every gram and over every piece of anything produced in the country. Everything that is not produced in the country, to keep in your hands, and then distribute at your discretion. Thanks to such control and distribution, to keep in submission and labor service all the people living in the country, the entire general population, without exception. So that it obeys the same will as one person. This is what socialism is. That is the highest and most massive form of slavery.

And according to Lenin, this is the first phase of communist society. Ordnung. Yes, he thought something in German.

Oh yes, and "plus the electrification of the whole country."

Of course, all sorts of "henchmen and hangers-on of the bourgeoisie", frightening the people, painted socialism as a monotonous, monotonous, gray barracks. But that's why they are "lackeys of the money bag", "serfs of the exploiters."

In fact, people have nothing to fear.

Firstly, no exploiters for you, but only your own red dictators, day and night rooting for the people.

Secondly, under socialism there will be "a great change from forced labor to labor for oneself, systematically organized on a gigantic national (to a certain extent, international, world) scale."

Thirdly, the proletarians, rationally and paternally strictly controlled by dictators, will be able to compete in work, "to show themselves, develop their abilities, discover talents."

Fourthly, after hours, everyone will go to subbotniks and rallies, where it is allowed to call on brothers in the class to work even better and be thrilled by the word "hegemon".

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Fifthly, the population "without exception" will govern the state: "The goal of our

is the free performance of public duties upon departure of the 8-hour

productivity lesson. For example, the turner defended the shift at the machine, issued a plan and - to the ministry, to manage.

Finally, somewhere far away, communism will enter its highest phase. To do this, it is only necessary to free the working people of the whole world and forcibly organize them, too, according to the Marxist scheme. After that, the state will wither away by itself, complete freedom, general prosperity and abundance will come. It is only unclear where the tribe of red dictators, which has bred on a planetary scale, will go.

"Oh, Petka, do you know what kind of life will come? You don't have to die!" (from the movie "Chapaev")

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

Oddly enough, but for some reason, very, very many were not inspired by the idea of building a giant electrified "zone". Even the allies in the matter of seizing power - the anarchists and bombers-Socialist-Revolutionaries - recoiled from the Bolsheviks and here

they were enrolled in the "contra".

Not scary. For the sake of the world revolution and the happiness of the proletariat, Vladimir Ilyich was ready to exterminate 90% of the population of Russia. No wonder Trotsky admired him so much:

"Lenin has a firm hand. And around him is a strong core of people like him, reproachful and irreconcilable people.

True, according to the leaders themselves, among these reproachful people there were quite a few (that way, 90 people out of every 100) scoundrels, crooks, "talentless and unscrupulous commissars" and other "communist bastards" worthy of being hanged "purely on a stinking rope." But these are exactly what were required: "The party is not a boarding school for noble maidens, some bastard is valuable because he is a bastard."

Like the Kharkiv Chekist Ivanovich, who fully subordinated morality to the interests of the class struggle: "It used to be that my conscience would speak in me, but now it's gone - my comrade taught me a glass of human blood to drink: I drank it - my heart turned to stone."

At leisure, having drunk blood, the "jolly monsters" of Bolshevism poured out their souls into poetry:

No greater joy, no better music

Like the crunch of broken lives and bones.

That's why, when our eyes languish

And passion begins to boil up in my chest, I want to scribble on your sentence One intrepid one: "To the wall! Shoot!"

That is why the story of a town called Chevengur, told by the writer Andrei Platonovich Platonov (1899-1951) is not a novel or hyperbole at all, but a true chronicle of the establishment of the "highest form of statehood" in some kind of Astrakhan, Arkhangelsk or Syzran.

"We must start socialism as soon as possible. - the local chairman of the revolutionary committee burns with enthusiasm. - First of all, it is necessary to eliminate the flesh of the unearned elements...

After a short life in Chevengur, Chepurny's heart began to ache from the presence of a dense petty bourgeoisie in the city. And then he began to suffer with his whole body - for communism, the soil in Chevengur turned out to be too narrow and littered with property and

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wealthy people; but it was necessary to immediately place communism on a living base ...

After serving as chairman of the revolutionary committee for two months, Chepurny was exhausted - the bourgeoisie lives on, there is no communism ...

And then Chepurny wanted to be tormented and called the chairman of the Cheka, Piyusya: Cleanse the city for me from the oppressive element! Chepurny ordered.

You can," Piyusya obeyed.

He was going to kill all the inhabitants in Chevengur, with which Chepurny agreed with relief.

You understand - it will be kinder! he persuaded Piyusu.

Otherwise, brother, all the people will die on the transitional steps. And then, the bourgeoisie are still not people: I read that a man, as he was born from a monkey, so he killed her. So you remember, since there is a proletariat, then what is the bourgeoisie for? It's downright ugly!"

(And here is an entry from the diary of the writer Vladimir Galaktionovich Korolenko (1853-1921) dated March 29, 1918: "A conversation with the deputy head of the Cheka of Ukraine about mass extrajudicial executions: - Comrade Korolenko, but order it for the good of the people! - and looks inquisitively at me").

Piyusia was personally acquainted with the bourgeoisie: he remembered the Chevengur streets and had a clear idea of the appearance of every householder. In addition, Piyusha knew their way of life and subsistence and was willing to kill any of them by hand, even without the use of weapons. From the day of his appointment as chairman of the Cheka, he had no peace of mind and was irritated all the time: after all, every day the petty bourgeoisie ate Soviet bread, lived in his houses and was a quiet bitch across the revolution.

(It is enough to read Lenin's instructions to the representatives of the Soviet government on the ground and it is easy to imagine how in the same way the Presovnarkom toiled with his whole body in the Kremlin from the presence of the bourgeoisie in the country, how the "unrighteous thousand" in other people's moneyboxes did not give him rest, how he convinced the chairman of the Cheka Dzerzhinsky "to immediately place communism on a living basis": to shoot, shoot and shoot, "avoiding idiotic red tape".

What is worth only one circular about decossackization.

"To carry out mass terror against the rich Cossacks, exterminating them without exception; carry out a merciless mass terror against all Cossacks in general ... "

Or the instructions of Evgenia Bogdanovna Bosch (1879-1925), "an active participant in the struggle for Soviet power in Ukraine":

"Hang, by all means hang, so that the people can see, at least 100 notorious kulaks, rich people, bloodsuckers. Make it so that for hundreds of miles around the people see

trembled, knew...").

However, after the total destruction of the "natural" bourgeoisie, there were still many people left in the city, almost all of them were not members of the Bolshevik party cell. And communism did not advance in Chevengur.

"I believe," Prokofy rationally rounded, one thing: since Karl Marx did not say about residual classes, they cannot exist. And they are - go out into the street: either a vlova, or a clerk, or a reduced head of the proletariat. How to be, please tell me!

And I think, since they cannot be, according to Karl Marx, they should not be. And they live and indirectly oppress us - how is it? ...

I go like this. it is necessary to withdraw the remnants of the population from Chevengur HOW MUCH

perhaps far away, so that they would get lost... Chepurny sniffed the tobacco with a puff and for a long time felt its taste.

Now he felt good: the class of residual bastards will be taken out of the county, and communism will come in Chevengur, because there is nothing to be."

Since the "residual bastard" could not and did not want to go far, she had to be shot from machine guns. Finally, the dream of the prerevolutionary committee came true: "Eleven people remained in the city ... The sun had already risen high, and communism must have set in in Chevengur in the morning."*

* Roman A.T. Platonov "Chevengur" was first published outside the USSR in 1972 year; in the USSR in 1988. If someone thinks that the writer has exaggerated too much, let him read the documents published not so long ago about the establishment of Soviet power in the Far Eastern city of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. There, local Piyusi and Chepurny shot, hung, stabbed, drowned in the Amur, burned or buried in the ground, beat with sticks to death 90% of the townspeople,

including children, as well as foreign citizens.

This is the Leninist method of building communism: shoot and hang, hang and shoot, until the "masses" become absolutely submissive, manageable, endlessly in love with their native Soviet power and with "the very human person."

One of the main specialists in the "liquidation of the flesh of non-truly elements", a member of the collegium of the Cheka "Red Latvian" Martyn Latsis (aka Jan Sudrabs; 1888-1938) through the Red Terror newspaper (!) instructed colleagues:

"Do not look for incriminating evidence in the case; whether he rebelled against the Soviets with weapons or in words. Your first duty is to ask him what class he belongs to, what is his origin, what is his education and what is his profession. All these questions should decide the fate of the accused.

And the comrades Eyduks, Orlovs, Kedrovs, Ivanovichs, Shulmans, Saenkas, Rosa Schwartz, Rebekah Meisel and other Bela Kuns voluptuously clicked their revolvers, ready day and night in a revolutionary cocaine frenzy to Dukhonin's headquarters", "slap", "poka", "exchange", "seal".

Since almost the entire thinking and creative part of Russia rose up against the brutal criminals and outcasts, this part of the nation had to be exterminated. The first point of the program for building a brighter future, as you know, was successfully completed and even overfulfilled. This did not require special knowledge, but only certain qualities of the organizers and performers.

"Well," the Leader sighed with satisfaction, "we have conquered Russia, now we must learn how to manage Russia."

Building a "new world" proved to be much more difficult. First, it turned out that the "conquerors" themselves do not know what, strictly speaking, should be built. Secondly, there were not enough working hands, peaceful days, materials and raw materials, production areas, knowledge, and experienced specialists. In addition, in the conditions of the continuous "aggravation of the class struggle", it was necessary to conduct a continuous struggle against pests, spies, alien elements, loafers, bastards, poachers, ruin, lice, etc.

In an extremely short time, it was possible to really destroy almost everything "to the ground", but for some reason communism did not come. Therefore, it took a lot to create anew, and only the "new" person had the right to create something new,

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which also had to be "produced". Old specialists, intelligentsia

("shit" by Lenin's definition) were not suitable for building a brighter future.

However, Lenin himself was of little use for this, and therefore, soon after the end of the Polish campaign, which buried the hopes for a revolution in Europe, he became homesick and died.

All he could do was destroy, crush, expropriate with "the most frenzied and reckless energy". All that really fascinated him until the last days was

increasing the "mass character" and the fundamental justification of terror. Lenin never engaged in any creative activity, even in a minimal amount. He did not plant trees, did not build houses, did not raise at least one child. All that was left of him was his "case" and his body. And on the edge of the grave, he continued to shake his strong fist: "We will return to terror!"

Sleep, Ilyich, you are my beautiful, Bayushki-bayu.

Quietly shines a clear moon

To your mausoleum...

The banner of struggle for universal happiness was taken up by the faithful Leninists.

Part |

LEADERS

And some people argue that, nevertheless, we won the 6th great war mainly because it was Stalin who led us, and if not for Stalin, it is not known whether we could cope with the enemy and win

his...

No matter what, I cannot agree with such an interpretation of events because it is a slavish point of view. Only slaves who cannot rise from their knees and look beyond the head of their master definitely need someone who would think for them, organize everything for them, who can be blamed in case of misfortune and who can be credited with success in case of misfortune. It's slave psychology."

N.S. Khrushchev

Who determined the state policy in the Land of Soviets?

All the most important state and military posts, of course, were occupied by active participants in the October Revolution and the Civil War. Professional suitability was not taken into account. The point "who was nothing, that will become everything" was fulfilled literally.

On November 1, 1917, Russia learned the names of its new rulers - the People's Commissars of the Workers' and Peasants' Government.

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was the "leader of the world proletariat" V.I. Ulyanov

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Lenin (1870-1924), under the profession of writing "writer".

People's Commissar for Internal Affairs - A. I. Rykov (1881-1938). After graduating from the gymnasium, Alexei Ivanovich entered the law faculty of Kazan University, but, according to his own recollections, "I had no time to sit on the student bench when I ended up in jail." Then followed the party underground, new arrests, prisons, exiles, escapes.

Of course, having spent almost six years in jail, plus three years in the northern regions, Rykov studied "internal affairs" only from the inside and did not understand anything in police work, as in any other: "I lived to be 30 years old and did not know how to straighten my passport. I have no idea what it's like to rent a permanent apartment somewhere."

People's Commissar for Agriculture V.P. Milyutin (1884-1937) was the son of a village teacher. He joined the Bolshevik Party at the age of sixteen. Twice he tried to get a higher education, but revolutionary activity was very distracting - eight arrests. In the meantime, he composed two Marxist pamphlets on agriculture, which is why he was considered a major specialist in it.

People's Commissar Trud A.G. Shlyapnikov (1885-1937) was the only "worker" in the Council of People's Commissars, because in his youth, before emigration, he managed to stand at the machine and even "dreamed of becoming a metal turner." However, the buzz turned out to be much more interesting. The ability to mobilize the masses erupted quite early: "While working at the Semyannikovskiy plant, I took an active part in the strike

boys

all workshops, ship, carpentry, to drive out those workers who did not want to participate in the strike. We filled our pockets with nuts, cuttings, and all kinds of pieces of iron; those who did not obey the general decision on the strike were showered with a hail of iron fragments, nuts, bolts, and this forced them to join the general movement. Education was "lower".

The Committee on Military and Naval Affairs was headed by an officer expelled from the army, editor of soldiers' newspapers V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko (1883-1939), ensign N.V. Krylenko (1885-1938), sailor P.E. Dybenko (1889-1938).

Trade and industry were entrusted to the son of the clerk V.P. Nogin (1878-1924). After graduating from the city school, he served for some time as an office boy, then worked as an apprentice in a dye house, attended Marxist circles, and was an agent of Iskra. From the age of twenty, Viktor Pavlovich wandered through prisons and emigration: "Somehow, recalling the past, he counted the number of prisons known to him by sitting in them. He counted 50 such prisons." Intensified self-education in places of imprisonment allowed him to "teach the literary road self-taught", and at the same time master all the subtleties of managing industry and trade.

People's Commissar of Education A.V. Lunacharsky (1875-1933) was born into the family of a Poltava official. In his youth, Anatoly Vasilyevich spent about a year in Zurich, combining lectures at the university with attending party gatherings. Then there were eight months in the Taganka prison, a three-year exile, emigration, revolutionary journalism, shunning from Marxism to God-seeking, from Bolsheviks to Mensheviks and back. Companions considered him a very enlightened man. Lunacharsky was a type of narcissistic chatterbox, able to make endless empty speeches on any occasion and on any topic, but organically unadapted to any organized activity.

People's Commissar of Justice G.I. Oppokov-Lomov (1888-1938), the son of a bank clerk, studied for one year at the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg University, but quit - the revolution started.

Eternal party journalist, translator of "Capital" and other Marxist

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works of I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov (1870-1928) was assigned to lead the financial department.

The People's Commissariat of Food was headed by the son of a Polish nobleman, who graduated from Moscow University, I.A. Teodorovich (1875-1937). He is from the same cohort of party theorists and journalists.

L.D., who graduated from the real school, became the Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Bronstein-Trotsky (1879-1940), party theorist, publicist and orator, active participant in the revolution of 1905-1907, chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, one of the main organizers of the October Revolution.

People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs N.P. Avilov-Glebov (1887-1942), son of a Kaluga shoemaker, "party professional" from the age of 19, graduated from a party school in Bologna. And he has behind him arrests, exile, emigration, prison universities. Least of all in his life he was interested in telegraphs.

The briefcase of the chairman for nationalities was handed over to another son of a shoemaker, an untrained seminarian, who organized the robbery of the Tiflis bank to replenish the Bolshevik cash desk, the author of heroic poems and the work "Marxism and the National Question", a wonderful, but then little known in the party Georgian I.V. Dzhughashvili-Stalin (1877-1953).

In general, all, as one, the members of the "workers' and peasants'" government were professional "revolutionaries", that is to say, "writers". None of them had other professional skills.

When appointed to public office, the main role was played by the party experience, the facts of persecution and repression by the "bloody tsarist regime" for revolutionary activities. At one time, such "prominent Bolsheviks" as V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, V.V. Kuibyshev, V.M. Molotov, M.V. Frunze, A.S. Bubnov, N.M. Bukharin, G.E. Zinoviev, L.B. Kamenev, A.I. Krinitsky, A.I. Rykov, A.I. Stetsky, S.I. Syrtsov.

Most, in addition, were arrested, were in prison, were in exile. The number of deportations and imprisonments was a matter of special pride and a clear indicator of merit.

One of the original record holders, Yakov Davidovich Drabkin (1874-1933), better known under the pseudonym of the party Sergei Ivanovich Gusev, without a doubt, was one of the most active revolutionaries. In his profile, in particular, it is indicated:

"Participated in economic strikes 53 times, political strikes - 20 times, 73 times in total; in street political demonstrations - 5 times, student movements - 1 time, underground circles - 19 times, illegal mass rallies - 75 times, Maydays - 6 times, armed uprisings and partisan demonstrations - 4 times, party conferences - 2, party congresses - 4 times. He spent 2 years 1 month in prison, 6 years 3 months in administrative exile, 1 year 6 months in political emigration. With what care everything is calculated!

First People's Commissar of Justice G.I. Lomov wrote:

"Our position was extremely difficult. There were many beautiful, highly qualified workers among us, there were many devoted revolutionaries who traveled all over Russia in all directions, passed in shackles from St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Moscow all the way of the cross to Yakutia, Verkhoyansk, but everyone had to learn how to manage the state.

Each of us could list almost all the prisons in Russia with a detailed description of the regime that exists in them. We knew where they beat, how they beat, gley how

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are put in a punishment cell, but we did not know how to govern the state and were not familiar with either banking technology or the work of ministries.

At first, it could be consoled by the fact that the first self-proclaimed Workers 'and Peasants' Government was also called Provisional. But not for long, only until the execution of peaceful demonstrations and the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918.

According to the memoirs of the old party member A.V. Shotman (1880-1939), he dissuaded Lenin from taking power, because he did not see among the Bolsheviks people capable of governing the state. But Ilyich told him:

"Nonsense! Any worker will master the ministry in a few days, no special skill is required here, and there is no need to know the technique of work, since this is the business of officials, whom we will force to work in the same way as they now force specialist workers to work.

And he appointed Shotman as Deputy People's Commissar.

Since then, this has been the custom in the Land of Soviets: it is not the place that paints the people's commissar, but the people's commissar the place. A faithful Bolshevik, invested with the confidence of the party, can lead anything, "no special skill is required here."

How could such honored fighters for the proletarian cause as the godfather of all Chekists F.E. Dzerzhinsky or shoemaker L.M. Kaganovich? And if anyone doubted the correctness of the plans and sabotaged plans, Felix Edmundovich shot those immediately, and Lazar Moiseevich (successively People's Commissar for Heavy, Fuel and Oil

industry) declared enemies of the people and handed over to the heirs of Iron Felix, that is, he also shot, but indirectly.

Was not an exception in the list of "old Bolsheviks" according to the milestones of the path traveled by V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, was carried away from the age of seventeen by the ideas of the proletarian revolution. After graduating from the cadet corps, he entered the Nikolaev military school. However, having completed the "course of a young fighter", he refused to take the oath of allegiance, citing "an organic disgust for the military." For this, Vladimir, shocked by the "insulting situation" of the barracks, was sentenced to ten days in a guardhouse, and then returned to his father. After poking around as a laborer and a coachman, a year later Antonov entered the cadet school, where he enthusiastically engaged in anti-government agitation and, in the end, was caught with subversive literature. The most remarkable thing about this story is the ending: released by an officer. He served only six months, went into an illegal position.

Further lines of the biography contain concepts common to people in his position: a circle, a military committee, agitation, illegal work, arrests, prisons, emigration, and the like. Only everything related to creative activity is missing. But a man sentenced by a royal court to death, replaced by twenty years hard labor, could not be incapable of holding the highest posts in the country: the commander of the troops of the Petrograd Military District, the troops of Ukraine and the head of the Political Directorate of the RSFSR (commander), the plenipotentiary and consul general (diplomat!), People's Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR (jurist).

One of the most prominent figures in the party - Matvey Muralov (1873-1959) - never studied anywhere, in the column "education" he wrote "self-taught". But he was endowed with the right to dispose of the destinies and lives of people. His position - a member of the Supreme Court of the USSR - demanded only one thing - to be merciless to "enemies of the revolution and the cause of the party."

Alexander Ivanovich Muralov (1886-1938) held high state and military posts. On November 23, 1917, he, an ordinary soldier of an automobile company, became

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" 13th commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District, later was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Armies, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a member of the Presidium of the State Planning Committee of the RSFSR, and so on. His main specialty is an agronomist, which he acquired at an agricultural school.

An active participant in the revolutionary movement in Russia, Valerian Kuibyshev (1888-1935) was considered one of the best prepared to occupy the highest government posts. He received his education in the cadet corps, studied for several months in the first year of the Military Medical Academy, and for several weeks at the Faculty of Law. Therefore, party comrades gave him the following description:

"Valerian Vladimirovich was one of the most educated people of his time. His economic works are still of considerable value. He was also a capable writer. He was versed in technology, medicine, natural science. He worked as chairman of the State Planning Commission, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the SSSR.

Adventure bomber L.B. Krasin (four years of exile, a year and a half of imprisonment did not prevent the "Russian student driven by fate" for thirteen years of underground activity to complete his education, get an engineering degree and a well-paid job in his specialty - all this in the conditions of an "inhuman" steam regime) managed to lead in less than six years people's commissariats of trade and industry, communications, foreign trade, at the same time being the plenipotentiary in England and France. As "piqué vests from Chernomorsk, sung by Ilf and Petrov," would say, "Krasin is the head!"

The biography of the theorist, organizer and practice of terror Martyn Latsis (Jan Sudrabs) is typical. An old Bolshevik, he conducted illegal and legal party work, had an arrest and was in tsarist exile. The lack of education was not an obstacle to occupying high party and state posts. According to Latsis, in principle, those who "can read and write" could not be "ours". In the future, the fiery Chekist did not change his views:

"The junkers, the officers of the old time, the teachers, the students and all the young students — after all, all of them, in their vast majority, are a petty-bourgeois element, and it was they who made up the combat formations of our opponents, and the White Guard regiments consisted of it."

In 1932, the retired executioner, who had a teacher's diploma, was appointed director of the Institute of National Economy named after G.V. Plekhanov.

Georgy Ippolitovich Lomov (aka Oppokov) also got used to the taste of leading people. Having surpassed the subtleties of justice, he switched to economic work and headed the State Planning Commission. Only Skvortsov-Stepanov, perhaps the only one who refused to mind his own business, cited his incompetence in financial matters. Undoubtedly, the reason for this was his excessive education. Well, even among the Bolsheviks there were sometimes their own "white crows".

There are two classes outside the law in a normal state:

Criminal and ruling.

During the revolutions

They change places -

In essence, there is no difference.

However, they were not going to manage anything, they did not plan to build anything, and they did not want to learn anything. After the conquest of Russia, another cherished goal burned the soul - to free the rest of the proletariat from the oppression of capital. Chief among all programs was Lenin's "Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution": by capturing

What is Russia! Russia is just a springboard for conquering the world, or at least the Eurasian continent. As befits an "incomparable genius," Ilyich thought big: "I don't give a damn about Russia. I am a Bolshevik." I really wanted to bring happiness to all working people on bayonets, to give the land in Grenada to the peasants, to wash galoshes in the Indian Ocean.

Thus, from the very beginning, the Bolsheviks declared war on the whole world of "unbridled imperialism." And in the first years of the existence of Soviet power, its main goal was to advance the revolution to the West and East, to create a World Republic of Soviets. All the riches of the completely plundered country were thrown to inflate chaos in war-torn Europe. Streams of gold and weapons went through the Bolshevik emissaries to Germany, Hungary, Austria, Finland, Sweden.

On October 1, 1918, Lenin demanded that Trotsky and Sverdlov create an army of 3 million by spring to "assist the international workers' revolution." And therefore - to rake out ten times more grain from the Russian peasants, "clear all the stocks both for us and for the German workers" (note that before that we had been raking bread for ourselves and for the Kaiser for half a year), increase the conscription tenfold, spare no money: "Do not save. Spend millions, many millions."

In March 1919, at the initiative of the Leader, the Comintern was created - the headquarters of the world revolution, a subversive organization with practically unlimited financial resources. Well, post-war hardships, the pathogenicity of the bacillus of Bolshevism spread in a favorable environment, weapons and money allocated without an account did their job. In the spring of 1919, the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet Republics arose. Here it is, the "global fire", rejoiced in the Kremlin. After all, Germany, with its mighty industry and organized proletariat, was considered the most "suitable" country for Marxist experiments.

Trotsky dreamed aloud: "Soviet Germany, united with Soviet Russia, would immediately be stronger than all the capitalist states put together!"

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern G.E. Zinoviev (1883-1936) announced in print that literally in a year all of Europe would be communist:

"The struggle for communism will already be transferred to America, and perhaps to Asia, and to other parts of the world" (from numerous statements it is clear what the process of "building communism" consisted of: and where the Bolsheviks are in power, there is communism. Than not Chevengur?)

The Red Army, having barely established Soviet power in Ukraine, made the first attempt to break into Europe through Galicia and Bessarabia, but was first detained by the Poles and the Grigoriev rebellion, and then defeated by the troops of Anton Ivanovich Denikin (1872-1947). Without waiting for help from "Red Russia", the Bavarian and Hungarian republics fell under the blows of "reaction". The failed leader of the Red Magyars Bela Kun (1886-1939) surfaced in Moscow and became famous in 1920 for his savage reprisals against Russian officers and the "hostile population" in the Crimea. Bolsheviks seated in the prisons of the people's commissars of Soviet Hungary

exchanged for captured Hungarian officers.

The "military program" gave the first failure. In Russia itself, a civil war flared up in full force, the people had already drunk enough of the "proletarian dictatorship". Ilyich and his party comrades had to put aside global plans for a while and get down to work on "cleansing the Russian land from all kinds of harmful insects." Europe

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at that time, it developed immunity and fenced off from the infected Soviet of Deputies with a cordon sanitaire of national states that arose in Eastern Europe under the Treaty of Versailles. *

* Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Polysa, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, plus Romania, which became independent

much earlier.

In the summer of 1920, a new attempt was made to convey to the Germans, French and British the "red rule of the Bolsheviks" - through the "white Polysa group". The war with the notorious "White Poles" in Moscow was declared "the most just that history has ever known."

In July, the troops of the Western Front reached the Vistula and bypassed Varptava from the north. The future government of the "socialist Polyp" rode in the wagon train: Julian Markhlevsky (1866-1925), Felix Dzerzhinsky (1877-1926), Felix Kohn (1864-1941), Edvard Prukhnjak (1888-1937), Joseph Unshlikht (1879-1938). Moscow printing houses urgently replicated their portraits with biographies in Polish. The issue of Sovietization of Polyp seemed to Lenin already resolved and not the most important. These days he telegraphed to Stalin:

"Zinoviev, Kamenev, and also I think that the revolution should be encouraged at once in Italy. My personal opinion is that for this it is necessary to Sovietize Hungary, as well as the Czech Republic and Romania.

With each new verst, once under the red boot, appetites grew a thousandfold, breathtaking prospects struck in the head. The Second Congress of the Comintern formulated the minimum program as follows:

"The Red Army, the main weapon of the working class, must be prepared in such a way as to fulfill its offensive mission on any sector of the front. The boundaries of this front in the near future are determined by the boundaries of the entire continent of the Old World.

However, this campaign failed miserably.

Firstly, due to the arrogance of the front commander M.N. Tukhachevsky

(1893-1937), who believed that in war "revolutionary courage and energy dominate everything else."

Secondly, Europe did not wait indifferently to be made happy, and, having "mobilized all the black forces", provided the Polish political leader Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935) with all possible material and military assistance.

Thirdly, the Polish "proletarians" did not recognize brothers in class. "The revolutionary committees of the Volga and Don divisions proclaimed Soviet power in Russian and in jargon. For the majority of Poles, the question looked simple: first Polsh, and then we'll see which one," recalls a participant in the events.

On August 14, 1920, the Poles suddenly (who would have thought that they were capable of such a thing!), launched a counteroffensive, which led to a crushing defeat of the entire Western Front. Those of the liberators who were not taken prisoner had to run 800 kilometers, all the way to Minsk. The cavalry corps of Gai Dmitrievich Gai (BZhishkyan; 1887-1937), which broke into Germany, was disarmed there.

The Moscow Sovietizers had to wash themselves with blood, sign a peace treaty with the Poles, declare themselves the winners of the next "Entente campaign", and pay "defeated" Poland 5 million gold rubles indemnity.

Moreover, at the same time, the White Guard left the Crimea for the last battle.

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"black baron" Wrangel, uprisings broke out in Kronstadt, the main base of the Baltic Fleet, and in the Tambov region.

The "Izvestia" of the insurgent Kronstadt in March 1921 indicated that the power in Russia was seized by adventurers who were ready to ruin the country with the entire population for the sake of abstract ideas:

"On the bitter experience of the three years of communist rule, we have seen what the party dictatorship leads to. A number of Party generals immediately crawl onto the scene, confident in their infallibility and not squeamish about any means to put their program into practice, no matter how it diverges from the interests of the working masses. These generals are inevitably followed by a pack of adjoining henchmen who have nothing in common not only with the people, but with the party itself. A class of parasites is being created, living at the expense of the masses, concerned about their own well-being, or those who provide them with a secure life.

And no matter what party is in power, it will not escape the role of a dictator, because, no matter how extremely socialist it is, they will have program and tactical points worked out not by life, but created within the walls of their offices.

But neither the "counter-revolutionary rebellions" nor the famine that broke out in Russia had any effect on the "program points" of the Leninists. Sailors and peasants were demonstratively cruelly brought to submission with the help of artillery pieces,

machine guns, armored trains, airplanes, poisonous gases and concentration camps.

And hunger in general turned out to be very useful. Under the pretext of fighting him, it was possible "with ruthless determination" to carry out an action to confiscate church valuables and at the same time shoot a fair number of "representatives of the Black Hundred clergy." The gigantic wealth of monasteries and laurels, estimated at several hundred million rubles, had long been a dream of Ilyich. Lenin was delighted with the "combination": "A wonderful thing is revolutionary violence and dictatorship, if they are used, when they should be and against whom they should be."

True, they did not buy a crumb of bread, not a gram of flour with this money. They bought 60,000 sets of leather uniforms for the valiant security officers from the bourgeoisie, supplied the askers of the Turkish general Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) with weapons and gold bars, paid for the installation of a monument to Marx in the center of London, and thought hard about the issues of helping India with gold and rifles.

In 1922, an even more terrible famine and cholera epidemic reigned in the country. Reports of the OGPU reported. In the Samara province "... Starvation is observed, corpses are dragged from the cemetery for food. It is observed that children are not carried to the cemetery, leaving for food. According to the Tyumen province: "in Ishim district, out of 500,000 inhabitants, 265 thousand are starving ... Cases of starvation are becoming more frequent" ...

Lenin, who had already begun to be tormented by "kondrashki", at that time was treated by starvation, declaring to the doctors "that he would never eat caviar again." The budget of the Comintern in 1922 amounted to over three million rubles. The cynical rhetoric Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin (1888-1938) later recalled with pleasure: "We ripped off the church like sticky, and we carry out our world propaganda on its "holy values", without giving a single shish of them to the starving."

In 1923, the Soviet leadership allocated 300 million gold rubles for the implementation of the "German October". Suitcases with currency and "diamonds for the dictatorship of the proletariat" went to the crisis-shaken Weimar Republic (inflation in the country robbed by the victors reached such a height that a wheelbarrow of German marks was required to buy a loaf of bread).

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EL left for illegal work in Western Europe. Pyatakov, K.B. Radek, V.V. Schmidt and other prominent figures of the party, students of the Military Academy of the Red Army, Chekists. They formed the "Red Hundreds", wrote instructions for the "All-German Cheka", distributed weapons and money to the communists, fascists, anarchists, national socialists.

Today, "fascist" and "Nazi" are abusive words, but at that time Lenin was very impressed with the energy and fighting enthusiasm of the former socialist Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), who created the fascist party in Italy in 1919.

N.I. Bukharin did not see much difference between the fascists and the Bolsheviks. Fascism, in the opinion of the "most valuable and leading theoretician" of the party, "is

full application of Bolshevik practice and especially Russian Bolshevism: in the sense of a quick gathering of forces, energetic action of a very tightly knit military organization ... and merciless destruction of the enemy when necessary and when circumstances call for it.

The meaning is clear: both are bandits of the same kind. Well, he, the theorist, knows better.

Funds were spent generously and uncontrollably, plundered by the millions. The apotheosis of violent subversive activity was to be the uprising in Berlin on November 7, 1923, on the day of the sixth anniversary of October, and the "direct assistance of the proletarian dictatorship" to the German and Italian revolutions. By order of Trotsky, cavalry corps began to advance to the western borders of the USSR.

True, the pragmatic Stalin was skeptical about the project: "If now the power in Germany, so to speak, falls, and the communists pick it up, they will fail miserably. This is "at best". And in the worst case, they will be smashed to smithereens and thrown back."

But the head of the EE Comintern was completely delighted. Zinoviev: "The crisis in Germany is growing very rapidly. A new chapter of the German revolution begins. This will soon pose grandiose tasks for us ... I am convinced that soon we will have to make decisions of a world-historical nature.

An, it didn't break off this time either. For some reason, the working class of Germany did not support the communists; there were no large-scale battles. Government troops under the leadership of General von Seeckt, who received dictatorial powers, quickly dispersed the "workers' governments" of Saxony and Thuringia, "drowned in blood" the armed uprising of the Red Army soldiers of Telman in Hamburg, and at the same time the "beer putsch" of the Nazis Adolf Hitler in Munich. Another adventure failed. Like the armed uprising of the "proletarians" in the same year in Bulgaria.

The attempted coup d'etat in Estonia in November 1924, which was supposed to end with the proclamation of a "revolutionary government" and the invitation of the regular units of the Red Army "to help", also failed.

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So, Europe resisted the invasion of the "red locust". The Bolsheviks had to take a peaceful respite. In the autumn of 1923, a global, almost tenfold, reduction of the Red Army began, its transfer to the militia-territorial principle.

Lenin, "the mountain eagle of our party", by this time already led a vegetative existence, and on January 21, 1924, he passed away. To bury it in the ground, according to Zinoviev, "would be too unbearable." Therefore, Ilyich

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were embalmed and a personal pyramid was taken to the incorruptible body on Red Square. Petrograd - "the cradle of the revolution" - was renamed Leningrad.

I.S. Stalin. He was one of the first to understand that there had been a rollback of the "revolutionary wave" and it was time to somehow settle in the existing territory. Russia, squeezed dry, lay in ruin and desolation. The economy collapsed, industry did not exist, transport was paralyzed, the small proletariat was almost destroyed. Commodity relations existed only in the form of natural exchange. In the battles of the Civil War, from hunger, disease and terror, according to various estimates, from 8 (the official figure of the Soviet era) to 15 million people perished, for example, the population of Moscow decreased by half.

Crazy money, generously thrown into the furnace of a revolutionary steam locomotive, also ended. "In order to win the Civil War, we robbed Russia," Trotsky let out frankly.

And there was no army. A special commission of the Central Committee, having studied the state of affairs in the Red Army, at the beginning of 1924 issued a verdict: "We do not currently have the Red Army as organized, trained, politically educated and provided with reserves of power."

We have arrived... There is a stop in the Commune.

To begin with, it was necessary to restore at least some semblance of a normal life, to provide for the simplest human needs, primarily physiological ones. People wanted to eat, walk around dressed and shod, have a roof over their heads. How to do all this, none of the fiery revolutionaries knew and had never been interested in such base questions before.

Therefore, back in 1921, the Bolsheviks, with gnashing of teeth, were forced to trumpet a "temporary retreat": to announce a new economic policy (NEP); unravel the "residual classes"—the petty and middle bourgeoisie, private property and wage labor; abolish the surplus appropriation, set a course for a "link" between the city and the countryside; reanimate the market so that the people, while the authorities are engaged in the creation of "distribution and supply apparatuses", feed themselves.

As Stalin explained, it would be foolish to shoulder "the incredible burden of finding a job and providing the means of subsistence for the artificially created millions of new unemployed. The NEP, by the way, is good because it saves the proletarian dictatorship from such and similar difficulties.

In the RCP(b) itself, meanwhile, a struggle was unfolding for the Supreme Chair in the pyramid of red dictators, which, from the first days of the revolution, Usoppiy Vozhd had lovingly rebuilt for himself. Strengthening the machine of unquestioning obedience, he managed to pass at the Tenth Party Congress, held in March 1921, a resolution on the prohibition of all factionalism and the dissolution of all groups formed on any but the Bolshevik platform. This resolution

marked a natural transition from "mercilessly decisive and draconian measures to increase self-discipline and discipline of workers and peasants" to the application of such measures to party members.

Without Lenin, of course, it was necessary to rally even stronger. And most importantly, do not break the "machine" itself, all members of the Politburo were united on this issue. So, Trotsky represented the party as a kind of communist samurai clan.

Stalin wrote about "a kind of order of the sword-bearers", welded together by a single will and unparalleled iron discipline: "The Party is the unity of will, excluding

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any factionalism and breakdown of power in the party. There were just enough people who wanted to become a "grand master". The "chapter" consists entirely of authoritative leaders, the old party guard:

Vozhl October, founder of the Red Army, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, People's Commissar of Communications, incendiary speaker and heroic hero Comrade Lev Davidovich Trotsky (Bronstein).

The leader of the Comintern and the Leningrad party organization, who shared a bed with Lenin in a sacred hut in Razliv, Comrade Grigory Evseevich Zinoviev (Radlomyslsky).

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the RSFSR, the first after Lenin, Comrade Alexei Ivanovich Rykov.

Chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense, Comrade Lev Borisovich Kamenev (Rozenfeld), associate of Ilyich, keeper of his personal archive.

The leader of the trade unions, Comrade Mikhail Pavlovich Tomsky (Efremov), a seasoned underground worker, ten years of suffering for the cause of the proletariat in prisons and exiles (of which five years of hard labor, is it really just "for belonging to a party"? Or maybe for a banal "wet"?).

The favorite of the party and also a leader, Comrade Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin. As a child, this child prodigy imagined himself to be the Antichrist and interrogated his mother - "a very intelligent woman, extremely honest, hardworking, doting in children and highly virtuous - if she was a harlot, which, of course, plunged her into the greatest embarrassment."

Through stubborn self-education, "working hard in libraries," Kolya Balabolkin grew into a ba-a-a-lysh theorist and began to utter the most important truths: "Proletarian coercion in all its forms, from executions to labor service ... is a method of developing communist humanity from the human material of the capitalist era.

Or a member of the Central Committee, reformed from an anarchist into an orthodox Bolshevik, GL. Pyatakov, who even frightened Lenin with his "outstanding will and outstanding abilities." It was Georgy Leonidovich who came up with the universal Bolshevik key for solving any problems:

"When thought clings to violence, fundamentally and psychologically free, not bound by any laws, restrictions, obstacles, then the area of possible action is spread to gigantic proportions, and the area of the impossible is compressed to extreme limits, It drops to zero. The boundless crushing of the possible, the transformation of what is considered impossible into the possible, is what characterizes the Bolshevik Communist Party. This is the true spirit of Bolshevism. This is the feature that most profoundly distinguishes our party from all others, making it a party of "miracles".

Just some kind of superman! Well, his bloody path of lawlessness eventually ended with a "wall", but the epitaph in current encyclopedias touches: "Unreasonably repressed."

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Streets and walls were plastered with their portraits, calendars were decorated with photographs of "creators and leaders", cities were named after them. New geographical names appeared on the map of the USSR - Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev.

The candidacy of the "gray mediocrity", the narrow-minded provincial, the "dropped-out seminarian" Stalin, is not theoretically

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who became famous, commanding him only the Secretariat as a contender for the post of Grand Master, was not listed among the "marshals of Ilyich".

Lev Davidovich argued: "His past activities remained virtually unknown not only to the masses, but also to the party. No one knew what Stalin said and did until 1917 and even until 23-24... Zinoviev treated Stalin cautiously and patronizingly. Kamenev - a little ironically."

Kamenev considered the general secretary "a leader of the county scale." Bukharin nodded condescendingly: "Nothing, we need such people, and if he is ignorant and uncultured," then "we will help him."

They, having forced Stalin to the post of General Secretary and fiercely opposed Lenin's recommendation to select a more tolerant comrade, were going to use him, a "figure of the second or third plan", as an ally in the fight against the undoubted "prince" Trotsky.

Meanwhile, Koba - a true conspirator, an underground practitioner - "bred" these fiery tribunes like boys. He had already concentrated immense power in his hands, but they did not understand this and the warnings of their own Leader

did not heed. He set up cadres, the very ones who, as you know, decide everything, and they were ornate at the meetings and flaunted in the presidiums, thinking that the "pashychnik" was doing their dirty work for them. They believed in the power of their great ideas and their inflated authority. Stalin, on the other hand, understood the power of the bureaucratic apparatus, which allowed, legally, quite democratically, by means of a well-prepared vote (Lenin masterfully mastered this technique, and Iosif Vissarionovich knew how to learn) to make the necessary decisions, which turned into an indestructible law by virtue of party discipline. When the leaders of the "planetary scale" realized their mistake, it was already too late.

But first, the "ruling troika" - Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin - in FULL agreement did one common thing: to get out of the saddle of Leon Trotsky. Nothing personal, solely for the sake of party unity. The method chosen was the simplest. All the theoretical views, ideas, statements of the "demon of the revolution" were declared "Trotskyism", everything that he proposed was anti-Party sedition, all his supporters were "Grotskyites". Of course, Trotskyism was in "irreconcilable contradiction" with Leninism, was a "bias to the side."

True, if you carefully reread the "three features of Trotskyism", it is clearly seen that Trotsky's main heresy is his claims to primacy, "distrust of the leaders of Bolshevism, an attempt to debunk them", otherwise there is no difference.

In the campaign organized against him, Trotsky was losing on points. The ideologist of the permanent revolution was bored with the apparatus fuss. He was not interested in building something there in a single country, he wanted great achievements, grandiose tragic roles on the historical stage. He lived in the past. His ideological comrades-in-arms were just as unsuitable for peaceful life, they were disgusted with everyday systematic work. One of them complained about life: "instead of preparing a secret revolutionary struggle, I found myself busy preparing a consular career ... Instead of being an agitator or organizer of an uprising, I will be an official." This is the tragedy of the "world conflagration" fanatics!

And just recently they knew other, glorious times. For example, in 1919, the Bolshevik emissary "Gomas" (aka J.S. Reich) was going to war for the happiness of the German proletariat: "Lenin's instructions were brief: "Take more money, send reports and, if possible, newspapers, but in general do what the situation will show.

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Then the Leninist banker Yakov Ganetsky (Fürstenberg) "gave out 1 million rubles in German and Swedish currency and took me to the pantry of the secret party cash desk ... Gold and jewelry lay everywhere: precious stones taken out of the frame lay in heaps on the shelves, someone then obviously tried to sort, and gave up. Ganetsky circled the lantern around and, smiling, said, "choose!"... He piled a full suitcase with stones, but he didn't take gold: it's cumbersome. I didn't get any receipts for stones - for the currency, of course, I issued a receipt "(However, Comrade Thomas stole millions of the currency issued against receipts).

Now, instead of engaging in subversive activities, leading the masses behind them, burning people's hearts with the verb, overthrowing oppressors, destroying thrones, expropriating other people's property, not thinking about their daily bread, a cohort of romantics of the revolution was invited to go to work everyday and work off their salaries. It is not surprising that the return to normal life, concern for the interests of only the USSR, when the bourgeoisie still rules around, was presented to them as reaction, Thermidor. *

* Ernesto Che Guevara (1928-1967), who was bored with liberated from the dictatorship of Batista

Cuba, leaving all his ministerial portfolios and laying down his head in the fight against imperialism in the jungles of Bolivia.

In addition, "in any political struggle of a large scale, one can, in the end, open the question of a steak. The prospect of "permanent revolution" was opposed by the new party bureaucracy with the prospect of personal well-being. So they fought for this, for a better life! That's why they took power. The revolution has won, it's time to share material wealth.

The degree of access to them directly depended on the position held, place in the party hierarchy, and career success. At the same time, local power from emergency wartime bodies passed into the hands of the first party secretaries. And Comrade Stalin was in charge of their appointment. He became their leader, painstakingly, with the help of V.M. Molotov and L.M. Kaganovich, building his pyramid of power, carefully selecting and placing people personally devoted to him who do not claim political leadership. Functionaries. Nomenclature. They, like the bulk of the Bolsheviks, did not care deeply about the oppressed of all countries without exception.

There were many people devoted to Stalin. Trotsky denounced them furiously: "It was a devotion of a special kind. Not the loyalty of the students to the teacher who enriched their thoughts, but the loyalty of the people whom the leader brought out of insignificance and whom he helps to secure a privileged position.

Either Lev Davidovich really was so naive, or he was pretending. Those who did not have enough steak joined the Trotskyists: the offended "heroes" of the Civil War, the commissars of the volost councils of people's commissars pushed aside from the helm, the chairmen of the fake republics, the revolutionary committees, the Chechens, other "red dictators" who tasted "joy" under the crunch of "breaking lives and bones". The offended fighters, who received a donut hole as a reward for "their selfless devotion", demanded the continuation of the revolution, accused the party elite of rebirth.

Trotsky tried to act under the banner of a fighter for inner-party democracy, against the ban on factional struggle of opinions. He argued that factionalism is inevitably connected with the life and development of the party. He was beaten by the resolution of the 10th Congress, accusations of Bonapartism, decisions of the plenums, where the decisive votes belonged to the cadres placed by Stalin and Molotov. And the "iron commissar" himself was well aware that Marx's socialism is a totalitarian system, and the party bureaucracy is its main support, and the mythical "proletarian dictatorship" is only a slogan that allows

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to justify violence and terror so dear to the heart of the Marxists, unrestricted by any laws.

The leader and teacher Ulyanov-Lenin wrote: "Without the "apparatus", we would have perished long ago. Without a systematic and stubborn struggle to improve the apparatus, we will perish before the foundation of socialism is created. His faithful disciple Stalin, in his article "On the Discussion," quite reasonably pointed out that all the cries of the opposition about democracy are only the desire of the party nobles, who have become corrupted and moved away from the trough, to regain their former influence:

"In the ranks of the opposition there are such as Beloborodoye, whose "democratism" is still remembered by the Rostov workers; Rozengolts, whose "democratism" did not fare well with our watermen and railroad workers; Pyatakov, from whose "democratism" the whole Donbass did not shout, but howled; Alsky, whose "democracy" is known to all; The bull, from whose "democratism" Khorezm still howls. Does Sapronov think that if the current "party pedants" are replaced by the "respected comrades" named above, democracy within the party will triumph? Let me be allowed to doubt it a little."

Stalin took an advantageous position: he was for collegiate leadership, he was a fighter against Trotsky's "personality cult". He spoke from the podium: "Is there a Central Committee whose unanimous decisions are respected by the members of this Central Committee, or is there only a superman standing above the Central Committee, a superman for whom laws are not written?" He demanded that personal ambitions be subordinated to common interests: "Trotsky did not understand that the party has grown a sense of strength and dignity, that the party feels like a master and it requires us to be able to bow our heads to it when the situation requires it."

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Of particular importance in this battle was the struggle for the armed forces, where Trotsky enjoyed great prestige. Most of the key positions in the central military institutions were occupied by people who were nominated by him during the Civil War and who were personally devoted to him. In all the barracks, Red Army clubs, red corners, banners and posters were hung, where Trotsky was called the leader and leader of the Red Army. At meetings of military personnel, he was elected in absentia to the honorary presidium, enrolled in the lists of units as an honorary soldier of the Red Army or Red Navy, adopted resolutions and toasts were sent to him, his biography and military victories were studied at

political pursuits.

The leadership of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was entirely for Trotsky and did not hide the fact that the army had its own opinion on internal party squabbles. Thus, Antonov-Ovseenko, head of the Political Directorate of the RVSR, the hero of October, who led the assault on the Winter Palace and the arrest of the Provisional Government, at the end of December 1923, on behalf of "comrades working in the army," sent a threatening letter to the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and the Politburo of the Central Committee, in which he warned that the military can "find a voice and call to order the" drunken leaders ":

"There is already talk among the military communists that it is necessary to support Comrade Trotsky by everyone, as one ... Instead of a serious analysis of serious issues, the Party and the whole country are fed with personal attacks, suspicions, bilious slander, and this is elevated into a system, as if this is what the widely proclaimed new course consists of... I know that this warning voice of mine will not make the slightest impression on those who are frozen in the consciousness of their infallibility by the history of selected leaders. But know that this voice is symptomatic. He expresses the indignation of those who throughout their lives have proved their selfless devotion to the party as a whole, to the interests of the communist revolution.

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The response was immediate. Urgently convened on January 12, 1924, the party Plenum recognized "this work of the opposition in the Red Army as especially dangerous, since this work creates a hostile mood among a part of the military communists against the leading body of the party - the Central Committee." Following this HI! The All-Union Party Conference demanded that party work be intensified in the army, and "for attempts to conduct factional work in the ranks of the Red Army ... punish especially severely." Zinoviev, who fell into hysterics, demanded the immediate arrest of Trotsky. However, such actions were fraught with dangerous consequences, and Lev Davidovich did not make sudden movements, laid to bed with "cryptogenic fever."

The February Plenum of the Central Committee noted "the presence in the army of serious shortcomings that threaten the army with collapse," and set the task of improving and strengthening the Armed Forces. Already on March 2, Antonov-Ovseenko, as a factionalist undermining the authority of the Central Committee in the army, was removed, and his place was taken by the head of the Agitprop (department of agitation and propaganda) A.S. Bubnov (from the old guard, by profession, it's easy to guess - a writer; the list of his merits in the fight against tsarism includes 13 arrests and 4 years in prison; after the revolution he established Soviet power in Ukraine, he received the Order of the Red Banner "for personal courage and mobilization of fighters for purification Kronstadt from counter-revolutionary gangs").

Andrei Sergeevich was known for the fact that he repeatedly participated in various opposition groups and factions, for which at one time a commissar in the North Caucasus Military District was removed from the candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the PKK. But few people knew that Bubnov (not a Stalinist, but rather a Bukharinite) was a fierce opponent of Trotsky, which is why in May 1922 Stalin dragged Bubeshka, who had outlived his erroneous views, from Rostov to Moscow and provided responsible

post.

On March 11, 1924, the permanent deputy people's commissar and deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, failed physician Efraim Markovich Sklyansky (1892-1925) was dismissed. He was accused of not coping with their official duties and not engaging in systematic military work. The reason was the report of the SI Gusev commission on the results of the check of the Red Army, which came to the conclusion that the army was not combat-ready.

M.F. was appointed to the vacant positions. Frunze is a creature of Zinoviev. Soon Mikhail Vasilievich combined two more responsible posts - head

headquarters of the Red Army and the head of the Military Academy of the Red Army. A new composition of the Revolutionary Military Council was formed. Trotsky remained chairman for the time being, but the council turned out to be significantly "improved" by his opponents: SM. Budyonny, K.E. Voroptilov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, S.S. Kamenev, M.M. Latevich, M.N. Tukhachevsky.

In April, Chekist I.S. Unshlikht headed the Office of the Chief of Supplies of the Red Army. In May, the convinced Trotskyist N.I. Muralov was replaced by Voroshilov as commander of the Moscow Military District. The commission, chaired by Bubnov, purged the teaching staff of the academies and dismissed 199 "elements alien to Soviet power or lacking a sufficient professional level."

At the 10th All-Crimean Regional Party Conference, the new head of the PUR demonstrated that he had firmly returned "to Lenin's positions" and justified his trust. Criticizing the compromise solution of the Crimean Communists, who considered the anti-Trotskyist campaign to be internal Moscow affairs, Bubnov declared: "You justified the opposition and accused the leading comrades, that is, the main group of the Central Committee of the party ... Trotskyism must be beaten mercilessly and directly."

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At the same time, the ruling troika cut military spending. The army was literally begging. The Revolutionary Military Council reported that "the appropriations made for the army for February and March put the army in a completely difficult situation, worsening its current situation even more." In response, the government expressed its intention to further reduce the military budget, even "due to a significant reduction in the combat capability of the Red Army during the summer period."

In August, the Revolutionary Military Council adopted a special resolution stating that a reduction in the estimate to 380 million rubles would inevitably lead to a reduction in the size of the army, and "an army of such a size, i.e. amputated by 1/3, in no case can it meet the tasks of defense, bearing in mind the real forces of possible enemies. The government replied that "the matter is not in the order of issuing appropriations and not in the lack of loans, but in the organizational side of the matter, in defects of an organizational nature." Like, you don't know how to run a business. The 610,000-strong armed forces had to be reduced by another 50,000 people.

All this was done despite the fact that the NEP made it possible to restore the country's economic potential to a large extent, and 1924 turned out to be very successful in this sense. That is, the collapse of the army in the conditions of economic growth was dictated solely by the logic of the inner-party struggle. Immediately after the elimination of Trotsky, money for the army was found.

Work to oust Trotsky's supporters from the military department took on a mass character in the course of one of the main measures of the military reform - the introduction of one-man command. A number of prominent commanders - Fedko, Fabricius, Latsis, Dybenko, Yakir, Vostretsov ... - suddenly turned to the Central Committee of the party with a memorandum "On the results of the construction of the Red Army on the 6th anniversary of its existence." In it, they argued that a sufficient number of commanders devoted to Soviet power had grown up in the troops, capable of doing without the guardianship of commissars, who turned into a brake on military development and were mainly engaged in squabbles and denunciations. Well, writing denunciations is the most

a direct commissar's duty, but they decided to slightly limit their powers of authority.

Stalin forwarded the letter to Bubnov. The subtlety of the moment was that literally a year before that, it was Andrei Sergeevich who fundamentally objected to the order of the Revolutionary Military Council No. 511, which allowed the absence of a commissar even with a non-party boss and thereby "unjustifiably narrowed the role of commissars in the Red Army." The Party then had to correct Comrade Trotsky's premature initiative. Now, however, it's a completely different matter!

After thinking, Bubnov proposed not to force the introduction of unity of command, but to stretch the process in time, not to give all commanders indiscriminate trust, but to approach each individually, depending on the level of training. At the same time recertify the entire command and political staff. And at the same time, as it turned out, and recalculate, since the Headquarters of the Red Army did not have generalized information about the number of commanders, as well as a system for accounting for personnel in the army.

In June 1924, a commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on military issues was created under the chairmanship of Bubnov. Within the framework of the commission, a special subcommittee was formed, endowed with exclusive powers to verify the business, professional qualities and political views of the entire commanding staff. The members of the commission determined the suitability of each commander and commissar for the role of a one-man commander based on two criteria: belonging to the Bolshevik Party and the ability to carry out educational work among subordinates. It is clear that Trotsky's supporters could not in any way be "skillful conductors of the party's policy."

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In December 1924, the plenum of the Revolutionary Military Council approved the instructions presented by Bubnov on the practical implementation of unity of command and entrusted its implementation to the Political Directorate of the Red Army. The instruction recommended considering the introduction of unity of command not as the elimination of the political composition, but as a way of combining the functions of party leadership, political education and military training in one person. Simply put, each commander had to become, first of all, a commissar. The second option is to make a commissar and make a commander.

Therefore, the plenum adopted a resolution in which it was noted that unity of command must be introduced in two forms. Complete unity of command was assumed when the commander was a member of the party and was invested with its confidence. Under such a commander, a deputy for political affairs was appointed. Incomplete unity of command was introduced when the commander was non-partisan or deemed "insufficiently trained" politically. In this case, a pure-blooded commissar remained with him. On May 6, 1925, the Central Committee adopted a resolution "On unity of command in the Red Army", which approved the work done in this direction and gave directive instructions on a gradual transition to single command, without reducing the role of the political composition.

Bubnov pointed out: "One should not think that, by nominating candidates for responsible positions as one-man commanders, we aim at such a valuable institution as the commissar staff of our army. After all, in the army

there remains a huge percentage of non-Party commanders. With full confidence in him, we, nevertheless, cannot allow the transfer of leadership of political work to him, and even more so of party work ... The great army of political commissars must be preserved and strengthened. And at the same time - to steadily increase the party stratum among the commanding staff. The Bubnovsky five-year plan provided for 100% membership in the party of commanders of regiments, divisions and corps and at least 60% of commanders of battalions and companies.

The introduction of unity of command while maintaining the "great army of political officers" gave the party apparatus, headed by the secretary general, unlimited possibilities for appointing, moving and dismissing the commanding staff of the army and navy (they worked thoughtfully, even at the end of 1928, half of the commanders were still "incomplete" one-man commanders), which ultimately ensured Stalin a complete victory in the struggle for the army.

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It must be said that after the Civil War, Lev Davidovich weakened in body and soul in an atmosphere of "ideological settledness", often fell ill, avoided party Sabbaths and public discussions, only occasionally wrote letters to the Central Committee, published articles in Pravda and, relaxing in resorts, "With all his being he assimilated the confidence in his historical rightness."

In the autumn of 1924, the people's commissar came out with a large article "Lessons of October", in which he blamed Zinoviev and Kamenev for their old sins, recalled his own merits in organizing the October Revolution, tried to present himself as Lenin's only and natural successor. It is not difficult to foresee the reaction of the supporters of the troika: each wrote an article, where Trotsky's behavior was no longer called factional, but anti-party. And in general, it turned out that not only was Lev Davidovich not an outstanding figure in the Russian revolution, but, on the contrary, all his conscious life he did nothing but harm Lenin and Leninism.

Pirate work unfolded to debunk the imaginary merits of the "leader of the Red Army", to oust the commanding staff and the Red Army from the minds

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ideas about Trotsky as an outstanding military leader. In November 1924, a meeting of the heads of political agencies chaired by Bubnov adopted a resolution demanding that the already approved topics of political studies be changed. Instead of memorizing slogans like "the leader of the Red Army, comrade. Trotsky," the new program of political education ordered to study the activities of the Bolshevik Party as the organizer and inspirer of all victories, including in the struggle against Trotskyism, this variety of Menshevism. From the barracks they began to take out portraits of the "idol of the Red Army."

At the top of its voice, hiding nothing, the party pointed to the true creator and immediate leader of the Red Army - Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Say, it was his brilliant head, and not at all some Trotsky, who created plans for the defeat of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and other Yudenichs, commanders of the fronts drew inspiration from his valuable instructions.

A whole Institute of His Name began work on the collection Lenin and the Red Army. And here Bubnov showed ingenuity and quickness: he managed to remove Lev Kamenev, a member of the Politburo, the founder and director of that very institute, from participating in editing the book: "People who are prone to perverting Leninism, A.S. Bubnov was afraid to entrust the publication of the leader's works.

As evidence of the outstanding military-theoretical knowledge of the "genius strategist and tactician", Lenin's extracts from Clausewitz's writings, statements and directives were rewritten (by the same tireless Bubnov) and published, playing a "decisive role in the defense of the Soviet Republic".

Lenin's thoughtfulness on a military theme was replicated and extolled: "an armed insurrection is a special kind of political struggle, subject to special laws, which must be carefully considered..." Soviet Republic!

In all companies and subdivisions equal to them, the red corners were renamed Leninsky, all the barracks and parade grounds were decorated with a memorable slogan for every serviceman: "Learn military affairs in a real way."

The most faithful student recited almost in rhyme: "Remember, love, study Ilyich, our teacher, our leader.

Fight and defeat enemies, internal and external - according to Ilyich.

But everyone was surpassed by the former manager of the Council of People's Commissars, pushed to

"scientific work", V.D. Bonch-Bruевич (1873-1955):

"Where he walks, everything is spiritualized with new life, winter gives way to spring, ice covers melt, snow irrigates the ground, and beautiful, fragrant flowers grow and bloom under his feet, and his path is framed by blooming broad-leaved lilies."

The new instructions required intensifying work to explain the merits of the life-giving fragrant Ilyich in the victory of October and the history of his principled struggle against Trotskyism: "The Party will not allow anyone to distort the precepts of Lenin!" From the "demon of the revolution" Trotsky's "Jew" was inspiredly molded.

The object of persecution, surrounded on all sides, no longer entered into controversy, on January 15, 1925 he wrote a statement asking "in the interests of the cause" to quickly remove from

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the post of people's commissar, expressing his readiness to work "where the party sends", and continued to nurture his favorite fever. Well, well, Stalin threw up his hands: "If, after each attack by Trotsky on the party, he begins to throw himself into a fever, then the party is not to blame." Let's take note of the statement.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), assembled two days later, in response to the numerous demands of senior political workers and military party organizations, it was decided to release the "revisionist" Trotsky from the duties of chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. On January 26, by a decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Frunze was appointed to these positions, Voroshilov became his deputy. They did not forget Muralov, who commanded the troops of the North Caucasian District: he was recalled to the capital and given a sham position - for "especially important" assignments at the Revolutionary Military Council.

Immediately after Trotsky was excommunicated from the leadership of the army, the military department received large additional appropriations and significantly increased the salaries of all command personnel. At the same January plenum, Stalin offered to support in every possible way the request of the new people's commissar for additional funding:

"We have a certain liquidationist mood in regard to the army... I must state in the most categorical manner that this liquidationist mood must be decisively liquidated... we must meet, resolutely and irrevocably, the demands of the military department."

The anti-Trotskyist campaign, however, did not lose its intensity. Already on January 31, a circular from the Political Directorate of the Red Army was sent to the troops, in which political bodies were ordered to continue work to eradicate and expose Trotskyism among the personnel. In fact, this work did not stop until 1941.

Prominent Trotskyists removed from key posts have not yet been repressed, the time has not yet come. They were sent to economic or diplomatic work. Sklyansky, for example, was appointed chairman of the board of the Mossukno trust, Antonov was appointed plenipotentiary to Czechoslovakia, and the leader of the "Red Cossacks" Primakov, a military adviser to China.

The ousting of the names of Trotsky and his team from the consciousness of military personnel was facilitated by the widespread propaganda of the merits of his successor. The biography of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze (1885-1925), an old Bolshevik (two death sentences, 8 years in hard labor), a military nugget who became famous for victories over Kolchak and Wrangel, began to be studied without fail in the system of political training of army and navy personnel. His activities were extolled in the periodical press, his articles and speeches were published. Frunze was increasingly called one of the most prominent commanders of the Civil War, an outstanding practitioner of military development. In the speeches and publications of Stalin and his supporters, the incompatibility of the views of Trotsky and Frunze on the main measures of military reform was strongly emphasized.

Frunze dreamed of creating a new theory of proletarian military art, while Trotsky was sarcastically interested in "can Marxism teach how to weave bast shoes?"

Trotsky just suggested that we create a training program for a Red Army soldier, deal with everyday issues in the army. He believed that in the conditions of the devastation that prevailed in the country, with the practical absence of normal funding, more simply could not be done.

Frunze insisted that reform was necessary, but first of all it was necessary to develop a unity of views on the main issues of army development and military art. He even thought of a trivial, but still too deep for the vast majority of "paint" thoughts: it turns out that each

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a decent state, even a Soviet one, must have a military doctrine, and devoted the theoretical work "The Unified Doctrine and the Red Army" to this problem.

Frunze called the military doctrine "the doctrine adopted in the army of a given state, which establishes the nature of the organization of the armed forces, the methods of combat training of troops, their driving on the basis of the views prevailing in the state on the nature of the military tasks lying before it and the methods for their resolution, arising from the class essence of the state and determined level of development of the country's productive forces.

In other words, first we need to figure out what kind of war we will be preparing for, "should we establish ourselves on the idea of passive defense of the country, without setting and pursuing any active tasks, or should we keep these latter in mind." On the answer to this question depends "the whole character of the construction of our armed forces, the character and system of training single fighters and large military formations, military-political propaganda, and the whole system of education of the country in general."

For Frunze, a convinced Marxist, the answer was clear. He did not allow the thought of the peaceful coexistence of two different types of states:

"There can be only one state of long, stubborn, desperate war to the death between our proletarian state and the rest of the bourgeois world ... By the very course of the historical revolutionary process, the working class will be forced to go over to the attack when a favorable situation develops."

If you get to the bottom of the original source, here Mikhail Vasilyevich literally quotes the resolutions of the Second Congress of the Comintern. Based on the foregoing, the political part of the military doctrine "cannot be active in the highest degree."

Conclusion: unconditional militarization of the entire life of the state is necessary; "the energy and will of the country must continue to be directed towards the creation and strengthening of our military power"; the consciousness of every inhabitant "should be imbued with the idea that our country is still in the position of a besieged fortress and will be in it as long as capital reigns in the world"; the propaganda apparatus should prepare "that psychological environment of nationwide attention, care and concern for the needs of the army"...

All institutions, organizations, branches of industry, science, education, medicine - absolutely EVERYTHING - must be built and proceed in their work from the perspective of the coming WAR.

The Bolsheviks were well aware that THEIR COMMUNISM could finally win only when there were no territories free from it on the globe, when it was possible to drive all of humanity, or those same ten percent of "human material" not exterminated into barracks lit by "Ilyich's bulbs". This is exactly what Lenin wrote:

"Definitive victory can only be achieved on a world scale... We live not only in a state, but also in a system of states, and the existence of a Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end, either one or the other will win. And until this end comes, a series of the most terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable.

Stalin understood the essence of the problem in exactly the same way:

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"One of two things: either we consider the country to be the basis of the proletarian revolution ... Or we do not consider the country to be the basis of the revolution, we do not have the data for building socialism, we cannot build a socialist society, and then, in the event of delaying the victory of socialism in other countries must put up with the fact that the capitalist elements of our national economy will take over, the Soviet power will disintegrate, the party will be reborn. That is why the loss of an international revolutionary perspective leads to the danger of nationalism and degeneration."

Well, he was quite right, in the end it all happened. But, as we see, in 1924-1925, none of the Soviet leadership was going to give up the revolutionary perspective.

The essence of the theoretical differences between Trotsky and Stalin was only that the former was impatient to conquer the world at once, since he believed that "only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe" was "a genuine rise of the socialist economy in Russia" possible, and the latter advocated what to accumulate strength, create a "base" in the USSR and carry out a gradual escalation of revolutions.

Stalin predicted:

"It is most likely that the world revolution will develop through the revolutionary falling away of new countries from the system of imperialist states... But it is also undoubted that the very development of the world revolution, the very process of falling away from imperialism of a number of new countries, will take place the faster and more thoroughly, the more thoroughly socialism will be strengthened in

the first victorious country, the sooner this country will turn into a base for the further development of the world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism.

Thus, at this stage, the "military program" was to turn the country into a powerful platform for the further export of the world revolution and to wait / create a "favorable environment" when we were "forced to go on the attack." Stalin already understood: no one but him is capable of solving this grandiose task - there are only windbags around.

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Not surprisingly, the Frunze doctrine received the full approval of the party leadership. True, Mikhail Vasilyevich himself did not have to put it into practice. On October 31, 1925, he died in the ward of the Botkin hospital after a seemingly simple operation for a stomach ulcer appointed by the decision of the Politburo. As the newspapers reported, a "joyful smile" froze on the face of the deceased - before his death, he was read an encouraging note from his beloved comrade Stalin. After Frunze's death, he was unanimously canonized. As a sign of mourning, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council, military parades on the day of the eighth anniversary of October were even canceled.

Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov (1881-1969), an unconditional Stalinist cadre, became the new people's commissar for military and naval affairs and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic, and Mikhail Mikhailovich Lashevich (1884-1928) - from the Zinovievites, and Iosif Stanislavovich Unshlikht - certainly "his" person .

Thus, using the main measures of the military reform to transfer the army under its direct influence, the Central Committee of the RCT (6), headed by Stalin, created a fundamentally new system of political and administrative leadership of the armed forces of the USSR. The dominant position in this structure was occupied by the political leadership and such a position

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things remained until the very end of the existence of the Soviet Union.

Since, with the introduction of unity of command, the affiliation of command personnel to the Communist Party became the determining criterion for career advancement, the role of party organizations and political agencies in solving personnel issues has significantly increased. The status of the Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was fundamentally changed. His boss A.S. Bubnov in April 1925 became the secretary of the Central Committee of the party. The Political Directorate itself was removed from the Revolutionary Military Council, became the Political Directorate of the Red Army and received the rights of a department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. As a result, the entire vertical of army political agencies and party organizations is now directly closed to the central party apparatus, headed by Stalin. All organizational ties between the army political agencies and party organizations with local party committees were eliminated.

As a result, in a short time, a qualitatively new, strictly hierarchical party structure was created in the military department, not subordinate to either territorial party bodies or top military leadership,

directly under the control of the Central Committee of the party, and ultimately its General Secretary - I.V. Stalin. The positions of Trotsky and his supporters in the army were dealt a crushing blow. Most importantly, the possibility of the activity in the armed forces of any other political force, except for the CPSU (b), was forever excluded. Party leadership of the armed forces became the "basis of the foundations of military construction" for all subsequent decades.

By the end of 1925, Stalin was already the recognized "pilot" and the only interpreter of Lenin's teachings (in all his speeches, densely interspersed with quotations, the spell sounded: "So Lenin spoke"). Songs about him have not yet been sung, but already in April the city of Tsaritsyn was renamed Stalingrad.

Zinoviev, who considered himself the rightful heir to the throne, realized with surprise that Stalin turned out to be a master of political intrigue, outplaying him in all respects. Having lost all their self-satisfaction - "there is no troika in allotment, but there is Stalin's dictatorship, Ilyich was right a thousand times" - Zinoviev and Kamenev rushed to Trotsky, complaining about the perfidy of the "Asiatic". In fact, the Secretary General had, he himself admitted, a sweet manner: "Mark a victim, prepare everything, mercilessly take revenge, and then go to sleep." But who cares about the screams of the losers.

At the XM Party Congress, held in December 1925, Zinoviev, who made his last report, criticized Stalin, his methods of leadership, and the ways he proposed for developing the country's national economy. Following him, Kamenev demanded the resignation of the General Secretary. Lured Stalin's "Parteigenossen" did not support the proposal, and a month later Lev Borisovich was transferred from the Politburo members to candidates. The delegates were especially impressed by Stalin's statements that no one would allow the leaders "to break with impunity and sit on the party's head. There will be no bows to the leaders." (Shouts: "That's right!" Applause.)

Another statement, significant: "For us, for the Bolsheviks, formal democracy is a dummy, and the real interests of the party are everything," they missed between their ears.

According to the well-established methodology, Zinoviev and Kamenev were ranked among the "NEW opposition", which impedes the construction of socialism in the country, perverting the holy teachings of Leninism.

In the army, the process was similar. The military communists did not support the oppositionists anywhere, some unhealthy doubts arose only in the Leningrad military district. A commission of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, headed by the indefatigable Bubnov, headed there. Having gathered a party conference, he actually

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repeated Stalin's theses.

"You say that the disciples of Lenin, the former leaders of our party, fell under the wheel? So much the worse for the leaders and so much the better for the party, which finds the strength to go past such leaders who do not follow Lenin. It only shows strength

our party!"

In the summer of 1926, Zinoviev, who had fallen out of the ruling pack, began to cry out that the Trotskyists "correctly warned" about the danger of the degeneration of the party and the "threatening growth of the apparatus regime." Trotsky, having found allies, perked up and declared that he was grossly mistaken in considering Zinoviev and Kamenev opportunists. Somewhat belatedly, he discerned that "the opportunist shifts were caused by a group headed by Comrade Stalin."

"The addition of castrated forces," Stalin chuckled through his mustache, but made organizational conclusions.

In July, a joint plenum of the highest organs of the party withdrew Zinoviev from the Politburo, and the SM became the first secretary of the Leningrad provincial committee. Kirov (1866-1934). The October Plenum recalled "Grishka Internilut" (Zinoviev) from the work of the Comintern and recommended that the ECCI release this "unscrupulous factionalist" from the post of chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. At the same time, a decision was made to expel Trotsky from the Politburo, and Kamenev from the list of candidates for the supreme body of the CPSU (b). At the same time, Lev Borisovich was dismissed from the post of chairman of the STO and made people's commissar of trade.

Two months later, hefty agents of the GPU wrapped the stubborn Lev Davidovich in a fur coat, carried him out of the house in their arms and took him to the station. His path lay in Central Asia, and soon beyond the borders of the USSR.

The famous historian and writer of the "new emigration" A.G. Avtorkhanov (1908-1997) argued that Stalin did not want to let Trotsky go abroad until "until the head of the OGPU Menzhinsky assured him that whether Trotsky would be in Alma-Ata, in the Lubyanka or in Madagascar, this would not be for his department plays a role. "Trotsky will be with us everywhere," Menzhinsky reassured Stalin. As you know, he was not mistaken.

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Buried in Mexico, Trotsky, describing the General Secretary, wrote:

"There was not even a shadow of that generosity of rich natures in him, which rejoices in the talents and successes of another. In someone else's success, he always felt a threat to his goals, a blow to his personality. With the strength of a reflex, he immediately assumed a defensive, and if possible, offensive position ...

What Stalin, this outstanding mediocrity, never forgave anyone for was spiritual superiority. He entered into the list of his memory all those who in any degree surpassed him, or at least did not treat him with respect. attention."

From the moment the "opposition bloc" was crushed, Stalin was definitely annoyed by Bukharin and his "schoolboy". It's not even so much about the bad character of Joseph Vissarionovich - it's not serious to talk about the spiritual superiority of Bukharchik - av

that there is only one step from leadership in the development of fundamental theoretical questions of socialist construction to claims for political leadership. Too popular, independent and irresponsibly talkative Bukharin began to interfere.

At this time, Stalin adopted the theses of Trotsky and Zinoviev, which

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he himself not so long ago condemned and smashed, and advocated accelerated industrialization and collectivization. At the beginning of 1928, when discussing the situation in the economy, the Central Committee began to clash of opinions on the question of methods for resolving existing problems. Bukharin and his supporters opposed emergency measures in carrying out collectivization and industrialization, against the "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry." The Stalinists denounced their opponents for not understanding the "mechanics of the class struggle."

Here Nikolai Ivanovich "saw the light", like his previous comrades, began to seek advice from the disgraced "Kamenyuga" and printed an article "Notes of an Economist" - fortunately he was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Gravda". Such a betrayal infuriated Stalin. The November Plenum of the Central Committee condemned the theoretical views of the Bukharin-Rykov group, aimed at slowing down the rate of development of industry and curtailing the construction of collective farms. Thus began the struggle against the "right" deviation.

In January and April 1929, the joint plenums once again considered and condemned the "surrender" platform of the "Rights"—Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy. The naive Bukharchik babbled something about personal friendship, saying that all of us, old Bolsheviks, did not agree on opinions - it happens. Why are we fighting guys? There was a time when Stalin wrote: "Kiss Bukhashka on the nose for me," but the logic of political struggle is inexorable. "We do not have a family circle," Joseph Vissarionovich snapped, "not an artel of personal friends, but a political party of the working class." There is nothing, you bastard, to conspire with yesterday's Trotskyists and deviate from the "general line".

"Friends" were accused of factionalism, of trying to put together an anti-Party bloc and were relieved of all their posts. Following this, they were removed from the Politburo, completely removed from political activity. Zinoviev and Kamenev were sent to Kaluga. Stalin bluntly declared that the time of the leaders was over: "If we proclaim some laws for the leaders, and others for the "common people" in the party, then we will have nothing left of either the party or party discipline."

Of the entire composition of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), mentioned in Lenin's will, only one person remained on the political Olympus. Trotsky wrote: "The gray figure suddenly separated at a certain moment from the Kremlin wall - and the world for the first time recognized Stalin as a ready-made dictator."

But the only surprise was that it was Stalin who turned out to be this dictator. Everything else - a pattern that the young Lev Davidovich, then an ardent opponent of Bolshevism, deduced back in 1904 - the party of violence can only evolve in one direction:

"The party apparatus replaces the party, the Central Committee replaces the apparatus, and finally the dictator replaces the Central Committee."

A terrorist regime of the party apparatus was established in the party and in the country, headed by the sole leader - Comrade Stalin, the leader of the world proletariat, a brilliant strategist, the best friend of scientists, children and athletes.

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Now it was possible to seriously engage in the creation of the "base of the world revolution." Stalin directed all his energy, all his will to the creation of his hitherto unknown, according to Ditorokhanov's definition, ideocratic Empire.

The introduction of the New Economic Policy made it possible to restore the economic potential of the country in the shortest possible time. In 1923, industrial production was more than twice the level of 1921,

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amounting to 39% in relation to 1913. Agriculture, freed from the delights of surplus appropriation, amounted to 75% of the pre-war level. The lifting of the external blockade made it possible to start economic contacts with European countries, although they never became strong. The marketing crisis of 1923 was successfully overcome, and in 1924 economic indicators were slowly but surely growing.

In 1926, Stalin announced that the country had entered "a new period of the New Economic Policy, a period of direct industrialization" and that "it is necessary to have a developed industry, for industry is the foundation, the beginning and the end of socialism, socialist construction." On April 13, while reading a report to the Leningrad activists, the Secretary General proclaimed a course towards industrialization:

"Consequently, the next and main task is to accelerate the pace of development of our country, to move our entire industry forward with all possible resources, and thereby accelerate the development of the economy as a whole ... But in order to renew our industry on the basis of a new technology, this requires, comrades, large and very large capitals. And we have little capital, as you all know... We need to transform our country from an agrarian country into an industrial country, and the sooner the better. But all this requires a lot of capital.

It was really problematic with capital. No one wanted to lend money to the Soviets. Of course. Lenin and his commissars, who seized power with German money and not without the help of the German General Staff, withdrew from the war, concluded a separate peace with the Kaiser, supplied him with bread and gold, released almost two million captured soldiers to their homeland, thereby designating themselves as actual allies of Germany. In addition, the Bolsheviks renounced all pre-war agreements and obligations, that is, first of all, from the need to repay billions in debts on loans, and at the same time pocketed the gold reserves of Romania. And after that they were proudly offended by the Entente, which sought to "strangle the Soviet power."

Who in the international arena is interested in dealing with lawless people who finance subversive organizations around the world in order to destroy the "world of capital". Just in May 1927, Great Britain broke

diplomatic relations in the USSR, when it became clear that the general strike of British miners was financed by agents of the Comintern. The scandal was huge.

Speaking at a meeting of Moscow party activists on April 13, 1928, Stalin confirmed that the capitalist countries were ready to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, provided that the royal debts were paid and the policy of "supporting the liberation movement of the working class of other countries" was abandoned. But it's a matter of principle:

"We cannot make these and similar concessions without renouncing ourselves — that is why we must be prepared for the fact that international capital will continue to arrange all sorts of dirty tricks for us ..." And we must continue to "lead emancipatory foreign policy.

The impossibility of obtaining investments in the West forced the Soviet leadership to accept the idea of self-reliant economic autarky. However, the ever-living Ilyich, who was going to fight with the whole world, put forward this idea back in the spring of 1918 in an outline of a plan for scientific and technical work:

"The greatest guarantee for the present Russian Soviet Republic of the possibility of independently supplying itself with the seven most important types of raw materials and industry."

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But all this required "big capital". Where to get them? Stalin

explained: we do not have colonies, we are not going to rob anyone, we cannot

go for onerous concessions with foreign firms. Remains the fourth

the path of industrialization, the path of one's own savings for the cause of industry, the path of socialist accumulation."

The restoration of industry was carried out mainly through the export of raw materials and, in general, everything that could be sold. Treasures of the Hermitage, the Kremlin, and museum collections were sold to purchase foreign currency. To the polite questions of Western buyers, for whom the masterpieces of Botticelli or Titian were removed and wrapped directly from the walls: "Don't you feel sorry?", Smiling Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan (1895-1978) answered: "Nothing, after the victory of the world revolution, all this will be ours again" . (As you know, Lenin in 1923 offered the Japanese to buy the Soviet part of Sakhalin. They did not agree on the price).

The possibilities of individual and primitive peasant economy could not ensure the planned pace of reconstruction. At the 10th Party Congress, held in December 1927, Stalin "pushed through" the decision to speed up industrialization and create large collective farms in the countryside: "To catch up and overtake the advanced capitalist countries."

So far there has been no talk of forced planting of collective farms. It was about "so that small and smallest farms gradually, but steadily, out of order

pressure, but by way of demonstration and persuasion, to unite into large farms on the basis of social, comradely, collective cultivation of the land, with the use of agricultural machines and tractors, with the use of scientific methods of intensifying agriculture.

For the time being, the course towards mass collectivization remained only a declaration: "big capital" was needed for cars and tractors, party members always had difficulties with "showing off", the bulk of individual peasants voluntarily united and "collaboratively" cultivated the land did not express desire. Only the Bolshevik methods of "persuasion" remained, but the General Secretary, while he was fighting Trotsky, was "not interested in fomenting the class struggle."

However, the desire to quickly raise the level of industrial production inevitably led to the idea of the "Great Leap Forward". In addition, the Great Depression was beginning in the West, which shook the world market and created "the conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge." It seems that a "favorable environment" was brewing in Europe. In order to provide timely assistance to the proletariat of the "backward" countries, a developed military-industrial complex and a powerful army were urgently needed, and for this - a final solution to the peasant question, the implementation of a complete state monopoly in agriculture, bringing to its logical conclusion the Leninist idea of the forced organization of "the majority of workers and peasants."

By the way, Vladimir Ilyich, who conceived the grain monopoly, grain rations and labor armies even before taking power, considered the "Decree on Land" a mistake, a concession made to please the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who helped carry out the October Revolution. All the "red professors" unconditionally rejected the farmer's way of developing agriculture. The farmer, in our "fist", is a class enemy. In addition, this world-eater, "spider and vampire" certainly wants to sell the products produced, even with the help of tractors and scientific methods, at a profit for himself.

Any, even the smallest private owner, independent producer, by the mere fact of his existence, "gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie." Collective farms were invented for this, in order to seize bread centrally, preferably for free, load it with songs into the bins of the motherland and not depend on "kulak whims".

In April 1929, having ideologically defeated the former "Left Communists",

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who now turned out to be "right deviators", the top Soviet leadership proclaimed "a general offensive of socialism along the entire front."

The "year of the great turning point" meant the curtailment of the new economic policy, continuous forced collectivization, a return to emergency measures, and the suppression of any resistance with an iron fist. From the "gradual and steady" amalgamation of small farms to the "steady" socialization of private property in the countryside at a shock and super-shock pace, using the entire arsenal of "persuasion" means. In general, the Bolsheviks decided to again primitively rob the farmer peasant.

Later, professors of the history of the CPSU explained to the post-war generations of citizens: there was no other way out - the aggressiveness of imperialism, as usual, continuously increased, the "kumach" became rich, impudent and "organized undermining"

against Soviet power, and it was time for all the people to declare that the concession made to capitalism in 1921 was only a temporary retreat, an accumulation of strength before a breakthrough into a brighter future.

The need to use the most extreme measures was henceforth justified by the theory invented by Stalin of the intensification of the class struggle as the progress towards socialism was successful:

"Socialism is successfully attacking the capitalist elements, socialism is growing faster than the capitalist elements, the share of capitalist elements is therefore falling, and precisely because the share of capitalist elements is falling, the capitalist elements feel mortal danger and intensify their resistance...

This is a regrouping of the forces of the class enemies of the proletariat, with the aim of defending the old against the new. It is not difficult to understand that these circumstances cannot but cause an intensification of the class struggle.

If the enemy does not surrender, he is destroyed. Like a class. If it gives up, too. It's interesting how people change.

Maxim Gorky, then not yet bought with gilets, November 20, 1917 wrote:

"The working class cannot fail to understand that Lenin, on his skin, on his blood, produces only a certain experience ... The working class must know that miracles do not really happen, that famine awaits it, the complete breakdown of industry, the destruction of transport, a long bloody anarchy, followed by no less bloody and gloomy reaction.

Well, in 1933 he sang of the wonders of the White Sea Canal, built by the hands of prisoners and his bosses from the NKVD.

In December 1929, Stalin announced a turn from the policy of "limiting the exploitative tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class." To suppress the resistance of the unbeaten capitalist elements, their dispossession and destruction, it was necessary to recognize the admissibility of emergency measures. Temporarily, of course.

And as soon as the Bolsheviks did what they loved, victories followed victories, as much as the head was spinning from success. A little more than a year has passed, and already half of the peasants (more than 10 million families) have signed up for collective farms: "We have more than doubled the five-year collectivization plan." The advantages of the collective-farm system were so temptingly explained to the Peasants that in

Those who did not want to unite in large farms, even from among the poor, in accordance with the established practice, were enrolled in the subclass of "sub-kulaks". The writer Mikhail Sholokhov, in a personal letter to Stalin, described the process of handing over grain to the collective farms of a single Veshensky district of the North Caucasus Territory:

"Since the falling curve of grain receipts did not ensure the fulfillment of the plan by the deadline, the regional committee sent a special commissioner, comrade Ovchinnikov, to the Veshensky district (the same one who once came to establish an "additional" yield). Ovchinnikov smashes the district leadership and, tapping on the holster of his revolver, gives the following instruction: "Bread must be taken at any cost! We will press so that the blood splatters! Break firewood, but take bread!"

And they began to "break firewood" around the district with great zeal and take bread "at any cost". By the arrival of the newly appointed secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kuznetsov and the chairman of the RIC Korolev in the district, there were already the fruits of Ovchinnikov's suggestion:

On the Pleshakovsky collective farm, two authorized representatives of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Belov and another comrade, whose last name is unknown to me, asked the collective farmers where the grain was buried, for the first time they applied the method of "loprosny with predilection", which subsequently spread throughout the region. At midnight, the collective farmers were summoned to the Komsod, one at a time, at first they were tortured, threatened with torture, and then they used torture: they put pencils between their fingers and broke their joints, and then they put a rope loop around their necks and led them to the hole in the Don to drown.

At the Grachesky collective farm, during interrogation, the representative of the RK lifted the collective farmers by the neck to the ceiling, continued to drag the half-suffocated, then led them to the river on a belt, kicked them along the way, put them on their knees on the ice and continued the interrogation.

At the Likhovidsky collective farm, the representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan at a brigade meeting ordered the collective farmers to stand up, placed an armed villager at the door, who was charged with the duty of ensuring that no one sat down, but he himself went to dinner. Had dinner, slept, came in 4 hours. The meeting was under the protection of the village. And the commissioner continued the meeting...

After Ovchinnikov left for the Verkhne-Donskoy region, Sharapov began to direct the work. Sharapov judged the work of the commissioner or secretary not only by the amount of bread found, but also by the number of families thrown out of their houses, by the number of roofs and ruined stoves uncovered during searches. "He felt sorry for throwing the kids out into the cold! Slobbered up! Kulak pity overcame him! Let them squeak and die like puppies, but we will break the sabotage!", Sharapov scolded the secretary of the cell of the Malakhov collective farm at the bureau of the Republic of Kazakhstan for showing some hesitation during the mass eviction of the families of collective farmers on the street ...

Exclusion from the party, arrest and starvation threatened every communist who did not show sufficient "activity" in terms of the use of repression, because, in the understanding of Ovchinnikov and Sharapov, only these methods should have given bread The number of those who died has not been established, because no one was interested in these statistics and is not interested; just as no one is interested in the number of deaths from starvation ...

But eviction is not the main thing. Here is an enumeration of the methods by which 593 tons of bread were produced:

Mass beatings of collective farmers and individual farmers.

Planting in the cold. The collective farmer is stripped to his underwear and put barefoot in a barn or barn. Time of action - January, February. Often they were planted in barns whole

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" by 37 brigades.

On the Vashchayevsky collective farm, the collective farmers poured kerosene on their legs and skirts, lit them, and then put them out: "Say, where is the pit? I'll set it on fire again!" In the same collective farm, the interrogated woman was put in a pit, half buried, and the interrogation continued.

On the Lebyazhensky collective farm, they were put up against the wall and fired past the HEAD of the person being supplemented with shotguns. In the same place: rolled up in a row and trampled underfoot.

In the Arkhipov collective farm, two collective farmers, Fomina and Krasnova, after a night of interrogation, were taken three kilometers to the steppe, stripped naked in the snow and allowed, ordered to run to the farm at a trot.

In the Solontsovsky collective farm, a human corpse was brought into the room by the commander, they put it on the table, and in the same room the collective farmers were interrogated, threatening to be shot.

On the Verkhne-Chirsky collective farm, the Komsolchiks put those who were being treated with bare feet on a hot stove, and then they beat them and took them out, barefoot, into the cold "...

And so on.

Let us recall Pyatakov's thesis: the Bolshevik Party is a party of miracles, and violence spreads the realm of the possible to gigantic proportions. How did Ovchinnikov, Belov, Sharapov and other representatives differ from foreign occupiers? The fact that "womb, egg!" spoke without an accent? Or faith in the bright ideals of communism? As one of the heroes of the Strugatsky brothers said: "If in the name of an ideal a person has to do meanness, then the price of this ideal is shit."

For some reason, Sholokhov thought that the robbery that had reigned in the villages was a consequence of the "excesses" of the local leadership, and asked to send "genuine communists" to the area.

Stalin answered him that the communists in Veshenka are the most genuine, they are just trying very hard to "curb the enemy", and writers, before getting into politics, "must be able to see the other side. And the other side is that the respected grain growers of your region (and not only your region) held the "Italian"

(sabotage!) and were not averse to leaving the workers, the Red Army - without bread. The fact that the sabotage was quiet and outwardly harmless (without blood) does not change the fact that the respected grain growers, in fact, waged a "quiet war" with the Soviet government. A war of exhaustion, dear comrade. Sholokhov.

Dear Mikhail Alexandrovich drank bitter and composed Virgin Soil Uplifted.

To the questions of the working people about the twists and turns of domestic policy, Stalin patiently explained that the petty proprietor was always the enemy, but earlier - two or three years ago - it was impossible to dispossess him of the kulaks, since the kulak fed the proletariat and the Red Army; "There was nothing to replace kulak production." But now that we have decided to move on to collective farming, now it is possible to rob it, now, of course, it is necessary. Is it possible to accept "kulaks" into the collective farm? Answer: under no circumstances should a "sworn enemy of the Soviet regime" be allowed into the collective farm. And do not call warmia, even in the construction battalion.

What to do with them? First, the most malicious (according to the classifier of the OGPU - 1st category, "counter-revolutionary kulak activists"), of course, should be shot. Secondly, how many "great construction projects" are around, and how there are not enough workers.

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In the significant April 1929, X\ party conference approved the first

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five year plan. Justifying it , Stalin explained:

"We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We have to run this distance in 10 years. Either we do it or we will be crushed."

They staked on the accelerated development, first of all, of the advanced branches of heavy industry (the production of means of production), which could become the basis for the industrialization of other areas of the economy. And here, as the "Shakhtinsk case" and other similar cases fabricated by the GPU showed, it was impossible to do without emergency measures. So the masses of dispossessed kulaks came in handy (in three months of 1930 more than half a million "kulaks of the 2nd category" were evicted to remote and uninhabited areas), "pests", unfinished enemies of the people who did not realize the charms of comradely cultivation of the land, and other capitalist elements that prevented the offensive socialism. Inept planning, their own incompetence, failures in the economy and agriculture were blamed on them.

It was they - free labor - who mastered the Far North and the Far East, dug canals, built factories and power plants, mined nickel and apatite, washed gold, simultaneously being reformed under the guidance and vigilant guard of wonderful people - the Chekists.

For the sake of a great goal, all property and passports were taken away from the collective farmers. And so that they would not feel deprived of the care of the Soviet government, in return they were given

"Law on strengthening criminal liability for theft and plunder of collective farm property" of August 7, 1932. In the first year and a half alone, according to the "law of three spikelets", 125 thousand "respected grain growers" were arrested and convicted, of which 5,400 people were shot.

The "victorious proletariat" received a seven-day work week without the right to dismiss and a registration system, teenagers were attached to the machine from the age of 14 and benefited from the distribution of all social protection measures on them on an equal basis with adults, up to the "tower".

The USSR skillfully used the global economic crisis to purchase equipment, technologies and specialists abroad. During the years of the first five-year plan, about 95% of Soviet industrial enterprises received Western assistance. Everything could be bought from the ruined "decaying capitalists", from oil refining equipment to secret tanks, engines, guidance systems, aircraft and torpedoes. Cooperation with Western firms and the use of cheap labor from the Soviet population made it possible to lay the foundation for modern heavy industry.

True, at the same time in 1932-1933 there were more than two thousand armed uprisings against forced collectivization, an unprecedented famine "happened" in the robbed village (only in Ukraine up to 20% of the entire rural population died, it was even worse in Central Asia), but these counter-revolutionary attacks could not prevent the movement "at full speed along the path of industrialization." As for the endless series of corpses on both sides of the canvas, this is just "the spent human material of the capitalist era."

But what were the achievements! During the five-year period, more than 1,500 plants and factories were built, including automobile, aviation, tractor, locomotive, artillery, ammunition, weapons, heavy industry was created, new deposits were developed, the fuel and energy base was improved, new economic centers were laid in the Urals. The military-industrial complex developed at an accelerated pace.

These successes looked especially impressive against the backdrop of the economic crisis,

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that covered the countries of Western democracy. Thus, the level of French industrial production for most of the 1930s was below 1913. By 1933, industrial production in the United States fell to 64% compared with the level of 1929, in England - to 88% in Germany - to 65%. World trade has fallen to 65%. The number of unemployed in the capitalist world amounted to 30 million people. True, cases of cannibalism were not observed there.

In the same memorable year of 1929, the Soviet Union, "taking into account the likelihood of an attack," began to deploy an unprecedented program (five-year plan) of military construction. The main directions of development of the Soviet armed forces were determined in the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 15, 1929 "On the state of the country's defense."

In November, the post of chief of armaments of the Red Army was established, who was given responsibility and leadership for the technical re-equipment of the armed forces. I.P. was approved as the first head of armaments. Ubovichin, from July 1931 - M. A. Tukhachevsky.

In the summer of 1930, at a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a plan for the construction of the Red Army was approved. It was envisaged to re-equip the army and navy on a massive scale with the latest models of military equipment; the creation of new technical arms; modernization of old systems; motorization and organizational restructuring of the old military branches; training of technical personnel and mastery of new equipment by personnel. The share of military spending in the state budget has steadily increased. In 1930-1931, Soviet industry annually produced 1,911 artillery pieces, 174,000 rifles, 41,000 machine guns, and 860 aircraft. Since 1931, mass production of T-26 tanks and the famous BT series began.

- In June 1930, Stalin, frightening party members with the increasing likelihood of external intervention, argued: the deeper the economic crisis experiences world capitalism, the more he wants to attack us and resolve "all contradictions taken together at the expense of the SSSG." Then the well-known saying, instantly rhymed by songwriters, sounded:

"We don't want a single inch of foreign land. But
we will not give up our land, not a single inch
of our land, to anyone.

In Voropiltov's speech, the no less famous program setting of the Red Army sounded: "We must build things in such a way as to achieve victory in the upcoming war "with little bloodshed and conduct this war on the territory of the country that will be the first to raise a sword against us."

In the 1920s, during a period of heated debate about military doctrine, Trotsky argued that the optimal course of action for the Red Army was a strategic defense and even a retreat inland to buy time to mobilize all forces and means. And only then, "having behind us space and numbers, we calmly and confidently outline the line where the mobilization provided by our elastic defense will prepare a sufficient fist for our transition to the offensive." In this regard, Lev Davidovich proposed to delete from the resolutions a declaration copied from the French charter (it began with the statement: "The French army ... does not recognize any other law than the offensive"), that the Red Army will be the most offensive of all armies.

The strategy of defensive war was also put forward by the professor of the Military Academy

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Red Army A.I. Verkhovsky (1886-1938), unconcerned by the Bolshevik grief over the hard lot of the "oppressed" in other countries. A former officer of the Russian General Staff, he argued that a defensive battle provides major political benefits and allows you to build up forces, that it is better for the Red Army to prepare Poltava for the enemy than to dream of Cannes: "From this point of view, it is more profitable for us to give Minsk and Kiev than take Bialystok and Brest.

Meanwhile, the true Marxist Frunze suggested throwing out the most harmful arguments glorifying defense and, "except for the most necessary, do not carry out any defensive work, and it is better to spend money on repairing the barracks."

He believed that future wars, due to the class contradictions tearing capitalism apart, "will approach our civil war in type", their essence will be maneuver operations on a large scale, because the Red Army must be educated "in the spirit of the greatest activity, prepare it for the completion of tasks revolution through energetic, resolutely and boldly carried out offensive operations", and the entire military mass "should be trained in the art

quickly and systematically carry out march maneuvers. Retreat E is a purely secondary type of hostilities, "a concept that is entirely included in the concept of an offensive."

True, Frunze did not yet plan to "maneuver" exclusively on foreign territory and, in order to fight a technically superior enemy, he considered it necessary to conduct a systematic and systematic preparation of "possible theaters" for waging a guerrilla war.

The concept of strategic defense was resolutely rejected as incompatible with the "spirit of Soviet military doctrine", however, in the general set of measures to prepare for war, it was planned to identify future areas of partisan operations behind enemy lines and in its border zone in peacetime. In future areas of hostilities, it was supposed to create a network of partisan cells, clandestine bases and warehouses with everything necessary for combat work.

On August 1, 1931, the Council of Labor and Defense, adopting a large tank program, indicated that technical successes in the field of tank building in the USSR "created strong prerequisites for a radical change in the general operational tactical doctrine." In 1932, the tractor and locomotive factories of the USSR produced 3032 tanks and tankettes (France, the most powerful land power, produced about 280 new tanks in 17 post-war years, England - about 80 tanks and 325 tankettes, Germany, for known reasons - not a single combat vehicle). Soviet aircraft factories produced 2490 aircraft (in the USA - 1396, in England - a little more than 1000).

The formation of the first mechanized corps (about 500 tanks, over 200 armored vehicles, 60 guns each), separate mechanized brigades, tank and mechanized regiments began. The resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council, adopted on December 11, 1932, authorized the formation of mass airborne troops.

From the podium of Lenin's tomb, the former locksmith Voroshilov proudly spoke:

"It is a silly tale that warmongers write that the Bolsheviks are afraid of war. No, the Bolsheviks are not afraid of war ... if, nevertheless, the imperialists collapse

war on us, we will fight with all the passion inherent in us, with all the fiercest strength of 150 million free people. We know that all working people are behind us, we know that we will win."

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At the same time, the history of the October Revolution and the Civil War was being rewritten. In 1929 Voroptilov published the book "I.V. Stalin and the Red Army", where he sang, in particular, the Stalinist plan to defeat Denikin. In 1930, under the editorship of A.S. Bubnova, S.S. Kamenev and R.P. Eideman published a major three-volume work, The Civil War of 1918-1921, in which Trotsky's activities were mentioned only as one of the reasons for the failures and defeats of the Red Army. Finally, in the festive order of the Military Council of February 23, 1933, everything was finally put in its place:

"With the name of comrade. Stalin, the best Leninist, the leader of the Bolshevik Party, the leader of all working people, armed struggle, victories and the building of the Red Army are closely connected. During the years of the civil war, the party always sent comrade. Stalin to the most dangerous and decisive fronts for the life of the proletarian revolution.

In the following era, all Soviet general secretaries, checking their lives according to Stalin, certainly wanted to be listed as great commanders. It is clear that their wishes have always found a response in the hearts of pocket historians and court marshals. Thirty years later, SM. Budyonny will fondly remember Nikita Khrushchev, the young commissar of the 74th regiment of the 19th rifle division. At the same time, painstaking researchers, throwing a portrait of a mustachioed leader into the wastebasket and replacing it with a portrait of a bald leader, will establish:

"It was he, Khrushchev, who was one of those under whose leadership the Red Army thwarted the black plan of the American, British and French imperialists with the help of the Entente fleet to save Denikin's army from complete defeat." And he is "one of the active creators of the Red Army and the organizers of the victory of the young republic of Soviets over foreign interventionists and internal counter-revolution."

And ten years later, "Marshal of Victory" G.K. Zhukov will remember how he dreamed of meeting and reflecting alone with the famous political worker L.I. Brezhnev.

By the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the picture of the civil war in Russia had been covered over, rewritten and again covered up so many times that on the epic canvas, besides Lenin, it was difficult to see only five or six figures of the "legendary commanders" - Budyonny, Frunze, Kotovsky, Chapaev, Shors ... That, perhaps, is all that the people know of several thousand commanders of the Red Army of the highest and middle levels.

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In January 1934, in the report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Tenth Party Congress to the Party Congress, with a feeling of deep satisfaction, it was stated that the five-year plan was completed in four years - "we did more than we ourselves expected", that as a result of the struggle of the Soviet people for the early implementation of the first five-year plan, the Soviet Union was transformed, throwing off the guise of backwardness and the Middle Ages, and became an advanced industrial-collective-farm power. The congress adopted a resolution on the second five-year plan for the development of the national economy for 1933-1937, "directing the material resources of the country, the will of the party and the energy of the masses to complete technical reconstruction. It said:

"The fulfillment of the Second Five-Year Plan will further strengthen the significance of the USSR as a bulwark of the struggle of the international proletariat, will raise still higher in the eyes of the working masses of the exploited masses of the whole world the prestige of the Land of Soviets as the base of support for the world proletarian revolution."

True, labor productivity, despite all the reports of the Stakhanovites, remained three times less than in England and Germany, they never

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has surpassed and will not surpass.

By that time, collective farms united about 75% of all peasant farms and 90% of all sown areas. The petty-bourgeois element in the countryside was finally tamed: the peasants were reduced to the status of serfs, entirely dependent on the favors of the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees, district committees and all kinds of "authorized comrades."

Stalin's apologists like to replicate the reviews of the foreign press about the first five-year plan in the USSR.

"The successes achieved in the machine-building industry are beyond any doubt ... The USSR is currently producing all the equipment necessary for its metallurgical and electrical industries. He managed to create his own automobile industry. He created the production of implements and tools that cover the whole gamut from the smallest tools of great precision up to the heaviest presses. As for agricultural machinery, the USSR is no longer dependent on imports from abroad. - The newspaper "E / daddy! Titez.

"The four years of the five-year plan have brought with them truly remarkable achievements. The Soviet Union worked with wartime intensity on the creative task of building basic life. The face of the country is literally changing beyond recognition." — Mayop magazine.

"He really solved the most difficult problem for Europe - he eliminated unemployment. He built excellent roads and revived the economy by manufacturing armaments, building barracks, and calling for military service. No one explained to the people that most of his program included unproductive labor, the results of which could not increase the welfare of the country, since the product of this labor could not be exported Purchasing power allegedly grew, because the state

printed money that could be spent..." Stop. It seems that this is about Hitler - also a socialist, he was just deploying his four-year plan.

Of course, no one read the articles themselves, and the first two quotations are taken from the Stalinist report "Results of the First Five-Year Plan", made on January 7, 1933. It also contained completely opposite reviews, Joseph Vissarionovich, unlike his current defenders, was not afraid to voice them:

"A review of the present state of affairs in Russia, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the five-year program has failed both in regard to its declared aims and even more fundamentally in regard to its basic social principles." - Magazine "Siggeyo H1\$yugu".

"Collectivization has failed miserably. She brought Russia to the brink of starvation." - The newspaper "Mem Wagk Tites".

If you think about it, the first group of statements does not contradict the second. It's just that some observers wrote about "amazing activity", power plants and blast furnaces, others about the fact that they were built and stand on bones. While the newspaper Pravda was publishing Comrade Stalin's greetings to the workers and personnel of the "steel stronghold of collectivization" of the Kharkov tractor building, the Italian consul reported to his superiors in Rome: "Every night in Kharkov they collect 250 corpses of those who died of starvation and typhus. It has been noticed that a large number of them do not have a liver ... from which they prepare pies and sell them in the market!

In addition, the successes of accelerated industrialization and collectivization are in many ways the successes of Soviet propaganda.

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Another question is even indecent to ask: why such sacrifices? To rivet 3,000 tanks every year, which will ingloriously burn out in the first days of the war and be declared obsolete? Or maybe life is better? Well, yes, Comrade Stalin just said that "life has become better, life has become more fun," and he cited figures in his report proving that in 1932 the "growth of the national income", compared to 1928, amounted to 85%. But it was impossible to eat this very "people's income": in 1932-1933, Comrade Stalin exported 34 million centners of grain, tens of thousands of tons of meat and dairy products.

Sholokhov's letter about the life of "wealthy collective farmers", summing up the results of collectivization in the Veshensky district, lay on the table of the Secretary General in April 1933:

"In this region, as in other regions, collective farmers and individual farmers are now dying of hunger; adults and children swell up and eat everything that a person is not supposed to eat, starting with carrion and ending with oak bark and all kinds of swamp roots. In a word, the district seems to be no different from the rest of the districts of our region ... Since the moment of complete collectivization, the sown area has almost doubled ...

Out of a population of 50,000, at least 49,000 are starving. Emaciated, swollen from

starvation, the collective farmers, who gave the country 2,300,000 poods of grain, who are currently living on the devil knows what, probably will not produce what they produced last year ... All this, taken together, leads to the conclusion that the sowing plan of the collective farms district by the deadline, of course, will not be fulfilled. But the grain tax will have to be paid not from the area actually sown, but from the control figure of the plan sent by the region. Consequently, the history of grain procurements in 1932 will be repeated in 1933. Here are the prospects ... "

Stalin's cadres, Stalin's people's commissars, loyal Stalin's disciples, people specially and carefully selected by Stalin led the great achievements and turning points. Like the former, they possessed all the external attributes of leaders, were decorated with orders, merits, cities were also renamed in their honor, their names were assigned to collective farms, enterprises, educational institutions and subways. But, unlike the violent "Leninist guards", always bickering over any reason, they knew who they owed everything to, who was in the house

Master.

Joseph Vissarionovich achieved his goal. Separate "mechanisms" of the power machine he designed still required additional running-in and refinement, some "gears" and "bolts" would definitely have to be changed during operation, but in general, it's pleasing to the eye - how the ranks aligned, discipline strengthened, how opinions were streamlined, what uniformity in thoughts and even in clothes. It was no accident that when speaking about the party, Stalin used military terminology:

"In our party, if we mean its leading strata, there are 3-4 thousand top leaders. This, I would say, is the generals of our party. Next come 30,000-40,000 middle managers. This is our party officers. Next come about 100-150 thousand of the lowest party level. This, so to speak, is our party non-commissioned officer."

On February 10, 1934, immediately after the "congress of the victors", the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks formed the Politburo of the Stalinist recruitment, consisting of:

Members of the Politburo:

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I.V. Stalin (general secretary of the party);

V.M. Molotov (graduated from a real school; chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR);

L.M. Kaganovich (self-taught; first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, secretary of the agricultural department of the Central Committee; as chairman of the Central Commission for the verification of party ranks, led the purge of the party that took place in 1933-34);

M.I. Kalinin (two classes of a rural school; chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, whom the proletarian writer Gorky called "a vertical goat in trousers" for his irrepressible passion for the female sex);

S.K. Ordzhonikidze (paramedic school; people's commissar for heavy industry); K.E. Voroshilov (one class of a rural school; People's Commissar for Defense);

CM. Kirov (technical school; first secretary of the Leningrad Provincial Committee and the North-Western Bureau of the Central Committee);

A. A. Andreev (two classes of a rural school; People's Commissar of Railways);

ST. Kosior (primary factory school; General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine);

V.V. Kuibyshev (one semester of the university; chairman of the State Planning Commission, deputy chairman of the SNK and STO).

Candidate members of the Politburo:

A.I. Mikoyan (graduated from the seminary, studied at the theological academy for less than a year, there, having changed his worldview, he joined the party; People's Commissar for Supply);

G.I. Petrovsky (two classes of the "exemplary school" at the city gymnasium; chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee);

P.P. Postyshev (self-taught; secretary of the KC KGT (6) of Ukraine);

Ya.E. Rudzutak (two classes of the parish school; People's Commissar of the RKI of the USSR and chairman of the Central Control Commission);

V.Ya. Chubar (technical school; chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine). Later, the following were introduced into the Politburo:

A.A. Zhdanov (real school); R.I. Eikhe (elementary school), N.I. Yezhov (he wrote: "unfinished lower"), N.S. Khrushchev (workers' faculty).

Almost all "members" and candidates for "members" in the column "education" had the most miserable entry and, with all the ability to work "miracles", it was an impossible task for many of them to correctly write a short letter. When appointed to the highest posts, such a criterion as literacy, in principle, did not matter. The then "Small Soviet Encyclopedia" (first edition) convinced: "In itself, the literacy of the population does not speak of its culture, since the literate may not use their skills to acquire knowledge for years." So Comrade Voroptilov, who headed the armed forces, was illiterate, but terribly cultured - he loved opera (more precisely, opera singers) and reading aloud.

Of course, education is not the most important thing for a politician. Politician is not

profession, but the desire for power. But they were not politicians, in the sense of people fighting for power. There was only one politician, all the rest were the conductors of his decisions in life, tools. And now for the fulfillment of this

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education would not even hurt. But what is not, is not. Among the listed persons were outstanding organizers, outstanding overseers, highly experienced apparatchiks, and all of them were executioners bound by mutual bloody bail.

So, Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich (1893-1991) - a copy, only much larger, described in Sholokhov's letter of grain procurement commissioners - at the January Plenum of 1933, complained that

leaders of different levels do not widely use such a tried and tested educational tool as execution, and called for tougher repression. Criticizing the vicious prosecutorial and judicial practice in the field, he urged to think, first of all, not about the observance of laws, but about the unquestioning implementation of the decisions of the party and government. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890-1986) personally signed over 7,000 death warrants.

Each of them was "an irreconcilable fighter of the party against Trotskyism, the right opposition and other anti-party trends and groups, a devoted disciple and assistant to Comrade Stalin in the struggle to unite the party ranks, to strengthen the Leninist-Stalinist unity of the party"; each had considerable personal merit in organizing the genocide and the return of the peasantry to serfdom, each, without flinching, could absorb the delicacies laid down according to their position to the cries of those dying of hunger right outside the windows of the special dining room.

Ordzhonikidze wrote to Kirov:

"The cadres who went through the situation of 1932-1933 and withstood it were tempered like steel. I think that with them it will be possible to build a State that history has not yet known.

No one tried to indulge in theoretical philosophizing - not according to Senka, a hat (they got so used to it that for forty years after Stalin's death they didn't come up with anything new in "scientific communism", except for "developed socialism" that burst with a bang in 1991; Khrushchev's program for 10 years to catch up and overtake America was announced by Stalin back in 1939). At meetings of the Politburo, they could discuss issues, argue and swear among themselves, but the Secretary General always spoke last. He drew a line beyond which the conversations ended.

Trotsky wrote:

"He directed his attention to people of a primitive warehouse, low culture, strong will and weak intellect ... To cope with people who surpassed him, he selected an apparatus from people who obeyed him."

The entire Stalinist "general" Lev Davidovich called the "kingdom of arrogant mediocrity." All mistakes, mistakes, miscalculations naturally stemmed from militant ignorance, incompetence, cruelty, lack of experience, inability to think at the level of major leaders and the desire to fulfill any instructions of the Leader at any cost.

One falcon Lenin, another falcon Stalin, And all around
the falcons flew in a flock ...

Energy, determination, strong will, widely practiced methods of intimidation and coercion allowed them to manage any assigned business. According to the Stalinist methodology, they rebuilt the structures they led, selected and placed personnel, and prepared the country for war.

Just in January 1934, Comrade Stalin pointed out:

"Things are clearly moving towards a new war ... But we are not afraid of threats and are ready

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to respond with a blow to the blow of the warmongers... And those who try to attack our country will receive a resounding rebuff, so that henceforth it would be repulsive for them to poke their pig's snout into our Soviet garden.

At the same time, there is no doubt that the foreign proletariat and "numerous friends of the working class of the SSSG" will not fail to seize the opportunity and strike at the rear of "their oppressors who started a war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries."

In reality, "the world's first socialist state" was not threatened by anyone. The conclusion in 1932 of non-aggression treaties with Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the Polyshey secured the northwestern borders from their possible anti-Soviet union and made it possible to conclude a Soviet-French non-aggression pact on November 29 of the same year. In September 1934, the USSR joined the League of Nations. On May 2, 1932, France signed a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, although without a military convention.

But events in Europe and the Far East testified to a deep crisis in the Versailles system of international relations. In 1931, the Japanese army invaded Northeast China, and in 1932 occupied Manchuria.

Germany at the beginning of 1935 announced the rejection of military restrictions. On March 10, the creation of aviation was officially announced in Berlin, and on March 16, the introduction of universal military service. On June 18, the Anglo-German agreement on naval armaments was concluded, officially allowing Hitler to start building a powerful fleet. In October, the Italians invaded Ethiopia. A strong Germany was needed by British politicians to limit French hegemony on the Continent. Paris flirted with Rome. Moreover, both the British and the French considered Italian fascism and German Nazism to be counterbalances to Bolshevism. All the great powers were spinning the flywheel of the arms race on the eve of a new fight for the redivision of the world.

Since that time, the main goal of Stalin's foreign policy has been the global reorganization of international relations by "rocking" the capitalist camp, not pushing the consolidation of the great powers, promoting the inevitable inter-imperialist conflict and using the "opportunity". A further strategy was thought out as early as 1925:

"If the war starts, then we will not have to sit idly by - we will have to go out, but to go out last. And we will come out in order to throw a decisive weight on the scales, a weight that could outweigh "(from Stalin's speech at the January plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).

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From 1935, Stalin began the concrete preparation of the country for a future war.

On May 15, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, at his suggestion, decided to create a Defense Commission of the Politburo to lead the preparation of the country for war with the powers hostile to the USSR (Germany, Japan and Polys - in the first place; France and England - in the second). It included Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze. The commission's work was based on the principle: "We will beat the enemy on his own territory."

In 1935, the transition began from the mixed territorial-personnel principle of recruiting the Red Army to a single personnel principle. Short-term training camps of personnel in the conditions of saturation of the army with modern equipment no longer made it possible to provide the necessary level of training for fighters and commanders. A logical measure, in connection with the transformation of the army into a personnel, seems to be the introduction on September 22 of personal military ranks. IN

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" The 47th resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR stated:

"Particularly responsible tasks in the training and education of the Red Army masses, assigned to the commanding staff as a whole, and the leading role of commanders in battle, require the establishment of military ranks that clearly reflect the military qualifications of each commander and commanding person, their seniority and merits, their power and authority as commanders and chiefs of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. In November, by a special decree, five commanders were awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

The Red Army at that time was an impressive force. The total number of armed forces by 1935 amounted to 1 million 200 thousand people, including 980 thousand in the ground forces. There were 4,400 tanks, tankettes and armored vehicles, over 6,000 aircraft in service. Organizationally, the ground forces were reduced to 119 divisions (87 rifle and 32 cavalry), 17 separate brigades (2 rifle, 12 tank, 3 rifle and machine gun brigades), 2 separate tank regiments, 4 tank battalions of the RGC.

Huge work was done to prepare the "small war": a network was created

sabotage groups in cities and on railways, detachments capable of deploying into large partisan formations have been formed and trained, and secret warehouses of food, explosives, weapons and ammunition have been laid. Bridges, large chimneys, depots, water towers, high embankments and deep excavations were prepared in advance for explosions.

So, by January 1, 1930, in the border zone of the South-Western Railway, up to 200 km deep, from the personnel of the border troops and the paramilitary guards of the railways, in addition to the subversive teams of two railway regiments, more than 60 partisan subversive teams with a total number of about 1400 people were trained. Special mine tubes, niches and chambers are equipped on the railway and at facilities. Similar work was carried out in the Belarussian and Leningrad districts.

The plan developed by the Headquarters of the Red Army in the early 1930s to repel "foreign intervention" envisaged the deployment of partisan struggle behind enemy lines from the first days of the war, including outside the USSR. To this end, in addition to the 3rd Airborne Special Purpose Brigade, 33 full-time and non-regular special battalions were created in the Moscow and border districts.

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In accordance with the task set by the Defense Commission, Soviet strategists began to draw up new plans. They considered Poland in alliance with Germany as a likely adversary. Czechoslovakia was considered as a possible ally.

M.N. Tukhachevsky wrote: "For the next short period of time, "to beat the enemy on his territory" means to beat the Polish-German forces on Polish territory."

In order to preempt the enemy in deployment, disrupt the mobilization and transfer of forces, the war must "flare up unexpectedly" and begin with the immediate entry into Western Belarus and Ukraine of the Soviet invasion armies, supported by strong aircraft:

"In this way, invasion operations disrupt the enemy's concentration time if the war began without a pre-mobilization period, which strikes at the Polish mobilization; finally, invasion operations most reliably provide their own strategic concentration ...

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Invasion operations are undertaken precisely because they are late

strategic concentration and it must be ensured by an advance invasion.

Following this, having completed the strategic deployment, the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts from the Grodno-Slonim-Luninets-Lvov line pass into

joint offensive, and it is preferable to deliver the main blow from the area south of Polesie "to the center of Polysh", where the decisive collision.

Various combat options were tested during the headquarters war games in April 1936 and January 1937. According to all calculations, it turned out that the available forces and means of the Red Army were not yet enough to defeat the Polish-German forces "in foreign territory": the number of divisions must be increased at least one and a half times and it is desirable to beat the opponents one by one - the young Wehrmacht was already considered a dangerous enemy. But in any case, invasion operations must remain in effect:

"They provide a gain in time by disorganizing the areas of concentration planned by the enemy. In addition, invasion operations immediately transfer military operations to the territory of the enemy.

Invasion operations with the massive use of aviation, large mobile formations and airborne troops were practiced and honed in the maneuvers of the Kyiv (1935), Belorussian and Moscow (1936), and other districts.

It is worth noting that at that time Germany could not attack the USSR first, even in alliance with Poland. In the years 1935-1937, the power of the Nazis hung on a thread twisted from the well-fed complacency of France and the impudence of Hitler. In March 1936, brazenly carrying out the remilitarization of the Rhineland of his own country, the Fuhrer literally played Russian roulette, bringing War Minister Werner von Blomberg to the state of a "hysterical servant".

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Meanwhile, the process of "arming the proletariat" continued with tripled vigor. In two five-year plans, the USSR was radically transformed and became a mighty military power. The country has reached a high level of economic autarky, which has made it possible to purposefully prepare for the struggle to increase its influence in the world.

Military construction reached a special scale during the second five-year plan. If the total industrial growth for 1933-1937 was 120%, then in the military-industrial complex - 286%. The share of military spending in the country's budget jumped from 11.7% to 21%. About 40% of the estimate of the People's Commissariat of Defense was spent on the purchase of weapons and equipment.

The average annual productivity of the aviation industry in 1935-1937 reached 3578 aircraft, armored vehicles - 3139 combat vehicles (the British army had 375 tanks in 1936), artillery - 5020. The production of rifles stepped over a million a year. But even these figures did not satisfy the military department, whose funding became so generous that they did not have time to spend money - the industry could not cope with orders. The number of armed forces exceeded one and a half million people.

All issues of armament were personally supervised by Stalin. He regularly called

chief designers, directors of factories, discussed the characteristics of types of weapons, set production plans and immediately gave counter

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Marshal Zhukov testified: "Without the approval of I.V. Stalin, not a single type of weapons or military equipment was taken into service or removed from service.

Iosif Vissarionovich, who undoubtedly had a colossal memory, hard work and extensive erudition, but a purely civilian person, decided for himself what the Red Army needed and what not. He, of course, consulted with specialists, who, by the way, changed quite often. But he decided himself: to take on

armament this weapon - remove this weapon from service, remove the Geo) of the rear gunner attack aircraft - put the rear gunner on the attack aircraft, wipe this constructor into camp dust - get it out of the ground and entrust it

responsible government job.

It's just that you can see everything. Even through and through Stalinist in spirit, the Military Historical Journal mentioned "inefficiently spent financial resources." What is it about? The fact that in 1934-1936 "practically all the tanks that rolled off the assembly line were obsolete", almost two billion rubles were spent on the production of scrap metal, "which is comparable to all the spending on education in the USSR during this period."

For example, over these three years, more than 3,600 T-37A and T-38 double amphibious tanks with 8 mm frontal armor, 40 horsepower engines, armed with one 7.62 mm machine gun were riveted (in general, they were in production from 1933 to 1939). As the experience of hostilities in Poland and the Finnish campaign showed, these machine guns on caterpillars sank more readily than they swam, and on rough terrain they lagged behind the infantry and were "not able to walk on small mud." Nevertheless, the "scouts", suitable only for parade passes, were in service until 1941 and disappeared absolutely uselessly, as if they were not there. Not a single tanker left memoirs: "I fought on the T-37."

Or why was it necessary to produce 11,000 T-26 tanks with bulletproof armor? Yes, simply because the scale was such - socialist, the country is big. Vaughn, Zhukov will complain that he lacks 25,000 tanks of the latest designs, and will receive these tanks. Like any dictator, Stalin had a penchant for megalomania, he liked armadas of tanks and planes. He understood that a lot was needed for victory: one hundred thousand combat vehicles, one hundred thousand bombers, more chemical weapons.*

t A quarter of a century later, another "faithful Leninist" to thunderous applause will squander money countless, cut

ships, change guns to rockets, open and close the lunar project; he will be declared a half-wit, but Stalin a genius.

It is difficult, however, at the age of 60 (the anniversary of the brilliant leader and teacher of all progressive mankind "was celebrated in 1938), with an unimaginable workload of various affairs, not only to delve into, but at least understand the essence of such problems as radar, hydroacoustics, radio communications, rocket science, cryptography, or what kind of thing is uranium fission? The problem was that no one else was allowed to make decisions about things of national importance, even Georgy Konstantinovich, even though he became chief of the General Staff.

It has long been a banal saying - all the generals are preparing for the last war. The thinking of Stalin and the vast majority of Soviet generals was marked, firstly, by the non-standard experience of the Civil War and, secondly, by the stereotype of a class approach.

Iosif Vissarionovich considered the war itself less difficult than collectivization - the main thing is to thoroughly prepare and properly place personnel. He did not take military professionals seriously. Quite characteristic is Stalin's telegram to Lenin dated June 16, 1919:

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"Marine experts argued that taking Krasnaya Gorka from the sea upsets marine science. I can only bemoan so-called science. The rapid capture of Krasnaya Gorka is explained by the most rude interference on the part of me and civilians in general in operational affairs, reaching the point of canceling orders by sea and land and imposing their own. I consider it my duty to declare that I will continue to act in this way, despite all my reverence for science.

With each new year, Joseph Vissarionovich's confidence in his military talents only grew stronger. And that is to say, the most illustrious generals of the country learned from him the science of winning. "I cannot fail to recall, at least briefly, one of the classic lessons that was given to us from the commanding heights of Tsaritsyno fields by the great strategist of class battles, Comrade Stalin." So touched by Marshal A.I. Yegorov (1883-1939), who himself commanded the fronts and directed the conduct of strategic operations. But where is Yegorov up to the "giant of thought": "The military operations carried out by Comrade Stalin are an indelible lesson in our minds as examples of classical military art of the Civil War era."

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Stalin considered a very important task, on the eve of the Great War, to restore complete "order" in the house, that is, the transformation of the USSR into a single military labor camp, cemented by faith and fear.

Therefore, on May 15, 1935, he created another body that few people still know about - the Special Commission of the Politburo on Security - to lead the liquidation of the notorious "enemies of the people." The commission included Stalin, Zhdanov, Yezhov, Shkiryatov, Malenkov and Vyshinsky. They were guided by the slogan: "In order to successfully beat the enemy at the front, you must first destroy the enemies in your own rear." The goal is to ensure the "moral and political unity of the Soviet people."

Iosif Vissarionovich went to the top for fifteen years, overcoming the resistance of real enemies, ideological opponents, stubborn and doubting. By their intrigues, he explained all the difficulties and all the failures. He used to look for enemies everywhere and found them everywhere. Enemies were among the "Leninist Guard" of the right and left opposition, engineers-saboteurs, the military, diplomats, traitor peoples, and even in their own families. Like the Jacobin executioner Marat, he could say: "No earthly force can prevent me from seeing traitors and exposing them, probably thanks to the higher organization of my mind."

Lenin recommended killing not only enemies, but also accomplices, as well as "those who could be accomplices", "doubtful and vacillating". Once started, it was time to finish the job, and at the same time clean up the ranks. Too many offended people have accumulated: leaders removed from the helm, deprived of the opportunity to rule by the military, relegated to the background of the "old Bolsheviks", "thinking themselves irreplaceable", arrogant and snickering party nobles, simply "staggering". They corresponded, met, discussed something, and even intended. Undoubtedly, there were those who slept and saw Comrade Stalin in a coffin in white slippers.

The results of the voting at the party congress in 1933 showed the presence of a latent opposition. In the face of a new danger, the "faithful disciples" rallied even closer around the Leader. In the summer of 1936, Stalin began a systematic purge of the top echelon of the party. Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov (1895-1940), this "bloody dwarf", was already trying on his famous mittens.

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As a result of the painstaking work of correctly oriented NKVD investigators, a picture of a grandiose conspiracy emerged that entangled all state structures. It was headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev, expelled from the party three times, sentenced to 10 years in prison, but never disarmed. Secret threads stretched abroad, to Trotsky (to whom else?) The "conspirators" had already carried out the assassination of Kirov and were now planning to seize the Kremlin, physically eliminate Comrade Stalin and members of the Politburo, the list is attached. After that, Trotsky enters Moscow and "restores capitalism."

The long-broken Zinoviev confessed everything at once and declared his readiness to do everything "in order to earn forgiveness, indulgence." It was necessary to tinker with Kamenev, but he quickly gave up. On August 19, 1936, an open trial took place in the House of Unions in the case of the United Trotskyist-Zinoviev Center. 15 people were brought to trial, famous in the recent past, party members - Zinoviev, Kamenev, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Reingold ...

The process went like clockwork. Under the weight of "irrefutable evidence", all the accused confessed to terrorist activities, repented and unanimously demanded that they be shot. Zinoviev publicly repented: "My perverted Bolshevism turned into anti-Bolshevism, and through Trotskyism I came to fascism. Trotskyism is a variety of fascism."

They were all killed on the night of August 26th. Then their children were killed. Under the stormy

applause of the nomenclature, which has not yet realized the full depth of the Leader's plan. The fiery Bolshevik publicist Karl Radek (1885-1939) denounced:

"Destroy this bastard! It is not a matter of destroying the ambitious, who have reached the height of the greatest crime, it is a question of destroying the agents of Faptism, who were ready to help kindle the fire of war, to facilitate the victory of Faptism, in order to get at least the specter of power out of its hands. People who raise arms against the lives of their beloved leaders of the proletariat must pay with their heads for their immeasurable guilt. Trotsky, the main organizer of this gang and its affairs, has already been pilloried by history. He cannot escape the verdict of the world proletariat."

For the sake of a pogromous publication, the arrest of Karl himself was postponed for a while, the scoundrel knew how to burn people's hearts with a verb.

Voti Georgy Pyatakov simply choked with indignation.

"There are not enough words to fully express my indignation and disgust. These are people who have lost the last features of their human appearance. They must be destroyed, destroyed, like carrion, battling clean, cheerful air.

Well, they soon destroyed it too - indeed, a real carrion.

Antonov-Ovseenko burst out with an article in Izvestia about "a special detachment of fascist saboteurs with whom there can be only one conversation - execution!" and praised "comrade Stalin, who sees the future with an eagle eye, ensures unity, turned the USSR into a mighty granite cliff."

Vladimir Alexandrovich forgot about his Trotskyist past, so he was soon reminded and also put up against the wall.

Chekists have already pulled out confrontations of participants in future political trials, together with the accused they edited the testimony, perfected the wording, invented the details. "Iron People's Commissar" Yezhov described the mechanics of the investigation with delightful spontaneity:

"Three times than giving the protocol for signature to the accused, he is first

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the investigator looked through, then handed it over to higher authorities, and important protocols even reached the people's commissar. The People's Commissar made instructions, said that it was necessary to write it down like this, and not like that, and then the protocol was given to the accused to sign.

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On January 23-29, 1937, another trial of Lenin's comrades-in-arms took place - the case of the "parallel Trotskyist center." It was attended by old Bolsheviks, repentant and forgiven oppositionists, meritorious

leaders of the party of "miracles" Pyatakov, Radek, Serebryakov, Sokolnikov, Muralov and others - a total of 17 people. As it turned out, they also killed Kirov, were engaged in espionage, sabotage, training of terrorist groups, made plans for the defeat of the Soviet Union in the war with Germany. In a word, they "spoiled clean air" and dreamed of restoring the "capitalist order."

At the trial, they all confessed so readily that the famous German writer Lion Feuchtwanger (1884-1958) who was present in the hall later wrote: accuracy of everything that happened.

This is to the point: Radek, dejected by the investigator's literary mediocrity, scribbled protocols on himself with his own hand, Pyatakov wildly fantasized about how he secretly flew by plane to Oslo to establish contact with Trotsky and negotiate German intervention.

Meticulously sort everything out, the court sentenced 13 people to death, four were "imprisoned" and killed a little later, in the camps.

Having betrayed all his friends and students, N.I. Bukharin wrote:

"The fact that the bastards were shot is excellent: the air immediately cleared ... Koba! I saw how the spirit of Ilyich rests on you.

Soon the turn came to Bukharin, morally he was already a dead man, "a soul burdened with a corpse." At his leisure, he composed letters of love to Stalin, poems about a happy life in the USSR and an appeal to the "Future Generation of Party Leaders":

"I am penniless for the new, young and honest generation of party leaders to read my letter at the Plenum of the Central Committee, to justify and reinstate me in the party. Know, comrades, that on the banner that you will carry in your victorious march towards communism, there is also my drop of blood."

"These are the bastards we worked with ... And if it weren't for these repressive methods, they wouldn't be so afraid - you also need to keep in mind," Molotov, who lived to a ripe old age, shrugged his hands.

"But now they say that the prosecution did not have any facts, except for the confession of the accused, which is not yet evidence of guilt," Felix Chuev, who spoke with him, doubted.

"What more proof of guilt is needed," answered Molotov, "when we already knew that they were guilty, that they were enemies!"

At one time, Bukharin himself formulated: "The one who wins the revolution is the one who

break another's skull." Comrade Stalin turned out to be quicker, he never turned his back. He, a real revolutionary, tirelessly made holes

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the backs of the heads of others. To whom a bullet, to whom an alpenstock. That's why he won. And the air became cleaner and more cheerful.

Across the country, "where people breathe so freely," a full-scale hunt was unfolding for "enemies of the people" and members of their families. The center lowered quotas for the shooting of people in each republic and each region along the administrative chain. From the seats they shouted: "Not enough!" and put forward counter plans. For example, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine complained: "Dear Comrade Stalin. Ukraine sends you 17-18 thousand arrested people every month. Moscow claims 2-3 thousand. Please take action. Loving you Nikita Khrushchev.

The repressive machine was gaining momentum. Party members and non-party members, workers and peasants, schoolchildren and professors, atheists and clergymen, housewives and members of the Central Committee of the party, artists and Chekists died in a bloody meat grinder.

At the February-March Plenum of 1937, the Secretary General made the famous report: "On the shortcomings of party work and measures to eliminate Trotskyist and other double-dealers":

"Remember: no successes can annul the fact of capitalist encirclement... As long as there is capitalist encirclement, there will be sabotage, terror, sabotage, spies sent to the rear of the Soviet Union... We must smash, discard the rotten theory that with each By our progress, the class struggle will fade away."

Delegates - members of the Politburo, party bosses and heads of the national economy, zealously, in a race, reported on successes in exposing pests. They, the owners of a new life, always liked this business, so far they had fun.

The stenographers recorded bouts of joyful animation: the evening meeting on March 1, 1937 was the goal. Here is the People's Commissar for Water Transport Pakhomov:

"Recently, they only began to check the footage and already such a bouquet. Serdyuk is the head of the Dnepropetrovsk shipping company, Khandozhko is the deputy head of the Yenisei shipping company—I name the names of people who have already been exposed and arrested (Laughter). Zimin - head of the mechanical ship service, Kuvshinov - deputy head of the Upper Volga Shipping Company, Bovin - head of the Central Administration of the Upper Volga Shipping Company, Samartsev - deputy. Head of the Moscow-Oka Shipping Company. (STALIN. Bovin was also arrested?) He was also arrested, he also turned out to be a bastard. (Molotov. Properly arrested?) Correct. (MOLOTOV. Didn't you know before?) No, I didn't.

I won't waste your time reading a large list, I have this list for 77 people. (Laughter), of which 2/3 are arrested. (STALIN. Not enough) Comrade. Stalin, I told you that this is only the beginning. (Laughter of all

hall).

We must work in a new way, and for this we must, first of all, expose all pests. How can they be revealed? If we take this fact and really consider it, consider in a new way why this happened, then we will go all the way and reveal one or two more bastards, I assure you. And as soon as we catch two or three bastards, these two or three bastards will give another two or three bastards (Laughter).

Here is an excerpt from the speech of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov:

"For example, in the State Bank of the USSR, we uncovered a rather powerful Trotskyist organization of up to 20 people ... (VOICES FROM THE LOCAL 3d0rovo! Wow!) ... In terms of the People's Commissariat of Light Industry, we are, in fact, just turning around. Although now we have

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convicted 141 active pests and saboteurs. Of these, a fairly significant group was shot."

Pests were hiding everywhere. Explosions in mines, accidents - sabotage and "wrecking labor protection"; lack of funds - "sabotage instructions for lending to agriculture", sewerage does not work - "sabotage

drafting." Along the way, they admitted to their own incompetence:

"We need, comrade business executives, to thoroughly dig and figure out where the secrets are in projects, and in enterprises, and in workshops, and in units ... So, in order for us not to have wrecking things, for this we must, firstly, to know and be able to truly understand all matters, and secondly, to take under real control, under real verification, those decisive things that we need.

Stalin (he is preparing for the war, provides a "reliable rear", Molotov explained the Great Terror in this way) carefully observed this bacchanalia, conducted a selection: with whom it would be possible to "go on reconnaissance", whom it was time to lower into the basement, who else would come in handy. On the desk of the General Secretary are no longer Lenin's volumes - theoretical disputes have long been over - but the history of the deeds of Ivan the Terrible:

"In such a slow and sure way, all local charters were destroyed. Veche disappeared, the squad turned into court servants, in everything dependent on the excellent disposition of the prince. The prince himself and his power rose to an unattainable height, and the greatness of this power was evident to everyone, for there was a flat field around. In the margins - Stalin's notes: "Teacher ... teacher" ...

Immediately after the end of the Plenum, a general directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks followed, which stated that "now the weakness of our people is not their technical backwardness, but political carelessness, blind trust in people who accidentally received a party card, the need to check people not according to their political declarations, but according to the results of their work.

Not immediately, but it finally dawned on the party boyars that in the right to a bullet they were equalized with all the happy Soviet people:

"The top was gripped by fear. Everyone competed in cursing former friends and lied to their friend, father and mother, and children, just to demonstrate loyalty to the "mustachioed". People were waiting for arrest from the day they put it on and even lied to themselves, even in their diaries, hoping that they would be read during the investigation.

The change of cadres, which took on the character of mass repressions, led to the fact that many leaders stopped thinking altogether, because any initiative is punishable, in an atmosphere of "face hunting" - mortally dangerous. An atmosphere of fear was instilled in society, a paralyzed will, leading to moral degradation. The party "generals" and the party "officers" fell into madness from the feelings of devotion and horror that overwhelmed the feverish brain.

Here is a candidate member of the Politburo P.P. Postyshev:

"Everywhere and everywhere he began to shout that there were no decent people anywhere, that there were many enemies ... Often Postyshev called representatives of the district committees to him, took a magnifying glass and began to examine student notebooks. The covers of all notebooks were torn off, because Postyshev saw a fascist swastika on the cover in the ornament!

But neither proletarian origin, coupled with a complete lack of education, nor merits in the collectivization of Ukraine, nor zeal in carrying out the Great Purge helped Pavel Petrovich. And with a magnifying glass, it must be admitted that he came up with a good idea. Every secretary of the city committee, district committee, party committee will acquire a magnifying glass in the Soviet country; everyone will search and find - in children's notebooks, in drawings

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" in fabrics, on money (the first Soviet money was printed with a swastika) - secret Faptist signs inflicted by the ubiquitous enemy agents. They would all be sent to illegal work in Germany, red stars on the Reichstag according to

paint at night.

After each cleansing wave, the "leaders" became smaller, became shorter in stature, poorer in mind. Party workers at all levels made up the most illiterate stratum of the Soviet "intelligentsia". On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, 70% of the secretaries of district and city party committees, as well as party committees of organizations and enterprises, had only a complete or incomplete LOWER education. The leaders of the union and autonomous republics, regional committees and regional committees did not differ much from their younger associates and fellow politicians: half of them had a general education in the amount of four classes of elementary

schools!

(The initial period of the war once again confirmed the well-known truth: executioners cannot be defenders. The party and Soviet workers who scurried to the east became the most mobile "ground units", far surpassing the notorious tank groups both in speed and in terms of transport equipment. They will throw secret documents, favorite magnifying glasses, ungrateful people, their duties in carrying out mobilization activities, but they will not forget to take their wives,

mistresses, chests of drawers and ficuses in tubs. Here are just a few examples, from just two weeks into the memorable summer of 1941:

"Leading officials of the Grodno, Novograd-Volynsky, Korostensky, Ternopilsky districts fled in a panic long before the departure of our units, and instead of taking out material values, they took out personal belongings using the vehicles at their disposal" ...

"In Pinsk, in a panic, they themselves blew up artillery warehouses and oil depots and announced that the Germans had blown them up with bombs, and the head of the garrison and the regional party committee fled to us in Luninets" ...

In Vitebsk a week before the arrival of the Germans:

"The regional executive committee dissolved its departments. Most of the workers with their families left. District councils also do not work and do not impose any order in the city. Now in Vitebsk there is not a single institution that would work. Everything was closed and self-liquidated, including the regional court, people's courts, regional prosecutor's office, regional health, trade unions, etc. Anxiety and panic were intensified by the fact that the city became aware of

the fact that senior officials of regional organizations evacuate their families with their property themselves, having received on the railway. station independent carriages, and the wives of these response workers from the NKVD, the regional executive committee, party organs and others began to leave work without permission. So, for example, they left the telegraph office, the telephone network, hospitals and other institutions... Chairman of the Vitebsk City Council Azarenka loaded a barrel of beer into a truck prepared by him in order to get drunk on the road, as he usually does in the city at his service. ..

"It should be noted that a number of workers of party and Soviet organizations left the districts to the mercy of fate, fleeing along with the population, sowing panic. The Secretary of the RK CP (b) U and the Chairman of the RKK of the Khmel'nitsky region on July 8 / July 8 / left the region and fled.

Together with the population is a strong word. Where did the population get trucks and "independent wagons"? The secretary tribe left the population to the mercy of fate.

They will return only after three years, they will declare all those who remained in the occupied territories as second-class people, "under the influence of fascism." And then

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for five decades in a row they will sing about their "leading and guiding role", fill up the counters with waste paper about underground regional committees "in action" and about how "a party ticket made a fighter twice as strong").

In March 1938, the last open political spectacle was played in Moscow - the trial of the "Anti-Soviet Right-Trotsky Bloc". The main roles were played by N.I. Bukharin (in prison enlightenment descended on him - he realized the supreme expediency of the Stalinist terror: "there is some kind of big and bold political idea of the General Purge: a) in connection with the pre-war period, 6) in connection with

transition to democracy (?), this purge captures all a) guilty, 6) suspicious, c) potentially suspicious"), N.I. Rykov, A.I. Yagoda, N.N. Krestinsky, A.T. Rozengolts, M.A. Chernov, I.A. Zelensky.

It turns out that these bad people also killed Kirov, survived Gorky, Menzhinsky, Kuibyshev (his brother commander Nikolai Kuibyshev, commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District, also a "conspirator", was already in prison, he was shot in August), they planned to cut the entire Politburo, distorted true policy of collectivization, dreamed of returning the free Soviet peoples under the "capitalist yoke", collaborated with German, Polish, Japanese, British intelligence, with the nationalist underground, with military conspirators, with wreckers from the NKVD, blew up something and even gave cartridges to Fanny Kaplan, to shoot at Lenin. In general, they spoiled the Soviet government where they could and how they could.

During collectivization, more than half of the country's 33 million horses, 70 million heads of cattle and pigs perished. So, Chernov, People's Commissar for Agriculture, personally exhausted the horses, organized three factories "for the development of infectious drugs" and almost left the red cavalry without horses. He and his accomplices "specially inoculated erysipelas and swine fever." Rozengolts organized the "wrecking export of cast iron" to Japan, from which the Japanese military made shells to bring them down on the heads of peaceful Soviet citizens. Chairman of the Central Union I.A. Zelensky poured glass and nails into oil and other "food items".

And with such a "bouquet" of articles, the head of the conspiracy, Bukharin, hoped that they would save his life, send him to serve his term "in Pechora and Kolyma, in a camp where I would set up a university (!), institutes (!!), an art gallery (!!!), Zoo and Photo Museum (?)"

On March 15, 1938, he was radically cured of chronic infantilism. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced 18 members of the "bloc" to death, three were given 25 years in prison.

The last representatives of the tribe of the "old Bolsheviks" were sung by the Prosecutor General of the USSR Andrei Yanuarievich Vyshinsky (1883-1954):

"The whole country, from small to old, is waiting and demanding one thing. traitors and pythons, who sold our homeland to the enemy, to be shot like filthy dogs! Our people demand one. crush the damned bastard!

Time will pass. The graves of the hated traitors will be overgrown with weeds and thistles, covered with the eternal contempt of honest Soviet people, of the entire Soviet people. And above us, above our happy country, our sun will still shine brightly and joyfully with its bright rays. We, our people, will continue to walk along the road cleansed of the last evil spirits and abominations of the past, led by our beloved leader and teacher - the great Stalin - forward and forward, towards communism!

Happy is the man who was born in the 8th Soviet century

In 1939, the Soviet Union was ruled by a completely different party. Gone

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" th, the times when someone had the courage to object, ask questions, just open their mouths in the presence of the Great Pilot. Of the fifteen people's commissars of the first set of the Council of People's Commissars, who shared portfolios after the capture of the Winter Palace, three remained alive - Trotsky, Avilov-Glebov (both had already been sentenced) and Stalin; naturally, four people managed to depart to the other world.

At the April gathering of party activists of the Kyiv Special Military District, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar of the 1st rank L.3. Mehlis shared his impressions of the last congress:

"Huh! At the Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks there were neither oppositional nor vilely disguised speeches. Even outwardly, the congress looked different - Bolshevik organization, smartness, efficiency characterize the work of the congress. During the work of the congress, people did not hang out in the corridors and smoking rooms. We listened attentively to the speakers, the audience caught every word of the speakers and quickly reacted.

The delegates followed with special love and attention every word of the leader of our party, Comrade Stalin. There are no words that could express that warm feeling, that love, those glances that stretched from the hall to the leaders of the party and government, to that person with whose name this victorious struggle is inextricably linked - to the great comrade Stalin ...

In its unity, in its solidity, in its solidarity and single purposefulness, X\Y! The Party Congress occupies an outstanding place in the history of Bolshevism. For many years we have not succeeded in creating such a situation in the party... The great leader of the party, Comrade Stalin, the leaders of the party and the government were all unanimously elected by the congress to the Central Committee."

He is no longer human. Later N.S. Khrushchev wrote:

"We are used to: since Stalin proposes, then there are no questions - a God-given proposal; everything that God gives, they don't discuss, but thank for it "(in a good mood, the Kremlin god patted the secretary of the Moscow Regional Party Committee on his shaved head and called him his" little Marx ", Nikita Sergeevich blushed and blossomed with a happy smile).

It is clear that such a large-scale conspiracy could not have been carried out without the participation of the military in it. On February 23, 1937, People's Commissar Yezhov announced at a plenum that the leaders of the anti-Soviet organization of the right, which was headed by the center consisting of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, Uglanov and Schmidt, planned not only to carry out a series of terrorist and sabotage acts, but also plotted to "overthrow the Stalinist regime" by a palace coup, "which could be carried out by one of the red generals."

Another option is to prepare for the defeat of the USSR in a war with Germany or Japan, which, of course, could not be achieved without the help of a "especially conspiratorial" military organization. Molotov confirmed: "Military

the department is a very big deal, its work will not be checked now, but a little later, and it will be checked very tightly.

Repressions shook the Red Army more than once. In the mid-1920s, a purge of commanding officers and political workers suspected of sympathizing with the Trotskyist opposition was carried out. A few years later, measures were taken to purge the Red Army from former officers of the old army. In November 1928, already 72% of the Red commanders were from workers and peasants. Only from November 1, 1929 to December 31, 1931, 4473 personnel and 5600 variable people were withdrawn from the army.

The matter was not limited to their dismissal. A number of conspiracy cases were put together, in which more than three thousand commanders were convicted. A wave of arrests swept through

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army in connection with the assassination of Kirov. For the period from December 1, 1934 to January 20, 1935, 43 servicemen were arrested in the Moscow Military District alone "for the open manifestation of counter-revolutionary sentiments". 131 people were dismissed from the Military-Political Academy, many of them were then expelled from the party and arrested. The vigilant authorities never let the army out of their sight, but the peak of terror came in 1937-1938.

According to the note of the army commissioner of the 2nd rank E.A. Shchadenko, from March 1, 1937 to March 1, 1938, 21,268 military personnel were dismissed from the Red Army, including 17,413 people for political reasons, 5329 of them were arrested and convicted. Thus, during this period, "only" a little more than 1% of the payroll of the armed forces was cleared. But what a "percentage" it was! Terror has never touched such high-ranking leaders. At the head of the Trotskyist military conspiracy were the marshal and the commanders of the troops of the most important districts!

The first to be exposed, arrested and shot in June 1937 was the "Tukhachevsky gang". Marshal Voroshilov, even before the trial of the "traitors", by a secret order, brought to the personnel of all companies, squadrons, batteries and squadrons information about the exposure of the military fascist organization by the NKVD, which had "the desire to liquidate the Soviet Union and restore the yoke of landowners and capitalists in the USSR", which was preparing murders the leaders of the party and government, which sold military secrets to enemies, undermining the "defense power of our Motherland."

Then everything went on a knurled track: "And as soon as we catch two or three bastards, these two or three bastards will give another two or three bastards." As a result, dozens of counter-revolutionary organizations were identified that metastasized all branches of the armed forces, all divisions of the armed forces. And began firing on their own.

In 1937-1938, three deputy people's commissars of defense, the people's commissar of the navy, 16 commanders of district troops, 25 of their deputies and assistants, 5 commanders of fleets, 8 heads of military academies, 25 chiefs of staff of districts, fleets and their deputies were repressed in 1937-1938. 33 corps commanders, 76 division commanders, 40 brigade commanders, 291 regiment commanders, two deputy chiefs of the political department of the Red Army, head of the political department of the Navy and a number of other commanders and political workers.

Since perestroika, for a long time, from book to book, from one television program to another, the phrase wandered:

"Three marshals of the Soviet Union out of five, two army commissars of the 1st rank out of two, two commanders of the 1st rank out of four, 12 commanders of the 2nd rank out of 12, two flagships of the fleet of the 1st rank out of two, 15 army commissioners of the 2nd rank out of 15...", and so on. Who counted, according to what formula - is no longer understood. It is also not clear what historical period was meant, and who was included in the category of "repressed". Some credibility was given by the fact that the marshals were counted correctly. But it also follows from this that the period covered fits within the years 1935-1939, which deprives all other calculations of any meaning.

Let's start with the fact that in 1935 five people were awarded the title of commander of the 1st rank. Of these, one died a natural death in 1936 and was buried with the highest honors (S.S. Kamenev), two (Yakir and Uborevich) were shot in 1937. Later, four more military leaders became commanders of the 1st rank, and three were shot. The three remaining (Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Kulik) in 1940 became marshals of the USSR.

There was only one army commissar of the 1st rank - the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, Jan Gamarnik. He shot himself. Then this title

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assigned to Peter Smirnov, Yefim Shadenko and Lev Mekhlis. The first was shot, and the other two felt great.

There were nine commanders of the 2nd rank of the "first wave". In 1936, I.I. Vapetisi, A.I. Sedyakin. In 1937, seven were repressed, Ivan Fedko was sent for promotion, and the title of commander of the 2nd rank was given to S.K. Timoshenko. In 1938-1939, three more were arrested.

During the same period, I.R. Apanasenko, N.N. Voronov, O.I. Gorodovikov, V.D. Grendal, M.1. Kovalev, I.S. Konev, S.I. Kulik, V.N. Kurdyumov, A.D. Loktionov, K.A. Meretskov, D.G. Pavlov, Ya.V. Smushkevich, I.V. Smorodinov, I.V. Tyulenev, G.M. Stern and others. These were imprisoned and (or) shot already in the ranks of generals. Therefore, "twelve out of twelve" does not work. The same confusion with commissioners.

In total, they shot: marshals - 3, army commanders of the 1st rank - 5, fleet flagships of the 1st rank - 2, army commanders of the 2nd rank - 10, army commissar of the 1st rank - 1, army commissars of the 2nd rank - 15, army military jurist - 1, commanders - 60, corps commissars - 25, commanders - 136, brigade commanders - 221, brigade

commissars - 34. Total 513 top bosses.

In the festive report "XX years of the Red Army and the Navy" in February 1938, Voroshilov

stated:

"After the destruction of the Faptist military gang and the cleansing of its ranks of corrupt, treacherous abominations, the Red Army became immeasurably stronger, more than ever monolithic and soldered around the party of Lenin-Stalin, around our Workers 'and Peasants' Government. However, in personal notes, Kliment Efremovich wrote something else: "The authority of the army in the country has been shaken ... The authority of the command staff has been undermined ... This means that the methods of our work, the entire system of command and control of the army, my work, as a people's commissar, have suffered a crushing collapse."

The army was completely decapitated. The entire command of the navy, the entire "clip" of the commanders of the military districts and their deputies, since 1924, with the exception of Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov, the entire leadership of the General Staff and departments, the teaching staff of higher military educational institutions were killed. The rotation of command, the leapfrog of movements inevitably led to a decrease in the level of combat readiness of the troops.

The newly appointed military leaders first of all uprooted the "wrecking" undertakings of the previous ones. So, in Transbaikalia in 1937-1938, five commanders of the district were replaced. Army General M.I. Kazakov recalled how in July 1937, after one year of study, he was released from the academy ahead of schedule and sent to the Central Asian District:

"Literally a few days after my arrival, the commander of the troops of the district commander I.K. was recalled to Moscow. Gryaznov never returned. He was replaced by Oka Ivanovich Gorodovikov, who had previously been Gryaznov's deputy. Then, for no more than two months, the post of commander was held by A.D. Loktionov, then by L. G. Petrovsky, and at the end of the year commander I.R. Apanasenko. I have the best memories of the chief of staff, brigade commander A.K. Malyshev. Unfortunately, we worked together for a very short time. In early March 1938, quite unexpectedly, Malyshev was removed from the post of chief of staff of the district, and I was appointed in his place. Almost simultaneously with this, a number of other replacements took place in the governing department of the district ...

The frequent change of commanders did not bring anything good. Some of them did not start with creative activity, but with the reorganization and breaking of everything that

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that was created before them. This had a very negative effect on the solution of the tasks that confronted the troops, and most importantly, on the mood of the commanding staff. It took a lot of effort to restore people's confidence and efficiency."

What if there is a war tomorrow? Apparently, Stalin was not going to fight yet. According to the observation of Konstantin Simonov, the Leader has already imagined that "he can plan history."

The strengthening of political supervision, the elimination of one-man command and the restoration on May 10, 1937 of the institution of military commissars did not increase the combat effectiveness of the army. But how could one manage without them, because "the commissar is the eyes and ears of the party and

government." Czechoslovak attaché Colonel F. Dastich on this occasion wrote:

"For me, the theory is completely intolerable that, due to the peculiarities of Russian psychology and the Soviet system, the Red Army is able to operate effectively on a basis that is unacceptable for the armies of other states. I have carefully studied the system of political commissars ... It cannot mean anything other than the division of command powers.

Moreover, in addition to the presence of sensitive ears and keen eyes, in all other respects the commissars demonstrated blatant illiteracy. In the act of accepting cases of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda by its new head in the fall of 1940, it was noted: the general educational level of the political staff is low: only 6.2% have a higher education, and 71.5% are below secondary. It was another set of vigilantes with magnifying glasses in their hands, who understood less about military affairs than the civil war commissars.

Military intelligence, a nest of spies, was defeated. In 1937-1938, 182 people were arrested there. The head of the political department of this department, Ilyichev, informed L.3. Mehlis:

"You know that, in essence, we have no intelligence ... There are no military attaches in America, Japan, England, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Finland, Iran, Turkey, i.e. in almost all major countries.

In the end, they destroyed all the persons who held the post of head of Soviet military intelligence from March 1924 to July 1940 tenge. The last pre-war head of the Intelligence Agency was the professional commissar F.I. Golikov (1900-1980). It was he who reported to Stalin on March 20, 1941:

"The most possible date for the start of hostilities against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany with her. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR this spring must be regarded as disinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence.

They curtailed and completely ruined all the work done in preparation for the guerrilla war. Firstly, they were still going to fight on foreign territory, and "we won't give up our own land." Secondly, and most importantly, in people with specific skills in sabotage and subversion, Stalin saw not the defenders of the country, but a threat to the regime he had established.

The Chekists, unraveling the tangle of a military conspiracy, "irrefutably proved": the traitors Uborevich and Yakir conducted demolition training and mining of important objects on the instructions of the Germans in their districts, preparing the defeat of the Red Army in the coming conflict. These commanders received instructions from the commander of the Berlin Military District (?), General von Rundstedt. Therefore, the workers of the General Staff, the NVKD, the secretaries of the regional committees involved in

preparation for the "small war", the commanders of the Red Army, who underwent special training. They destroyed the network of partisan schools, along with their leaders and students, and disbanded partisan detachments and groups. Most of the "Red partisans" were arrested as bandits preparing secret bases for foreign invaders. Few survived. Professional saboteur I.G. Starinov wrote in his memoirs:

"All the bases and partisan detachments prepared in advance in case of war were liquidated, the cadres of the partisans were destroyed, and anyone who was involved in this matter was considered as an enemy of the people or an accomplice of the enemy of the people."

As a result, when it broke out, with the deployment of the partisan struggle, they were a year late, and even then it was all a complete improvisation, incomparable with the opportunities lost, destroyed by their own hands. And the "small war" was led by loyal, but little versed in it comrades, like Ponomarenko, Voroshilov or Zhukov (Georgy Konstantinovich, apparently recalling his youth and personal experience in suppressing the Antonov rebellion, in his instructions to the partisans recommended that when occupying settlements, the first thing to do was to set up patrols and take hostages from among the local population).

The arrests of high-ranking military leaders entailed a chain reaction of terror in relation to their subordinate employees, the elimination of the "sabotage" directions they supervised in military science, in the creation of new types of weapons, the seizure of "sabotage" textbooks, instructions and theoretical works. The mechanized corps were disbanded.

The repressions in the armed forces pursued the same goal as the repressions in the party: on the eve of the "decisive battle" to create an obedient and loyal mechanism to Stalin, to make the command staff an obedient puppet in the hands of the political leadership. Military leaders with ambitions, hesitant, thinking, incomprehensible, and therefore doubtful, were removed from the army. Military talent or, conversely, military mediocrity, did not play a role. Which, of course, did not contribute to the development of the breadth of thinking among the new nominees. But that's exactly what they didn't need. Stalin needed only absolute obedience, he presented his army as a multimillion-strong, obedient to a single will, mechanized horde led by unreasoning, blindly loyal "Stalinist commanders."

Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov wrote:

"Stalin decided, the rest were left to act in accordance with this ... People who are accustomed not to act independently, but only to wait for orders and instructions from above, so as not to hesitate to carry them out, will be of little use if a harsh hour comes. Fear of punishment and irresponsibility live side by side. The work of the military apparatus is not proceeding according to plan, but as if spasmodically, in jerks. Fulfilled one order - and waiting for the next. What if it doesn't arrive on time?"

The repressions also had foreign policy consequences. It was clear to any outside observer that the massive annihilation of the command staff of the Red Army caused enormous damage to its combat capability.

Potential allies once again pondered the question of whether it is worth dealing with the Soviets at all? How can one trust a government whose members organize sabotage, train wrecks, political assassinations, or prepare to defeat their own army in a future conflict with "foreign aggressors"? The People's Commissar of Communications blows up mines. The People's Commissar for Agriculture "artificially spreads epizootics", destroys livestock and spoils crops. The People's Commissariat of Defense is full of spies and conspirators. And even the head of the pioneer camp

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"Artek", together with the main Pioneer leader, are plotting a grandiose sapper sabotage operation to bring down the Ayu-Dag mountain on the head of comrade Molotov, who admires the beauty of the Crimea.

In the spring of 1937, a decision was being prepared in Paris on negotiations with the USSR at the level of the General Staffs. However, after the first arrests in the top Soviet military leadership, Lieutenant Colonel L. Simon, the French military attaché in Moscow, in a report dated June 14, recommended not to rush things:

"In this state of affairs, it seems prudent, before embarking on military negotiations, to wait for signs of a certain internal calm to appear in the USSR ... If official explanations do not correspond to reality, then what is the price of a regime that seeks to destroy energetic and knowledgeable people who almost twenty years...

Of course, one would like the execution of eight military leaders to be justified by serious motives, but the history of the Bolshevik regime suggests that the true motives were undoubtedly less serious than one might imagine. Indeed, one should not forget that in Russia human life has never been of great value. The words themselves do not have the meaning given to them in Western Europe. This is the case with the words "freedom" and "democracy", which are here pronounced rather out of cunning and which do not correspond to the idea we put into them ...

Even now, Mr. Stalin looks like a figure who, if necessary, can pursue an opportunist policy and is perfectly able to appropriate the concepts of his destroyed opponents. That is why it is so difficult to foresee the orientation that he will choose, and which, quite probably, is known only to himself.

In Paris, they agreed with Simon's analysis and decided to postpone the establishment of military contacts with an unpredictable partner.

The new attaché, General Auguste-Antoine Palace, only confirmed the French leadership in the opinion that in the event of a war with Germany, significant military assistance should not be expected from the Soviet Union. At the end of June 1938, Palace wrote:

"1) The Red Army probably no longer has high-ranking commanders who would participate in the world war except as soldiers or non-commissioned officers.

2) The military doctrine developed by Tukhachevsky and his entourage, which the instructions and instructions declared wrecking and canceled, no longer exists.

3) The level of military and general culture of the cadres, which had previously been very low, especially fell due to the fact that the highest command posts were transferred to officers who were quickly promoted to command a corps or army, jumped several steps at once and were chosen either from young people whose training leaves wish for the best and whose intellectual qualities excluded a critical or non-conformist position, or from among the militaries of no value, found themselves in the public eye in a civil war and subsequently pushed aside, which allowed them to avoid any contact with the "enemies of the people". Under the current conditions, promotion in the Red Army is a kind of diploma of incompetence.

4) The purge, spreading down the stairs from top to bottom, deeply disorganizes military units and badly affects their training and even on their conditions.

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existences. In this regard, the increasingly numerous complaints about the poor maintenance of military equipment are very indicative ...

5) The incessant movement of officers, against which the Soviet command strongly opposed since 1930, as a result of the purge, became more than ever numerous...

6) The establishment of the institution of military commissars, the efforts made to put at the head of military units officers who served in areas remote from each other and unfamiliar with each other, and more and more direct supervision by the state security organs puts the cadres of the Red Army in a position of impossibility useful work and deprives them of any initiative and enthusiasm for the work.

7) Even discipline is undermined by criticism from the subordinates, who are pushed and shaken to this, their bosses, constantly suspected that tomorrow they will turn out to be "enemies of the people."

This unfortunate situation, which inflicted more serious damage on the Soviet cadres (at least in the high command) than the world war, makes the Red Army almost unusable at the present time. The Soviet authorities are aware of this and are making unremitting efforts to train new cadres as soon as possible. However, despite the creation of numerous new schools and intensive posting of officers to refresher courses, the severe wounds from the catastrophe caused by the purge will in all likelihood take years to heal.

Hitler came to the same conclusion. Confirmation of their correctness for him was the course of the Winter War of the Soviet Union with Finland. When planning the Eastern campaign, the Fuhrer, as an important strategic factor, laid in

calculations low professional level of the Soviet command.

Here is the opinion of Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky:

"Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start a war, the rout of the military cadres that happened in our country played a large role.

Stalin, confident in the miraculous method, and subsequently regularly arranged bloodletting for the military. In total, in 1936-1940, approximately 43-44 thousand military personnel were repressed, including about 10 thousand commanding officers from the middle level and above.

In the textbooks "History of the CPSU" for a long time they wrote:

"Under the leadership of I.V. Stalin, the Bolshevik Party defeated the enemy agents and thus promptly destroyed all possibilities for the appearance of a "fifth column" in the USSR. The defeat of the enemies of the people was of great importance for strengthening the defense capability and was tantamount to winning a major battle.

Whether it was a column or not, Stalin completely removed the problem of opposition: when, with his arrogance, he put the country on the brink of death, no one even dared to utter a word at the Boss.

Zhzhzhzh Today's neo-Stalinists have come up with an absolutely wonderful theory.

The Great Saint Joseph Stalin and his apostle Lavrenty Beria lived in the Soviet country. Everyone else, including the inner circle, turned out to be stupid,

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bastards and self-seekers. Everything that Comrade Stalin did was right and ingenious, everything for the good of the people. And if it were not for millions of external and internal enemies, milky rivers with jelly banks would flow into the USSR. Therefore, the terror of the 1930s was an absolutely necessary, far-sighted action. However, with some twists:

"Unfortunately, the objectively necessary elimination of the fifth column in the country was not without serious shortcomings. Infiltrating into the state security organs, foreign intelligence agents managed in a number of cases to arrest and convict innocent people. By doing this, they pursued two goals: to damage the party cadres, to compromise the punitive policy (!) of the Soviet government in the elimination of the fifth column in the country "

(From the political biography of I. V. Stalin, prepared by his grateful descendants).

So, the seasoned residents of the Abwehr and the defenders compromised, you understand, the policy of "liquidation" in order to splatter the white clothes of St. Joseph with innocent blood.

I wonder what Nikolai Yezhov and his colleagues are, who are they? Sneaking agents or "innocent people"?

Along with the successes in industrialization and collectivization, there was another reason for pride: "There are no exploiters left on the sacred Soviet land", which means, the Secretary General announced at the Tenth and Second Congress, socialism has already been built in the USSR, a new phase has begun - a gradual transition to communism .

For a successful "transition", in accordance with the precepts of Lenin, the proletariat had to defeat, expropriate and destroy the exploiters in the world masstab. Stalin believed that he was already sufficiently well prepared to intervene in European affairs. The USSR had a powerful economy, a developed military-industrial complex, and a well-armed one and a half million army. In the third five-year plan, the construction of "understudy factories" beyond the Urals, inaccessible to "all kinds of air attacks," began. It is no coincidence that at a meeting of Moscow and Leningrad propagandists, Stalin declared:

"There are cases when the Bolsheviks themselves will attack: if the war is just, if the situation is suitable, if the conditions are favorable. They are not at all against an offensive, not against any war. The fact that we shout about defense is a veil, a veil. All states are in disguise."

At the same time, he especially emphasized Lenin's idea that the victorious proletariat of one country "will be forced by the force of circumstances to undertake a campaign against other backward, reactionary capitalist countries in order to help the proletariat of these countries free themselves from the bourgeoisie."

Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis explained the same thing to Kyiv military propagandists:

"If we try briefly, but intelligibly, so that the broad masses understand, to formulate the essence of the Stalinist theory of the socialist state, then it must be said that this is the theory of the liquidation of the capitalist encirclement, that is, the theory of the victory of the world proletarian revolution. The Stalinist theory of the socialist state opens the semaphore of the revolution and calls the world proletariat to the last decisive battle ... The Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, the international army according to the ideology prevailing in it, will help the workers of the aggressor countries to free themselves from the yoke of fascism and eliminate the capitalist encirclement, which I have spoken about more than once Comrade Stalin reminded us.

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On steel bayonets and Voroshilov volleys, on the mighty wings of the Soviets, we will carry the liberation of the working class of the capitalist countries and hoist

the banner of communism on the remaining five-sixths of the globe!

The socialist ship is powerful, omnipotent, invincible. He is not afraid of bad weather and storms. The great helmsman Stalin is leading this ship to the last and decisive battle, to the assault on capitalism, to the world Commune.

Did Lev Zakharych flog the gag?

The first attempt to promote the "revolutionary falling away of new countries from the system of imperialism" was made in 1938 during the Czechoslovak crisis, when Germany announced its claims to the Sudetenland inhabited by "Aryans". The Soviet Union had an agreement with Czechoslovakia on military assistance, but with one caveat: assistance was to follow only if France also provided it. The French did not want to fight, and they, together with the British, persuaded the government of Czechoslovakia to make concessions in the name of maintaining peace in Europe. Then on April 26, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council M.I. Kalinin publicly stated: "The Pact does not forbid either side to come to the rescue without waiting for France."

In the western regions of the USSR, 30 rifle and 10 cavalry divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank and 12 aviation brigades were concentrated. Then another 30 rifle and 6 cavalry divisions, 2 tank corps, 15 tank brigades were put on alert. At the same time, other mobilization activities were carried out. 328 thousand people were called up from the reserve, and the dismissal of tens of thousands of demobilized people was delayed.

Stalin privately conveyed to President Benes that he was ready to provide military assistance if Czechoslovakia "in the interests of self-defense" began hostilities against Germany. On September 20, the Soviet government reaffirmed its readiness to fulfill its allied obligations.

However, everything ended with the signing of the Munich Agreement. Stalin was clearly shown his place in the affairs of European politics. The Versailles system ceased to exist. Its collapse could not but lead to another clash between the great powers.

As soon as the implementation of the Munich Agreement was assured, on October 24, 1938, Germany offered Poland to settle the problems of Danzig and the "Polish Corridor" on the basis of cooperation within the framework of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Thus, Germany would solve for itself the task of rear cover from the east in anticipation of the final occupation of Czechoslovakia, would revise the German-Polish border established in 1919, and would significantly strengthen its positions in Eastern Europe.

Polysha, continuing her policy of balancing between Berlin and Moscow, in October began a sounding in the USSR on the subject of normalizing Soviet-Polish relations. On November 4, Moscow offered to sign a communiqué on the normalization of relations, which was signed on November 27. Berlin never received an answer to its proposals.

England and France, believing that the process was under control, accelerated rapprochement with Germany, not excluding the process of recognizing Eastern Europe as a zone of German influence.

However, Germany, hoping to become the leading force on the continent, sought from the "watchers" of Europe to recognize the status of a world power,

66 which was impossible without a show of force or even defeat of these countries. By March 1939, it became obvious to the German leadership that although German influence in Eastern Europe had increased significantly, it still had not become decisive.

The final elimination of Czechoslovakia allowed Germany to demonstrate its strength to its eastern neighbors, make them more accommodating and significantly reduce the danger of an anti-German alliance in Eastern Europe. According to Berlin, the solution of the Czechoslovak question would lead to the neutralization of Poland, the economic subordination of Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The return of Memel would lead to German control of Lithuania and the strengthening of German influence in the Baltics.

Thus, the rear was provided for the war in the West, which was considered in Berlin as the first stage in ensuring German hegemony in Europe. Based on this, in the autumn of 1938, the German leadership set a course for the normalization of relations with the USSR.

Assessing the current international situation, A.A. Zhdanov at the Leningrad party conference, recalling that the USSR is "the strongest, most independent power", declared that Faptism - "this is an expression of world reaction, the imperialist bourgeoisie" - threatens mainly England and France. Under these conditions, England would very much like "Hitler to unleash a war with the Soviet Union," so she remains on the sidelines, hoping to "rake in the heat with the wrong hands, wait for the situation when the enemies are weakened, and pick up."

According to Zhdanov, this maneuver was unraveled by Moscow, which will "save up some strength for the time when we will deal with Hitler and Mussolini, and at the same time, of course, with Chamberlain."

In the report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the KhMUP to the Party Congress, Stalin formulated the tasks of Soviet foreign policy in the conditions of the beginning of a new imperialist war and the desire of England, France and the United States to direct German-Japanese aggression against the USSR.

The Soviet Union must "continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries; be careful and not let our country be drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war, who are accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands; strengthen in every possible way the combat power" of its armed forces and "strengthen international ties of friendship with the working people of all countries interested in peace and friendship among peoples."

From the context of the speech, it becomes clear that the "warmongers" are countries pursuing a policy of non-intervention: England, France and the United States. Under these conditions, the goal of the Soviet leadership was to use the crisis and the contradictions of the great powers to further strengthen their influence in the world, with the prospect of finally resolving the issue of the existence of a capitalist society. And events grew like an avalanche.

March 15, 1939 German troops entered the Czech Republic.

On March 26, Polya finally rejected the German proposals for a territorial settlement.

On March 28, the USSR declared its interests in Estonia and Latvia.

On April 28, Germany terminated the Anglo-German naval agreement and the non-aggression pact with Poland, and on April 30, informally informed France that either London and Paris would persuade Poland to compromise, or Germany would be forced to improve relations with Moscow.

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Italy at the same time, in violation of the Anglo-Italian agreements, occupied Albania. The process of "appeasement" is out of control. A new ally was needed to contain German expansion. England and France were forced to start probing the position of the USSR.

On April 1, Moscow told London that "we consider ourselves not bound by anything and will act in accordance with our interests."

Thus, in the course of the political crisis in Europe, two military-political blocs emerged: Anglo-French and Italian-German, each of which turned out to be interested in an agreement with the USSR. In April 1939, Germany, Britain and France simultaneously approached Moscow with various flattering proposals. Stalin was in no hurry. He got the opportunity to choose with whom he negotiated, since in the changing conditions everyone was interested in an alliance with him. The brewing war in Europe opened up new prospects for strengthening the influence of the Land of Soviets on the continent. On April 4, People's Commissar Litvinov, guiding the Soviet plenipotentiary in Germany about the general principles of Soviet policy, noted that "it is impossible to delay and stop aggression in Europe without us, and the later they turn to us for our help, the more expensive

will pay."

On April 11, 1939, Germany undertook a sounding of the position of the USSR with a view to improving relations, but the Soviet side preferred to take a wait-and-see attitude. On the same day, England asked the USSR how it could help, if necessary, Romania. On April 14, France invited the USSR to exchange letters of mutual support in the event of a German attack on Poland and Romania. At the same time, Paris invited Moscow to submit its own proposal for cooperation. On the same day, England invited the USSR to declare support for its western neighbors in the event of an attack on them. Finally, on April 17, the Soviet Union offered the Anglo-French to conclude a mutual assistance pact.

Active diplomatic games began between all interested parties.

Negotiations between England and France with the USSR, which lasted five months, reached an impasse. Both sides pathologically did not trust the other and did not want to bind themselves with specific obligations, mired in the intricacies of the protocol and interpretations of international law. At the same time, they quietly probed Berlin for improved relations, division of "spheres of interest", and non-involvement in business.

In addition, the Western partners were not too afraid of the Wehrmacht and had a low opinion of the combat power of the Red Army. Another stumbling block was Polysya, who vociferously rejected any alliance with Moscow, demanded guarantees from the West, carried out partial mobilization, and at the same time secretly flattered Berlin.

Conductor of Stalin's thoughts to the masses L.3. Mekhlis sneered from the podium:

"As a prostitute, if the women present here will excuse me, passes from hand to hand, so Polysya gave herself to France, then started a serious romance with Berlin. Now the Polish madam has announced that she has taken a firm stand and is looking for a serious partner, always with funds. Let's see what comes out of it."

England and France categorically did not want to fight, they counted on major political and economic concessions to appease Hitler and channel German aggression to the East, let the Aryans fight the Bolsheviks until they were blue in the face. The British bombed Berlin with offers of cooperation and the division of "spheres of interest", promising to stop negotiations with the USSR

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and at the same time blackmailing the Germans by the mere fact of negotiations - all in the spirit of traditional British policy:

"England is a professional warmonger, but a double-dealer, a clever double-dealer. Its policy is simple - to destroy your potential opponents by proxy, dragging them into a war with anyone, especially the Soviets, and I will come to an end the strongest and I will dictate.

The Fuhrer had already firmly decided that private British concessions did not solve the problem in principle, and that a victorious war was needed to gain hegemony in Europe. To do this, it is necessary to isolate Poland politically, to provide guarantees for the non-intervention of England and France in the German-Polish conflict, and, in extreme cases, to secure a rear and reduce the threat of an economic blockade by an agreement with the Soviet Union. At the May meeting with the leaders of the Wehrmacht, Hitler bluntly stated: "Further successes cannot be achieved without bloodshed."

On July 29, 1939, the Fuhrer suggested that Moscow take into account Soviet interests in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe in exchange for the rejection of the treaty with France and

England.

Stalin, fearing an Anglo-German conspiracy, became very interested in this idea. He soberly assessed the situation and considered it more profitable to sign an agreement with Germany in order to bargain for his share, provide Hitler with a "green light" in the war with the West and "come to the end of the strongest" himself.

Too many of the peace fighters actually wanted war passionately: Germany, Japan, the United States, and no doubt the Soviet Union. The war in Europe suited the American "Uncle Sam" as well as possible. Hitler, believing in the "blitzkrieg" strategy, hoped to defeat his opponents one by one. Stalin and Roosevelt - choose a favorable moment for themselves and resolve the dispute about influence in the world in their favor. The Japanese and the Italian Duce also had their own plans. The world was doomed.

On August 23, the "upper diplomat" Joachim Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow, and after negotiations with Stalin and Molotov, on the night of August 24, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and a secret additional protocol were signed, defining the spheres of interest of the parties in Eastern Europe (it is interesting that in London that the same day they unsuccessfully waited for the arrival of Hermann Goering with a similar mission). Finland, Estonia, Latvia, part of Poland, Bessarabia were assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR.

By the way, Soviet historians concealed the existence of secret protocols for almost half a century, accusing "bourgeois falsifiers" of slander. After the papers were filled, the same people with honest eyes began to convince that there was nothing special in these protocols, everyone did it. Only, it seems to me, there should be one of two things: either you are engaged in historical science, or the protection of state secrets. And then some kind of ridiculous position turns out.

The military missions of England and France left Moscow with nothing. Trotsky stated:

"The alliance with Hitler gave Stalin the satisfaction of that feeling that dominates him over all others: the feeling of revenge. To conduct military negotiations with the Nazis during the presence of friendly military missions of France and England in Moscow, to deceive London and Paris, to announce unexpectedly a pact with Hitler - all this clearly shows the desire to humiliate the British government, to avenge England for the humiliations to which it subjected the Kremlin during the period when Chamberlain was developing his failed romance with Hitler."

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" 69 But what can I say, Adolf Aloizovich was really a likeable, understandable person, not like all sorts of Daladiers and Chamberlains. And what is the closeness of worldviews:

"Those who claim that the revolution is not over are fools. Unfortunately, there are people in our movement who understand revolution as constant chaos... The main thing is the selection of capable people who, with blind obedience, put government orders into practice. The party is a kind of order... The Fuhrer must be alone... The unity within the movement must be unprecedentedly strong. We have no right to fight among ourselves... Therefore, no unnecessary discussions!

And how famously the Fuhrer gave his "old fighters" a Night of Long Knives! Whatever you say, Hitler is "the great strategist of the revolution." Ribbentrop later recalled that among the Kremlin Bolsheviks he felt like in a circle of old party comrades.

Both dictators were satisfied with themselves and each other.

"Now the whole world is in my pocket!" Hitler pounded on the table with his fist. He had already given the order to attack Poland.

"It seems we managed to carry them out," Stalin said with satisfaction. He was already counting the political profits.

The Soviet Union managed to stay out of the European war, while gaining a significant free hand in Europe, more room for maneuver between the warring factions in their own interests, and the opportunity to shift the blame for the breakdown of negotiations on London and Paris. By signing the pact, Stalin and Molotov themselves set the date for the start of World War II.

As a last argument, on August 25, 1939, England signed an agreement on mutual assistance with Poland. Further concessions meant for London and Paris a voluntary renunciation of the status of great powers. But that didn't stop Hitler.

On September 1, German troops invaded Poland. A few days later, England and France entered the war.

Everything went according to Stalin's plan. In a conversation with the leadership of the Comintern on September 7, 1939, the Leader assessed the current situation as follows:

"A war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries for the redivision of the world, for dominion over the world! We don't mind if they fight well and weaken each other. Not bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries is shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler, without understanding or wanting to do this, is undermining the capitalist system...

We can maneuver, push one side against the other, so that we better tear ourselves apart. The non-aggression pact helps Germany to some extent. The next moment is to push the other side."

As for Poland, "the destruction of this state in the current conditions would mean one less bourgeois fascist state! What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we spread the socialist system to new territories and populations?

It is clear that such goals of Soviet foreign policy were not advertised, on the contrary, everything was done to convince world public opinion that

that the Soviet Union strictly adheres to positions of neutrality and is only very concerned about its own security.

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On September 17, the Red Army began the Liberation Campaign in Poland. The two Soviet fronts, eager to help the Slavic brothers, had up to 600 thousand people, more than 2,000 aircraft and about 4,000 tanks. The Germans had already announced the capture of Warsaw and received a congratulatory telegram from Molotov, it was Moscow's turn to snatch its share. By the end of September, the Polish state - "the rogue offspring of the Treaty of Versailles" - ceased to exist, to the delight of the scurryers of the whole world. The Brothers in Arms celebrated the victory with joint parades and banquets.

Until August 1940, the Soviet Union, exercising its "right" and spreading the socialist system, committed aggression against five more states. They say that the Red Army soldiers were met here and there with flowers. They meet by clothes. In the Sudetenland, given to the "torn apart" by Germany, the Wehrmacht was also greeted with flowers, the soldiers called the operation "flower war", and in Ukraine in 1941 they got a lot of bouquets.

Rather than being nostalgic for bouquets, it's better to remember how the Red Army was shot in the back in 1941, how they were escorted out in 1991, and how "grateful" they are to this day. It is ridiculous to listen to the speeches of the deputies of the current Russian State Duma that the Balts themselves called us, organized their own revolutions and should be grateful to Moscow for the unique opportunity to "reunite with the peoples of the Great Land of Soviets" and take part in building communism. Maybe, after all, to clarify with the Baltic states themselves what they think about this? Or is it still "all our war, wherever it takes place, is a progressive and just war"?

Happy Soviet life turned out to be attractive ONLY FROM the facade. The Sovietization of the New "territories and populations" was carried out by tested Bolshevik methods. nationalization, forced collectivization, dissolution of all political and public organizations, persecution of the church, deportation, executions of unnecessary classes and "ALL other bastards".

It broke only in Finland, she was the only one who did not succumb to the Kremlin's blackmail and put up courageous resistance, losing part of the territories as a result of the Winter War, but defending her independence. Already after the war, Molotov, in a conversation with the figure of the Yugoslav Communist Party Milovan Djilas, remarked with regret: "Ah, Finland is a nut."

The occupation of neighbors on the basis of a secret agreement with Hitler is still considered in Russia to be a matter absolutely necessary for "ensuring the security of the USSR." In addition, this is "favorable for humanity, the Lithuanians, Western Belarusians, Bessarabians, whom we delivered from the oppression of landlords, capitalists, policemen and all other bastards, consider themselves happy," and it is also quite reasonable from the point of view of creating a springboard for further conquests, so that to make the Germans and Czechs, Poles and Danes happy.

Trotsky repeatedly emphasized the limitations of the Stalinist mind in long-term forecasts:

“Stalin is characterized by contempt for theory. The theory takes reality on a larger scale. Common sense takes reality on a small scale. That is why Stalin is extremely sensitive to any immediate danger, but is not able to foresee the danger rooted in large historical trends.

Indeed, Stalin could not even imagine that he would be cruelly deceived, that the new territories would not at all increase the “defense capability” of the country, since they were not intended for that, but the flock brought to obedience to him, the celestial, would have to be called his “brothers and sisters” and raise not on

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Liberation campaign, but to the Patriotic War.

But so far, Joseph Vissarionovich was becoming more and more strengthened in the thought of his own infallibility, that he was able to fool Hitler.

By the autumn of 1940, it became clear to both friendly sides that there was nothing more to share. At the negotiations in Berlin, Molotov unsuccessfully tried to bargain with the Fuhrer for Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Black Sea straits.

Hitler was not going to give up key positions in the Balkans, he had already made the “most important decision of his life”: in order to defeat England, it was necessary to crush the Soviet Union. On December 18, the Fuhrer signed a directive on the implementation of the Barbarossa plan.

Comrade Stalin never changed his decision at all. The two most aggressive regimes were bound to clash with each other.

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Soviet military planning for military operations against Germany began in October 1939, almost immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Borders, according to which Stalin traded Lithuania from Hitler for a piece of former Polish territory.

Until June 1941, five variants of the plan for the operational use of the Red Army were developed. The creative process acquired particular intensity from the second half of 1940 and at the end of July, the drafting of a document entitled “Considerations on the Foundations of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East in 1940-1941.” has been completed. The plan was to concentrate the main efforts in the direction of Warsaw and East Prussia.

In the spring of 1940, Hitler "turned his back" and launched an invasion of France.

It seemed that this was the case to "break the skull", it couldn't be more convenient: the Wehrmacht would run into the impregnable Maginot Line, bleed to death in battles with the largest land army in Europe, and then the Red Army would come to the aid of the countries of Europe, groaning under the Nazi boot.

Immediately after the signing of peace with the Finns, an accelerated transfer of Soviet troops that had passed the combat school to the western border began. By the end of June, the USSR could already field 84 rifle and 13 cavalry and mechanized divisions against Germany, reinforced by 17 tank brigades (200 tanks each, 3,400 in total). The German land army at that time had 12 infantry divisions near the Soviet borders. Of these, 9 were Landwehr.

Molotov in a narrow circle spoke frankly about the intentions of the Soviet leadership:

"Today we support Germany, but just enough to keep her from accepting peace proposals until the starving masses of the warring nations give up their illusions and rise up against their leaders ...

At this moment, we will come to the rescue, we will come with fresh forces, well prepared, and on the territory of Western Europe ... a decisive battle will take place between the proletariat and the decaying bourgeoisie, which replicate the fate of Europe forever.

It is no coincidence (for Stalin just didn't do anything and didn't say a single word) by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of May 7, 1940 in the Red Army were

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general and admiral ranks were introduced, which is quite natural for any professional army. But for the Red Army, these titles were a fundamentally new phenomenon.

Ranipe, the word "general" should have been associated among the red fighters With the images of class enemies, "organizers of the counter-revolution, executioners of freedom", now - with "loyal sons of the socialist Motherland, skillful educators of subordinates." An important reason for making such a decision was the fact of the "acute military-political situation."

But, to the surprise of the whole world and the extreme disappointment of Stalin, the campaign in the West did not drag on. Hitler, demonstrating an example of "blitzkrieg", defeated France in forty days. On June 22, 1940, the Fuhrer surrendered in the Compiègne forest. Comrade Stalin, learning about this, swore obscenely and decided to prepare more thoroughly.

After additional study, by September 18, 1940, the Soviet General Staff prepared a new version of the plan, which suggested the possibility of using the main forces of the Red Army, depending on the situation, in the North-West or South-West direction. These options for the deployment of Soviet troops received the names "northern" and "southern" respectively.

Geographically, the Pripjat River basin almost exactly in the middle divided the Western theater of operations - hence the two main directions.

On October 5, 1940, the plan was presented to Stalin and Molotov. During the discussion, the General Staff was instructed to finalize the plan, taking into account the deployment of an even stronger main grouping as part of the Southwestern Front. As a result, it was planned to increase the number of troops here by 31% in divisions, by 300% in tank brigades, and by 59% in air regiments. And on October 14, 1940, the "southern" version was approved as the main one.

For the offensive, it was more profitable, since it ran through more convenient terrain, cut off Germany from the main allies and oil sources, and led Soviet troops to the flank and rear of the enemy. A blow in the north led to a head-on collision with the main forces of the German army and required a breakthrough of fortified areas in very difficult terrain.

A series of operational-strategic games played on the maps led to the final rejection of the "northern" option. In March 1941, a new plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army was adopted. Southern Poland was chosen as the main direction of the Soviet offensive. On one of the pages of the plan, where tasks were set for the South-Western Front, there is an eloquent note: "Offensive to begin 12.6" (June 12th).

The main forces of the German were also supposed to meet in the southwestern direction. The Red strategists were sure that the Wehrmacht would concentrate its main forces south of Brest. Since the time of Tukhachevsky, it was believed that the very idea of a campaign against Moscow and the military defeat of the USSR by the Nazi army was fantastic. If Hitler decides to fight, he will try to chop off Ukraine.

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The development of the Red Army in 1939-1941 was in fact a covert mobilization deployment, since according to the system adopted in the summer of 1939, the number of formations and units in peacetime was brought to wartime levels. This simplified the process of mobilization, shortened its terms and was supposed to contribute to a higher degree of combat effectiveness of the mobilized troops. Most of the planned forces had already been formed or were completing their formation by the summer of 1941.

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Since the strategic deployment plan and the concept of the first operations were designed for the complete mobilization of the Red Army, they were closely linked to the mobilization plan approved by the government on February 12, 1941. The mobilization deployment was to lead to the creation of a wartime army of 8.9 million men. Mobilization was planned to be carried out by echelons within a month.

The first echelon, which included 114 divisions, fortified areas on the new border, 85% of the air defense forces, airborne search, over 75% of the Air Force and 34 artillery regiments of the RKG, was supposed to complete mobilization within 2-6 hours from the moment the mobilization was announced.

The main part of the troops deployed on the 10th - 15th day, the full mobilization of the armed forces was envisaged on the 15th - 30th day. The main task of the Soviet divisions near the border was to cover the concentration and deployment of their troops and prepare them for going on the offensive.

On March 8, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars was adopted, which provided for the covert mobilization of 903.8 thousand reserve servicemen under the guise of training camps. This measure made it possible to call up 805.2 thousand people by the beginning of June.

In the spring of 1941, the Wehrmacht turned south, to the Balkans and the Mediterranean, carried out a landing operation in Crete - a rehearsal for landing on the British Isles, and demonstrated preparations for Operation Sea Lion.

Stalin decided it was time to start Groza.

In April, the covert strategic deployment of the Red Army began, which was supposed to be the final stage of preparations for war.

It was from April, when the Wehrmacht was engaged in the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece and did not threaten the country of the victorious proletariat, that Stalin began to panic about "provocations". Prior to that, they were completely "succumbing" to them, without fear of any "complications". For example, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov says:

"In late February and early March, German aircraft again violated Soviet airspace several times. They flew with amazing audacity, no longer concealing the fact that they were photographing our military installations ... I suggested to the Main Naval Staff that the fleets be instructed to open fire on violators without any warning. Such a directive was transmitted on March 3, 1941. On March 17 and 18, German planes were fired several times over Libava ...

Rereading the reports from the fleets now, I find reports among them, and in particular, from the commander of the Northern Fleet A.G. Golovko that anti-aircraft batteries open fire on German aircraft flying over our bases. By the way, Stalin, having learned about my order, did not object, so in fact these days there was already a war in the air in the fleets: anti-aircraft gunners drove off German planes with fire, and our pilots fought them on their obsolete "seagulls" .. It's silly to engage in the persuasion of a bandit when he climbs into your house.

After one of these cases, I was summoned to see Stalin. Beria was sitting in the office besides him, and I immediately understood where the wind was blowing from. I was asked on what basis I gave the order to open fire on the intruder aircraft. I tried to explain, but Stalin cut me off. I was severely reprimanded and ordered to cancel the order immediately.

send their fighters to land the enemy on airfields.

It was from April 1941 that a full-scale process of concentration in the western districts of 247 divisions allocated for the war with Germany (81.5% of the available forces of the Red Army) began. After mobilizing the reservists and bringing their numbers to full strength, they would have numbered over 6 million people, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 15 thousand tanks and 12 thousand aircraft.

C12? April began the advance to the western border of four armies from the internal districts, the advance of three more armies was being prepared, which were to complete the concentration by July 10. These armies, uniting 77 divisions, constituted the second strategic echelon.

On June 12-16, the General Staff ordered the headquarters of the western districts to begin, under the guise of exercises, the secret advancement of the second echelons of the covering armies and reserves of the districts, which were to occupy concentration areas 20-80 km from the border by July 1. In total, the troops of the first operational echelon numbered 114 divisions.

It is clear that all these preparations were surrounded by a veil of the strictest secrecy and provided by a powerful disinformation company. For example, it follows from Halder's diaries that the Germans never revealed the presence in the Bialystok ledge of a Soviet shock group (10th Army) consisting of two rifle, one cavalry and two mechanized corps - almost 1,500 tanks. What can I say, even if the presence in the Red Army of the T-34 and KV tanks, put into service in 1939, participating in the war with Finland, turned out to be a surprise for the Germans.

The camouflage regime even extended to the Comintern, which was denied the publication of an appeal by May 1, 1941 with a detailed analysis of the international situation, on the grounds that this "could reveal our cards to the enemy." In general, in April-June 1941, the Soviet leadership pursued such a cautious foreign policy that this gave a number of authors a reason to talk about the policy of "appeasement of Germany." Say, Stalin was afraid of Hitler. Or even cooler:

"Stalin knew that in the spring and summer of 1941 the army was not ready for war ... The unpreparedness of the army for war was the reason for Stalin's desire to delay the start of the war. In the end, he convinced himself that there would be no war in 1941."

Here is an oddity: Stalin was afraid of "provoking" a German attack and at the same time advanced 77 divisions of the second strategic echelon to the west; in direct violation of secret agreements with the Germans, he ordered the formation of the 238th Infantry Division, "staffed with personnel of Polish nationality and persons who know the Polish language and are in the service of the Red Army." For what purpose? For the parade in "liberated" Warsaw? Is this not a "provocation"?

Why would Stalin be afraid? He had full information about the forces of the Wehrmacht and the possibilities of German industry. He had numbers in front of him. He knew that Soviet military equipment was much superior to the German one in quantity and not inferior to it qualitatively. He believed at that time that, in terms of combat training, the Red Army soldiers and their commanders would not yield to German soldiers.

and officers.

He was going to attack suddenly, at the most favorable moment, with huge forces. He was well aware that in the event of a speech by the USSR against Germany, he would inevitably receive England and the United States as allies. He quite logically reasoned that an attack on the Soviet Union was a suicidal idea that Hitler would never do.

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Only one thing could not occur to the "leader of all peoples" - that Hitler did not consider him a serious opponent, as well as the "invincible and legendary" Red Army, and was going to defeat the USSR in four weeks. Accustomed to playing his games with the whining "old Bolsheviks", breaking all barriers with his will, dealing with obsequious nonentities, Iosif Vissarionovich made a mistake in the psychoanalysis of the German Fuhrer. Adolf had his own logic, he had his own plans, the spirit of Ilyich on Stalin's forehead did not tremble him like Bukharin did.

How could Stalin know about the "unpreparedness of the army"? Quite the opposite. Here is the testimony of Admiral N.G. Kuznepova:

"I.V. Stalin imagined that the combat readiness of the armed forces was higher than it actually was. Knowing exactly the number of new aircraft stationed on his orders at the border airfields, he believed that at any moment, on a combat alarm, they could take off into the air and give a reliable rebuff to the enemy. And he was simply stunned by the news that our planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.

At a reception in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941, the Leader confidently stated:

"For the time being, we carried out a line on the defensive - until we re-equipped our army, did not supply the army with modern means of struggle. And now that we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now we must move from defense to offensive. In defending our country, we must act offensively. From defense to move on to a policy of offensive action ... The war against Germany will inevitably grow into a victorious people's liberation war.

The Soviet leadership attributed the victories of the German army in Europe to the weakness of the opponents, German impudence and numerical superiority. With the Red Army, a similar number will not work:

"Everything new that has been introduced into operational art and tactics by the German army is not so difficult and is now accepted and studied by its opponents, just as the armament of the German army is not news. On the basis of boasting and self-satisfaction, the military thought of Germany no longer goes forward, as before. The German army lost its taste for further improvement of military equipment. If at the beginning of the war Germany had the latest military equipment, now ... military

Germany's technical advantage is gradually diminishing."

That is , from the point of view of Comrade Stalin, nothing special about the Wehrmacht did not imagine.

By mid-May 1941, the final plan for a future war was ready.

This document directly formulated the idea that the Red Army should "preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it is in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the military branches."

Thus, the main idea of Soviet military planning was that the Red Army, under the cover of troops deployed on the border of the western districts, would complete the concentration of forces intended for war in the theater of operations and go over to a sudden decisive offensive.

Since there are no documents on the Barbarossa plan for Soviet intelligence

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it was not possible to get it, the war conceived by Stalin was not preventive. The "greatest strategist of all times" did not believe in the German attack on the Soviet Union and believed that "in order to wage a big war with us, the Germans, firstly, need oil, and they must first conquer it, and, secondly, they need to eliminate Western front, land in England or make peace with her.

From this, he concluded that Hitler would move the Wehrmacht either to the Middle East or to the British Isles, but would not risk a protracted and hopeless war for him with the "great and mighty", having England in the rear.

In general, it can be seen that the Soviet plans lacked any connection between the actions of the Red Army and the possible actions of the enemy. From here, the scenario of the beginning of the war emerges: under the cover of the troops of the western districts, the Red Army is concentrating and deploying in the Western theater of operations, simultaneously conducting private offensive operations. The completion of the concentration serves as a signal for a transition to a general offensive along the entire front from the Baltic to the Carpathians, with the main blow in southern Poland.

German troops in the Soviet plans are designated by the term "concentrating", which means that the initiative to start the war will come entirely from the Soviet side, which is the first to begin and complete the deployment of troops in the theater. The transition to the offensive was tied not to the situation on the border, but to the moment of concentration of the assigned forces - this is the 20th day of the start of the deployment.

The troops were tasked with delivering a powerful blow to the German army:

"The first strategic goal of the actions of the Red Army troops is to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed south of the Brest-

Deblin and access to the Ostrolenka front, the Narew River, Lovich, Lodz, Kretzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc by the 30th day of the operation.

The next strategic goal is to have: an offensive from the Katowice region in a northern or northwestern direction in order to defeat the large forces of the center and northern wing of the German front and seize the territory of southern Poland and East Prussia.

The immediate task is to defeat the German army east of the river. Vistula and in the Krakow direction, go to the river. Narew, Vistula and capture the area of Katowice "...

To ensure a powerful first strike, the main forces were planned to be deployed in 18 armies of the first echelon, which included most of the mobile formations. In the rear they deployed 7 armies of the second strategic echelon, behind them - 3 armies of the third strategic echelon. The role of shock mobile groupings was to be played by 29 mechanized corps (in each 1031 tanks), the formation of which began in June 1940.

By the summer of 1941, the armed forces of the USSR were the largest army in the world. As of June 22, there were 5 million 774 thousand 200 people in them, of which: in the ground forces - 4 million 605.3 thousand, in the Air Force - 475.7 thousand, in the Navy - 353.8 thousand, in the border troops - 167.6 thousand, in the internal troops of the NKVD - 171.9 thousand people.

The ground forces had 303 divisions, 16 airborne and 3 rifle brigades. The troops had 117,581 guns and mortars, 24,488 aircraft and 25,886 tanks. In the first half of 1941, the Soviet industry produced 100% tanks and 87% of the latest types of combat aircraft, completing the transition. for the release of only these samples. The annual increase in military production in 1938-1940 amounted to 39%, three times the increase in all industrial production in the country.

In a word, Stalin solved the first of the most important tasks: he turned the USSR into a

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"the basis for the further development of the world revolution."

On May 20, the "all-Union headman" Kalinin declared:

"The capitalist world is full of blatant abominations that can only be destroyed by the red-hot iron of holy war." By the way, the song "Holy War" was already written, however, the premiere took place earlier than expected.

On May 27, an order was issued to create field front command posts.

For all that, the Soviet leadership knew about the concentration of German troops near the borders of the Soviet Union, but, apparently, this did not bother him much. Stalin, and together with him Timoshenko and Zhukov, who were initiated into the Grand Plan, almost until June 22, believed in the defensive nature of the German

measures and continued preparations for the offensive operation.

For example, in the summary of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Special District of June 5, 1941, the build-up of German troops near the border was noted. But the conclusions emphasized that the reinforcement of the grouping is taking place "mainly by artillery and aviation units", while at the same time the Germans are "forcing the preparation of the theater by building defensive structures, installing anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns directly on the state border line, strengthening the protection of the state border by field units, repairing and expanding roads, bridges, the delivery of ammunition, fuel, the organization of air defense measures. It was also said that "anti-war sentiments in the German army are taking on ever broader dimensions."

Such reports received by the General Staff were more likely to create the belief that the Wehrmacht was preparing for defense against a possible Soviet invasion, but was not going to attack the USSR itself in the near future.

On June 18, Stalin was given a report from agents from Germany about the deployment of German fighters and the appointment of future heads of the occupied Russian lands. Blinded by breathtaking prospects, the Liberator of Europe passed a resolution: "You can send your source to ..."

The "Kremlin Highlander" had no doubt that the Red Army was stronger than the Wehrmacht and that Hitler should be afraid. Fear and, quite naturally, take defensive measures against a Soviet invasion.

Marshal Zhukov writes in one of the versions of his immortal memoirs:

"I remember how once, in response to my report that the Germans strengthened their air, intelligence and military intelligence, I.V. Stalin said: "They are afraid of us."

Stalin himself was afraid of one thing - to frighten off the "beast", and was preoccupied with only one thing - to keep the secret until the last moment, to reveal his plans ahead of time. After all, then there will be no surprise.

The German command at this time was concerned about similar problems. So, on June 18, Goebbels (coincidentally, on the same day when the historic obscene resolution was imposed) wrote in his diary:

"We observe restraint in all matters relating to Russia ... We must not , absolute allow ourselves to be provoked now."

And no one concludes that Hitler was afraid. Everyone understands that this is a disguise by the aggressor of his vile intentions.

From June 14 to June 19, the command of the border districts was instructed

withdraw front and army departments to field command posts. Soviet preparations were entering the final stage.

By June 22, 1941, the grouping of Soviet troops of the first echelon in the West consisted of 3088.2 thousand people, 57.041 guns and mortars, 13.924 tanks, 8974 aircraft. In addition, there were another 1,769 aircraft in the aviation of fleets and flotillas.

By this time, 16 divisions had already arrived from the second echelon - 10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 mechanized divisions, in which there were 201.7 thousand people, 2746 guns and mortars and 1763 tanks.

In the western military districts, 64 fighter, 50 bomber, 7 reconnaissance and 9 attack air regiments were concentrated, in which there were 7133 aircraft. In addition, there were 4 long-range bomber corps and 1 long-range bomber division - a total of 1339 aircraft. On April 10, the transition to a new system of organization of aviation logistics began.

In April, five airborne corps were formed in the western districts. On June 12, the Directorate of Airborne Troops was created. At the same time, the rear and hospital units were being deployed. At stationary warehouses and bases, stocks were continuously accumulated.

Until the day "M" remained a week and a half.

One can endlessly debate whether Stalin was going to attack first. Both supporters and opponents of this version give a lot of arguments that actually prove almost nothing and disprove nothing.

The dispute, which began about fifteen years ago, came to a standstill due to the lack of documents. The Russian archives continue to keep the secrets of the lost empire, the secrets of Comrade Stalin. Although the very fact that the operational plans of the Red Army for 1941 have not yet been found is suggestive.

In any case, our defensive measures do not impress. For example, from the works of the former chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Western OVO, General L.M. Sandalov, it follows that no defense was built in the border areas, and they were not going to defend themselves: "whoever dared to ask questions about the defense in the Brest direction was considered an alarmist" .

However, not only in Brest. Neither the district nor the army plans for covering the creation of rear front and army lines of defense provided. Specifically, the troops of the 4th Army were preparing to force the Bug and advance to the Vistula.

In March-April, the army headquarters participated in the district operational map game. In the course of it, a front-line offensive operation on Byala Podlaska was practiced.

Preparation went on in stages in all command units. On June 21, the headquarters

the exercise of the 28th rifle corps on the topic: "The offensive of the rifle corps with overcoming the river barrier", and a new exercise was planned for June 22: "Overcoming the second strip of the fortified area". This is a "cover army", so she was going to "cover".

Soviet cover plans initially did not provide for opposition to the concentration of troops from the enemy. Thus, the full deployment of the troops of the border districts in the cover zones took up to 15 days according to the plans. Moreover, in the event of an enemy attack, the troops of the first echelon would obviously not have time to occupy their defense lines on the border.

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Sandalov again:

"The mutual arrangement of the fortified areas and the areas of deployment of troops did not ensure, in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy, the timely occupation of the fortifications not only by field troops, but also by special Urov units. So, for example, in the zone of the 4th Army, the term for occupying the Brest fortified region was determined by the district for one rifle division - 30 hours, for another - 9 hours, for Urov units - 0.5-1.5 hours. On training alerts, it turned out that these terms were underestimated.

Thus, the Soviet General Staff proceeded from such a variant of the beginning of the war and the situation that had arisen, in which it would be possible to advance to the border without interference from the potential enemy, occupy the designated cover zones, prepare to repel the attack, and mobilize:

"A feature of all army cover plans was the absence in them of an assessment of the possible actions of the enemy, primarily the option of a sudden offensive by superior enemy forces. The essence of the tactical maneuver boiled down to the fact that it was necessary to quickly assemble and make a march to the border. It was assumed that in the areas of concentration, time would be given for the final preparation for battle.

Only under the influence of a series of alarm signals a few hours before the German attack, Stalin decided to give the troops the famous Directive No. 1 - "do not succumb to provocations."

From the point of view of increasing combat readiness in anticipation of enemy aggression, the document is completely stupid. But Stalin's hesitations can be understood: literally two or three weeks remained before the start of the "Thunderstorm", maybe the German generals were really trying to open the grouping of Soviet troops by some kind of "reconnaissance in combat". I didn't want to show my cards.

Therefore, instead of a directive to bring the troops of the western districts to full combat readiness in case of war, Stalin ordered a short directive with instructions that the attack could begin with provocative actions.

He still hoped that he would be able to start diplomatic negotiations and, under their cover, complete the concentration of forces for the offensive. But here, indeed, "history took little time." Carrying out mobilization

the directive did not.

Marshal Baghramyan, reporting that the reception of the first directive at the headquarters of the KOVO lasted about two hours, explains:

"The reader may ask, but would it not be easier, in order to save time, to send a short conditional signal from the General Staff, having accepted which the command of the district could order the troops just as briefly: to put into action "KOVO-41" (this is how we called the plan to cover the state boundaries). All this would take no more than 15-20 minutes. Apparently, in Moscow they did not dare to do this.

That's just the point, the signal "KOVO-41" should have been followed by very specific actions, not related to repelling aggression. While there was hope - what if Hitler was bluffing, warnings were sent to the troops like "do nothing" and "do not cross the border."

The reason is that, having invested all the talent of the organizer and all his strength into the Thunderstorm plan, Stalin had no other plans. The Soviet General Staff did not plan any defensive operations. There were no plans for defense, "red packets", special "short" signals for this case in the troops. Sudden

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an enemy strike with large forces was not considered even theoretically, which means that there were no thought-out decisions on this score.

At the first stage of the Great War, the fleet was not assigned offensive tasks, and instead of disorienting directives, the People's Commissar of the Navy simply announced to the fleets "Readiness No. 1". This turned out to be enough for the sailors to meet the war prepared: they knew what had to be done in this case, and they did it. Neither Stalin nor Zhdanov, supervising the fleet, nor Timoshenko and Zhukov could prevent Kuznetsov from fulfilling his direct functional duties.

And one more question. And if Hitler had not attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, what would Comrade Stalin have done? Order armies to load into trains and go back to their districts? It can be further simplified. If the Wehrmacht had made a jump across the English Channel and invaded England, would the Soviet Union have observed the friendship treaty with Germany in such a situation?

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The "treacherous attack" of Germany turned out to be so unexpected for the Soviet leadership that in response to the formal declaration of war, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, managed to squeeze out only the helpless: "We did not deserve this."

For some time, the Kremlin harbored illusions that the "invincible and legendary" would throw the enemy out of the sacred Soviet land in the shortest possible time. But the miracle didn't happen. Stalin, declaring war Patriotic, and himself the Supreme

Commander-in-Chief, he tried to lead the military operations by the usual methods: he searched for enemies, shot and shuffled the commanders, tormented them with petty care, appointed commissars again, declared all the priests captured as traitors, with his authoritative opinion "overturned military science." And only when the Germans reached the Volga, and 70 million Soviet people were under occupation, Stalin lost his arrogance, began to listen to the opinion of specialists, and, with his characteristic perseverance and thoroughness, began to study military affairs.

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Part I

* Instead of military glory, you revel in shame: for there is no good parishioner without good nobles, and a myriad army without a skilled commander is a flock of sheep dispersed by the sound of the wind ... and dwarfs, crippled in spirit, are not governors From a letter from Prince Kurbsky to Tsar Ivan the Terrible In April - May 1917, fantasizing about the future world order ,

Marxist V.I. Ulyanov dreamed of the general arming of the people, without exception of all citizens and women aged 15 to 65, who would replace the standing army and police, take over the task of protecting the socialist Fatherland, conducting food requisitioning, sanitary control, and "educating the masses." All this without breaking away from production and government. Lenin's "cook" dreamed of an extremely multifunctional social organism.

The first armed formations of the Bolshevik Party were workers' squads and battalions of the Red Guard. They began to form at plants and factories in large cities immediately after the February Revolution. Along with detachments of agitated sailors and soldiers, they formed the striking force of the October Revolution.

The salaries of the revolutionary proletarians, as well as the entire Leninist Central Committee of the RSDRI (6), as well as all other leftist parties, were regularly paid by the German Imperial Bank. The weapons were supplied by the German General Staff. In order to free all the oppressed and lead them on the right road straight to communism, Lenin and his "comrades" really needed power. And the Germans really needed a force that would destroy the Russian Empire from the inside, decompose the Russian army, take the country out of the war, thereby saving Germany, choking in the stranglehold of a naval blockade, from a hopeless war on two fronts. The interests of the partners coincided almost perfectly.

After the capture of the Winter Palace and the distribution of portfolios, the top-priority, paramount task of the self-proclaimed government of people's commissars, along with the nationalization of the State Bank, was the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. Lenin had to repay debts to those without whose help he would never have ascended the Russian throne, and he still had to sit on it.

On November 7, 1917, Lieutenant General N.N. Dukhonin (1876-1917), who was in Mogilev, received Lenin's order to immediately begin negotiations "with the command of the Austro-German troops", which was a direct

betrayal of Russia's allies. The next day, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs addressed a note to all the ambassadors of the Allied Powers with a proposal to declare a truce on the fronts.

Without waiting for the response of the Entente, on November 9, the Council of People's Commissars removed the commander-in-chief, who had sabotaged the instructions of the Bolsheviks, appointing Ensign N.V. Krylenko. It was urgently necessary to "pull the army out of the hands of the reactionary generals." The soldier N.I. was assigned to the Moscow Military District.

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Muralov, his headquarters was recruited from ensigns and lieutenants, by some misunderstanding one staff captain crept in there.

At the same time, telegrams flew to all corps and divisions, urging the masses of soldiers over the heads of their commanders to begin negotiations on a truce in certain sectors of the front and organize fraternization with the enemy. In Berlin, everyone understood correctly: already at the end of November, the transfer of German divisions to the West began.

On November 21, immediately after the "capture" of Mogilev by the new - Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Dukhonin was torn to pieces by "revolutionary soldiers and sailors" (just at that time, heading to Brest-Litovsk, a delegation of the Council of People's Commissars crossed the front line under the leadership, according to modern concepts, of an international terrorist Alof Abramovich Ioffe). And for a long time, killing officers, the revolutionaries joked: "They sent me to Dukhonin"

Lenin needed a "peaceful respite" no less than the Kaiser, in order to consolidate his power in a vast country as quickly as possible, break the old state apparatus, create new power structures to fight the internal "counter-revolution". He and his associates masked the essence of what was happening with demagogic slogans about "revolutionary peace" and calls on the proletariat of the belligerent countries to "take the cause of peace into their own hands."

The old army, numbering about 8 million people, of which more than 6 million soldiers and officers were at the front, interfered with both Emperor Wilhelm and Vladimir Ilyich. Therefore, having declared the armed forces a "sick part of the Russian state organism", the Bolsheviks immediately began to treat them through systematic decomposition and radical destruction. Already on November 10, 1917, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars signed a decree on the demobilization of the army. The comfrey troops, having gained enough strength, began to leave the front in whole regiments and disperse to their homes: divide the land, smash the landowners' estates and police stations, expropriate the expropriators, thereby ensuring the "triumphant march of Soviet power."

In parallel, the formation of a NEW army apparatus was carried out, the main tasks of which were considered to be the interception of control, "the elimination of ANY the possibility of restoring the power of the exploiters".

On November 22, for the "implementation of the struggle against the counter-revolution" at the Headquarters in Mogilev, the Central Revolutionary Field Headquarters was created, which formed expeditionary detachments to help local soviets.

On December 16, the Council of People's Commissars, in order to "democratize", adopted decrees "On the equalization of all military personnel in rights" and "On the elective beginning and on the organization of power in the army." Ranks, titles, titles, awards and other distinctions were abolished - everyone began to wear the "honorary title of soldier of the revolutionary army", the election of command personnel was approved, that is, the complete collapse of the regular army was ensured. "These measures," confirms the official Soviet historiography, "created the possibility for the unhindered activity of the Bolsheviks among the soldier masses."

Officers who refused to remove their insignia were lynched. In distant Tobolsk, fulfilling a decree, the guards tore off the shoulder straps from citizen Nikolai Gomanov.

"General considerations for the formation of the army" were also developed, according to which the new armed forces should be recruited on volunteer

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from among the "true champions of freedom and revolution", whose duty is to "live fighting and die fighting".

By the end of 1917, in most of the military units, power passed into the hands of the soldiers' committees, and the Military Revolutionary Committee began to manage the former Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. The leadership of the troops was carried out simultaneously by two bodies - the reorganized headquarters of the Headquarters and the Revolutionary Field Headquarters.

In mid-January 1918, Lenin proudly reported to the delegates of the emergency Congress of Soviets:

"The old army, the barracks drill army, the torture of soldiers, is a thing of the past. She was scrapped, and not a single stone was left of her."

Thus, through the efforts of the Bolsheviks, Russia became defenseless against external invasion. A short experience of hostilities managed to clearly show the low combat capability, very weak organization and controllability of the Red Guard "expeditions", "flying detachments", "free squads", not to mention the gangs of the Baltic "lads".

The Council of People's Commissars had to start creating a new type of regular army. The first legal act proclaiming the formation of a "socialist army of workers and peasants" was the "Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People" published on January 4, 1918, which, along with the oath of allegiance to the Soviet government, the Bolsheviks tried to slip for approval to the Constituent Assembly.

But, alas. The deputies did not recognize Soviet power. The intractable "constituent office"

had to be dispersed, and workers' demonstrations in support of it had to be shot, of course, solely for the benefit of the proletariat. With this landmark decision, Lenin set a course for unleashing a civil war, but this did not frighten him (he immediately scribbled an article with a characteristic subtitle: "They are pushing the civil war"). A week later, the Declaration was approved by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The main task of the "socialist army" was decreed "to ensure full power for the working masses and to eliminate any possibility of restoring the power of the exploiters." This meant not only Russia. One of the points of the resolution explicitly stated that the new type of army "fights for the interests of the working people of the whole world and serves as support for the coming social revolutions around the world."

On January 15, at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, the Decree "On the organization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army" was considered and adopted. According to this document, which was a genuine victory for democracy, "about 40 non-Russian nationalities, who were not allowed by tsarism to military service, for the first time received the right to defend the socialist Fatherland with weapons in their hands." Two weeks later, the Decree "On the organization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet" was adopted.

Under the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, the All-Russian Collegium for the Organization and Formation of the Red Army was established, whose duties included the development of new charters and instructions, as well as providing the forming units with everything necessary. Members of the Board N.I. Podvoisky (1880-1948), N.V. Krylenko (1885-1938), K.A. Mekhonoshin (1889-1938) and other Bolsheviks launched extensive propaganda work.

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Throughout the country, military departments and headquarters of the Red Army were created under local soviets and soldiers' committees. In the active army, for the recruitment of volunteers, the headquarters of the Red Army were organized under the soldiers' committees. A network of recruiting centers was developed, and hundreds of agitators stood out from among the Red Army soldiers, carrying out mobilization work in the rear and at the front. On January 18, Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd Military District A.V. Antonov Ovseenko signed an order to create the first corps of the Red Army, the basis of which was to be Petrograd workers.

Citizens of the RSFSR at least 18 years old were allowed into the ranks of the Red Army. Entry into the ranks of the Red Army was organized on the principle of voluntariness and class principles. Recommendations from military committees, party, trade union or other public organizations loyal to the Soviets were required from volunteers.

The Red Army soldiers were entitled to a monetary allowance (50 rubles per month), secured by all the assets of the Imperial Bank of Germany ("to pay for the maintenance of the Red Guard and agitators in the country" in January 1918, the Germans transferred 50 million rubles in gold, "to hand them over to representatives of the People's Commissars").

However, the expected influx of defenders of the socialist Fatherland did not happen. Not too many hunters were found to participate in

fratricidal war, except for members of the Red Guard, anarchist sailors, "internationalists", a certain number of people fooled by the ideas of universal equality and various kinds of criminal elements. Successfully "democratized" soldiers of the cadre army, trying to get home faster, massively self-demobilized, the officers fled,

saving your life.

(The ideas of equality inspired the "weary masses" and were comprehensively exploited by the Bolsheviks. They themselves knew very well that there could be no equality. Lenin wrote: "The concept of equality, apart from the destruction of classes, is stupidity and a wicked prejudice ... We want to destroy classes, in this respect we stand for equality, but to pretend that we will make all people equal to each other is the most empty phrase and the stupid invention of an intellectual.")

Meanwhile, especially for the world and the remnants of the Russian public in the White Palace of the Brest Fortress, a spectacle of negotiations was played out.

But the conditions put forward by the Germans, which meant the loss of 150,000 square kilometers of territory for the country, were so shameful that even in the Bolshevik Party, bound by an iron hoop of discipline, an implacable opposition to the "obscene world" arose, offering to declare a revolutionary war on the enemy. At an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), only 15 people voted for Lenin's proposal to sign peace, and 48 voted against. After all, most members of the government and the party had no idea about Lenin's deeply secret connections with German intelligence.

Therefore, A.A. Ioffe, and after him L.D. Trotsky dragged out the negotiations in Brest, pursuing two tactical goals. Firstly, it was planned to launch a propaganda campaign in order to protect the leaders from accusations of selling the interests of Russia too obviously, to inspire the masses that the government was stubbornly resisting Germany's demands, and the peace being concluded was of a forced, violent nature. Secondly, in Petrograd they hoped for the rapid development of the revolution in Europe - what the hell is not joking, but what if Karl Liebknecht really

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companies with Rosa Luxembourg and Clara Zetkin will "push" the German imperialists and "get us out of all difficulties."

To help Ilyich make the right decision and to convince his overly revolutionary comrades-in-arms that the Germans "could attack," the Kaiser's troops went on the offensive on February 18 along the entire front, from the Gulf of Riga to the mouth of the Danube. There was no one to stop them. Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, former lieutenant general, and now a "soldier of the revolutionary army", M.D. Bonch-Bruевич (1870-1956) reported to the Council of People's Commissars.

"Many sections of the Front have been completely abandoned by units and are not guarded by anyone. Under such conditions, the front should be considered only designated ... The vast majority of experienced military commanders were either removed during the elections, or left when soldiers of their age were dismissed from service. At the huge

most soldiers have only one desire to go to the rear... Fortified positions are destroyed, covered with snow, buildings are falling apart; the wood is hauled away for fuel, and the wire is removed to facilitate "fraternization" and trade. The armies are completely incompetent and unable to contain the enemy ... The front of a special army for 120 miles is open.

Encountering no resistance, the Germans occupied Dvinsk (now Daugavpils), Polotsk and Minsk, approached Petrograd, captured a huge amount of guns, ammunition and various equipment.

Meanwhile, the performance continued. On the one hand, Lenin and Trotsky loudly announced "The Socialist Fatherland is in danger", a revolutionary headquarters for the defense of Petrograd was organized, and a barrier was created in the most important directions from the Red Guard formations and parts of the army and navy, which still retained combat capability.

On the other hand, "Mr. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars" received confidential instructions from the Russian Department of the German General Staff: "The Headquarters Department has the honor to ask for information about the mood of the detachments sent to Pskov and warns against possible sad consequences if patriotic propaganda and agitation are carried out in these detachments against the German Army.

The Germans occupied Pskov without a fight. After that, the offensive was suspended and on the morning of February 23, more stringent peace conditions were put forward. This event later served as a pretext for declaring February 23 as the birthday of the Red Army, which supposedly "stopped the German advance (and, according to some of the most fantastic works, even" defeated the Germans ") near Pskov and Narva."

That the enemy stopped of his own accord is clear from Lenin's speech at \1| party congress:

"We assumed that Petrograd would be lost by us in a few days, when the German troops approaching us were at a distance of several transitions from it, and the best sailors and Putilovites, with all their great enthusiasm, found themselves alone when unheard-of chaos and panic ensued, forcing troops to run to Gatchina, when we were experiencing the fact that we were taking back what had not been surrendered, and this consisted in the fact that the telegraph operator came to the station, sat down at the apparatus and telegraphed: "There is no Nemp. The station is occupied by us."

The Kaiser and his generals did not need Petrograd (this could cause a wave of patriotic upsurge in the country, which would inevitably wash away the Bolsheviks), but a separate peace, Russian raw materials and a pocket Russian government.

On February 24, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR accepted all the terms of the ultimatum. On March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed between Soviet Russia, on the one hand, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, on the other. According to the treaty, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were handed over from Russia to the enemies. In the Caucasus, Türkiye received a huge territory with the cities of Kare, Ardagan and Batum. Ukraine and Finland were recognized as independent states.

Russia thus lost an area of about 800 thousand square kilometers, with a population of 56 million people.

Here is how the American diplomat E. Sisson commented on this agreement:

"Germany made a Russian peace with its own fictitious government, falsely called the Council of People's Commissars ... Germany did not abandon the Bolshevik leaders, recognizing their further use for the German world campaign aimed at internal disorganization of the peoples with whom she is at war. But it limited their activities to the boundaries of the closed province into which Great Russia has become.

But within the limits of this vassal "province" the Bolsheviks, under the protection of German bayonets and with the direct participation of German "advisors", could now do whatever they please. For the sake of such an opportunity, Lenin was ready to give up both St. Petersburg and Moscow. He was ready to "retreat at least to the Urals." And prudently drove the "golden echelons" to the east. The main thing is to retain power and win time: "If you fail to adapt, if you are not disposed to crawl on your belly, in the mud, then you are not a revolutionary, but a talker."

Until November 1918, the world's first state of workers and peasants was, in fact, a German protectorate, whose government "crawled on its belly", biding its time and dreaming of a revolutionary war in Europe.

By the way, in accordance with Article 5 of the peace treaty, the Red Army was also subject to liquidation. The fronts were liquidated, the armies were disbanded, the First Corps of the Red Army had to be disbanded, the position of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was abolished. Us! Lenin stated at the party congress: "We don't have an army, but we have to continue to live next to a predator who is armed to the teeth" ...

Meanwhile, the pacified "predator" did everything possible to speed up the process of establishing the power of the Bolsheviks on the ground. The Germans continued to provide not only financial and material assistance, but also sent military units of the German army to Russia to suppress popular resistance.

Lenin had no doubt that time was working for him. In the spring of 1918, it was clear to the naked eye that Germany's position was unpromising, that she would lose the war anyway, and that one had to be ready for that day. Remaining a Marxist to the marrow of his bones, Vladimir Ilyich was going to transfer the fire of the world revolution to Europe, "cause an international revolution, make this transition from our revolution, as narrowly national, to the world."

In the meantime, it was necessary to "seize the moment", secretly help the allegedly independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic, support the rebel detachments of Ataman N.I. Makhno and N.A. Grigoriev, to supply weapons to the Finnish Red Guard, to cultivate a new ideological and bacteriological weapon - "the bacillus of Bolshevism, and spread it to all surrounding territories.

Therefore, having approved the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the UP Party Congress also adopted a secret

"Resolution on War and Peace", which stated:

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"The first and main task of both our party, and the entire vanguard of the class-conscious proletariat, and the Soviet government, the congress recognizes the adoption of the most energetic, ruthlessly decisive and draconian measures to increase self-discipline and discipline of the workers and peasants of Russia ..., to create everywhere and everywhere the most strictly connected and by the iron united will of the organizations of the masses fastened together, organizations capable of united and selfless action both in everyday life and especially at critical moments in the life of the people - finally, for the comprehensive, systematic, universal training of the adult population, without distinction of sex, in military knowledge and military operations .

The congress sees the most reliable guarantee for the consolidation of the socialist revolution, which has triumphed in Russia, only in its transformation into an international workers' revolution.

The congress recognizes it necessary not to publish the adopted resolution and obliges all members of the party to keep this resolution secret.

The spring of 1918 became a time of feverish military construction, which laid the organizational principles of the Red Army for all subsequent years.

Already in March, the Supreme Military Council was formed, which was entrusted with the management of the organization of the cadre army and "all military operations." The council consisted of a chairman (L.D. Trotsky), a military leader (M.D. Bonch Bruyevich) and three members. To protect the demarcation line with the German troops, a curtain line was created, consisting of separate Red Army, Red Guard and partisan detachments. The curtains did not so much protect the country "from possible invasions" as they prevented the mass exodus of the population from the northern and central provinces, which were the first to appreciate the "charms" of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

On March 26, the Supreme Military Council abolished the election of commanders; March 31 - issued an order on the introduction of a new system of military district administration and on the establishment of six military districts in the European part of the RSFSR.

Since there were few trained commanders with proletarian origins, and Podvoisky liquidated all the cadet and cadet schools back in November 1917, Lenin proposed using the former officers of the tsarist army, "but at the same time vigilantly monitor them, putting commissars over them and suppressing their counter-revolutionary intentions."

On April 6, the institute of military commissars was established to oversee the work of military experts and educate personnel in the spirit of devotion to the Soviet regime. According to the regulation, not a single order of the commander of a unit or formation, without the signature of the commissar, was subject to execution. Commissars were "only impeccable revolutionaries, staunch fighters for the cause of the proletariat and the rural poor", but, as a rule, they knew nothing about military affairs.

By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 8, to carry out organizational work on recruiting the Red Army, a local military apparatus was established - volost, district, provincial and district military commissariats. It was planned to begin the formation of 58 infantry divisions with a staff of 360,000 officers and rank and file. In April, Lenin approved a plan for the deployment of a million-strong army on the basis of united states.

The case was in full swing from voluntariness to universal military service. The first step towards its introduction was the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of April 22, which obliged everyone

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volunteer to serve at least six months.

On the same day, the decree "On Compulsory Training in the Art of War" introduced compulsory general training of workers and "peasants who do not exploit the labor of others" in military affairs. All citizens of both sexes (although the participation of women was voluntary) from the age of 16 to 4 years, as well as teenagers, without interruption from work and study, were supposed to study in the Vseobuch system - Lenin's dream came true. After eight weeks of classes according to a single 96-hour program, the proletarian was considered liable for military service. The decree provided for "revolutionary responsibility" for evading training in the "art of war".

By the end of April 1918, there were 200 thousand people in the armed forces of the RSFSR (plus 36 thousand in the Red Guard detachments). A very significant percentage of the personnel in them were the so-called internationalist warriors, simply mercenaries.

By the time the autocracy was overthrown, there were about 5 million foreign citizens in Russia, including 2.2 million prisoners of war - Austrians, Germans, Turks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks. It was these, in fact, enemy soldiers (German with the permission of the German command), in company with restless Latvian riflemen, impoverished Chinese, just adventurers from all over the world at first, that made up the strike force of the Leninist regime, establishing the Soviet regime with pleasure and not without profit. power in a country given to them for complete plunder and desecration.

For example, well-armed, soldered by conscious discipline and fellow countrymen, who hated the Empire, under the command of military personnel officers, the regiments of Latvian riflemen became a real find for Lenin, the force without which the Bolshevik government, perhaps, would not have remained in power. The Bolsheviks deliberately destroyed the former Russian army, but the Latvian regiments were not subject to demobilization. They had to pay for the promised independence of Latvia with their "international aid".

(By the way, the national question also had its own subtleties. The loud declaration of the rights of nations "oppressed by tsarism" to self-determination, contributing to the collapse of the Russian Empire and the disunity of peoples, prevented the anti-Bolshevik forces from uniting, made the nationalists allies of Lenin, who promised not to "keep anyone by force".

Of course, for the time being. After all, the interests of the world revolution demanded quite the opposite - global sovietization: "For our part, we do not want secession at all. We want the largest possible state, the closest possible union, the largest possible number of nations ... We want revolutionary proletarian unity, unity, not division.

Already on October 30, 1917, Vladimir Ilyich invited Latvians to Petrograd to establish revolutionary order, and less than a month later, the 6th Tukums Rifle Regiment (over 2,500 people) arrived in the capital. The shooters participated in the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, in actions to nationalize banks, arrested counter-revolutionaries, guarded important objects, warehouses, and carried out guard duty. At the same time, to protect the people's commissars from the people, on the orders of the commander-in-chief Krylenko, a Consolidated company of Latvian riflemen (540 people) was formed.

In January 1918, the Bolsheviks actually headed for the Civil War, but they were sorely lacking reliable units to suppress the flaring up resistance. Little was the use of detachments of anarchist sailors, all

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hid in the rear and lost their combat capability immediately after recapturing a wine shop from the enemy. Some sailor Zheleznyak was good enough to throw out the indignant "intellectuals" with deputy mandates from the Tauride Palace, to carry out expropriations is also a necessary thing, but, according to rumor, when the "wanderer of the seas" needed to get to Odessa, he went to Kherson .*

* Anarchist sailor of the Baltic Fleet Anatoly Zheleznyakov (1895-1919) joined the Bolsheviks in October 1917. In January 1918 he was the head of the guard at the Tauride Palace. By order of Lenin on January 5, he dispersed the Constituent

collection of Russia.

Therefore, in January 1918, the 3rd Kurzeme Regiment of Latvian Riflemen went to the Don to pacify the Cossacks of General Kaledin. At the same time, the 6th Tukums Regiment left for the north to provide fraternal assistance to the proletariat of Finland. The task of suppressing the "mutiny" in Belarus of the corps of General Dovbor-Musnitsky, who refused to "democratize" the Polish units, was readily taken on by the 1st and 4th regiments. In general, in late 1917 - early 1918. almost half of the Latvian riflemen (about 10 thousand people) took part "in the fight against counter-revolution" outside the territory of Latvia. And not just arrows. Latvian Red Guard detachments were created in Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav, Odessa, Aleksandrovsk, Vitebsk and other cities.

The February offensive of the German army and the subsequent conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk temporarily limited Lenin's territorial appetites. The Germans knocked out the Red Finns from Finland, the Red Latvians from the Baltic states. Soviet Latvia ceased its two-month existence.

The shooters adopted a resolution not to "surrender to German imperialism" and "join the proletarian army of Russia." In practice, they formed the core of this "proletarian" army - eight thinned regiments and the 1st Latvian communist congratulations. The rest of the Red Army consisted of separate, unrelated to each other and practically subordinate to no one but the revolutionary conscience, partisan detachments with elected commanders, usually former non-commissioned officers or ordinary soldiers.

The Latvians ensured the secret relocation of the government to Moscow, guarded the Kremlin (the consolidated security company grew into the 9th Infantry Regiment) and the approaches to the new capital. They were also entrusted with the export of gold reserves and other "values of the Republic" into the interior of the country.

Until now, the glorious history of the Chinese battalions, which were formed throughout the country, has not been written. They also guarded Lenin. And Comrade Trotsky, and other comrades. The Chinese ptiroko were used to carry out punitive actions, executions, as torture specialists. There were almost 300 thousand Chinese in Russia, during the World War they were recruited en masse for various jobs, they were in almost every major city - Petrograd, Moscow, Perm, Yekaterinburg, Odessa ... The Germans were engaged in food appropriation (!), in particular, on Don (!!). It is easy to imagine the reaction of the Cossacks.

It is clear that all this army was intended exclusively for "internal use". The number of internationalists who fought for the happiness of the Russian proletariat in the ranks of the Red Army ranged from 250 to 300 thousand people (including more than 40 thousand Chinese mercenaries, about 12 thousand Czech legionnaires). The number of international formations - detachments, companies, battalions, legions, regiments, brigades and divisions - rolls over five hundred. And how they strengthened the Cheka!

In the spring of 1918, Lenin believed that he had already won the civil war:

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"It was necessary to defend this victory (there are 6 types of the October Revolution) in

civil war. It took about three months from defeating

Kerensky ("fool and braggart") near Gatchina, continuing victories over the bourgeoisie, junkers, part of the counter-revolutionary Cossacks in Moscow,

Irkutsk, Orenburg, Kyiv, ending with a victory over Kaledin, Kornilov and Alekseev in Rostov-on-Don ... Victories on the home front were relatively easy.

At the UP congress, the leader declared: "The civil war has become a fact. ... A wave of civil war was rising all over Russia, and everywhere we won with extraordinary ease ... ". Finally, in April: "We have recaptured Russia... We must now govern Russia."

And to manage, according to Lenin's understanding, meant to carry out

forced organization of the entire population, subject it to iron discipline, establish a comprehensive accounting and control of grain and grain production (and then all other necessary products), separate the sheep from the goats, determine each ration and distribute this ration depending on the "usefulness" of a member of society for Soviet power:

"When it comes to the distribution of food, it is impossible to think that it is necessary to distribute only fairly. And one must think that this distribution is a method, an instrument, a means for raising production. It is necessary to give state food support only to those employees who are really needed in conditions of the best labor productivity, and if food is distributed as an instrument of politics, then in the direction of reducing those who are not absolutely needed and encouraging those who are really needed.

Thus, Vladimir Ilyich intended to govern by terror and famine. In May 1918, having "winned with extraordinary ease" in the civil war, he decided that it was time to move on to the coveted, "warm stage of the revolution" - the introduction of a food dictatorship, the subordination of the petty-bourgeois elements to the "will of one person." For it was unbearable for him to look at the mess that had formed around him: "everyone strove in his own way. Animals roamed, birds flew, insects crawled; but no one wanted to march in step.

On May 13, 1918, the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On granting emergency powers to the People's Commissariat for Food to combat the rural bourgeoisie, hiding grain stocks and speculating with them" was approved.

On May 27, a decree "On the reorganization of the People's Commissariat for Food and Local Food Organs" followed, providing for the centralization of the entire food business and the steady implementation of the grain

monopoly.

On the basis of these decrees, the People's Commissariat for Food received the right to use armed force to seize grain and set about organizing food committees and a paramilitary Food Requisition Army. In June, the first food workers appeared, of which food battalions and food regiments were formed (by the autumn of 1920, there were more than 77 thousand fighters in the Food Army).

Lenin, announcing a "crusade" in the countryside, called on the advanced workers to organize "iron detachments" themselves and take control of "every point in the production of grain."

The Prodrazverstka was still thought up by the Provisional Government, but it understood

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under this term is somewhat different and did not throw out the slogan "With machine guns for bread".

The Soviet government simply declared enemies of the people everyone who hid surplus grain, did not take it to bulk points, but wanted to sell it without fail. That is, all the peasants, except for the whitest ones, who had nothing to "hide". These lumpens were enlisted as allies of the proletariat, organized according to the decree of June 1, into committees of the poor, gave them "power unrestricted by any laws" and allowed to rob everyone else. combos

WERE "strongholds, organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the countryside".

The main enemies, of course, were declared those who had something to take away - the "glutted" kulaks - "the most brutal, the rudest, the wildest exploiters." The very idea that people could live normally on earth, feed on their labor and grow rich, regardless of the existing government, not obeying the "sole orders of the Soviet dictators" and not showing any desire to feed parasites, caused Lenin to have attacks of furious anger.

As soon as he did not call them: spiders and leeches, vampires and bloodsuckers, robbers and speculators. They had money, "they had saved up thousands and hundreds of thousands of money," and they were also going to strangle and slaughter "infinitely many workers" and restore the "power of the landowners"! Therefore, all of them must be killed. The leader had already estimated that there were hardly more than two million "kulaks" in the country, "the kulaks are the minority among the people", there would be enough cartridges for everyone. Ilyich disliked the kulaks very much, he hated them as a class: "A merciless war against these kulaks! Death to them! And food detachments moved into the village, but under the protection of German, Hungarian, Austrian and other internationalists.

That's when it exploded. Then, in the summer of 1918, from this "Red Campaign", from the rebellion of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (they knew that the confiscated grain was going to Germany in echelons), from the peasant uprisings, the Civil War began. It gained even more momentum in late autumn, when German troops began to clear the occupied territories, transferring power to national governments.

On November 13, 1918, the Central Executive Committee solemnly declared that the conditions of the Brest peace "have lost their strength and significance" and called on the peoples "to decide their own fate." However, the Central Bureau of Bolshevik Organizations in the Occupied Regions, which arose literally out of thin air, immediately issued an appeal: "We cannot allow the organization of counter-revolutionary elements and the seizure of power ... Immediately start organizing Soviets of Workers' Deputies."

Alas, no one was going to organize councils either in Ukraine or in the Baltic states. Crowds of refugees from the RSFSR managed to tell a lot about life in the country of the victorious proletariat. Legitimately elected Provisional Governments came to power in Estonia and Latvia. In Ukraine, the government of Hetman (former lieutenant general) P.P. Skoropadsky. The Transcaucasian republics - Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan - declared their independence.

But all these governments were bourgeois, therefore, according to the Bolsheviks, "wrong" and "illegal". The real rulers lived in Moscow - "true thieves in law." Through the demarcation line to the west and south, in order to ensure the "revolutionary-proletarian unity" of the peoples and to assist the "international workers' revolution", units of the Red Army moved. However, during the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, not only the Bolsheviks received a "breathing space": "armies of the overthrown classes" stood in the way of the proletarian army, small in number, but better organized, with a large number of officers in their ranks.

Actually, it was only then that the Red Army was truly born, although the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on universal military service for all workers aged 18 to 40 came out on May 29, 1918.

On September 2, 1918, simultaneously with the declaration of the country as a military camp - "The Republic is surrounded by enemies!" - instead of the Supreme Military Council, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was created under the chairmanship of L.D. Trotsky. The leadership of the active army of the RVSR was carried out through the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Republic. The disbandment of the Red Guard was completed.

On September 11, the curtains were liquidated and fronts were created in their place. By December 1918, 12 armies were deployed, in which there were 285,000 bayonets and sabers (according to Soviet historians, internationalists accounted for only about 8%, but this is in the fall, and there is a strange thing: Latvian riflemen "do not count"). The total number of armed forces reached 800 thousand people, and by the beginning of 1919 - 1 million 630 thousand. Lenin demanded to bring it up to three million by spring.

It became clear that one cannot do without specialists.

The principle of formation of the command staff of the Red Army was formulated by Lenin. On the day of the Red Officer on November 24, 1918, the leader gave a clear instruction:

"Building a new army, we must take commanders only from the people. Only red officers will have authority among the soldiers and will be able to consolidate socialism in our army. Such an army will be invincible."

However, the vast majority of "red officers" had no military education, and often no education at all. The formations they led were poorly managed detachments of armed workers, former soldiers and sailors, capable of terrorizing a single area or carrying out guerrilla raids, but had "correct intelligence, neither communication with each other, nor the ability to more complex maneuver" and showed complete failure. In a clash with the armies of the "overthrown classes", and the "commanders in chief" and "commanders" who had bred in a multitude did not want to obey anyone.

(S.S. Kamenev, being the head of the Nevsky section of the Western Veil, formally described the detachment subordinate to him in this way: "Many volunteers were from those who, going voluntarily to serve in the Carnal detachment, actually hid from military work, there were many of them a vicious element with predatory tendencies.

Trotsky later wrote:

"Our central position, the location of the enemies in a large circle,

the opportunity for us to operate along internal lines of operations, reduced the Naptu strategy to one simple idea: namely, to the successive liquidation of fronts, depending on their relative importance ... We had the opportunity to transfer forces and massage them into shock fists in the most important direction at the moment . However, this advantage could be realized only under the condition of complete centralism in management and command ... it was necessary to be able to order, not persuade.

After fierce party disputes, it was decided to build the Red Army on

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on a regular basis, rejecting the nonsense about the total arming of the people. A month after the announcement of compulsory military service for workers, the mobilization of former officers and officials was introduced. On October 1, 1918, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars was issued on the general mobilization of "persons of the General Staff", except for obvious cripples "obsessed with serious illnesses."

Trotsky testified:

"Each of the improvised commanders needed an officer ... A fair percentage of educated officers had ... an extremely favorable influence on the general level of command" ...

(In 1918) "76% of the entire command and administrative apparatus was represented by former officers of the tsarist army and only 12.9% consisted of young red commanders who naturally occupied lower positions."

In total, 75,000 former officers served in the Red Army, including more than 500 graduates of the Academy of the General Staff. Among them were those who were forcibly mobilized, there were those who decided to make a career under the new government, but after all, the family had to somehow be fed under the conditions of "war communism". A surge of patriotism and the desire to serve the motherland, regardless of the political coloring of the government, among the officers who did not want to participate in the war on the "home front", caused the German invasion, and then it turned out that the "bird got stuck", and there is no freedom of choice.

There were also those to whom the Bolshevik slogans about a new Russia seemed more attractive than the ideas of the White movement. They did not immediately understand that the main "ideas" of the Bolsheviks were violence, unscrupulousness, monstrous cruelty, and all their slogans and promises were shameless lies.

By the way, regardless of whether the officers voluntarily joined the Red Army or were mobilized, a special order required the commissars to monitor them, punish them, "keep on record the families of officers and take them to responsible positions if there is an opportunity in case of treason

take over the family.

Comrade Martyn Latsis taught: "The first duty you must ask him is what class he belongs to, what is his origin, what is his education and what is his profession." Based on these "three questions" of any military specialist in

any moment could be dragged to the basement, which the axis did systematically. In case of any failure, the former officers were first accused of treason. Even the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Republic, Joachim Joakimovich Vatsetis, landed on the bunk in the summer of 1919. The officers were and remained a class enemy, they were used for the time being, or, to put it in Lenin's language, "they built communism from the bricks that the capitalists picked up against us."

They fought on the side of the "Reds", some for conscience, some for fear, organizing the supply of the Red Army, conducting mobilization activities, commanding armies and fronts, planning operations so that in the end some Primakov could show off in front of the soldiers and the photographer on a white horse with saber. It is funny to read the reasoning of S.M. Budyonny like: "Perhaps the weakest point in the Wrangel organization was the generals. I knew Pokrovsky, and Shatilov, and Ulagai, and others well: we had to beat them in 1919. They were not very brave warriors, with a narrow military outlook, with limited operational thinking. I wonder where the illiterate Cossack got such "unlimited operational thinking", who was his chief of staff?

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All the chiefs of the Soviet front-line staffs in 1918-1920 were former

officers of the General Staff (where else to get a competent staff officer?), 53% of the chiefs of staff of the armies and 37% of the commanders of the armies are also them.

Frunze's chief of staff was General N.S. Makhrov, in the headquarters of Tukhachevsky during the attack on Warsaw - General N.V. Sologub. General A.A. Samoilov commanded the 6th separate army, General P.P. Sytin - Southern Front, General V.D. Olderozh - Eastern Front, General A.E. Snegarev - by the troops of the North Caucasian Military District and the combined armed forces of Belarus and Lithuania, Colonel V.M. Gittis - Western and Caucasian fronts. The commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the RSFSR were colonels of the General Staff I.I. Vatsetis and S.S. Kamenev, and their chiefs of staff were Generals P.P. Lebedev and M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich.*

* The reader will look in vain in encyclopedias for information about the majority of these and similar people who ensured the victory of the Bolsheviks over their opponents. Later, when the need for "military experts" disappeared, the grateful revolutionaries

most of them were executed or rotted in the camps.

At the M Party Congress (1919), member of the Central Committee Grigory Yakovlevich Sokolnikov (aka Brilliant) reported:

"Where military specialists were involved, where the partisan army was reorganized into a regular army, stability of the front was achieved, military success was achieved. On the contrary, where military specialists have not found a use for themselves ... there they have come to the complete disintegration and disappearance of the armies themselves.

Despite this, many prominent Bolsheviks, for example, Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Stalin, as well as proletarian military leaders who came forward from the people, like Budyonny and Voroshilov, spoke out against the involvement of class alien officers in military work, expressed their distrust of him, accused him of treason, demanded "to reconsider the attitude to the military experts. On this basis, the so-called "military opposition" even arose. Indeed, forcibly mobilized officers often ran across to the opposite side. So the vel and the workers in whole regiments moved from red to white, from white to green and back to red, that's why it is the Civil War. For example, the regiment of Izhevsk workers was considered the best military unit in Kolchak's army. But the Marxists saw the difference: the proletarians made mistakes because of ignorance and unconsciousness, the "officers" cheated because of their class origin.

Lenin also fell into doubt, for he himself demanded the complete destruction of the "bourgeois layer". However, the defeat of the Red Army on the Eastern Front, the complete collapse and defeat of the Ukrainian front, which was essentially partisan, made a proper impression on Vladimir Ilyich. A flexible tactician and a supporter of iron discipline, he declared the policy of attracting military experts to be the only true one, urged, discarding "ignorant conceit", to learn military affairs from them, of course, subject to vigilant control over the officers and merciless suppression of any "counter-revolutionary encroachment":

"Hundreds and hundreds of military experts are cheating on us and will continue to be cheated on, we will catch and shoot them, but thousands and tens of thousands of military experts systematically and for a long time work for us, without whom the Red Army could not have been created, which grew out of the accursed memory of partisanism and managed to win brilliant victories in the east ... Partisanism, its traces, its remnants, its remnants caused both our army and the Ukrainian army immeasurably more disasters, disintegration, defeats and catastrophes, loss of people and loss of property than all the betrayals of military experts.

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As the need passed, they got rid of them, promoting "red officers", graduates of early courses for command personnel, so that by the end of the Civil War the number of former officers of the tsarist army was about 34% and steadily decreased further.

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In the end, using merciless terror and promises of universal equality, the mobilization of all resources combined with unparalleled ferocity, an iron organization based on the basest instincts, slogans of self-determination of nations and discord in the enemy camp, which allowed them to beat them in turn, the Bolsheviks defeated Russia. One of the factors contributing to this victory was the presence of tens of thousands of officers in the service of the Bolshevik regime.

But the heroes of the war, hung with orders of the Red Banner of War and "revolutionary weapons", glorified in poetry and prose, were, of course, not they, but the flesh of the flesh of the working people, worker-peasant commanders, mostly former non-commissioned officers, ensigns or, in last resort, lieutenants. Say, they created a new proletarian military art, on the head

surpassing all other inventions of the bourgeois. The generals were now supposed to speak down, there was nothing to learn from them. For example, SM. Budyonny wrote:

"The White Guards had well-trained personnel, they were commanded by experienced military leaders. However, all these gentlemen were beaten by the red fighters, including the cavalry, according to all the rules of military art.

Robert Petrovich Eideman, yet another nugget strategist, a half-educated student of the Forestry Institute, an accelerated ensign who began his military career immediately from the position of head of a division, asserted with aplomb: "Denikin's operational thought was too decrepit, reflecting the degeneration of an obsolete system."

The military legacy of the tsarist army was rejected as "backward" and unsuitable for the Red Army. Former Lieutenant M.N. Tukhachevsky, defeated by Piłsudski near Warsaw in 1920, less than a year later, in an article for the journal *Voyennyj vestnik*, brazenly asserted:

"We have not inherited good methods of combined arms training from the tsarist army, and we ourselves must persistently develop them in relation to the conditions of the Red Army."

The "budenny", "eidemans" and "Gukhachevskys" did not inherit a lot. Including such methods of training and education of troops, as a result of which millions of soldiers and commanders of the most ideological army in the world went over to the side of the enemy, as happened in the Soviet-German war of 1941—

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In 1921-1922, during the period of the reduction of the Red Army, the "old regime" generals and officers were quietly escorted to teaching. In 1924, they were purged from educational institutions and dismissed from the army; in 1930-1934, the survivors were arrested and imprisoned on charges of a monarchist conspiracy, including such prominent military specialists and scientists as A.E. Snegarev (1865-1937), A.A. Svechin (1878-1938), A.Kh. Bazarevsky, N.E. Kakurin (1883-1936); some were even shot.

In 1937-1938, they finished off those who did not have time to die a natural death - for example, 68-year-old P.I. Sytin...

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By the end of 1935, the Soviet military hierarchy had taken shape. Top management

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people approved in new military ranks by a resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars dated

September 22: 5 marshals of the USSR, 5 commanders of the 1st rank, 2 fleet flagships of the 1st

rank, one army commissar of the 1st rank, 9 army commanders of the 2nd rank, 2 fleet flagships of the 2nd rank, 15 army commissars of the 2nd rank.

Almost all of them were solid Bolsheviks, heroes of the Civil War, spattered to the top with the blood of their compatriots, tested in ideological battles with the Trotskyists, the right and left opposition, and other deviations.

At the top of the pyramid, the first five marshals in Soviet history shone with merit and regalia. The newspaper "GTravda" wrote about them:

"The best of the best, worthy of the worthy iron tribe commanders of the Red Army. The five marshals embody the incomparable qualities of the sons of the people, the military leaders of the workers and peasants, our commanders. Under their leadership, the regiments of the Red Army have covered their banners with unfading glory, under their leadership the Red Army vigilantly guards the Soviet lands from enemies.

Let's get to know this "iron tribe" better.

Marshals

Marshal Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov was born in 1881 in the village of Verkhnee, Yekaterinoslav province, into a working-class family. At the age of twelve, Klim went to a rural zemstvo school, where he studied for two winters. The official biography of the "first red officer", "the invincible marshal of the working class" tells of a hungry childhood, poverty and "a craving for education when it is impossible to satisfy it." True, when opportunities for satisfaction appeared, cravings disappeared. Kliment Efremovich never studied anything again.

At the age of fifteen, he began working as a fitter's assistant at the Yuryevsky Metallurgical Plant, where in 1899 he organized a strike of crane operators and foundry workers. The first arrest, dismissal, blacklisting, wanderings in search of work followed. In 1903 he was accepted into the Lugansk organization of the RSDLP. Thus began the path of a professional revolutionary.

After the split of the Social Democrats, Voroshilov resolutely joined the Leninists and, in defiance of the Mensheviks, presented himself at party meetings as "Comrade Antimekov." Energetic, temperamental Klim quickly became a prominent figure in the Bolshevik movement.

In the first Russian revolution, elected chairman of the Lugansk Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Voroshilov led strikes at the Hartmann factory, created combat squads, delivered weapons from Finland, and organized an underground laboratory for making bombs. In 1906 and 1907 he was a delegate to the Stockholm and London Party Congresses, where he met Lenin, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky. In July 1907, the bomber was arrested for the third time. He received from the "bloody tsarist regime" three years of exile in the Arkhangelsk province. He fled from exile exactly three months later.

In 1908-1917, Voroshilov conducted underground work in Baku, St. Petersburg, and Tsaritsyn. The work was regularly interrupted by arrests, imprisonment, deportations to remote regions of the empire. After the February Revolution, Kliment Efremovich spent a month as a member of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies, and then

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returned to Lugansk, where he was elected chairman of the city council, city дума and party committee. In November 1917, as a delegate to the Constituent Assembly, Voroshilov went to the capital and, falling into the thick of things, became a commissar of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee and one of the founders of the Cheka, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage.

In March 1918, Lenin, paying for advance payments and ticketless travel in a sealed carriage, concluded a separate peace with Germany, according to which Ukraine occupied by the Germans was recognized as an independent state, the further fate of which would be decided "without the participation of the Russian authorities." Austria-Hungary and Germany signed the corresponding agreements with the delegation of the Central Rada of Ukraine, which immediately requested German military assistance.

Officially, the Bolsheviks could not prevent this in any way. But they had vast experience in underground work and, formally observing the conditions of the Brest Peace, diligently fanned the flames of the "revolutionary war" in the territories that had separated from the Russian Empire, secretly supporting the rebels Makhno, Grigoriev, Shinkar.

Voroshilov was sent to Ukraine. There he created the 1st partisan Lugansk socialist detachment of 600 people and on March 13 he went to battle "with the executioners of the proletarian revolution" - German interventionists and Ukrainian independentists.

Soon the detachment turned into the 5th Ukrainian Army. True, the Germans were not afraid. Just two weeks later, the defeated "army" began to hastily retreat. Voroshilov led his "troops" to Lugansk, from where the "legendary Voroshilov campaign" of the red partisans with families, trains and convoys of looted goods began through the rebellious Cossack Don to the Volga.

With the beginning of the revolution, the Donets were about to stick their lances into the ground and, leaving the front, scattered around the villages, but two months of Soviet power and Lenin's decree on the introduction of the surplus appraisal outraged them. General A.I. Denikin wrote in his memories:

"Screams were heard from all sides, stories about mass atrocities, about the desecration of churches, about arsons and robberies, about the rape of women and children" ...

Therefore, angry "White Cossacks destroyed railways, bridges, blew up water pumps, continuously attacked moving troops and echelons." Nevertheless, in early July 1918, "a group of troops of Comrade Voroshilov" broke through to Tsaritsyn.

Here was his old acquaintance from the Baku underground, I.V. Stalin, an extraordinary representative for the procurement and export of grain from the North Caucasus. The Bolsheviks called "harvest" the forcible, at gunpoint, seizure of food products from the entire population of the country. They declared objections "enemies of the people", with all the ensuing consequences.

The peasantry and the Cossacks responded to the robbery with mass uprisings. Stalin, having unlimited powers, at the same time appointed himself the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District and the head of the city's defense against the Cossack units that did not accept Soviet power, General Sh.A. Krasnov, elected Ataman of the Don.

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Iosif Vissarionovich categorically did not trust military specialists, who served at the headquarters of the district, preferring to periodically drown the former royal officers in the Volga. Kliment Efremovich, who hated the "white bone" with all his proletarian gut, immediately became a member of the military council of the district and commander of the Tsaritsyno group of troops.

In September 1918, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic ordered the formation of the Southern Front on the basis of the North Caucasian District with headquarters in Kozlov; the commanders were appointed "military specialist", the former general P.T. Sytin. From the troops of the Tsaritsyn and Kamypinsky directions, the 10th Army was organized under the command of Voroshilov. The army consisted mainly of partisans knocked out from Ukraine, as well as declassified elements. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Army A.I. Okulov testified:

"They don't need anything, just" cut a little "- whom, for what - it is decidedly indifferent. The huge convoys of some units, where thousands of marauders, deserters and loafers are hiding, like locusts devastate the surroundings, devour supplies, sow panic and decay ... Partly due to what the 10th army is doing among the civilian population, and maybe most of all precisely for this reason, we are waging war among an enemy country ... As a result, when our troops approach, the civilian population often arm themselves, put up desperate resistance to us, and in the event of a defeat they run en masse, taking with them everything they can, and hiding and destroying the rest.

Stalin and Voroshilov, in correspondence with Moscow, themselves modestly majestic and "the most prominent members of the party", categorically refused to move to Kozlov and obey the "untrustworthy" former general, demanding the right to vote in all military decisions.

The squabble reached Lenin. Ilyich took the side of Tropkoy. As a result, Sytin remained in the post of commander with the personal mandate of the RVSR for "complete independence in matters of a strategic and operational nature." In the second half of October, Stalin was recalled from Tsaritsyn, Voroshilov was removed from the composition of the revolutionary military council of the front.

Trotsky, who took up the task of instilling iron discipline in the army, characterized the former locksmith as the focus of "home-grown opposition of non-commissioned officers and partisans against the centralized military organization and military specialists." Since then, Voroshilov has become a loyal ally of Stalin in the fight against Trotsky.

In November, Kliment Efremovich, due to complete incompetence, was removed from command of the army and appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in the hastily formed Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine. It published a manifesto without a word, in which it announced the deposition of Hetman Skoropadsky and the "restoration of all the gains" of October.

Following the manifesto, the Soviet troops set off on a campaign, which in January 1919 formed the Ukrainian Front under the command of V.A. Antonova-Ovseenko. Numerous peasant insurrectionary formations, which temporarily acted in the same team with the Bolsheviks, also became noticeably more active.

For some time, Voroshilov commanded the troops of the Kharkov district, in June 1919 he served as commander of the 14th Army, formed from the remnants of the 2nd Ukrainian Army and the red units knocked out of the Crimea and Yekaterinoslav. Antonov-Ovseenko reported to Moscow:

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"Voroshilov was the commander in a certain sector of the internal front. At first he had great setbacks on it, corrected by successes in other areas where he was not in command. He can attribute to himself the success of the fight against Grigoriev only because of a big misunderstanding. The report of his headquarters about the defeat of Grigoriev near Alexandria turned out to be false ... Voroshilov's statements in the field of his own successes are shamefully exaggerated.

Voroshilov could not show military talents as commander, his army was defeated by the corps of General A.G. Shkuro and threw him over the Dnieper.

Nevertheless, at the RCP(b) Congress, Kliment Efremovich, sincerely thinking of himself as a commander, became one of the leaders of the so-called military opposition, which denied the need to use military experts.

The commanders and commissars, who were promoted from the ranks, argued that in any case, former officers could not be trusted, and only communists should be appointed to high positions.

On November 19, 1919, Trotsky signed an order to create the First Cavalry Army, in which Voroshilov became a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. In this position, he participated in campaigns on the Denikin, Polish and Wrangel fronts, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. The horsemen, brutalized with blood, terrified the population of the "enemy country", destroyed everything and everyone in their path, not distinguishing the reds from the whites. Commissar of the Southern Front Gusev telegraphed Trotsky:

"Parts of the First Cavalry Army terrorize the authorities, rob and shoot residents and even the families of employees in the Red Army, all cattle are stolen ... The results of the atrocities are already affecting, those villages that were on the side of the Soviet government and are far from participating in banditry, now, on the contrary, have a terrible hatred for the Red Army and Soviet power.

In March 1921, the commissar of the Southern Group of Forces Voroshilov suppressed the Kronstadt rebellion, for which he received the second Order of the Red Banner. In the same year, he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and appointed commander of the troops of the newly created North Caucasian Military District, which at that time was conducting a "continuous fight against banditry": either the Terek Cossacks who supported Denikin were evicted and shot, and their lands were given to the Chechens, then "mercilessly shot" Chechen nationalists. It was for these works that Kliment Efremovich was awarded the third Order of the Red Banner.

Stalin closely followed the progress of his old friend. At the suggestion of the Secretary General, the commander of the troops of the Moscow District N.I. Muratov was transferred to the North Caucasus, and Voroshilov was appointed in his place. In January 1925, he became deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. After the death of Frunze, Kliment Efremovich headed the country's armed forces on November 6, 1925, and in January 1926 he was elected a member of the Politburo. The appointment of Voroshilov caused surprise in the military environment, where they had a very low opinion of his military talents. But for Stalin, only one fact mattered: Klim was a proven, most reliable ally.

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia wrote in 1929:

"Voroshilov did not receive systematic military training. For the first time, he became acquainted with military affairs in the fierce revolutionary struggle of the class from whose depths he emerged. The Civil War was the only practical school for him. Only at the end of the military suffering did he get the opportunity to get acquainted with the theory of military affairs. All this imposed a special

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imprint on the work of Voroshilov, and made him one of the most characteristic, striking and original figures among the military leaders and commanders of the October Revolution ... Highly developed class instinct, deep adherence to principles, genuine democracy - these are the main features of his political profile.

The whole trouble is that Kliment Efremovich believed that this "school" and this "profile" is quite enough to defeat any enemy. Therefore, the original and bright leader was not interested in the theory of military affairs, preferring to it the high art of opera in the person of female performers.

The propaganda apparatus tirelessly sang the exploits of the "first red officer" and he became one of the most popular people in the country. Songs were sung about him, poems were composed, cities and towns were named after him. Artillerymen fired "Voroshilov volleys", pilots ate "Voroshilov breakfasts", Red Army soldiers fought for the right to wear the badge of "Voroshilov marksman" or "Voroshilov horseman", wheat "Voroshilovskaya" was earing in the fields. Voroshilov, in his turn, sang the strategic genius of Stalin, dedicating the opus "Stalin and

Red Army".

On July 20, 1934, the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was renamed the People's Commissariat for Defense. Voroptilov still remained at his post, "successfully implementing Stalin's plans for building a mighty Red Army." On the eve of the eighteenth anniversary of October, Kliment Efremovich received another gift - the city of Lugansk was renamed Voroshilovgrad.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Ilyich Yegorov was born in 1883 in the city of Buzuluk, Orenburg Region, into a bourgeois family, which he subsequently carefully concealed, posing as a proletarian. Graduated from the Samara classical gymnasium.

In 1901, he was called to serve his military service as a volunteer, and then sent to the Kazan Infantry Cadet School, which he graduated in 1905. During the years of the first Russian revolution, Alexander Ilyich suppressed unrest and peasant uprisings in Transcaucasia and even distinguished himself in punitive deeds, earning the Order of St. Stanislav, 3rd degree. During the First World War, he commanded a company, battalion, regiment. He fought bravely: two wounds, three shell shocks, six military awards and St. George's weapons. He rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

After the February Revolution, Yegorov, an opportunist of pure water, joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, adjoining its right wing, campaigned for the war to a victorious end, and sharply criticized the irresponsibility of the Bolsheviks. It was not for nothing that the Provisional Government promoted him to colonel. But in October 1917, Alexander Ilyich turned much to the left in his views and moved to the ruling party of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Therefore, in December he received the post of a member of the board of the Commissariat for the demobilization of the old army.

From January 1918 he worked in the military department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, inspecting the formation and training of Red Army units. In May, he was appointed commissar of the All-Russian General Staff and chairman of the Higher Attestation Commission for the selection of officers for the Red Army. A staunch supporter of the creation of a disciplined regular army, Yegorov, in a report addressed to Lenin, justified the need to introduce the post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Republic and create a unified headquarters under him. In July 1918, after a failed rebellion, the Left SRs were outlawed. Outraged, Alexander Ilyich publicly, through the newspaper Pravda, broke with them and signed up with the Bolsheviks.

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In August 1918, Yegorov led the red troops who fought against the Cossacks of General P.A. Krasnov on the Balashov-Kamypshtin section. In October, the 9th Army of the Southern Front was formed on the basis of these troops. In December, Yegorov replaced Voroshilov as commander of the 10th Army, and in January 1919 he defeated the Cossacks on the outskirts of Tsaritsyn. However, in the spring, the troops of the Caucasian Volunteer Army P.N. came to the aid of Krasnov. Wrangel. On May 25, large White forces crossed the Sal River in the area of the Pletnev farm. Egorov personally led the counterattack of the 4th (Divisional Commander S.M. Budyonny) and the 6th (Divisional Commander I.R. Apanasenko) Cavalry Divisions. As a result, up to three regiments of white infantry were defeated, and the brave commander received a bullet wound. For this fight

Egorov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Nevertheless, on June 30, the army of General Wrangel took Tsaritsyn.

In July 1919, Alexander Ilyich was briefly appointed assistant commander and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front with the simultaneous entry, again instead of Voroshilov, into command of the 14th Army. This army left Kyiv with battles, then defended Bryansk. At the end of September, the South-Eastern Front was separated from the Southern Front, and Yegorov began to command the new Southern Front, at the suggestion of Stalin, although Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev objected to the appointment: "due to personal characteristics, he is unlikely to cope with such a difficult task." Stalin was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front.

In connection with the decisive offensive of Denikin's troops on Moscow, the Southern Front was declared the main front of the Republic. On September 20, the Red troops left Kursk, on October 1 - Voronezh, on October 13 - Orel. The real threat hung over Tula with its military factories and Moscow. The success of the whites was facilitated by the presence of large cavalry formations, which made it possible to maneuver forces, creating superiority in the right directions.

The Bolsheviks were greatly impressed by the 40-day raid of the 4th Don Cossack Corps, General K.K. Therefore, under the slogan thrown by People's Commissar Trotsky: "Proletarian on horseback", the creation of the red cavalry began. Lev Davidovich was one of the initiators of the formation of the "Red Cossacks" as a mobile strike force, along with the Cavalry.

To defeat Denikin, under the leadership of Trotsky and Kamenev, a plan was developed, the essence of which was to deliver flank attacks in converging directions in order to encircle the main enemy forces: from the area northwest of Orel (with the participation of the Latvian and Estonian Rifles, the 8th Cavalry Division of the Red Cossacks) and from the area east of Voronezh (by the forces of Budyonny's cavalry corps, together with other cavalry units). The counter-offensive began on October 11 and developed extremely successfully.

The simultaneous victory of the Red troops near Orel and Voronezh marked the beginning of a radical change in the situation on the Southern Front. In November, Stalin and Yegorov turned the Cavalry Corps into the First Cavalry Army, approving Budyonny as commander and Voroptilov as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. For many years, these four went through life, supporting each other in the struggle for power. In all the discussions of the 1920s, Yegorov defended the correctness of Stalin and took care of the promotion of veterans of the First Cavalry.

On January 10, 1920, the Southern Front was renamed the South-Western Front, with Yegorov and Stalin at its head. In February, the troops of the front completely cleared the Ukraine of Denikin. In the spring, in view of the mutual desire of the parties, the war of Soviet Russia with Poland began: the Poles sought to revive the Commonwealth within the borders of 1772, the Bolsheviks - to export their branded product -

"News has just come from Germany that a battle is going on in Berlin, and the Spartacists have taken possession of part of the city. It is not known who will win, but it is necessary for us to accelerate the mastery of the Crimea in order to have completely free hands, because the civil war in Germany can force us to move west to help the communists.

On April 21, Warsaw signed an agreement with Simon Vasilievich Petlyura (1879-1926), according to which the government headed by him (the Directory) was recognized as the legitimate authority in Ukraine, and in return ceded eastern Galicia to Poland up to the border of the Zbruch River. Two days later, a military convention was concluded on the joint actions of the Polish and Ukrainian armies.

On April 25, the armies of the Polish Southern Front under the command of Jozef Pilsudski went on the offensive, broke through the Soviet Southwestern Front, and occupied Zhitomir, Kazatin, and Zhmerinka within three days. On May 6, they took Kyiv, capturing bridgeheads on its eastern shore.

A month later, the 1st Cavalry Army of Budyonny, who arrived from the Caucasian Front, broke through the Polish front with a powerful counterattack from the Uman region and liberated Kyiv on June 12. Legionnaires and Petliura's haidamaks, despite the reinforcements transferred from Belarus, just as rapidly rolled back to the west.

On July 4, having received 200 thousand replenishment people (of which more than 100 thousand were deserters caught in the villages) and the 3rd cavalry corps of G.D. Guy, moved forward the troops of the Western Front M.N. Tukhachevsky. The northern Polish front of General S. Sheptytsky retreated to the line of old German positions without accepting battle. Twenty days later, the Soviet troops were tasked with "inflicting a final defeat on the enemy and capturing Warsaw no later than August 12."

Egorov and Stalin also wanted to do something great, and they proposed to transfer the main efforts of their front from the Lublin direction to Lvov, promising to deal with it in a week. The Moscow comrades, in euphoria estimating the distance to Budapest, Prague and Bucharest, agreed with joy and without any hesitation. From that moment on, the two Soviet fronts, which had previously carried out a concentric offensive against the Polish capital, began to scatter in different directions. The self-confidence of the Soviet strategists was soon punished. At the end of July, the Poles firmly beat the Budennovites near Brody; the main forces of the Southwestern Front were drawn into heavy protracted battles on the outskirts of Lvov. And in mid-August, the "miracle on the Vistula" struck - a sudden counterattack on the left flank of Tukhachevsky, ending in the complete defeat of the entire Western Front.

As a result, not only did Yegorov have to withdraw his armies to the east, but Wrangel, who had left the Crimea, occupied Northern Tavria. To fight him, a new front had to be created under the command of Frunze. The Southwestern Front, after the conclusion of an armistice with the Poles on October 18, retreated to the state border line and was abolished at the end of the year.

December 30, 1920, given the "solid theoretical knowledge of the military

Affairs "and the experience of commanding the fronts, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic ranked Yegorov in the headquarters of the Red Army. From January 1921, Alexander Ilyich commanded the Kyiv military district, in April he took over the Petrograd district. Simultaneously from September

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1921 to January 1922 he also commanded the Western Front instead of the disgraced and recalled Tukhachevsky.

In February 1922, Yegorov was sent to command a punitive army in Transcaucasia, with the task of "pacifying" the occupied territories of the recently independent republics. The case was familiar. The commander ordered 22

February 1923:

"To liquidate banditry in the shortest possible time and to deal with bandits relentlessly and severely; the population, which is unfriendly to the Soviet power, to disarm, accomplices and harborers to be arrested.

In general, Alexander Ilyich did an excellent job and earned the republican orders of the Red Banner from the grateful new authorities of red Georgia and red Azerbaijan. During the period of his command, the Caucasian Army also became a Red Banner.

In May 1924, Yegorov replaced Frunze as commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian and Crimean forces. In 1925 he was appointed military attache in China, but in the spring of 1926 he was recalled from diplomatic work. For a year and a half, he served as deputy chairman of the Military Industrial Directorate at the Supreme Economic Council. In October 1927, People's Commissar Voroshilov appointed his comrade-in-arms in the Paritsyn battles as commander of the troops of the Belarusian Military District.

At the end of 1930, Yegorov was sent to Germany to improve his military leadership skills. In April 1931, he took the post of Chief of Staff of the Red Army, which in 1935 was transformed into the General Staff.

Alexander Ilyich was not fond of theoretical works. He tirelessly strengthened his high position with praises to the address of Stalin "who taught him military affairs" and patron

Voroshilov, constantly descending to outright servility. Here is what he wrote in 1931, congratulating the Commissar of Defense on his 50th birthday:

"With what delight I recalled this close joint combat work, which took place under the tactical leadership of our beloved leader Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. When we consider that history, in order to solve its problems, will require more people capable of showing great qualities of mind, will, firmness, determination and selfless devotion to the cause of Lenin, and know that our Soviet Union has such people, in the person of Joseph Vissarionovich and Kliment Efremovich, becomes even happier, and cheerfulness, like a living string, fills all the fibers of the body.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny was born in 1883 on the Kozyurin farm, into a family of landless peasants who settled on the Don. He learned grammar by himself. In 1903 he was drafted into the army, as part of the 48th Don Cossack Regiment he participated in the Russo-Japanese War. In 1908 he graduated from the St. Petersburg school of equestrians, after which he served in the Primorsky Dragoon Regiment. At that time, Semyon Mikhailovich was a dashing fighter, a real "support of the throne." In World War I, he rose to the rank of sergeant major. For exceptional bravery shown in battles on the German, Austrian and Caucasian fronts, he was awarded the full St. George's bow.

Budyonny began his Soviet military career in February 1918 as the leader of one of the red partisan detachments of the Salsky district. Since July, he was assistant commander of the 1st Don Peasant Socialist

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punitive cavalry regiment B.M. Dumenko, also a former sergeant-major. In September, the regiment was deployed to the 1st Don Cavalry Brigade, which became the core of the Consolidated Cavalry Division of the 10th Army of the Southern Front formed in November 1918. The division almost entirely consisted of volunteer peasants of the Don and Kuban, who fiercely hated the "White Cossacks".

In March 1919, in connection with the appointment of Dumenko as assistant chief of staff of the 10th Army for cavalry, Budyonny became a division commander and a member of the Bolshevik Party. Having taken office, the first thing he demanded from the army headquarters was a personal car and a new coat "the color of the hyke is covered with fur" (his original words from the note). In May 1919, the 1st Consolidated Cavalry Corps was formed from two cavalry divisions under the command of Dumenko. However, Boris Mokeevich was seriously wounded in the same battle near the Sal River as Commander Yegorov. His place was taken by Budyonny and Semyon Mikhailovich did not miss his chance.

In August, the 10th Army and Budyonny's corps attempted to recapture Tsaritsyn, but were repulsed. As a real combat force, the corps first declared itself in the Voronezh-Kastornenskaya offensive operation of the Southern Front. During the oncoming battles on October 12-19, 1919, the Budenovites defeated two white cavalry corps: the 4th Don General K.K. Mamontov and the 3rd Kuban General A.G. Shkuro, after which they occupied Voronezh. Then, developing the offensive in the Kursk direction, they created a serious threat to the flank and rear of the Volunteer Army, ensuring the success of the troops of the Southern Front near Orel.

A month later, Budyonny's corps was deployed to the First Cavalry Army. It included the 4th, 6th and 11th cavalry divisions, an armored division, armored trains, an air squadron and other units. Thus, a powerful cavalry formation was born, capable of solving strategic tasks, and Budyonny advanced into the ranks of the most prominent Soviet military leaders. Old Tsaritsyn acquaintances K.E. became members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the army. Voroshilov and E.A. Shchadenko.

Together with military glory, bandit glory came to the army. The military commissar of the 42nd Infantry Division reported to Moscow:

"There is not a single settlement visited by the Budennovites, where a continuous groan of the inhabitants would not be heard. Mass robberies, robbery and violence of the Budyonovites replaced the whites' housekeeping... Chests were broken into, women's underwear, money, watches, tableware and so on were taken away. There were allegations of rape and torture. The horses were brought into the rooms... The peasants sprept - what's the difference: the whites robbed - now the reds are robbing ?!

It is clear that during the Civil War, both sides were engaged in self-supply, showed cruelty, and committed violence against the local population. But here, too, the First Cavalry surpassed all others. Wherever the red cavalry went, a trail of robberies, robbery, and pogroms stretched behind them everywhere.

By January 1, 1920, rapidly developing the offensive to the south, the First Cavalry broke into the Donbass, captured Taganrog on January 7, Rostov-on-Don on January 10 and reached the Sea of Azov, dividing the front of Denikin's troops into two parts. To complete the liquidation of the North Caucasian enemy grouping, on January 16, 1920, the Caucasian Front was formed under the leadership of V.I. Shorin, which included the First Horse. However, an attempt to solve the task by relentless pursuit in the Batai direction failed due to the fact that Semyon Mikhailovich and Kliment Efremovich decided to give their heroic fighters a good rest.

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The Rostov robbery eclipsed all the previous ones. The plenipotentiary representative of the Cheka in the North Caucasus, Yakov Khristoforovich Petere, told Dzerzhinsky:

"After the occupation of Rostov, the whites fled in panic, went further, beyond Bataysk, but Budyonny's army, instead of pursuing the fleeing enemy, began to engage in robberies and drunkenness in Rostov. Local comrades tell horrors about the pogroms of the Budennovites. But this is not as important as the behavior of Budyonny himself - he can no longer talk to anyone and suffers from mania

greatness."

Semyon Mikhailovich, firmly believing in his genius, permissiveness and impunity, did not reckon with anyone, sent all the "commanders" to a well-known address:

"Send the Revolutionary Military Council - to ... also the commander - a traitor to the revolution, and I send you to ..., and if you want, I will shoot you."

Radevity for the Cavalry Stalin achieved the resignation of the "incompetent" Shorin, convinced Lenin and the new command of the front that the enemies of the revolution were deliberately creating an "atmosphere of hostility and malice" around the First Cavalry. Even the abundance of wine in Rostov was declared a "white provocation"!

In mid-February, when there was no longer anything to rob, and the last bottle had been drunk, the Budennovites moved to conquer the Kuban. The Yegorlyk operation began, during which the largest oncoming cavalry battle in the entire Civil War took place. On February 28, at Belaya Glina, more than 20 thousand horsemen collided in a saber cabin, which ended in the defeat of Denikin. The ensuing mass robberies in the villages generally corresponded

Lenin's policy of "decossackization".

However, on the other hand, any commander knows that looting corrupts the troops. The meeting of responsible political workers on February 28 stated:

"Robbery, violence, banditry, arbitrariness, robbery and murder by fighters and political committee commanders, theft of trophies remain unpunished ... By advancing forward, the Cavalry destroys the counter-revolution, but by its behavior | occupied areas contributes to the revival of the counter-revolution.

The Bolshevik representatives seriously feared that "Budyonovshchina" would not turn into a new Makhnovshchina. The commissars periodically shot the bandits before the formation of the regiments, who, in turn, quietly shot the commissars.

In April 1920, Budyonny led his army in marching order from the Caucasian front to the Polish one. For 52 days, the cavalymen covered 1,500 km (28-30 km a day) and, as part of the Southwestern Front, took part in the Soviet counteroffensive. On June 5, the First Cavalry broke through the enemy defenses, occupied Zhitomir and Berdichev. Then, going to the rear of the 3rd Polish Army, she forced her to leave Kyiv on June 11.

The victory was marked by new pogroms and massacres of prisoners. On August 18, the future writer Isaac Babel (1894-1940), who served in the 6th Cavalry Division, wrote in his diary:

"We go with the military commissar along the line, we beg you not to cut down the prisoners, Apanasenko washes his hands. Sheko mentioned - to cut, it played a terrible role. I don't

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looked at the faces, pinned, shot, the corpses are covered with bodies, one is undressed, the other is shot, groans, screams, wheezing ... Hell. How we bring freedom is terrible. They search the farm, pull out, Apanasenko - do not waste cartridges, slaughter. Apanasenko always says - kill his sister, kill the Poles ... Information about the defense of Lvov - professors, women, teenagers. Apanasenko will cut them - he hates the intelligentsia, it's deep, he wants an aristocratic in his own way, a peasant, Cossack state.

Subsequently, the Soviet offensive stalled. Pilsudski managed to solve the "Budyonny problem". Against the prepared defense, saturated with obstacles and firing points, dashing cavalry attacks were powerless. Passing combat practice in the 4th Cavalry Division K.A. Meretskov

recalled:

"The battles were extremely fierce. The cavalymen turned into infantry: having galloped to the positions of the enemy, they very rarely attacked them in cavalry formation, but more often they spepted and under heavy fire, often crawling along the bellies, acted as huntsmen. We will break through one line of defense, but immediately we meet with the second, third. "

After the failure near Lvov, the battered Cavalry made the transition to the Southern Front to fight the Wrangelites. In the opposite direction, the "Budyonny invasion" swept across Ukraine. From the first days of the withdrawal of units from the front, unhealthy moods began to appear among the fighters: "Let's go to clean the rear from the Jews", "Let's go to connect with Old Man Makhno", "Beat the Jews - commissars and communists." Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry G.N. Melnichansky reported:

"In Priluki, 21 people were killed, 12 wounded and many women and children were raped. According to the stories of the townsfolk, women were raped on the street in front of everyone, many of the prettier girls were taken in the convoy. In Vakhnavka, 20 people were killed, the number of wounded and raped is unknown, and 18 houses were burned." On October 14, the leadership of the Kyiv province complained to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine: "In Tarashchansk, all residents, Soviet workers and even Soviet institutions were robbed. The total number of those killed is 150 "...

At the end of October, several hundred soldiers and commanders of the 6th Cavalry Division (by the way, this glorious division had a separate venereal company named after Semyon Budyonny), including the "aristocrat" Apanasenko, had to be arrested and court martialed, 140 people were sentenced to death.

In the course of the offensive of the Southern Front, which began on October 28, 1920, the Cavalry Army was introduced into the breakthrough from the Kakhov bridgehead with bunkers to cut off the enemy's escape route to the Crimea through the Chongar Isthmus. Wrangel's troops in this battle

were defeated, but the Soviet cavalry acted sluggishly, and the main White forces managed to escape to the peninsula. In the decisive battles for the Crimea, Frunze did not dare to use the First Cavalry and released it from the reserve only when the outcome of the battle was completely clear. Since the end of November, the Budennovites have been enthusiastically engaged in "squeezing out the surplus appropriation" and fighting Makhno's rebels, while often running from one opposing side to another. So, a friend of the army commander, order bearer G.S. Maslakov, led a whole regiment to the Makhnovists.

In May 1921, Budyonny was appointed a member of the military council of the North Caucasian Military District. The First Cavalry Army was also relocated there. Semyon Mikhailovich was instructed to liquidate the Kuban rebel army and

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to pacify the villages that did not want to "de-Cossackize", for which in September the command of all the troops of the Kuban-Black Sea region was concentrated in his hands. In his new position, the army commander first of all (Order No. 1 of September 28, 1921) ordered the execution of 56 hostages and warned that "the Soviet government would burn the hornet's nest without a trace with a hurricane of artillery fire."

"He ran to the voivodeship early in the morning, on Michaelmas Day, and immediately decided: "There will be bloodshed tomorrow. What made him take such a decision is unknown: for he, in fact, was not angry, but just like that, a brute "...

For more than a year, Budyonny worked hard, organizing punitive expeditions and demonstrative executions of "accomplices", families of rebels and hostages. Only in the Yeysk department in just two months, 680 people were shot on his orders, of which only 90 were rebels.

At the end of 1922, martial law in the Kuban-Chernomorsk region was lifted, and Semyon Mikhailovich became the deputy commander of the district. For "active participation in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat" and personal heroism, the legendary army commander was awarded three Orders of the Red Banner for a grul, one order for a faithful saber, and one more for a revolver.

In October 1923, the First Cavalry Army was disbanded, Budyonny was appointed assistant to the Commander-in-Chief for Cavalry and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. From April 1924 - inspector of the cavalry of the Red Army. Former cavalry general A.A. Brusilov (1853-1926), who held the same position in 1923-24. recalled:

"By himself, Wahmister Budyonny always treated me very respectfully, it's only a pity that he barely knew how to sign his last name, and others wrote articles and orders for him, even academic officers who managed to obscure their "white bone" and adjust to communists."

In May 1926, Semyon Mikhailovich was sent to Turkestan to finish off the Basmachi. This "business trip" of his, when the red horsemen cut down everyone who was taller than a cart, the old people in the villages remembered even half a century later. The next achievements in the field of extermination of the counter-revolution were marked by the Order of Labor of the Red Banner of the Red Uzbekistan.

In 1928 Budyonny together with Mikoyan controlled the progress of grain procurements in Siberia and the Far East. In 1932, "on the job" (!) The almost illiterate commander graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army! Hardly knowing at least the alphabet, he was also the editor of the newspaper, which was called "For the Horse", and the author of horse breeding truls.

True, Semyon Mikhailovich knew the device of the horse thoroughly and liked to talk from a high rostrum about the importance of the "chance campaign" and the intricacies of inseminating queens. In 1933, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia wrote:

"Budyonny is waging an uncompromising struggle against the views of individual commanders who underestimate the role of cavalry in modern warfare, repressively suppressing all "attacks" that weaken the growth and combat training of the cavalry. In accordance with this attitude, Budyonny is working hard to introduce into the thick of the army the right views on ensuring the conditions for the further growth of our cavalry - from the most important political issues, from issues of combat training to private questions about forging, bedding material, equestrian sports, etc. ".

The name of the marshal was borne by two cities, as well as the former village of Novo-Nikolaevskaya and

Cape 108 on an island in the Arctic Ocean. On the day of his 50th birthday, Voroshilov wrote: "In the years

civil war in our cavalry, many people claimed the "Budennov" role. But we had and have only one Budyonny.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky was born in 1893 on the Aleksandrovskoye estate in the Smolensk province into the family of a bankrupt landowner. He graduated from the gymnasium and the cadet corps. In 1912 he entered the Alexander Military School. From a young age, Mikhail felt himself born for great deeds, dreamed of becoming at least a general and was firmly moving towards his cherished goal. In the summer of 1914, after graduating from college, he was released as a second lieutenant in the Life Guards Semenovskiy Regiment, with whom he went to war, having the firm intention to verify the "Bolshevik exploits" and become the Knight of St. George.

As a deputy company commander, Tukhachevsky participated in the battles near Lublin, Ivangorod, Lomza, was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir with swords, but was captured on February 19, 1915. On the fifth attempt, he managed to escape from the officer camp only by the autumn of 1917, using a military trick: Mikhail Nikolayevich, under the officer's word of honor, was released into the city for a walk, but instead of seeing the sights of the glorious Ingolstadt, he rushed to the Swiss-German border. He returned home exactly in October. The soldiers elected a resolute second lieutenant as company commander.

In April 1918, Tukhachevsky was accepted into the service of the Military Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which dealt with the formation of the Red Army. In April, Mikhail Nikolaevich quite consciously joined the RCI (6). Disappointed in the Romanovs, he said back in the camp: "If Lenin is able to rid Russia of the rubbish of old prejudices and help her become independent, free and strong, I will follow him."

In May, Tukhachevsky was appointed military commissar of the Moscow region of the Western Front, in June he was sent to the Czechoslovak (from mid-July the Eastern) front, to fight the 40,000th rebellious corps, whose uprising, which began on May 25, swept the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia.

With only a mandate in hand, Mikhail Nikolayevich quickly formed his 1st Revolutionary Army from disparate detachments, for the first time mobilizing former officers and establishing military revolutionary tribunals. The rebellion of the commander-in-chief, the Left Social Revolutionary M.A. Muravyov almost cost the young commander his life. He was arrested and only accidentally escaped execution. Tukhachevsky later wrote of the unfortunate commander:

"The thought of becoming Napoleon" haunted him, and this definitely showed through in all his manners, conversations and actions ... He was extremely cruel. In general, Muravyov's abilities were many times inferior to the scale of his claims. He was a selfish adventurer, and nothing more.

It's funny that our hero with a contemptuous expression painted his own portrait, that's how he was perceived by those around him. One of his colleagues recalled: "Smart, energetic, firm, but vile to the last degree - nothing sacred, except for his immediate benefit; by what means it is achieved is indifferent."

"A ruthless and unprincipled adventurer," A.I. wrote about him. Denikin. And Misha was ill with Bonapartism since childhood: "he starred in the poses of Napoleon, mastered the haughty expression on his face."

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The first major operation developed and successfully carried out by Tukhachevsky was the capture of Simbirsk in September 1918. During the autumn, the Bolsheviks managed to clear the Volga region from the Komuch People's Army (Committee of the Constituent Assembly), since the Czechoslovak troops themselves had already withdrawn from the battle. In December, in the midst of preparations for the Orenburg offensive, Tukhachevsky was transferred to the Southern Front, where he led the 8th Army. The front was faced with the task of finishing off the army of ataman Krasnov, "occupying the Don region" and

indicatively punish the Cossacks.

On January 24, 1919, a Circular Letter of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on decossackization was issued, demanding that the rebellious population of the Don, Kuban, and Urals be wiped off the face of the earth. The circular ordered the "extermination" of the Cossack leaders, mass terror "in relation to all Cossacks in general who took any direct or indirect part in the struggle against the Soviet power", the execution of anyone "who is found to have a weapon", that is, almost all Cossacks without exception, colonization of Cossack regions. To destroy the Cossacks, a special expeditionary corps was formed, which operated under. slogan: "The more we cut out, the sooner Soviet power will be established on the Don."

The 8th Army, advancing along the Don, reached the Seversky Donets River by March. Moscow instructions in it were carried out diligently and strictly. According to the commander of the group of troops F.K. Mironov, "only on the path of the 8th Army, tribunals shot 8,000 people for the benefit of the social revolution." The further advance of the army was stopped by the beginning of the ice drift and the Cossack uprising that broke out in the rear.

At this point, Tukhachevsky was again transferred to the Eastern Front, where in April he led the 5th Army defeated by Kolchak. The situation here was critical: the Soviet front was broken through, the Whites had already occupied Ufa, Bugulma, Belebey and were moving towards the Volga. Commander of the Eastern Front S.S. Kamenev developed a plan for a counterattack on the flank of the advancing enemy grouping. As part of the offensive that began on April 28, Tukhachevsky successfully carried out the Buguruslan and Belebey operations, leading (in combination with the strike of the Southern Frunze group) to the defeat of the Western Army of General Gaida. Then followed the Zlatoust operation, which was risky in design, with overcoming the Ural ridge and a deep detour maneuver, which opened the road to Siberia for the Red Army in July 1919. On July 24, the Fifth Army entered Chelyabinsk.

The commander was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for the "skillful leadership" of the troops and the "tremendous success" achieved. The Omsk operation, which unfolded in mid-October, was distinguished by decisiveness and rapid advance, assured by the complete defeat of Kolchak's troops and the capture of the capital of the "supreme ruler" of Russia on November 14. Tukhachevsky was awarded the highest award at that time - the Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. Mikhail Nikolayevich already imagined himself a venerable commander, explained to the audience the basics of the "class strategy" and, knowing the works of Napoleon, could repeat after him: "I believed in myself as an extraordinary person and was imbued with ambition

for the accomplishment of great deeds, which until then had been drawn to my imagination.

True, at the age of 26, General Bonaparte only dreamed of getting an army under his command.

The commander, favored by the authorities, was sent south to finish off Denikin. At the end of January 1920, having replaced Shorin, who was displaced at the initiative of the "offended" cavalymen, he took command of the Caucasian Front, acting against Denikin's main forces on the borders of the Don and Manych rivers. After the regrouping of forces and sobering up in Rostov, Budyonny's cavalry, red 14

February 110 launched a general offensive. Mikhail Nikolaevich successfully coped with the duties of the commander, following the strategy he had formulated in everything.

"Civil war, by its very nature, requires reproachful, bold offensive actions. Revolutionary energy and courage dominate
to everyone else."

This was his winning formula. The capture of Novorossiysk on March 26 marked the end of Denikin's Volunteer Army. Tukhachevsky, on instructions from Moscow, began to consider a plan for an invasion of the Transcaucasus, but he was suddenly recalled to Moscow, where, at the suggestion of Commander-in-Chief Kamenev, who highly appreciated the "recent operations", he was appointed commander of the Western Front.

The plan for the defeat of the Poles, Mikhail Nikolayevich developed himself, putting into it all his "military finds": a ram attack of the "infantry masses", the concentration of forces in the chosen direction, a deep detour maneuver, bold offensive actions without looking back, without reserves and regardless of the enemy, straight into "revolutionary seething" Germany.

The campaign against the Vistula began on July 4, 1920. "Through the corpse of the white Polypi lies the path to the world fire. On bayonets we will bring happiness and peace to working mankind. To the west! March to Vilna, Minsk, Warsaw!" the commander admonished the red regiments with inspiration. And was broken. Did not come out of Mikhail Nikolaevich Bonaparte. The Polish campaign greatly tarnished his reputation as a commander. In addition, by blaming the command of the Southwestern Front for his failure, he made "splendid enemies." Actually Tukhachevsky's military leadership career ended there, the punitive one began.

In March 1921, the Kronstadt rebellion broke out. Having rioted enough, having shot a lot of officers and other representatives of the "residual classes", the Baltic sailors discovered with amazement that in the fourth year of the struggle for a brighter future they simply had nothing to feed their revolutionary organisms. And there is no one to rob in Russia. At the same time, the entire fleet knew about the feasts that the commander of the fleet, Fedor Fedorovich Raskolnikov (aka Ilyin), a former midshipman of the 1917 class, rolled up for his entourage.

Outraged by another cut in rations, the garrison held a citywide

rally, created a Provisional Revolutionary Committee, imprisoned local party members in the investigation basement, and on March 3 addressed an appeal to all "comrades and citizens", urging them to hold re-elections of the Soviets, to throw the history of the Bolsheviks overboard and to exercise the right to a new free life themselves - without commissars, Chekists, food requisitions and "moral bondage":

"Life itself under the rule of the communist dictatorship has become more precious than death. Here the banner of insurrection is raised for liberation from three years of violence and oppression, the rule of the communists, which has eclipsed the three hundred years of the yoke of the monarchy.

Against the backdrop of widespread peasant riots and strikes by starving workers in Petrograd, this was a serious threat. At the disposal of the garrison, numbering more than 25 thousand people, were warships, including two battleships, up to 140 coastal artillery guns, over 100 machine guns.

The government of the commissars immediately declared the recent support of the revolution to be the Black Hundreds and began to gather military formations to Kronstadt, restoring control of the 7th Army and placing Tukhachevsky at its head.

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The first assault, undertaken by the Red cadets on March 8, was repulsed by artillery fire from battleships and forts with heavy losses for the attackers. Then, in order to raise the morale of the Red Army soldiers, the Tenth Party Congress, which was held at that time in Moscow, seconded about 300 front-line delegates to fight the "Black Hundred-Socialist-Revolutionary counter-revolution".

By March 16, the strength of the 7th Army reached 45 thousand soldiers with 159 guns and 433 machine guns. On the night of March 17, units of the Bolsheviks moved across the ice of the Gulf of Finland in an offensive against Kronstadt and broke into the city in the morning of the next day. The order of the commander read: "It is cruel to deal with the rebels, shooting without any regret ... do not get carried away with prisoners."

The massacre began. The revolutionary tribunal sentenced more than 2,103 people to execution. In addition, several hundred were killed right on the ice near the walls of the fortress without any trial. About 6.5 thousand were sent to camps. About a third of the garrison fled to Finland. The Red troops, according to official figures, lost 3120 people killed and wounded, "but the plans of the counter-revolution were thwarted." Two hundred especially distinguished comrades were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Literally a month later, Tukhachevsky's talents were needed on the Tambov Front. There, the peasants, robbed to the skin by their native proletarian power, gathered in crowds at the granaries and asked for bread, thereby demonstrating the most vicious counter-revolution. These hungry crowds, according to the report of the commander-in-chief S.S. Kamenev, the Red Army men heroically "shot from machine guns."

In August 1920, a peasant uprising broke out in the Tambov province under the leadership of the former teacher Alexander Stepanovich Antonov (1888-1922), which engulfed 5 out of 12 counties and spread to the Voronezh and Saratov provinces. The rebels, driven to despair by looting and violence, who

perpetrated by food detachments and eternally drunken Revolutionary Committee members, demanded the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, the restoration of political and civil rights of all segments of the population, "without dividing them into classes", the abolition of the food dictatorship, freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly. By December, the peasant army consisted of more than 20 regiments, consolidated into two armies, and a separate brigade.

In the Tambov province, the Bolsheviks immediately introduced martial law. The Red troops burned the villages to the ground, the peasants went into the forests, stubbornly shot back the Chekists and party workers. In October, Lenin demanded from the RVS, the command of the internal security forces and the Cheka, the "quick and complete" elimination of the Antonovshchina, which threatened to develop into a mass armed uprising of the peasants of all Central Russia. Large forces were thrown into the fight against the "kulaks" - 22,000 bayonets, 4,500 sabers, 312 machine guns, 44 guns and 10 armored cars - under the command of the former staff captain A.V. Pavlova (1880—

1937).

In February 1921, the "authoritative commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the fight against banditry in the Tambov province" was created under the chairmanship of V.A. Antonov Ovseenko, in April-May - "command of the troops of the Tambov region." The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks entrusted the Kronstadt hero Tukhachevsky, who on April 27 was placed at the head of the punitive army, to crush the "bandits" and the "Socialist-Revolutionary locusts". In addition to the regular units of the Red Army, the troops of the Cheka, VOKhR and CHON participated in the operations - a total of about 140 thousand people, supported by 103 guns, 21 armored vehicles, 18 aircraft, 5 armored trains.

The local population stubbornly refused both to surrender their weapons and to issue

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antonovtsy. The turning point occurred after the order of the commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee No. 171 of June 11, 1921 began to be implemented, according to which hostages were destroyed if the population did not extradite partisans and their families, if bridges and "other national property" were damaged near the village. In general, each paragraph of this document ended with the standard formula "shoot on the spot without trial."

The order was carried out especially coolly in the "viciously bandit" villages. If the execution of the first batch of hostages did not give a result, they immediately took the next one. For example, after the execution of three batches of hostages in the village of Kulyabovka, Borisoglebsk district, it turned from a "malicious bandit" into a Soviet one. Ten years later, the authors of the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" said that Tukhachevsky's punishers occupied the "centers" of the Antonov movement for the sole purpose of "ensuring the conduct of political explanatory work and the protection of the peasantry." It should be noted in this connection that in only one "malicious bandit" village of Parevka in the Kirsanov district, 80 residents were shot in the course of "explanatory work".

By the end of June, about 50,000 "kulak-Socialist-Revolutionary elements" and members of their families found themselves in pre-equipped concentration camps on the territory of the Tambov province. In July, the commander decided to use chemical weapons: "The forests, where the bandits hide, should be cleared with poisonous gases." In the end,

Tukhachevsky drowned the uprising in the blood of the people. Later, the biographer of the punisher commander wrote:

"On the Antonov front, Tukhachevsky applied new methods to link combat work with the consolidation of Soviet power in the field, and the uprising was liquidated methodically, on schedule, within forty days."

The former nobleman proved his devotion to vile power, after which he quickly went up the hill. In the fall of 1921, Tukhachevsky was appointed head of the Military Academy of the Red Army. In January 1922, he again took command of the troops of the Western Front. In the spring of 1924 he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army. In 1925 - Commander of the Western Military District, as well as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In November, he became Chief of Staff of the Red Army. From May 1928 he commanded the troops of the Leningrad Military District. Since July 1931, Tukhachevsky was the head of armaments, deputy People's Commissar of the Navy and representative of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. Since 1934 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

Mikhail Nikolayevich was an enthusiast of the technical equipment of the Red Army, theorized a lot, mainly on the topic of future conquests, dreamed of tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft, for which he was awarded the title of "red militarist". Trotsky described him as "a talented, but overly impetuous commander."

Marshal Vasily Konstantinovich Blucher was born in 1890 in the village of Barshchinka, Yaroslavl province. He graduated from the parochial school and went to work in Moscow. Worked as a locksmith. In 1910, he was convicted for calling for a strike, served 2 years and 8 months in the Butyrka prison. In 1914 he was drafted into the army. He fought as a private on the Southwestern Front. In January 1915, he came under artillery fire, was seriously wounded and, after being cured, was decommissioned "into a primitive state." In 1916 he joined the Bolshevik Party.

After the February Revolution, Vasily Konstantinovich, with the aim of conducting anti-war and anti-government agitation, enrolled in a reserve regiment stationed in Samara. The soldiers liked the ideas of pacifism, in the days of October they went over to the side of the Bolsheviks with the whole regiment, providing

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establishment of Soviet power in Samara.

But the ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks, Major General A.I. Dutov (1879-1921) did not recognize the "great truth of the Bolsheviks" and took control of a strategically important region that blocked communications with Turkestan and Siberia. For which he was immediately declared an "enemy of the people." On November 26, 1917, Lenin ordered "to provide the working people of Orenbuzhye with emergency military assistance" (it is noteworthy that the actions of the general were approved by the Orenburg Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies).

A consolidated Northern flying detachment headed from Petrograd to the Southern Urals under the command of the former midshipman S.D. Pavlov, already famous for having raised General Dukhonin on bayonets in Mogilev; Samara allocated a Red Guard detachment, reinforced by an artillery battery and a commissar

Blucher. With the arrival of the detachment in Chelyabinsk, the Bolshevik Soviet liquidated the local constituent assembly and took power in the city into its own hands. Vasily Konstantinovich was elected head of the military revolutionary committee, and in March 1918 he headed the Chelyabinsk Soviet and the joint headquarters of the detachments operating against Dutov.

Spring passed in battles with the "White Cossacks", during which the red detachments cut out to the last man eleven villages, "the most outstanding for their counter-revolutionary". The Orenburg chieftain was forced to withdraw his troops to the Kyrgyz steppes. "Our victory was already complete," but the rebellion of the Czechoslovak corps changed the situation dramatically. On May 27, the Czechs captured Chelyabinsk, and on July 7, General Dutov returned to Orenburg.

By mid-July, the entire South Ural grouping of the Reds, numbering about 10 thousand bayonets and sabers, was in the enemy ring. In this situation, some detachments of "ideological" fighters went over to the side of the "White Cossack counter-revolution". Vasily Konstantinovich proposed to break into the areas occupied by units of the Red Army.

Under the leadership of Blucher and the Kashirin brothers, having covered about 1,500 kilometers with battles, the Consolidated Ural Detachment in mid-September 1918 joined with units of the 3rd Soviet Army. By the way, together with Blucher, a Chinese battalion under the command of comrade Zhen Fuchen, German and Hungarian detachments left the encirclement. Noting the merits of Vasily Konstantinovich ("The crossing of Comrade Blucher's troops under impossible conditions can only be equated with Suworov's crossings in Switzerland"), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee awarded him the newly established Order of the Red Banner No. 1. The combined detachment merged with the remnants of the 4th Ural division defeated by the Whites, the 225th Infantry Regiment was put together from the Chinese. Blucher became the head of the division. The army at that time waged heavy defensive battles in the Permian direction.

Vasily Konstantinovich coped with the command successfully, and in January 1919 he was made assistant commander of the 3rd Army, and in April - head of the Vyatka fortified region. After the transition of the Red Army on the Eastern Front to a decisive counteroffensive, the liberation from the white Kungur and Perm, the need for a fortified area disappeared. At the end of the summer, Blucher formed the 51st Rifle Division from the fortress brigades and the Northern Expeditionary Detachment and set off at the head to "catch up" with Kolchak. In the autumn battles in the Tobolsk region, the division demonstrated stamina, and the divisional commander demonstrated the ability to navigate in difficult situations. On November 11, Blucher's division entered Kolchak's capital Omsk, then pursued the enemy all the way to Lake Baikal.

In August 1920, the 51st division was transferred to the Southern Front, in the area

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Kakhovka, to fight the "black baron" Wrangel. The division repelled all attempts by the White 2nd Army Corps to liquidate the Kakhovka bridgehead, managing to repel even a massive tank attack, exotic for that war. In the counteroffensive that followed on October 28, Blucher commanded the Perekop shock group, which delivered the main blow from the bridgehead. However, on the move on the shoulders of the enemy, it was not possible to break into the Crimea. Therefore, on November 7-8,

storm.

Two brigades of the Blucher division went around the enemy fortifications through Sivasht, and the other two, together with the Makhnovist brigade, took the Turkish Wall head-on. Having an 8-fold superiority over the enemy, the Reds crushed the few defenders of the white Crimea and broke into the peninsula. "The last nest of the Russian counter-revolution" was destroyed. For the capture of the Perekop and Ishun positions, the heroic 51st Rifle Division, which lost three-quarters of its strength, and its commander were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The surviving Makhnovists were shot down immediately after the assault. In the following months, Blucher was engaged in hunting for the "father" and his "rebel army" together with Budyonny's horsemen.

In the summer of 1921, Vasily Konstantinovich was recalled from Ukraine and appointed Minister of War of the "buffer" Far Eastern Republic invented by Lenin to avoid friction with Japan and commander-in-chief of the People's Revolutionary Army created on the basis of partisan formations. Blucher did a lot to ensure that it was an army not only in name, but Moscow also helped - threw one and a half million rubles in gold.

In February 1922, under the leadership of Blucher, the NRA launched a general offensive and inflicted a row on the White Rebels. sensitive lesions. The assault on Volochaevka and the capture of Spask, which predetermined the fall of the white Primorye, officially ended the military operations of the Civil War. Because of the quarrel, flare up in the camp of the victors, Vasily Konstantinovich did not reach the Pacific Ocean, he was recalled to Moscow.

In August 1922, Blucher was appointed commander of the 1st Rifle Corps stationed in the Petrograd region, and in 1924 he was sent as chief military adviser to China under the revolutionary government of Guangzhou (Canton). First of all, the adviser introduced the institution of commissars in the People's Revolutionary Army. He became one of the main developers of the plan and a participant in the Great Northern Expedition of the Kuomintang troops. However, in July 1927, after Marshal Chiang Kai-shek announced a break with the communists, the Soviet specialists from the Kuomintang army were withdrawn.

Upon his return from China, Blucher was assistant commander of the Ukrainian military district, but in the summer of 1929, in connection with the conflict on the CER, he was again sent to the Far East. The fact is that officially the Chinese Eastern Railway was under joint management, but in reality it was completely in Soviet hands. The government of Chiang Kai-shek tried to install Chinese representatives on the KVJ under the protection of troops. Such arrogance should not go unpunished - they decided in Moscow, and on August 6 the Revolutionary Military Council issued a decree on the creation of a Special Far Eastern Army. ODVA was headed by Blucher, an experienced "Far Easter" and a connoisseur of Chinese tricks.

On August 18, the Soviet advanced units invaded the territory of Manchuria with "the greatest restraint", and by the end of November, the "Chinese militarists" were completely defeated by the red regiments, using the latest MS-1 tanks at that time. Three rifle divisions, one cavalry brigade and the Amur military flotilla took part in the operation. Irrecoverable Soviet losses

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amounted to 147 people, no one counted the corpses of the Chinese. For this victory, Blucher was awarded the Order of the Red Star, also number one, and the Special Far Eastern Army became the Red Banner.

Since then, Vasily Konstantinovich has been serving as a kind of "governor-general" in the Far East, actively participating "in public life and the development of the region's economy." He's some random marshal. He received the highest military rank, rather, for his position, taking into account the special status of the Far Eastern Army (a quarter of all the country's ground forces consisted of it), than for real military merit. He did not lead major strategic operations, did not win high-profile victories, did not command anything larger than a division during the Civil War, his role in the reorganization and modernization of the Red Army is not known, not a single work on military theory or history came out of his pen. Marshall Administrator. Marshal-business executive.

His most original invention is the Soviet version of the Arakcheev settlements - the Special Collective Farm Corps. It was created at the suggestion of Blucher at the height of collectivization in March 1932 in order to "strengthen the security of the Soviet Far Eastern borders, develop the richest virgin and fallow lands, provide the population of the Far East and the army with food, significantly reduce the import of bread and meat from Siberia to the Far East, develop economy of the Far East.

In his "military collective farm" Blucher recorded 60 thousand soldiers and commanders, half of the army. Collective farm soldiers grazed cattle, the command staff comprehended the intricacies of pig breeding. How much this strengthened the "security of the Far Eastern borders" is not clear, bread and potatoes still had to be imported. But Vasily Konstantinovich never thought of laying at least some kind of road along the border for the transfer of troops in the event of a military conflict.

Commanders of the 1st rank

Commander of the 1st rank Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev was born in 1881 in Kyiv in the family of an officer. He graduated from the cadet corps, the Alexander Military School and the Academy of the General Staff. He devoted all his time exclusively to service, he did not dream of any revolutions. During World War II, he was Chief of Operations of the 1st Army, Commander of the 30th Poltava Infantry Regiment, Chief of Staff of the 15th Rifle Corps. He rose to the rank of colonel.

After the October Revolution, he went to the service of the new government. According to Sergei Sergeevich himself, the collection of articles by Lenin and Zinoviev helped him to establish himself in his choice, which made him "a stunning impression, opened up completely new horizons." The former colonel first served as the elected chief of staff of the 3rd Army, mainly dealing with its demobilization and liquidation, and from May 1918 he led the Nevelsky section of the Western Region of the curtain detachments. In August, he was appointed assistant military leader of the Western Veil.

In September 1918, Kamenev was appointed commander of the Eastern Front, which actually had to be put together again. There was not even a headquarters, which the previous commander had taken with him (before that, he commanded the front

Vatsetis, his headquarters was formed from Latvians). Under the leadership of Kamenev, the front repulsed the onslaught of Kolchak's army in March 1919, launched a counteroffensive, and, having successfully carried out a number of operations, drove the enemy troops back beyond the Urals. Trotsky later recalled: "Kamenev was undoubtedly a capable military leader, with imagination and the ability to take risks ... Things were going so well in the East during this period that I completely stopped going there and

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did not even know Kamenev by sight. Inspired by success, Smilga, Lashevich and Gusev carried their commander in their arms, it seems that they drank brotherhood with him and wrote rave reviews about him to Moscow. For victories on the Eastern Front, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee awarded the commander with a golden weapon with the Order of the Red Banner.

Meanwhile, in the south, by the beginning of the summer of 1919, the Red Army left Tsaritsyn, Donbass, Kharkov. Having defeated the Ukrainian Front, General A.I. Denikin on June 20 published the so-called

Moscow Directive. In accordance with it, the Armed Forces of the South of Russia launched a general strategic offensive against the capital. "Everyone to fight Denikin," Lenin called. At the same time, at the insistence of members of the Central Committee, Vladimir Ilyich decided to change the commander in chief.

In early July, Kamenev was appointed commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the RSFSR. His first task in the new field was the development of a plan for the grouping of forces on the Southern Front. However, the August counteroffensive against the Kuban, organized by the Reds, failed, and a military catastrophe was brewing. Finally, in September, after long disputes among members of the Politburo and the military, Trotsky's proposal was accepted to deliver the main blow through the proletarian Donbass "along the watershed between Denikin and the Cossacks." Ten years later, this decision will be called "Stalin's brilliant plan to defeat Denikin."

In early October, the Southern Front was urgently replenished with fresh forces, by order of Kamenev, the Latvian and Estonian divisions, the cavalry brigade of Primakov's Red Cossacks, and Budyonny's Cavalry Corps were transferred here from other directions. From October 11 to November 18, the troops of the Southern Front, having gone on the offensive, defeated the Volunteer Army, the 3rd and 4th Denikin cavalry corps and, having wrested the strategic initiative, threw them back in the Orlovsko-Kursk direction for 165 kilometers.

Later, under the leadership of Kamenev, the defeat of Wrangel and the war with Poland were carried out. With his participation, the "last centers of counter-revolution" in Karelia, Bukhara and Fergana were suppressed.

From April 1924, after the reorganization of the central apparatus and the abolition of the post of commander in chief, Kamenev was appointed inspector of the Red Army, and from March 1925 - chief of staff of the Red Army. He lasted 8 months in his last position. Then he was again an inspector, head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army, the main head of the Military Academy for tactics. Since May 1927 - Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. Since June 1934, Kamenev was the head of the Air Defense Directorate and at the same time a member of the Military Council under the NPO of the USSR.

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Commander of the 1st rank Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir was born in 1896 in Chisinau in the family of a pharmacist. He studied at the University of Basel (in Switzerland) and at the Kharkov Institute of Technology.

In 1915-1917, evading mobilization into the army, Iona worked as a turner at the Odessa Military Plant. After the February Revolution, he signed up for the Bolsheviks and conducted anti-war propaganda among the soldiers of the 5th Zaamur Regiment. In December 1917 he was elected a member of the Bessarabian Council, the Gubernia Party Committee and the Gubernia Committee.

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In January 1918, Yakir hired a "Red Guard detachment" of 500 Chinese for a moderate fee and declared war on the "Romanian occupiers." In the spring and summer, this half-educated student, who, by his own admission, did not understand anything in military affairs, commanded the Tiraspol combined detachment "to combat the Romanian oligarchy." The Chinese Yakiru fell in love immediately and for life:

"The Chinese are steadfast, they are not afraid of anything. A native brother will die in battle, but they will not blink an eye: he will come up, cover his eyes, and that's it. Again he will sit down next to him, in a cap - cartridges and will calmly release cartridge after cartridge ... The Chinese will fight to the last.

In connection with the offensive of the Austro-Hungarian army, the detachment had to retreat through the uprising of the Cossack regions to the territory of the RSFSR. For some reason, the Cossacks of Asians did not like internationalists and almost the entire battalion was destroyed: "When a Cossack catches a Chinese during a civil war, he will definitely kill him, and even mock him."

To join the ranks of the Red Army, Yakir went along the commissar line. From June 1918 - Commissar of the Brigade of the Voronezh Division, from September - Head of the Political Department of the Southern Sector of the Veil Detachments, from October - member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 8th Army. In the battles with the Krasnov Cossacks for the Liski station in November 1918, he earned a heavy shell shock and the Order of the Red Banner No. 2.

In January 1919, during the occupation of the Donetsk region, creatively developing and systematizing the provisions of the circular on decossackization, Yakir issued an order to "shoot on the spot all those with weapons" and "percentage destruction of the male population." A report on the work of the Revolutionary Tribunal in the village of Uryupinskaya has been preserved:

"Death sentences were poured in batches, and quite often innocent people, old men, old women and children were often shot At the place of execution, the convicts were stripped naked, and all this in front of the eyes of the inhabitants. Women who covered their nakedness with their hands were mocked and forbidden to do so. All

the executed were lightly buried near the mill, not far from the village ... A flock of dogs divorced near the mill, pulling the arms and legs of the executed along the village.

Denikin's troops prevented Yakir from completing the useful work he had begun.

In July 1919, he received the 45th Rifle Division under his command. In August-September, he commanded the Southern Group of Forces of the 12th Army (of three divisions) during its exit from the encirclement to Zhitomir and Kyiv. For this transition and the export of "all the values of the south of Ukraine" he was awarded the second order. The third Order of the Red Banner was awarded to Yakir for the Polish front, that is, for not taking Lvov. In general, despite the three orders, Iona Emmanuilovich did not become famous for his victories.

In December 1920, he was appointed commander of the 14th Army, but just a month later the army was disbanded. In 1921-1923, Yakir commanded the troops of the Crimean region, the Kyiv military district and the Kyiv region, the 14th rifle corps, was an assistant commander of the armed forces of Ukraine and Crimea. Since April 1924 - Head of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army.

From November 1925, Yakir commanded the troops of the Ukrainian Military District. In this position, he ensured the organization of the Holodomor in Ukraine, in particular,

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prevented the "organized by counter-revolutionaries and Polish agents" mass exodus of peasants to cities and other regions of the country. The party said: "Let them die in their homeland," therefore, the areas doomed to starvation were cordoned off by troops.

The Italian consul reported:

"In a week, a service was created to catch the fugitives. At midnight they were drowned in the Seversky Donets ... Those who were not yet swollen from hunger and could survive were sent to barracks on Golodnaya Gora or to barns, where another 8,000 souls died on the straw - mostly children. The weak were sent in boxcars outside the city and left to die away from people. Upon the arrival of the wagons, all the dead were unloaded into large ditches dug in advance ... every night in Kharkov they collect 250 corpses of those who died of starvation and typhus.

This happened literally under the windows of the Yakirovsky office: the headquarters of the district was located in Kharkov.

In 1927-1928, Yakir took a course at the Academy of the German General Staff. On May 17, 1935, on the basis of the Ukrainian district, two new ones were formed - Kiev and Kharkov. Yakir moved to Kyiv. He was not fond of military theory, he was known among the troops as a virtuoso of obscene speech.

The commander of the 1st rank, Ieronim Petrovich Uborevich, was born in 1896 in the village of Antadrius, Vilna province, into a peasant family. He studied at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. In 1916 he graduated from courses at the Konstantinovsky Artillery School. As a lieutenant of the 15th heavy artillery division, he participated in the First World War, fought on the Vistula, Neman, in Bessarabia.

After the October Revolution, Uborevich organized Red Guard detachments in Bessarabia. In January-February 1918 he commanded a revolutionary regiment in battles against the Romanians and Austrians. He was wounded, captured, but escaped. From August he commanded the Kotlas heavy howitzer battery, from September - the Nizhne Dvina brigade, from December to September 1919 - the 18th rifle division of the 6th army, blocking the way to Vologda. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Since October 1919, Ieronim Petrovich commanded the 14th Army and the Shock Group of the Southern Front, which, together with the 13th Army of Gekker, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Volunteer Army near Orel and Kromy, participated in the liberation of Kursk, Kharkov, Poltava, Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa.

On the occasion of the victories won, a grandiose revelry took place, the echo of which resounded in Moscow. On this occasion, Lenin sent a letter to Ordzhonikidze, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council:

"T. Sergo! I received a message that you, commander of the 14th, were drinking and walking with women for a week ... Scandal and shame! And I praised you all right and left !! And Trotsky was informed ... Answer that hour: 1) Who gave you wine? 2) How long have you been drinking in RVS 14? Who else did you drink and hang out with? 3) Also - women? ... 5) Commander 14 - a drunkard? Can't fix it?"...

Comrade Sergo did not give up his drinking buddies and was even offended: well, they noted, it's business. In March-April 1920, during the defeat of the White Guards in the regions of Yekaterinodar and Novorossiysk, Uborevich commanded the 9th Army of the Caucasian Front. For skillful

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leadership of the troops was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Arms. In April-July he again commanded the 14th Army in the war with Poland, in July-November he led the military operations of the troops of the 13th Army holding back the Wrangelites. For battles in the Berlyansk-Melitopol region, he received the second Order of the Red Banner. He again accepted the 14th Army, fought in Ukraine with "bourgeois-nationalist gangs", i.e. with the peasants, who for some reason did not like the Bolsheviks.

In January-April 1921, as an assistant to the commander of the armed forces of Ukraine and the Crimea, Ieronim Petrovich was engaged in the liquidation of the "Walk of the Polevskoy Free People's Anarchist Republic" Ataman Nestor Makhno. From the end of April, during the suppression of the Tambov rebellion, he was Tukhachevsky's deputy. He commanded a consolidated group of two cavalry brigades and an armored detachment. In the summer, as commander of the troops of the Minsk province, he smashed the counter-revolution in Belarus. As you can see, in this way, it was an excellent punisher.

From August 1921 he commanded the 5th Army and the troops of the East Siberian Military District. In August 1922, Uborevich replaced Blucher as War Minister of the Far East and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army. Under his leadership, the Primorsky operation was developed and carried out, which was certified by the capture of Vladivostok and awarded the third Order of the Red Banner. Then he again accepted the 5th Army. From November 1924 he was deputy commander and chief of staff of the Ukrainian military district.

In 1925, Uborevich was appointed commander of the troops of the North Caucasian District, where the "Chechen bandits" again raised their heads. The new commander, using his rich experience in fighting the people in various regions of the country, in a short time prepared and carried out a military operation to "disarm the population of the Chechen Autonomous Region."

According to Uborevich's instructions, the troops of the Red Army surrounded the Chechen villages and offered to hand over all available weapons within no more than two hours. In case of non-compliance with the requirements, settlements were fired upon by artillery and aircraft until the enemy completely surrendered. After that, the OGPU officers seized the "vicious and bandit element."

The operation began on August 25 and lasted two weeks. 101 settlements were subjected to artillery and machine-gun fire, 16 villages were bombarded, 119 houses were blown up, more than 300 people were arrested, more than 25 thousand rifles, 4 thousand revolvers and about 80 thousand cartridges were confiscated.

In 1927-1928, Ieronim Petrovich studied military affairs in Germany, after which he replaced Voroshilov as commander of the Moscow District. In 1930-1931 he was deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and head of armaments of the Red Army. Finally, in 1931, he accepted the Belarusian Military District.

According to colleagues, Uborevich loved practical work in the troops, he had a kind of "military bone".

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Commander 1st rank Ivan Panfilovich Belov was born in 1893 into a peasant family. I was preparing to become a teacher, but life took a different turn. He went through the First World War, received three St. George's crosses and non-commissioned officers' badges. Immediately after the February Revolution, he signed up for the Left Social Revolutionaries, was elected representative of the regimental committee of the 1st Siberian reserve regiment.

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At the head of the regiment in October 1917, he established Soviet power in Tashkent. WITH

January 1918 Belov was the head of the garrison and the commandant of the fortress

Tashkent. In January 1919, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries acted in the city. Ivan

Panfilovich, having shown "exceptional resourcefulness", passed his comrades in the party and defected to the RCP (b).

For six months, from April 1919, he was commander-in-chief of the troops of the Turkestan Republic, then commanded the 3rd Turkestan Rifle Division. In June 1919, Chief Division Belov suppressed the "White Guard rebellion" of the Red Army garrison stationed in the city of Verny (now Alma-Ata), in September he led the defense of Andijan.

In August-September 1920, at the head of the Bukhara Group of Forces, Ivan Panfilovich "brilliantly carried out an operation" to seize the independent neighboring state of Bukhara, organized with the aim of providing "revolutionary fraternal assistance to the Bukhara people in their struggle against the despotism of the Bukhara autocrat", as well as the confiscation of the emir's treasury, which was estimated at 150 million gold rubles.*

* The Bolsheviks recognized the independence of the Emirate of Bukhara in March 1918, but two years later they recognized it as "necessary

deal with the Bukhara government." A little later (in 1921) they did the same with the independent republics of Transcaucasia - Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

"Brotherly help" was accompanied by the barbaric destruction of the largest Muslim center - Old Bukhara (according to the commander of the Turkestan Front M.V. Frunze, "a stronghold of obscurantism and the Black Hundreds"), the destruction of historical monuments, the use of chemical shells, unheard-of crimes of the invaders and rampant looting. Belov, with his staff, especially distinguished himself during the plundering of the emir's treasury. The representative of the Cheka in Turkestan, comrade Ya.Kh. Peters' eyes widened as he confiscated from the commander of the Bukhara group only a bag of gold ingots, money and silver, so necessary for the world revolution. A member of the "troika" of the Revolutionary Military Bureau Mashitsky reported:

"After the surrender of Bukhara, arson and incredible robberies and looting began. All the wealth contained in the cellars and storerooms of the Registan was looted, huge fireproof cabinets were broken, broken... The Krasarmiya took part in the robbery, and two echelons with looted property were sent to Tashkent...

A procedure was quickly established, on the basis of which, in memory of the "revolution" in Bukhara, precious objects, often of historical significance, were given away, and it came to the point that everyone who found himself in Bukhara considered it shameful not to take something "for memory" .

The last emir, Said Alim, fled to Afghanistan, and the Bukhara region until the early 1930s remained a hotbed of Basmachi and permanent uprisings. Ivan Belov and his successors, without delving into the intricacies of the East, chopped "counter" into cabbage. The military commissar of the 1st Turkestan Cavalry Division I. Vinokurov reported to Moscow:

"The situation now in Eastern Bukhara is extremely deplorable, theoretically we are consolidating Soviet power here, but in practice we are slaughtering the poor by the thousands ... Now I have absolutely no idea what colossal work is needed to reconcile the population with us."

Red fighters and commanders, not knowing rest, carried the "backward" and "dark" peoples of Central Asia, enslaved by feudal lords and reactionary clergy, deliverance "from the threat of colonial imperialist slavery", clearly

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promoted the bright ideas of communism: they burned mosques, arranged barracks and stables in them, "used the sheets of the Koran for natural needs", raped Muslim women.

One of the participants in those events later admitted: "Every one of our campaigns against the Basmachi was usually accompanied by murders and robberies of civilians."

In 1921-1922, Belov, commanding a rifle division, suppressed "kulak revolts" in the Kuban. Then he commanded a corps. In 1923 he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses of the Academy of the General Staff, improved his qualifications in Germany.

From November 1927, he headed the "restless" North Caucasian district. In this position, Ivan Panfilovich was mainly engaged in his favorite thing - organizing punitive actions. The policy of forced "solid collectivization", the closure of mosques, the stupid tyranny of high-ranking Soviet and party cattle led to the fact that in September 1929 an uprising broke out that engulfed the whole of Chechnya and a number of mountainous regions of Dagestan.

It was necessary to be complete scoundrels and provocateurs in order to force Muslims in the most religious regions of the Caucasus to engage in pig breeding and turn mosques into barns, and then call in troops to suppress "anti-Soviet speeches." But the communists were such cattle. And their troops were always ready. Under the leadership of Belov, two "Chekist-military" operations were carried out, they took Shali by storm using artillery, but they managed to suppress the uprising only by April 1930.

Then Ivan Panfilovich visited Germany, where he adopted the experience of the Reichswehr. Since 1931, Belov commanded the troops of the Leningrad, since 1935 - the Moscow military districts. For military distinctions in the war with his own people, he received two Orders of the Red Banner. He left no military work.

zhzhzhzh

Commander of the 1st rank Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov was born in 1882 in the city of Zlatoust. In 1903 he graduated from the Moscow Military School, the Academy of the General Staff in 1910. He served in the Turkestan and Warsaw military districts in command and staff positions. He participated in the First World War, was the chief of staff of the Cossack brigade, the 2nd Turkestan division, the 10th rifle corps. Under the Provisional Government he received the rank of colonel. IN

December 1917 was elected head of the Caucasian Grenadier Division.

In March 1918, division chief Shaposhnikov was demobilized, but already in May he voluntarily enlisted in the Red Army and was appointed assistant chief of the Operational Directorate of the Headquarters of the Supreme Military Council of the Republic, and in October he headed the intelligence department of the Field Headquarters of the RVS.

In March 1919, Boris Mikhailovich became the first assistant chief of staff of the People's Commissariat of Defense of Ukraine, in August - head of the intelligence department, in October - the operational department of the Field Headquarters. He was directly involved in the development of a plan for a counteroffensive against Denikin in October 1919 and other strategic operations.

Since February 1921, Shaposhnikov was the first assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Red Army. For services to the Republic he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In May 1925, he was appointed deputy, and from October commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District. Exactly two years later he headed the Moscow

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military district. In May 1928 he became Chief of Staff of the Red Army. By the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1930, he was admitted to the party without undergoing candidate experience. From April 1931 he commanded the troops of the Volga Military District. In April 1932, Boris Mikhailovich was transferred to the post of head of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze.

Since September 1935, he again commanded the troops of the Leningrad Military District. A highly professional staff officer, the author of the classic work "The Brain of the Army", Boris Mikhailovich enjoyed great prestige in the army and personally with Stalin.

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Fleet flagship 1st rank Vladimir Mitrofanovich Orlov was born in Kherson in 1895. As a student at St. Petersburg University, he took part in the revolutionary movement, was arrested twice. In 1916, from the 4th year of the Faculty of Law, he was called up for military service, in October 1917 he graduated from the school of midshipmen of accelerated graduation and was appointed watch chief on the cruiser Bogatyr, stationed in Revel. After the October coup, the sailors elected the politically savvy Orlov a member of the ship's committee.

After the breakdown of the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk in early 1918, German troops went on the offensive in the Baltic. The cruiser "Bogatyr", along with other ships of the Revel base, by order of the chief of staff of the Baltic Fleet A.M. Shchastny, made the transition from Revel to Helsingfors, and then from there to Kronstadt. From March 12 to April 22, in difficult ice conditions, the Baltics managed to withdraw about 250 warships and auxiliary vessels from the ports of the Baltic, Finland and the Aland Islands.

For this feat, Shastny was accused of "preparing a counter-revolutionary

coup and treason", on the orders of Trotsky, they arrested him right in his office, urgently convicted and shot. Now historians claim that Aleksey Mikhailovich was dealt with because he thwarted Lenin's plan to surrender the ships of the Baltic Fleet to the Germans.

V.M. Orlov, meanwhile, joined the Bolshevik Party and went along the commissar line. Ships did not go to sea, the Kronstadt sailors, taking care of their leisure time, organized a cultural and educational club, which by the end of 1918 would become the Central Cultural and Educational Council of the Fleet. Orlov was elected deputy chairman of the board. There he did interesting things:

"The board organized a number of groups in general education subjects, as well as schools for specialists - navigators, mechanics, courses for accountants. Lectures were given on socio-political topics, on literature and art. Sports were developed quite widely. By August 1918, sections of wrestling, gymnastics, boxing, fencing, football and athletics were working.

On February 15, 1919, all this amateur activity turned into a very serious institution - the political department of the Baltic Fleet, headed by Orlov. At the same time, he was the editor of the Red Baltic Fleet newspaper.

Until the end of the Civil War, Orlov and his colleagues laid the foundations of the sinecure for all subsequent generations of Soviet political workers. placed commissars, strengthened party organizations, held rallies, issued leaflets, "raised morale, fostered love for the Motherland, hatred

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to the enemies. Here in May 1919, the destroyer "Gavriil" went to sea to shell the enemy coast, and the political department explains to the personnel "that ships whose teams show courage, art and solidarity can fight with honor with any enemy." In June, the forts "Krasnaya Gorka" and "Grey Horse" revolted, Orlov admonishes expeditionary detachments, instructs commissars and communists. In October, General Yudenich attacks Petrograd, Vladimir Mitrofanovich "systematically informs" the political staff about the situation, talks with sailors and soldiers, and organizes concerts for them.

In February 1920, the party sent Orlov to work on the restoration of water transport as deputy head of the Main Political Directorate (Glavpolitvoda) and at the same time head of the Donkubanzachernomor political water department, and then commissioner of the Baltic Sea Transport.

In December 1921, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Orlov was returned to the fleet and appointed assistant to the head of the Political Directorate of the RVSR for the maritime unit - head of the Naval Department. Since 1923, he headed the administration of naval educational institutions. In 1926, after graduating from the Higher Academic Courses, the party entrusted him with the post of commander of the Black Sea Naval Forces.

Since June 1931, Orlov - a naval commander, never commanded even a boat - the head of the Navy of the Red Army and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR.

zhzhzhzh

Fleet flagship 1st rank Mikhail Vladimirovich Viktorov was born in Yaroslavl into a noble family. In 1913 he graduated from the Naval Corps, in 1915 - the Mine class, in 1917 - the Navigator class. During World War II he served in the Mine Division of the Baltic Fleet, then as a senior navigator of the battleship *Grazhdanin* (former battleship *Tsesarevich*).

After October, Viktorov took the side of the Bolsheviks. He served as an old navigator of the cruiser "Oleg", participated in the amphibious landing near Narva, commanded the destroyer "Horseman", the battleships "Andrew the First-Called" and "Gangut". In June 1919, he participated in the suppression of the rebellion of the garrisons of the Krasnaya Gorka and Gray Horse forts (the forts cleared of counter-revolution were renamed Krasnoflotsky and Vanguard), in military operations against the English fleet and the troops of General N.N. Yudenich.

In March 1921, Mikhail Vladimirovich suppressed the Kronstadt rebellion, for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, in April he replaced Dybenko as senior naval commander of the conquered Kronstadt. In May, he was appointed head of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea, from June 1924 - of the Black Sea, but already in December he headed the Hydrographic Department.

Since 1926, after graduating from the advanced training courses for senior command personnel, Viktorov again commanded the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea, from March 1932 - the resurgent Naval Forces of the Far East (then he was accepted into the party).

A well-educated professional sailor Viktorov was considered one of the best naval commanders.

zhzhzhzh

Army commissar 1st rank Yan Borisovich Gamarnik was born in 1894 in Zhytomyr in the family of an employee. After graduating from high school, in 1913 he entered

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St. Petersburg Psychoneurological Institute V.M. Bekhterev, a year later he transferred to the Faculty of Law of Kyiv University. In 1916 he joined the Bolshevik Party.

In October 1917 he became a member of the Kyiv Revolutionary Committee, from March 1918 - a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine, in April-June - a member of the "Insurgent Nine". He was one of the leaders of the Odessa, Kharkov and Crimean underground party organizations. He worked on the deployment of the partisan movement. At the end of 1918, Gamarnik, being a member of the Revolutionary Committee, led an armed uprising in Kharkov against the government of Petlyura (Directorate). Since May 1919 he was the chairman of the Odessa Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, a member of the Odessa Defense Council.

After the defeat of the Ukrainian Front, Gamarnik became a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Group of Forces of the 12th Army, together with Yakir, led it out of encirclement. In November 1919 - April 1920 he was the commissar of the 58th Infantry Division.

After the Civil War, Yan Borisovich continued his career as a party functionary: in 1921-1922 he was chairman of the Odessa and Kyiv provincial executive committees, in 1923-1928 he was secretary of the Far Eastern regional party committee, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Siberian Military District. In 1928 he was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Belarusian Military District.

In October 1929, by decision of the Central Committee, Gamarnik was transferred to work in Moscow and appointed, instead of Bubnov, head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. At the same time, he became a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, and the following year - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Under the direct supervision of this "bearded man with a gloomy face and kind eyes," the armed forces were purged in 1930 of former tsarist officers, "participants in the monarchist conspiracy."

Commanders of the 2nd rank

Commander of the 2nd rank Ioakim Ioakimovich Vatsetis was born in 1873 at the Neugorf manor in the Courland province into a peasant family. He graduated from a real school, the Vilna Infantry School (in 1897), the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (in 1909).

Member of the World War. In the summer of 1915, the formation of national units began to protect the Baltic states from the invasion of German troops. Thus, the Latvian Rifle Division (39 thousand people) appeared in the Russian army, in which Vatsetis commanded the 5th Zemgale Regiment. The division fought in the Riga direction, showed good training and combat readiness.

After the fall of the monarchy, the ideas of the right of nations to self-determination, propagated by left-wing socialists, found fertile ground in the Latvian regiments. Therefore, when the Bolshevik coup took place, the Latvian riflemen, on the orders of the Revolutionary Committee of the 12th Army, occupied the main strategic points in Latvia and Estonia, ensuring the "triumphal procession" of Soviet power in the Baltic states. On December 22, 1917, the Central Executive Committee recognized the independence of Soviet Latvia, in which the implementation of the Land Decree and other Leninist decrees immediately began.

Colonel Vatsetis "resolutely" went over to the side of the revolution. In December, he was summoned to Mogilev and appointed head of the operations department of the Revolutionary Field Headquarters at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander and at the same time commander of the Latvian Rifle Corps. In January 1918, Vatsetis led the fighting against the rebellious 1st Polish Corps.

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General I.R. Dovbor-Musnitsky - another national formation created in the Russian army.

On April 13, 1918, on the orders of Trotsky, on the basis of the Latvian units, the formation of the First Latvian Soviet Rifle Division (generally the first division in the Red Army) began under the command of Vatsetis. It was planned to have 9 rifle regiments and 1 cavalry regiment, divisions of light and heavy artillery, and an aviation detachment. By mid-June 1918, the division had 8,151 men, 175 machine guns, and 25 guns.

In July, during the rebellion of the Left Social Revolutionaries, Vatsetis was actually the only military leader who supported the Bolsheviks. He once again proved his devotion to power by shooting the headquarters of the rebels in the Morozov mansion from three-inch guns. Latvians played the first fiddle in suppressing anti-Bolshevik uprisings in Yaroslavl, Murom, Rybinsk, Saratov, Novgorod, and the Penza province.

Lenin's instructions: "Hang, be sure to hang, so that the people see ... see, ruffle, know" - were addressed to Evgenia Bosh, but it was not she who hung. Chroniclers from the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR noted in this regard: "And again, the shooters justified the trust placed in them" (however, the Czechoslovak inter-detachment was also noted in Penza with massacres of the population). The Latvians also shot the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front M.A. Muraviev.

From July 12, 1918, Vatsetis, having loyal shooters at hand, commanded the Eastern Front, organized military operations against the Czechoslovak corps (and this national formation of former prisoners of war was created, for the death of Russia, under the tsar-father).

The front headquarters was created from the headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd Latvian rifle brigades, and the 5th army formed by Vatsetis was more than half staffed by Latvians and was headed by the commander of the 1st Latvian regiment P.S. Glorious. R.I. took command of the 3rd Army. Berzin.

In August, the "White Czechs" managed to capture Kazan, and with it - half of Russia's gold reserves. However, in early September, the Reds managed to organize a successful counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. The beloved commander of the 5th regiment became the first Soviet military unit to be awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner for these battles. At the height of the operation, Vatsetis was appointed commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the RSFSR.

At this time, from all directions, the red Latvian regiments were transferred to the west. By the end of 1918, they were deployed into two rifle divisions, which formed the core of the army of Soviet Latvia. Vatsetis was appointed its commander, remaining part-time commander-in-chief. The invasion of native land began in December, and by the end of January 1919, a large part of the country was occupied. Riga fell on January. Commander-in-Chief wrote:

"One of the most important tasks of the Latvian army was to CLEAR the soil, watered for a long time with sweat and blood and tears, from historical debris in the form of rotten privileged tops of the old social order of the Baltic states and clear the ground for the power of the working people."

What follows is clear. For five months, a regime of the most severe terror triumphed in Latvia. Entire battalions of executioners did not have time to shoot, hang and rob the numerous "garbage". Only at the beginning of summer

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"counter-revolutionary forces" again recaptured Riga and kicked out "fighters for a just cause." The army of Soviet Latvia was renamed the 15th army, and the shock Latvian division again spun off from it.

But in the summer of 1919, Vatsetis' brilliant career in the Red Army came to an abrupt end. It all started with disagreements between the commander-in-chief and the headquarters of the Eastern Front. Considering that the main danger for the RSFSR was brewing in the South, Vatsetis proposed to stop the successful offensive against Kolchak and transfer a number of divisions to the Southern Front. However, this idea was categorically opposed by Kamenev and the commissars who were with him. The commander of the Eastern Front promised to allocate the necessary divisions and finish off the enemy. Kamenev fulfilled his obligations in full, but the authority of the commander-in-chief was shattered. Then Vatsetis tried to remove Kamenev, but on July 8 he himself was removed from office.

Trotsky recalled:

"Both of them were colonels of the General Staff of the old tsarist army. There was an undoubted competition between them, in which the commissars were also drawn. It is difficult to say which of the two colonels was more gifted. Both possessed undoubted strategic data, both had experience of the Great War, both were distinguished by an optimistic temperament, without which it is impossible to command. Vatsetis was more stubborn, more willful, and undoubtedly succumbed to the influence of elements hostile to the revolution. Kamenev was incomparably more accommodating and easily succumbed to the influence of the communists who worked with him.

The latter circumstance, coupled with the successes of the Eastern Front, proved to be decisive. Almost immediately after the resignation of Vatsetis, the Chekists were arrested on suspicion of involvement in a "military conspiracy", but they were soon released, and from August 1919 until the end of the Civil War, he worked in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

Since 1921, Joakim Ioakimovich became a teacher at the Military Academy of the GKKA.

Commander of the 2nd rank Pavel Efimovich Dybenko was born in 1889 in the village of Lyudkov, Chernihiv province, from peasants. He graduated from the four-year city school. He worked as a loader, construction worker. In 1911 he was arrested for evading military service and transferred to the recruiting station. After graduating from the mine school, he served on the battleship "Emperor Pavel I" Baltic Fleet.

At the height of the World War, the sailor Dybenko was engaged in anti-war propaganda among the sailors of the brigade of battleships and achieved considerable success. As soon as the tsar abdicated the throne, the "brotherhood" propagandized by him began to exterminate the officers. They were shot, hoisted on bayonets, beaten with rifle butts or sledgehammers, drowned in ice-holes. And Dybenko in April 1917 became chairman of the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet - TsentrObalt.

Actively participated in the preparation of the October Revolution in Petrograd, led the formation and dispatch of detachments of sailors to the capital. The cruiser "Aurora" and other ships entered the Neva on the orders of Dybenko. The next laziness after the capture of the Winter Palace, the semi-literate Pasha Dybenko became a member of the Soviet government, People's Commissar for Naval Affairs and, as the official biography says, "one of the organizers of the Soviet fleet", as well as the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly and executions of workers' demonstrations.

In February 1918, as we know, the German command moved its troops towards Petrograd. In the Narva region, the Bolsheviks tried to block

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they are on their way with the forces of the Red Guard and detachments of "revolutionary" sailors.

People's Commissar Dybenko declared the Red Terror of the "German bourgeoisie" and, at the head of a consolidated detachment of 800 people (for comparison, take the Winter, bridges, post office, telegraph, etc., 10 thousand Baltic people came to help Lenin) marched to Narva. However, the fuse of the "brothers", the entire war consumed high-calorie food in the rear (the brigade of battleships did not participate in hostilities), was enough for one day of front-line life. According to the memoirs of M.D. Bonch-Bruевич, instead of fighting the Germans, "the decomposed sailors took up a barrel of alcohol obtained on the way."

Already on March 3, Dybenko announced the head of the Narva combat section of the former General DT. Parsky as an enemy, we will specially put his heroic detachment in a "difficult position", and gave the order to retreat. The sailors accepted the order with enthusiasm, they "ran to Gatchina", covering 120 kilometers in a record short time. In mid-March, Dybenko was expelled from the people's commissars, arrested and put under investigation for the slack of Narva. But as soon as the detention was replaced with an undertaking not to leave, Pavel Efimovich recruited a whole echelon of sailors and departed to the east to fight the "counter-revolutionary wave." On the orders of Moscow, the echelon was detained already in Samara, the commander was returned back. The trial took place in May. The Revolutionary Tribunal acquitted the former people's commissar, but the Central Committee expelled him from the party - "for a dishonorable violation of an obligation."

After the trial, Pavel Efimovich left for underground work in Ukraine, against the "bourgeois-landlord dictatorship" of Hetman Skoropadsky. In August 1918, he was captured in Sevastopol and imprisoned, but in September the Germans returned the "resident" to the Council of People's Commissars safe and sound. After that, he was engaged in the formation of rebel units in the "neutral" zone.

At the beginning of 1919, Dybenko surfaced as the commander of one of the partisan detachments as part of the Ukrainian Front, "created to assist the working people of Ukraine in liberation from the German-Austrian invaders and bourgeois nationalists", participated in the capture of Kharkov, which became the temporary capital of Soviet Ukraine, and in the offensive to Yekaterinoslav.

On February 21, he led the 1st Zadneprovskaya division. Pavel Efimovich also had colorful characters as brigade commanders - the chieftain of the NA. Grigoriev and "father" N.I. Makhno. Then Dybenko commanded the Crimean army, which on April 29

occupied Sevastopol. For a short time, Dybenko again became the People's Commissar of the Crimean Republic. However, in May, Grigoriev first raised an armed rebellion, and then the Cossack Lieutenant General A.G. Shkuro, a former commander of the Red Army, who was arrested on charges of counter-revolution and miraculously escaped execution, defeated Nestor Makhno's brigade, covering the Taganrog-Rostov section. After that, at the end of June, Soviet troops were forced to leave the Crimea. They made a division out of the Crimean army, and Dybenko was sent to the Academy of the General Staff.

In mid-June, the Whites took Kharkov. The "Special Commission for the Investigation of the Atrocities of the Bolsheviks" scrupulously recorded traces of the vital activity of the horses:

"Having climbed into the temple under the leadership of Dybenko, the Red Army soldiers, together with the mistresses who had come with them, walked around the temple in hats, smoked, scolded Jesus Christ and the Mother of God in a foul-swearing way, stole the antimimension, the curtain from the Royal Doors, tearing it to pieces, church clothes, underwear, handkerchiefs for wiping the lips of those who take communion, overturned the Throne, pierced the icon of the Savior with a bayonet. After the outrageous had left, in one of the vestibules of the temple there were

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excrements were found."

Dybenko did not stay at the academy. Since October 1919, Pavel Efimovich consistently commanded the 37th Rifle, 1st Caucasian "wild", 4th and 2nd Cavalry Divisions on the Caucasian and Southern fronts. In September 1920 he returned to study.

Being a student of the academy, Dybenko went to suppress the Kronstadt rebellion. In the course of organizing the punitive forces, the Bolsheviks had serious difficulties: a number of military units refused to oppose the rebels. Under these conditions, the non-partisan Dybenko was entrusted with the command of the Consolidated Division. The former chairman of Cetrobalt justified the trust and especially distinguished himself by ordering to shoot at his own retreating soldiers at a critical moment in the battle. So Pavel Efimovich earned his first Order of the Red Banner. A year later, commanding a punitive division "against Antonov's gangs" - the second order.

As we already know from the previous presentation, the Bolsheviks had a special honor with punishers. In 1922, Dybenko was reinstated in the party, with a credit for pre-revolutionary seniority. At the end of the academy, this "land sailor" commanded the 6th, 5th, 10th rifle corps. May 6, 1925 was appointed head of the Artillery Directorate, in 1926 - head of supply. Red Army.

Since 1928, Dybenko commanded the troops of the Turkestan military district, fought heroically with the Basmachi of Maksum Fuzaili and Ibrahim-bek, received another Order of the Red Banner. In 1930-1931 he was studying in Germany. In 1935 he headed the Volga Military District. In his free time, he wrote memoirs about his exploits and the role of the Baltics in the victory of the October Revolution (see his work "From the depths of the tsarist fleet to the Great October Revolution").

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Commander of the 2nd rank Ivan Fedorovich Fedko was born in 1897 in the village of Khmelev, Sumy region, into a peasant family. After graduating from elementary school, he studied at the vocational school of cabinetmakers, worked at a furniture factory. At the beginning of 1916 he was called up for military service, in July he was sent to the South-Western Front, and four months later he was seconded to study at the Kyiv school of ensigns.

During the October Revolution, Fedko became one of the leaders of the Revolutionary Committee in Feodosia, where he organized a detachment of the Red Guard, which then deployed into the 1st Black Sea Revolutionary Regiment. The whitewash of the proletariat was followed by massacres of classes that had no prospects for a new life. So, in January 1918, in Evpatoria, the revolutionary crew of the hydrocruiser (floating base of seaplanes) "Romania" drowned 46 of their officers, one, for the sake of interest, was burned in the furnace of a steam boiler. But in connection with the entry of German troops into the Crimea, they had to leave this kind of exciting activities and urgently leave for the Kuban.

In May-October 1918, Fedko commanded the 3rd and 1st columns of the troops of the North Caucasus, fought against Denikin. Since October 27, after the betrayal of IL. Sorokin, temporarily served as commander-in-chief of the revolutionary troops in the North Caucasus. In November, he commanded the 11th Army, then was an assistant commander and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the same army.

*

Ivan Lukich Sorokin (1884-1918) from the beginning of 1918 commanded the Red Cossack detachment, in the summer - the Rostov combat site,

then - a group of troops. In August - September he was the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops in the North Caucasus, then commanded the 11th

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and the army. In October he opposed the Bolsheviks. The Second Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of the North Caucasus outlawed it. His

was arrested in Stavropol and imprisoned, where he was soon killed without investigation or trial.

In May 1919, Ivan Fedorovich left at the disposal of the Soviet government of Ukraine and was appointed to help Dybenko, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Crimean Soviet Republic, deputy commander of the Crimean army. At the end of June, going on the offensive from the Kerch bridgehead, Denikin drove the Reds out of the Crimea. This time Fedko left through Perekop. From the remnants of the Crimean army, the Crimean Soviet division was formed under the command of Dybenko, Fedko remained deputy. On August 1, the division was renamed the 58th Rifle Division, Ivan Fedorovich became its commander. The division defended Nikolaev, then, as part of the Yakira group, it emerged from the encirclement and in September connected with the main forces of the Red Army. For these battles, the divisional commander was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In December 1919, Felko left to study at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. After six months of study, in June 1920, he was sent to the Southern Front as commander of the 46th Infantry Division. During the defeat of Wrangel, he commanded the shock group of the 13th Army. For fighting on the Nikopol bridgehead, he was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner. In December he returned to the academy.

The division commander received the third order "for skillful command" of the 187th cadet brigade as part of the Dybenko Consolidated Division during the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion. In May 1921, Ivan Fedorovich, rooting for Soviet power, asked the head of the academy for leave and volunteered to put down the Tambov rebellion. Commanded the 1st combat area. For the differences shown in the fight against the peasants, he was awarded the fourth order. In December, he returned to the academy again to finish his studies.

In February 1922, Fedlko was appointed commander of the 18th Yaroslavl Rifle Division. On April 25, 1925, an order was issued to appoint him to the Turkestan Front as commander of the 13th Rifle Corps.

For six months, Ivan Fedorovich was engaged in the elimination of the Basmachism in the territory of Eastern Bukhara. For success in defeating the detachments of Ibrahim-bek, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Bukhara Republic. In November, he headed the 2nd Rifle Corps, which he commanded for about two years.

From February 1927, Fedlko was chief of staff of the North Caucasian Military District. In 1928 he went to Germany, to the maneuvers of the Reichswehr. In 1929, he was sent to the Far East to help "resolve the conflict" on the CER. From February 1931 he commanded the Caucasian Red Banner Army. In March 1932 he was appointed commander of the Volga Military District, in October 1933 he became assistant commander of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army. Since June 1934, Ivan Fedorovich commanded the Primorsky Group of Forces OKDVA.

zhzhzh

Commander of the 2nd rank Ivan Naumovich Dubovoy was born in 1896 on the Chmyrivtsy farm in the Chigirinsky district in the family of a miner. In November 1916 he was drafted into the army, graduated from the ensign school. Didn't make it to the front. Actively made a revolution in the Donbass.

Since February 1918, Dubovoy commanded a detachment of the Red Guard in Bakhmut, then he was the military commissar of the Novomakeevsky district, commandant of the Central Headquarters of the Red Guard of Donbass, and assistant chief of staff of the 10th Army. Participated in the defense of Tsaritsyn.

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Since 1919, Ivan Naumovich was the chief of staff of the group of troops of the Kyiv direction of the Ukrainian Front. Subsequently, Dubovoy was the chief of staff and commander of the 1st Ukrainian Army, the head of the 3rd border division, assistant to the division chief at Shors, since September after his death, the head

44th Infantry Division, which, as part of the 12th Army, distinguished itself in the elimination of "kulak banditry". For merits in the fight against counter-revolution, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

After the end of the Civil War, he continued to command the 44th division, and in 1924 he became the commander of the 14th rifle corps. In 1926, Dubova graduated from the Military Academic Courses.

In October 1929 he was appointed assistant, in December 1934 - deputy commander of the Ukrainian military district. From May 1935 he commanded the troops of the Kharkov Military District.

zhzhzh

Commander of the 2nd rank Mikhail Karlovich Lewandovsky was born in 1890 in the village of Nikolaevskaya Terek province. In 1912 he graduated from the Vladimir Military School. Participated in World War II, rose to the rank of staff captain.

In February 1918 he joined the Red Army, organized red detachments in the Grozny region. And here the Chinese could not do without: in the battles near Grozny, Nalchik and Kizlyar, a battalion under the command of a certain Pakh Tisan distinguished himself. In July 1918, Levandovsky was elected People's Commissar for Military Affairs of the Terek Soviet Republic. He led the suppression of "counter-revolutionary actions" in the regions of Vladikavkaz and Grozny.

In January 1919, Gola became commander of the 11th Army. The army carried out an offensive operation in the direction of Yekaterinodar and Novorossiysk. However, it was defeated by Denikin's troops and an epidemic of typhus. Having lost two-thirds of the personnel, she went through the Kalmyk steppes to Astrakhan.

Retreating, the army everywhere left traces of the most sophisticated atrocity. Still would. With her bayonets, she ensured the activities of one of the most famous "jolly monsters of Bolshevism" - Plenipotentiary Georgy Atarbekov (1891-1925). For example, in Pyatigorsk, with a detachment of Chekists, Atarbekov took about a hundred hostages to the cemetery and chopped them with checkers; in Armavir he machine-gunned a train of Georgian officers and sisters of mercy returning home; in Yekaterinodar he "spanked" about two thousand prisoners. So the former staff captain Lewandowski had a quite adequate idea of the government he undertook to serve.

In February, the 11th Army was disbanded. After that, Lewandovsky successively commanded the 1st Special and 7th Samara Cavalry, 33rd Kuban Rifle Divisions (as part of the revived and again disbanded 11th Separate and 10th Armies), fighting against parts of the Caucasian Army P.N. Wrangel in the Astrakhan direction. After the failure of Denikin's campaign against Moscow, the Reds returned to the North Caucasus in February-March 1920. Lewandovsky commanded the Terek group of troops, the most important task of which was to capture the oil fields. Lenin kept this question under special control, bombarding the RVS of the front with telegrams:

"We desperately need oil, consider a manifesto to the population that we will cut everyone if they burn and spoil the oil, and vice versa, we will give life to everyone if

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E Maykop and especially Grozny will be handed over intact.

Even before the completion of the operation, Vladimir Ilyich set the command of the Caucasian Front the task of organizing an invasion of the Republic of Azerbaijan - there were also views on Baku oil. Therefore, throwing into the landfill the slogans about the right of nations to self-determination that had played their destructive role, Lenin returned the lost colonies:

"It is extremely necessary for us to take Baku. Direct all efforts towards this, and be sure to be purely diplomatic in your statements and ascertain as much as possible in the preparation of a firm local Soviet government. The same applies to Georgia, although I advise you to treat it even more carefully."

This was how the scenario that later became classic was worked out: the government of puppets asks the Kremlin for military assistance, which the Bolsheviks never knew how to refuse. The main role was assigned to the 11th Army, which was again led by Lewandowski. The Azerbaijani government, through diplomatic channels, tried to find out from Moscow what the concentration of Soviet troops near the border meant, but received no answer.

On April 27, the intervention began. Two days later, Baku was captured by strikes from land and sea. A telegram from the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan flew to the "leader of the world proletariat" with a request to "immediately provide real assistance by sending detachments of the Red Army" to repel the onslaught of "united bands of internal and external counter-revolution". or serious resistance, the occupying troops advanced, carrying out demonstrative actions of intimidation. In Baku, they started shooting the population on the very first night.

Lewandovsky in July 1920 took command of the 9th Army, which defeated the landing force of Wrangel Lieutenant General S. G. Ulagai on the Taman Peninsula and especially distinguished himself in the extermination of the Kuban Cossacks. As a member of the Revolutionary Military Council S.A. Anuchin, in July, the Revolutionary Military Council of the army, together with the Kuban Black Sea Committee of the RCP (6) and the Revolutionary Committee, formed shock detachments. The drummers "shot more than one thousand opponents of the Soviet power and burned more than one village (more than one hundred houses). And this had an extremely favorable effect on the Cossacks, it sobered them up.

In the spring of 1921, the 9th Army contributed to the establishment of Soviet power in the Transcaucasus, eliminating the "counter-revolution" in Georgia. And from July to September, being the governor's military commissar of the Tambov province, Mikhail Karlovich crushed the rebellious peasants - he pacified the "Antonovshchina". In April 1924, he was appointed commander of the Turkestan Front and for a year and a half "pacified" the Basmachi movement in Central Asia. From November 1925 - commander of the Caucasian Red Banner Army, at the same time from March 1928 - authorized by the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the Transcaucasian Federation.

Since October 1928, the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army, since December 1929, the commander of the Siberian, then the Transcaucasian military districts. Since 1933, he again commanded the Caucasian army.

zhzhzhzhzh

Commander of the 2nd rank Mikhail Dmitrievich Velikanov was born in 1892 in the village of Zimino, Ryazan province, into a peasant family. He graduated from the seminary, worked as a zemstvo teacher. In 1914 he was drafted into the army and sent to the ensign school. He finished the war with the St. George Cross, in the rank

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second lieutenant.

In early March 1918, he joined the Red Army and was appointed company commander of the Lefortovo detachment. In May, at the head of the Consolidated Detachment, he went to fight against the "White Czechs" in the 1st Army of Tukhachevsky. The detachment became part of the 24th Iron Division, Velikanov became commander of the 2nd Simbirsk regiment. In December, he took command of the 1st brigade, in February 1919 he temporarily acted as head of the 25th Samara division. In the spring of 1919, he commanded the Ufa shock group of troops, took part in the defeat of Kolchak's troops in the Urals, and led the defense of Orenburg.

On July 17, 1919, he was appointed head of the 20th Infantry Division of the 1st Army of the Eastern Front, which he led until the end of the Civil War. In September, the division was transferred to the South-Eastern Front. As part of the 10th Army, together with the "Budennovites", she participated in the battle near the village of Yegorlykskaya, as part of the 11th Army, she carried out the occupation of Azerbaijan.

In May 1920, "the dark forces of the counter-revolution succeeded in provoking several major uprisings in Azerbaijan." The share of division commander Velikanov fell to the suppression of the uprising in Ganja. In the autumn of 1920, the working people of Armenia became agitated. The Revolutionary Committee, created by the Bolsheviks, gathered in the remote village of Dilijan, declared Armenia a Soviet Socialist Republic and immediately called for help "the heroic Red Army of great socialist Russia." The 11th Rapid Reaction Army moved to help the Armenian proletarians. Already on December 4, Velikanov led his division through the streets of Yerevan. It is interesting that the Soviet army "helped" the Armenians in cooperation with the Turkish one.

No more than two months passed, and the same opportunity happened in Georgia, on February 10, 1921, it had to be occupied as well. Velikanov commanded a group in the Tiflis direction. On February 25, after fierce battles with Georgian troops, a telegram arrived in Moscow: "The Red Banner of Soviet Power flies over Tiflis."

However, while the Georgians were being helped, the restless Dashnaks recaptured Yerevan from the "Red Imperialists" in mid-February. Velikanov had to return and restore order in Armenia, convincing the slow-witted Armenians of the advantages of the Soviet system through artillery, airplanes and armored trains. Yerevan was recaptured only on April 4.

In 1922, three times the order bearer Velikanov graduated from the Higher Military Academic Courses for the Command Staff of the Red Army and was appointed commander of the 1st Caucasian Rifle Division, and then the 9th Rifle Corps. Since 1923, he was an assistant to the commander of the district troops, an inspector of the infantry of the Red Army. Since 1933 he commanded the troops of the Central Asian Military District.

zhzhzhzh

Commander of the 2nd rank August Ivanovich Kork was born in 1886 in the village of Ardlan, Livonia province, into a peasant family. In 1906 he graduated from the Chuguev Infantry School, in 1914 from the General Staff Academy, and in 1917 from the Military Observer Pilot School. He served mainly in the headquarters, the last rank - lieutenant colonel.

In July 1918, August Ivanovich joined the Red Army, worked in the Operational Department of the Vseroglavitab, from October he was the head of the Western Front headquarters department and the head of the operational intelligence department of the 9th Army headquarters.

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The annulment of - the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk allowed - the Bolsheviks to start implementing plans for the Sovietization of Estonia. In mid-November, the Revel Revolutionary Committee, formed by Kremlin envoys, called on the people to oppose the "self-proclaimed government of Päts" and "asked" the working people of the RSFSR to provide Estonians with "help" with the troops of the Red Army.*

*

Konstantin Piate (1874-1956) in 1918-19 was Prime Minister and at the same time Minister of War of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Estonia.

In 1919-34. led the Agrarian Party. In 1938-40. state president. In August 1940, after the occupation of Estonia by the Red Army troops, he was arrested by the NKVD and sent to the Soviet

concamp. In the last years of his life he lived in the settlement, where he died.

In response to this request, or rather, even earlier, the government concentrated the 7th Army and the "red" Estonian and Latvian units brought from all fronts near the Estonian border, and immediately moved them to the offensive. On November 25 they took Pskov, by the morning of November 29 - Narva. Already at noon of the same day, in the building of the Narva City Hall, local and alien Bolsheviks proclaimed the Soviet Socialist Republic - the Estland Labor Commune.

Cork received in this Commune a position as a consultant to the People's Commissariat for military affairs. By the beginning of January 1919, the Red troops occupied a large part of the territory of Estonia, not reaching only 30 kilometers from Revel (Tallinn), and with their bayonets ensured the unfolding "socialist transformations".

However, on January 9, the "Beloests", with the support of German troops, Finnish and Russian volunteer formations, launched a counteroffensive and entered Narva ten days later. The government of the "Commune" moved to Pskov, then to Luga. It did not lose hope for revenge, and on February 18, 1919, with the approval of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), it began to form the Estonian Red Army, whose chief of staff was Kork. In March-April, another attempt by the Reds to invade Estonia followed, but it also ended in failure. Moscow, distracted by the fight against the successful offensive of Kolchak, could not help with additional forces. Moreover, in May, the army of General N.N., formed on the territory of Estonia, went on the offensive. Yudenich. On May 25, the "White Estonian troops" recaptured Pskov, by mid-June the Whites were under the walls of Petrograd.

The Estonian Red Army had to be disbanded, its units became part of the Western Front. August Ivanovich was appointed assistant commander of the 7th Army, which in July managed to push Yudenich's troops to the borders of Estonia. In August 1919, Kork took command of the remnants of the defeated Red Army of Soviet Latvia, renamed the 15th Army, and took Pskov again. In the autumn, Yudenich made a second attempt to capture Petrograd, but was defeated. A significant role in its defeat was played by the flank counterattack of the Kork army, and even more so by the general's refusal to recognize the independence of Estonia in case of victory. On October 31, the Red troops returned Luga, on November 7 - Gdov. For these battles, the commander was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. On February 2, 1920, Moscow concluded a peace treaty with Tallinn, the Sovietization of Estonia had to be postponed for twenty years.

In the spring, the 15th Army was transferred to Belarus, where the Bolsheviks were preparing to resume the war against Poland. On May 14, in order to help the Southwestern Front, which had surrendered Kyiv, the commander of the Western Front launched an offensive without waiting for the concentration of all his forces. A week later, Soviet troops occupied Molodechno and Borisov. However, on May 30, the Poles counterattacked and, with the help of their reserves, restored the situation. Only the 15th army of Kork was able to hold a small foothold in the Polotsk region. In July, she participated in the campaign against the Vistula, was defeated, like the entire Western Front, by two divisions of the 15th Army

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were interned in East Prussia. Nevertheless, the defeated commander was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner.

Since October 1920, Kork commanded the 6th Army of the Southern Front, which participated in the battle in Northern Tauria and stormed Perekop. For the capture of the Perekop and Ishun positions, he was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. In May 1921, the 6th Army was disbanded, its administration was directed to the formation of the Kharkov Military District. Kork took command of the district, then was assistant commander of the armed forces of Ukraine and the Crimea, assistant head of the air fleet of the Red Army.

Since 1922, he commanded the Turkestan Front. In December 1923 he was appointed assistant commander of the Western Military District. Then, in February 1925, he became the commander of the Caucasian Red Banner (punitive) army of the Caucasus, led operations that had not yet become routine at that time to convince the inhabitants of Chechnya of the merits of Soviet power. The headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District reported: "To convince Urus-Murtan, it took artillery shelling from 900

shells and aerial bombardment.

Since November 1925, Kork commanded the troops of the Western, since 1927 - the Leningrad military districts. During this period he joined the Bolshevik Party. In 1928 he was a military attache in Germany, head of the Supply Department of the Red Army. In 1929 he took command of the troops of the Moscow Military District.

In 1935, Kork became head of the Frunze Military Academy and a member of the Military Council under the People's Commissariat of Defense. He actively participated in the development of military theoretical problems, was the author of a number of works on military theory and tactics: on military doctrine, strategy and tactics, on the operations of the Civil War.

zhzhzhzh

Commander of the 2nd rank Nikolai Dmitrievich Kashirin was born in 1888 in the city of Verkhneural'sk, in the family of a stanitsa ataman. In 1909 he graduated from the Orenburg cadet school, served in parts of the Orenburg Cossack army. He completed the First World War with the rank of podesaul (corresponding to the army rank of staff captain).

In 1917, Kashirin was elected chairman of the regimental Cossack committee. In March 1918, together with his brother Ivan, he formed the "first Soviet Cossack hundred" in Verkhneural'sk, with which he participated in the fight against the troops of General Dutov. As a result of the successful actions of the Kashirin detachment, the connection of the Orenburg and Orsk Soviet detachments was ensured. Leading them, Kashirin came to the aid of the Samara Soviet army, defeated two white Cossack regiments and covered the withdrawal of the army. In July, the Orenburg detachment of Nikolai Kashirin, the partisan brigade of Ivan Kashirin and the 1st Ural Regiment of Blucher merged into the South Ural Army, which made its way to join the main forces of the Red Army.

From September 1918 N.D. Kashirin - assistant chief, then head of the 4th Ural division, later renamed the 30th rifle division. In 1919, he was the commandant of the Orenburg fortified area, the head of the 49th fortress division of the Turkestan Front.

In 1920, as commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, he participated in the defeat of Wrangel's troops on the Southern Front. Corps under command

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Kashirina, acting as part of the 13th Army, inflicted a number of defeats on the enemy and, in cooperation with other formations, liberated Melitopol, Genichesk, Kerch. After the defeat of Wrangel, Kashirin commanded the Alexander Group of Forces, which participated in the fight against the rebel army of Nestor Ivanovich Makhno.

In 1923-1925 he was the commander of the 14th Rifle Corps, was on assignment at the headquarters of the Red Army, commanded the 1st Cavalry Corps of the Red Cossacks. In 1925-1931, he was assistant commander of the Ural, Belorussian, and Moscow military districts. In 1924 he graduated from the Military

academic courses for the higher command staff of the Red Army.

From June 1931, for six years, Kashirin commanded the troops of the North Caucasian Military District. He had the dubious "honor" of suppressing the Chechen uprising of 1932, which broke out on March 23, prepared by the "kulak-mullah underground" and led by Imam M. Shamilov, since the previous "talkers" did not cope with this task. The reports of the district headquarters noted "the organization of this speech, the exceptional bitterness of the rebels in the battles, continuous counterattacks, despite the big losses, religious singing during the attacks, the participation of women in the battles." Difficulties did not frighten Nikolai Dmitrievich, already on April 9 he reported to Moscow that "the uprising must be considered suppressed." According to official data, the losses of the rebels amounted to 333 people killed, 150 wounded (there were no reports on the number of those shot), the losses of the punishers were 27 killed, 30 wounded.

Kaptirin's awards: two Orders of the Red Banner and an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon.

zhzhzhzh

Commander of the 2nd rank Alexander Ignatievich Sedyakin was born in 1893 in St. Petersburg in the family of a soldier. With the outbreak of World War II, he was called up for military service. In 1915 he graduated from the Irkutsk military school. He fought and rose to the rank of captain.

Since October 1917, he participated in the formation of Red Guard detachments. During the Civil War, he was commissar of the 2nd Pskov division, commander of an armored train, rifle regiment and brigade, assistant commander of the 13th army, commissar of the headquarters of the Southern Front, commander of the 31st and 15th rifle divisions.

After the war, he became an infantry inspector in the Petrograd Military District. During the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion, he commanded the Southern Group of the 7th Army. In 1921-22, he commanded the troops of the Karelian region of the Petrograd Military District, fought with the "White Finnish detachments", repelling the invasion of the military units of the "rebellious proletariat" of the Karelian Labor Commune. In December 1923, Sedyakin received the 5th Red Banner Army.

Graduated from the Higher Military Academic Courses. In 1924-1927 he commanded the troops of the Volga Military District. Since 1927, he was deputy head of the Glavupr, then an inspector of infantry and armored forces of the Red Army. In 1931 - 1932, the head of the Military-Technical Academy of the Red Army named after Dzerzhinsky.

Since 1933, he was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army, led the Military Technical Academy, the Combat Training Directorate of the Red Army.

zhzhzhzh

Commander of the 2nd rank Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis (Astrov) was born in 1897 in

Livonia province in the family of a laborer. In March 1917 he was mobilized in

army. After graduating from the Odessa military school, ensigns were sent to

Western front. Conducted Bolshevik propaganda among the soldiers, participated in the creation of soldiers' committees.

After the revolution, he worked in the party and Soviet bodies, was the commissioner of the Don region. In May 1919 he was appointed military commissar of the Oryol province, then commissar of the 55th Infantry Division. Participated in battles with Denikin.

In 1924 he graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army. In August 1926, he was appointed deputy head of the Air Force of the Red Army. In November 1929 he graduated from the Kachin Aviation School and received the title of military pilot. In June 1931, after a business trip to Germany, he became the head of the Red Army Air Force and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council.

The name of Alksnis is associated with many important measures to improve the organizational structure of the Air Force, equipping them with new military equipment. On his initiative, mandatory periodic checks of the piloting technique of the flight crew, pre-flight training of crews were introduced, and instrument flights out of sight of the ground were introduced.

zhzhzhzh

Commander of the 2nd rank Innokenty Andreevich Khalepsky was born in 1893 in the city of Minusinsk, the son of a tailor. Educated at the county city school. He worked as a telegrapher.

In early 1918, he became secretary of the Central Committee of the trade union of postal and telegraph workers, in April he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party.

During the Civil War, he fought near Narva as part of the Red Guard detachment. Then he participated in battles with the "White Czechs" and the White Guards in the Urals, was the head of communications of the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front. Since October 1918, the Extraordinary Commissar for Communications of all fronts. Since March 1919, the People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs of Ukraine. In October 1919-June 1920, he was the head of communications for the Southern, South-Western and Caucasian fronts. From July 1920, he was an assistant, then deputy chief, and from September, head of the Communications Directorate of the Red Army.

In 1924-1929 he was the head of the Military Technical Directorate of the Red Army, since 1929 he was the head of the Motorization and Mechanization Directorate, and since December 1934 - the Armored Directorate.

zhzhzhzh

The flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank Ivan Kuzmich Kozhanov was born in 1897 in the village of Voznesenskaya in the Kuban. In 1916 he was drafted into the Navy, graduated from the Separate midshipman classes, served on the auxiliary cruiser Oryol and the destroyer Bodry of the Siberian Flotilla. In 1917 midshipman Kozhanov joined the Bolshevik Party.

Since 1918, Ivan Kuzmich was the head of the Special Purpose Detachment under the People's Commissariat for Maritime Affairs, commanded the landing detachments of sailors as part of the Volga military flotilla, formed in June from river vessels and a group of warships of the Baltic Fleet. He fought with the "White Czechs" and the White Guards in the Volga region. For the battles near Yelabuga and "outstanding contribution" to the defeat of Kolchak

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was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In July 1919, the Volga flotilla became part of the Volga-Caspian military flotilla under the command of F.F. Raskolnikov, who supported the actions of the ground forces of the Southern, Turkestan, and then the Caucasian fronts. In the summer and autumn of 1919, the flotilla and "Kozhanov's detachments" took part in the attack on Tsaritsyn, the defense of Astrakhan, the battles near Mariupol, and in April 1920, in the capture of Baku.

On May 18, ships of the Red Flotilla appeared at Anzali, the largest Iranian port on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. After artillery shelling, landing units of sailors were landed on the shore. The English garrison stationed in Anzeli retreated to the neighboring city of Rasht. Officially, the purpose of the operation was proclaimed "the return to the Soviet Republic of the ships taken away by the White Guards and interventionists." The deed was done, it would seem that it would be possible to return to Baku with victory.

But "suddenly" it turned out that a revolution had begun in the coastal Gilan province of Persia (Iran). Providing "disinterested assistance to the Persian working people", Soviet troops occupied the city of Rasht, where on June 4 it was announced the creation of a government and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic, chaired by Mirza Kuchek Khan. Soviet friends handed over power over the captured settlements to the newly-minted "Persian revolutionary democrat", supplied him with weapons, and helped with instructors. Soviet ships remained on the Anzeli roadstead, but under the flags of "independent Soviet Azerbaijan."

The Persian revolutionaries immediately began to take active steps according to Lenin's recipes. they appointed their own commissars, confiscated property from the "rich", confiscated land, and most importantly, cut and shot numerous "enemies of the revolution".

In response to requests from Tehran, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G.V. Chicherin made honest eyes and declared the non-interference of the RSFSR in the internal affairs of Persia. However, the "attempt to conduct a communist policy in Gilan" did not lead to successful results: the revolutionary shahs divided power and tirelessly killed each other, not to mention the people. A year later, the Gilan Republic collapsed, some of its commissars went over to the side of the Shah's troops,

the other fled to Baku.*

* According to official Soviet data, Kuchek Khan "on September 29, 1921, carried out a counter-revolutionary coup, as a result of which the leading figures of the Iranian Communist Party were killed and its organizations were crushed. This made it easier for the Shah's regime to defeat

Gilyan Republic.

Kozhanov, from September 1920, commanded an expeditionary naval division on the Sea of Azov, operating against the troops of General Ulagay in the Kuban and Wrangel's troops in Northern Tavria. In March 1921, he distinguished himself in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion, after which he was appointed commander of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. In July, Ivan Kuzmich was again transferred to the south, making him head of the Caucasian Defense Sector of the Black and Azov Seas. From January 1922, he served as chief and commissar of the Naval Forces in the Far East until their liquidation at the end of the year.

In 1924, Kozhanov received a referral to study at the Naval Academy. After graduating in 1927, he served as a naval specialist (attache) at the USSR embassy in Japan. From March 1930 - assistant commander, from September - commander of the destroyer Uritsky. From November 1930 - Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. From June 1931 -

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Commander of the Black Sea Naval Forces, renamed in 1935 into the Black Sea Fleet.

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The flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank, Lev Mikhailovich Galler (more precisely, "von Haller") was born in 1883 in St. Petersburg in the family of a military engineer. After graduating from the Naval Cadet Corps, he served on the ships of the Baltic Fleet: the cruisers "Asia" and "General-Admiral" and on the battleship "Glory". In 1912, after graduating from the artillery officer classes, he served on the battleship "Andrew the First-Called", then was the flagship gunner of the 2nd brigade of battleships, senior officer of the battleship "Glory".

He met the October Revolution as a captain of the 2nd rank, being the commander of the destroyer Gurkmenets-Stavropolsky. In March 1918 he participated in the Ice Campaign.

During the Civil War, he commanded a destroyer, a cruiser, and was the chief of staff of the Active Detachment of Baltic Sea Ships. Having taken command of the battleship Andrei the First-Called in April 1919, he participated in operations against the troops of Yudenich and the British fleet, shelling the rebellious forts Gray Loshal and Krasnaya Gorka.

In 1921 he was appointed head of the destroyer division, then

Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. In 1926 he completed advanced training courses for senior officers at the Naval Academy. Since 1927, Haller commanded a division of battleships, in 1929 he led the transition of the battleship "Paris Commune" and the cruiser "Profintern" from Kronstadt to Sevastopol.

In March 1932, Haller was accepted into the party and appointed commander of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea (since 1935 - the Baltic Fleet).

Let's mark the commissioners en masse. He is the commissar and is the "ordinary commissar", the "eyes, ears and punishing right hand" of the party.

zhzhzh

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Amelin Mikhail Petrovich (1896-1937), head of the political department of the Kyiv Military District.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Aronshtam Lazar Naumovich (1896-1938), head of the political department of OKDVA.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Bulin Anton Stepanovich (1894 - 1938), deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, head of the department for command staff.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Veklichev Georgy Ivanovich (1898 - 1938), member of the military council of the North Caucasian Military District.

Army commissar 2nd rank Grishin Alexander Sergeevich (1895-1938), head of the political department of the Baltic Fleet.

Army commissar 2nd rank Gugin Grigory Ivanovich (1896 - 1937), member of the military council of the Black Sea Fleet.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Ippo Boris Mikhailovich (1898 - 1937), member

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Military Council of the Central Asian Military District.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Kozhevnikov Sergey Nikolaevich (1896 - 1938), head of the political department of the Kharkov Military District.

Army commissar 2nd rank Landa Mikhail Markovich (1890-1938), editor of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Mezis August Ivanovich (1894 - 1938), member

Military Council of the Belarusian Military District.

Army commissar 2nd rank Okunev Grigory Sergeevich (1900 - 1938), head of the political department and member of the military council of the Pacific Fleet.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Osepyan Gaik Alexandrovich (1891 - 1937), deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Slavin Iosif Eremeevich (1893 - 1938), head of the UVVUZ of the Red Army.

Army commissar 2nd rank Smirnov Petr Alexandrovich (1897-1938), member of the Military Council of the Military District.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Shifres Alexander Lvovich (1898 - 1938), head of the Military Economic Academy of the Red Army.

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So, let's sum up some results. The five marshals included two locksmiths who graduated from elementary school, a self-taught sergeant major, a second lieutenant with a two-year military education, and one colonel. Of the fourteen army commanders, seven graduated from military schools, four of them graduated from the Nikolaev General Staff Academy. There was also a violent tribe of "legendary" commanders and brigade commanders, mostly not at all burdened with education. But almost all of them are punishers, up to their very nostrils covered in the blood of peasants, Cossacks, "Caucasians" and other "Asians".

By the way, Joakim Joakimovich Vatsetis once said:

"If it depended on me, I would not give high posts to those who do not have at least three years of experience in commanding a regiment. Only this post develops in the commander an organizer, administrator, tactician and operator, strategist and politician, arbitrator and educator. An officer's academy is a regiment."

But among the highest Soviet "generals" there were only four or five people, the rest almost immediately "jumped" into commanders and commanders. For comparison. B.M. Shaposhnikov, having completed the basic and additional courses of the Nikolaev Military Academy, was appointed only as a company commander and commanded it for two goals.

It is clear that the proletarian revolution raised its own proletarian cadres to the very top. However, the rapid development of military affairs and military equipment in the 1930s made higher demands on the professional qualities of commanders than the ability to ride "on a hot war horse", cut down "counter" and poison the peasants with gases.

However, formally all the "prominent" military leaders had diplomas

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"academicians". Only now the quality of these diplomas was incomparable with the revolutionary one, due to the low general educational level of the students, as well as the deep contempt of the main part of them for the bourgeois sciences in general, for the military in particular. In addition, these sciences were taught by former tsarist generals and colonels, "with a narrow military outlook", who, due to their "political backwardness", did not understand the determining role of the class struggle.

The first admission of students to the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army was announced in November 1918. More than half of the applicants came from workers and peasants, of which 25% had only primary education. The main role in admission was played by the following factors: a) recommendations from two members of the RCP(b); 6) own party experience; c) experience of military work in the Red Army. The entrance exams for the "petrels of the revolution" were simplified to the limit, essentially turning them into a fiction.

Head of the Academy in 1919-1921 A.E. Snegarev wrote:

"There are no languages, mathematics is for 4 classes, even military regulations are not required, politically valuable people are accepted for half an hour and with very poor knowledge, the focus of the tests was shifted to "general development" - a term that is open to errors, but turns out to be the only expedient."

The term of study was determined at six months (although later the term was increased). This is extremely small, given that in tsarist times it took 2-3 years to become an "academician", having already 12 years of general and military education behind him. Entrance "tests" then included exams in Russian and two foreign languages (!), General tactics, artillery, horseback riding, charters of military branches, mathematics, geography, general and Russian history.

Naturally, the curricula and plans of the teachers had to be rebuilt in accordance with the characteristics of the students. I had to start "from the most elementary steps of military knowledge." All "unnecessary" and "indigestible" subjects like astronomy, higher mathematics, geography, geodesy, ancient history were also thrown out, and in their place the absolutely necessary courses of Marxism and tactics of revolutionary battles appeared.

The future marshal and chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov (1897-1968) recalled:

"But even for six months in a row, no one listened to the lectures. Usually people, having studied for a while, departed for the army in order to return later and finish their studies. It happened to me as well. Some had to ply so three or four times. Most often they studied in the winter, and fought in the summer "...

Therefore, the first release of the "Red General Staff" took place only in October 1921. The Academy was "successfully graduated" by such famous people in the Red Army as A.M. Meretskov (four classes of a rural school), P.E. Dybenko (four-year

city school), I.V. Tyulenev (five classes of a real school as an external student), I.F. Fedko (elementary school), V.D. Sokolovsky (teacher's seminary). Head of V.I. Chapaev (according to the certification, "almost illiterate") fled, understudied, because, as he himself wrote in a report addressed to his superiors, "all this has already passed in battles."

By that time, taking into account the reduction of the armed forces, this educational institution was reprofiled to train personnel at the tactical level of command, making it the combined arms Military Academy of the Red Army. The senior and senior command staff over the next 15 years were trained at

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" in 141 different courses.

Young "kraskoms" compensated for the gaps in education with the desire for knowledge, diligence in study. As for the high-ranking order bearers, they were incurable in their militant ignorance. Here, for example, Dmitry Schmidt enters the academy:

"At the entrance exams, Schmidt was pathetically helpless. Limping, with his huge saber at his side, he slowly approached the table.

- Name the years of the reign of Peter the Great, - they asked him.

"I have no idea," he replied dryly.

- Name the wars of Catherine II.

- I do not know them.

The generals looked at each other, and Martynov repeated the question: "Tell us the years of Catherine the Great's reign and the year of her death."

"I wasn't alive then, and that doesn't interest me. ... This blew up Martynov:

— Lord , It is unacceptable! I refuse to examine further this candidate.

Then the academy commissar rushed in, and this wonderful cavalryman was accepted on the condition that he promise to take the exam later, when he had more time to study history, which practically meant never.

It's a pity that this "wonderful cavalryman" did not live to see 1941 (he was shot as an "enemy of the people", a "Grotskyist" and, of course, a "foreign pption"), he would certainly have "kicked his tail" to the scoundrel Guderian.

There was no sense in the "study" of SM. Budyonny, who "overturned the stereotyped theory of warfare". In general, it is difficult to imagine how it is possible to immediately receive a higher military diploma at the age of 50.

education, without having had any at all. And besides, without interruption from official duties "to introduce into the thick of the army the correct views on ensuring the further growth of the cavalry" and cares for the "insemination of queens." *

* Although, in principle, it is possible to imagine. For example, today the commander of the Moscow Military District, three times Hero, with the rank of colonel general, will come to the Academy of the General Staff to study. How will it look like

"studies"?

The wife of Marshal Yegorov spoke about the company that surrounded Semyon Mikhailovich:

"Comrades in the Cavalry Army, veterans of campaigns during the civil war gathered here: Apanasenko, Kosogov, Tyulenev, Shadenko, Timoshenko, Gorodovikov, Kulik. Dozens of times I heard retellings of each about personal valor and heroism in the field life. Vanity. The feigned pose, the desire to be visible, the jealousy of everything young that overtakes them, were the characteristic features of this campaign.

Assistant Inspector of the Red Army Cavalry B. K. Verkhovsky during interrogation in the NKVD showed:

"The system of servility was brought to the point where we not only allowed the Marptal Bulenny to hit us in the face, but even exposed ourselves to blows and

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then, as a sign of devotion, they kissed his hands" (!!!).

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In the period from 1926 to 1933, a number of major Soviet military leaders went on a business trip to Germany to participate in Reichswehr maneuvers or study at the academy there. Among them were Alksnis, Belov, Dubovoi, Dybenko, Yegorov, Kork, Levandovsky, Primakov, Triandafillov, Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Feldman, Eideman, Yakir and many others - more than 150 people in total.

Those of them who wanted to study, knew how to observe, thought about the coming war, managed to learn a lot from these trips. Head of the Frunze Military Academy R.P. Eidemann wrote in a report in August 1928:

"Looking closely at the Reichswehr, we had the opportunity to make sure that we, perhaps without noticing it ourselves, already adopted quite a lot in the organization of classes, in matters of organizing combat and control from the Germans Not everything, of course, is ideal from the Germans , but still the German army is an army that keeps in its command staff the best traditions of the world war ...

The general orientation is toward mobile warfare. Struggle against manifestation of positional tendencies. From this basic course for maneuver warfare arise the requirements of tactics and technology, hence the emphasis on training a flexible command and control apparatus that quickly responds to the situation (maneuvers not so much for training troops as for the command apparatus), pressure on the technique of issuing orders and orders, and command language ".

On the contrary, "honored revolutionary fighters" reduced their stay abroad to a pleasant pastime. For example, Dybenko mainly used "schnapps" and cognac in the campaign with the commander of the Caucasian army K.A. Avksentevsky. Therefore, twice the "academician" Pavel Efimovich never found out that the "American" language is English, and Konstantin Alekseevich drank himself to the point that he tried to rape the landlady and all the servants in the house. I had to pack the hero and send it to Moscow at low speed.

The great strategist Tukhachevsky, who made a trip to Germany in 1932, found nothing useful for himself. In his report addressed to Voroptilov, he gave the command of the German army an unflattering assessment:

"The leadership of the Reichswehr conceives of war in the form of the last, mobile period, the imperialist war. He is incapable of imagining new forms of combat resulting from new weapons: aircraft, tanks, automatic rifles, and so on.

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And such people developed the Soviet military doctrine, mobilization and operational plans, ordered equipment and weapons, trained troops, prepared the army for war.

To which? Yes, for the very one for which Lenin and Stalin tirelessly urged to prepare: for a war with the "backward" bourgeois countries in order to draw more and more new states into the "World Republic of Soviets".

As A.A. Svechin, "strategy cannot exist in an airless space; it is doomed to pay for all the sins of politics."
More

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Frunze, laying the foundations of the Soviet military doctrine, demanded:

"Organize the work of military headquarters in such a way that the Red Army can fulfill its tasks in any operational direction and in any sector of a possible future front. The boundaries of this front are determined in the nearest future by the boundaries of the entire continent of the Old World...

Hence the need to educate our army in the spirit of the greatest activity, to prepare it for the completion of the tasks of the revolution by energetic,

decisively and boldly carried out offensive operations ...

Our commanding staff should be educated mainly on the ideas of maneuvering ... This follows from the class nature of the workers' and peasants' army and at the same time coincides with the requirements of military art.

So, the Soviet strategy from the very beginning considered the new war ("the coming battle with imperialism") exclusively as an offensive, predatory, colonial war. It was officially proclaimed and repeated many times in various documents and speeches that the "future war" would be waged not for the sake of concluding a profitable peace by defeating the enemy's armed forces, but for joining new lands and populations to the "brotherly family" of the Soviet peoples. The Communists, like the Nazis, constantly lacked "living space". That is why they were going to fight on foreign territory, or rather, for foreign territories:

"After occupation, each territory occupied by us is already Soviet territory, where the power of the workers and peasants will be exercised ... we, too, will expand into a socialist coalition when new socialist revolutions break out or when we have to occupy one or another area under the rule of capital" (Frunze).

destruction of the socialist of the most "large-caliber" red theoretician, this is Tukhachevsky's No. , called "the basis of the war."

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Discussing the nature of future wars, M.V. Frunze confidently declared that "they will approach our civil war in type. And if so, then in general, the methods of positional warfare will not be widely used.

Accordingly, the ideas of mobile warfare were adopted, with extensive motorization of ground forces and powerful air support.

True, old professors like Svechin, Snegarev or Verkhovsky tried to raise the question of the advantages of a defensive course of action and even went so far as to assert that "it is necessary to be able to lose territory." They did not understand the essence of "class strategy", and therefore their views were rejected as "bourgeois limited and backward". After all, only the "strategy of destruction" of capitalism made it possible to liberate the oppressed of all countries. "We will not give up an inch of our land!" - proclaimed Stalin, but you can't argue with him.

But, since it was still not possible to "crush" all enemies at once, a theory of sequential operations was developed. In 1923 Tukhachevsky wrote:

"A series of successively introduced annihilation operations, connected by continuous pursuit, can replace an annihilation battle,

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which was the best kind of clash in the old armies."

Thus, the "red theorists" built the following scheme.

a) the ultimate goal of the operation is the crushing (complete defeat) of the enemy's manpower;

6) method of action - continuous offensive;

c) a means - long-term operational pursuit, avoiding pauses and carried out by a number of successive operations, each of which is an intermediate link on the way to the final goal.

Soviet military thought recognized that the most effective way to conduct offensive operations was to strike the enemy with tremendous penetrating force throughout the entire depth of his orders. The delivery of such strikes required the use of an "all-encompassing ram" in the chosen direction - a mass of infantry, tanks, artillery in depth, supported by aviation, with simultaneous "aviation combat" behind enemy lines and the use of chemical weapons.

After breaking through the defense, the "ram" makes a detour maneuver, or pursues the enemy, "until he (the enemy) is pinned to some obstacle or to an area that he cannot leave." At the same time, "the enemy's counterattack will be most beneficial to the victorious attacker, because it gives the latter the opportunity to break and destroy the enemy's counteroffensive."

As you can see, Tukhachevsky did not draw any conclusions from the Polish campaign, when one short counterattack turned all his ram masses into an uncontrollable herd.

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At the same time, the punitive commanders, the occupying commanders were confident that the peoples of the USSR sang hymns of happiness, having such wise leaders as Stalin and his henchmen, and such outstanding military leaders as they themselves, while the working people of all other countries "groan under the yoke of oppressors" and can't wait for the Red Army to come. Therefore, as soon as the war begins, the working class of the capitalist powers will stand up in unison in defense of "their international socialist fatherland" and launch "an insurrectionary movement in the rear of our enemies." In 1929 Tukhachevsky prophesied:

"In addition, we must not forget that in future clashes with the imperialist states, we will inevitably encounter such a serious factor as the socialist working-class movement in countries hostile to us ... In the course of the war, the position of the capitalist countries will worsen. The imperialist war will turn into a civil war.

In accordance with the "class strategy" so beloved by Tukhachevsky and other prominent Red commanders, as the Soviet troops conquer new regions, they will steadily be strengthened by the proletarians pouring into their ranks:

"The most profitable destruction (of a living armed force) is achieved by capturing the enemy, since, in addition to weakening the enemy army, prisoners economically strengthen the rear of the winner."

The idea of an active offensive method was reflected in the developed

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in the USSR of the theory of a deep offensive operation. Its creators were V.K. Triandafillov (1894-1931), B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.B. Kalinovsky, A.N. Lapchinsky (1882-1938), V.D. Grendal (1884-1940) and other former officers of the tsarist army. The theory provided for the simultaneous delivery of strikes to the enemy throughout the entire operational depth of his defense, for which it was meant to use the high combat capabilities of modern artillery, tank and mechanized troops, aviation, and airborne assault formations. *

* Open the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, published in 2001. There you will read that "the correctness of the main provisions of the theory of deep operation was confirmed during the Great Patriotic War" and that "the basic principles of this theory have not lost their significance," despite the fact that the term "deep operation" ceased to be used already during the Second World War. If we translate these sayings into a more understandable language, it turns out that the pre-war constructions of Soviet theoreticians brilliantly failed in 1941-1945, but for us it has always been the most important thing - "not

give up principles.

The operation was carried out in order to solve two main problems. First, to break open the front of the enemy's defense with a strike of tanks, artillery, infantry and aviation to its entire tactical depth. Secondly, to develop tactical success into operational success by immediately introducing mobile troops into the breakthrough. It was recognized that the offensive operation is most fully developed in

front.

It was believed that for such an operation it was necessary to create at least a double superiority in forces and means over the enemy, to have at its disposal 2-3 shock and 1-2 conventional combined arms armies, a strong aviation group and a mobile group consisting of tank and mechanized formations, capable of developing success and independently holding important areas or objects in the operational depth of the enemy. The leading role in the front-line operation was assigned to the shock armies.

The depth of the front operation was determined by the red theorists at 250 km, and the width of the offensive zone at 150-300 km. The pace of infantry advance was envisaged at 10-15 km, mobile troops up to 40-50 km per day.

To ensure high rates of advance and ensure the ultimate goals of the operation, the troops of the front were built in two echelons. Tanks, supported by massed air strikes and parachute landings, had to break through the defenses and strike to a depth of 100-120 km. Combined-arms armies, which made up the second echelon, spread the breakthrough and consolidated the success achieved. The frontal strike was supposed to develop into an operation to encircle and destroy the defending enemy.

The tactics of deep offensive combat were also developed. Its essence consisted in the simultaneous massive use of troops and equipment to attack the entire depth of the enemy's battle formation with the aim of encircling and destroying him.

Simultaneous suppression of the entire depth of the enemy defense was supposed to be achieved by the continuous impact of aviation on the reserves and rear of the defending troops, the decisive advance of long-range tanks, the unstoppable advance of infantry with direct support machines, as well as the swift actions of mechanized and cavalry formations behind enemy lines. Tank troops were given a special place:

"Quickly and boldly penetrating into the depths of the enemy's marching formations, tanks along the way (without getting involved in a long battle) shoot down the enemy's reconnaissance and security forces, overturn the batteries that had time to turn around in firing positions, contribute to the ranks of the deploying enemy

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disorder, sowing panic and disrupting the organization and control of troops deployed for battle ... A deep tank attack is being carried out with all possible swiftness. "**

*

A. Gromychenko "Essays on the tactics of tank units."

At the same time, in the first place was put "the need for deep tank operations across the entire location of the deploying enemy in order to paralyze his attempts to attack, snatch the initiative and prevent the organized deployment of his main forces."

It follows from this that the blow must be struck suddenly, against the enemy, who did not have time to turn around in battle formations. The strike of the Red troops should be sudden - without a declaration of war, with the implementation of a set of measures for strategic and tactical camouflage.

The theory of deep operation attached great importance to gaining air supremacy in the initial period of hostilities. Since it was concluded that modern wars "would start suddenly, without a formal declaration of war", air supremacy was planned to be achieved by sudden

attacks on enemy airfields before the start of hostilities on the ground. Accordingly, medium-range front-line bombers and attack aircraft received priority in the construction of the Air Force.

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In February 1933, the Red Army received an official guide to action - "Temporary instructions for organizing a deep battle."

Defensive actions in the operational-strategic plan were not considered even theoretically. The defensive actions of the troops were developed at the tactical level—the defense of a regiment, division, and corps as part of a general strategic offensive. Talking about operational defense on an army scale "was somehow considered indecent and almost contradicted our offensive doctrine" (Isserson). Such a maneuver as a systematic retreat to previously prepared positions on the scale of a front or an army was considered harmful and simply impossible. Former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

RSSFSR S.S. Kamenev said:

"Planned withdrawal, as such, should not take place. The army, not to mention larger military formations, should, in the event of an unsuccessful course of the operation, act with a more complex and more meaningful maneuver in terms of its final achievements, having as its task a counterattack with a transition to a decisive counteroffensive.

The idea of an active offensive method of warfare was embodied in all pre-war regulations, as well as in the plans for operational-strategic games and exercises. These provisions were reflected in the Field Manual of 1936, developed under the direct supervision of Tukhachevsky and Egorov:

"Any attack on the socialist state of the workers and peasants will be repelled with all the might of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union with the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the attacking enemy. Combat operations will be conducted for destruction. Achieving a reptile victory and the complete crushing of the enemy is the main goal in the war imposed on the Soviet Union.

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In accordance with the main provisions of the military doctrine, military construction was carried out.

During the period of rapid technical re-equipment and reorganization of the Red Army, Tukhachevsky got the opportunity to put his theories into practice. Even when he was the commander of the troops of the Leningrad District, in January 1930 he submitted a memorandum to the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, in which he proposed

significantly increase the size of the wartime army (up to 260 divisions) and the amount of military equipment; to create his favorite "ram masses", he requested 50 thousand tanks, and 40 thousand aircraft for them (meanwhile, in accordance with the program approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, by the end of the first five-year plan it was planned to have 5500 tanks and 3500 aircraft in the Red Army all types).

Voroshilov, diligently avoiding expressing his opinion on any serious issue, handed over the letter to Stalin along with the negative conclusion of the Red Army Headquarters. Iosif Vissarionovich, preoccupied with economic problems, twisted his finger at his temple and called Tukhachevsky's plan "clerical maximalism" that could ruin the entire national economy, which Kliment Efremovich rejoiced a lot. However, in reality, Stalin was very sympathetic to the idea of "militaryization of the country", he simply measured it against economic possibilities.

The robbery of the village in the process of collectivization made it possible to acquire "big capital", and the first successes of accelerated industrialization were also indicated. Therefore, already at the beginning of 1931, the program for the construction of the Red Army was revised in the direction of increasing the personnel and the value of troops with temporary weapons (the estimate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, compared to "before the turning point" in 1928, increased by more than 10 times!).

In July 1931, Tukhachevsky was appointed deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and head of armaments of the Red Army. Since 1932, "tractor" and "locomotive" plants have already produced more than three thousand tanks a year, about the same number of aircraft produced Soviet "furniture factories".

Since 1933, the Headquarters of the Red Army planned its measures to "establish, in wartime, such a scale of deployment in which the Red Army could fight against any coalition of world capitalist powers and inflict a decisive defeat on the armies of these powers" and to "secure the first place in the world for the Red Army on all decisive types of means of struggle.

The 1934 mobilization plan provided for the deployment of armed forces numbering 4.8 million people (including 149 infantry and 22 cavalry formations of the first stage); the number of tanks in service was to be 9,000.

The new mobilization plan M-8, approved at the end of 1937, provided for an increase in the mobilized forces to 8.6 million people (including 6.4 million people in the formations of the first stage). The Red Army was the first in the world to start creating mechanized brigades and corps, aviation armies and airborne assault forces.

Of course, Tukhachevsky did not create a fundamentally new strategy, but he was interested in new trends in military theory, responded vividly to them, and strove to equip the troops with the most advanced equipment. Together with Uborevich, he made a great contribution to the construction of a modern army. Of course, certain mistakes were made, so after all, they had to start almost from scratch.

Mikhail Nikolayevich himself was very fond of all kinds of "military fashions"

and technical innovations: universal guns and recoilless guns,

missiles and "aircraft carriers", radio-controlled boats, tanks,

aircraft, torpedoes. With his filing, generously funded and completely

exotic projects like an electromagnetic installation that deflects enemy projectiles, "death rays" or "underground tanks".

But, firstly, not all of these developments were completely useless, for example, radar installations or radio-controlled landmines. And secondly, if Tukhachevsky alone is to blame for all the mistakes in military development, then what were all the other leaders and generals worth, in particular, the people's commissar of defense, the heads of artillery, armored and other departments?

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The heroes of the Civil War, depending on under whose command they happened to perform their exploits or atrocities (the choice of definition depends on the reader's beliefs), were divided into peculiar clans - "cavalrymen", "chervonets", "infantrymen", "kotovets", "Chapaevs". Each of them ascribed to himself an exclusive role in the victorious occupation of his own country and enthusiastically intrigued against competitors in the struggle for influence, posts, recognition of merit.

The most powerful group was made up of veterans of the First Cavalry Army. At the origins of its creation stood "comrade" Stalin himself. He carefully selected, placed and protected "his cadres" both during the war years and during the period of the radical reduction of the Red Army, and contributed to their promotion to leading positions. These people were his reliable support during the period of the struggle with Trotsky, and they did not have the slightest desire to let "strangers" reach the commanding heights. In the First Cavalry, the career of SM began. Budyonny and B.M. Shaposhnikova, A.I. Egorova and G.I. Kulik, S.K. Timoshenko and I.R. Apanasenko, E.A. ShShadenko and A.V. Khruleva, I.V. Tyulenev and A.A. Grechko.

On the contrary, the "Red Cossacks", who constituted the core of the military opposition, were relegated to secondary roles in the course of the struggle against Trotskyism, considered themselves offended - there was little power, few honors, few privileges - and desperately fronded.

The "infantry" had fewer opportunities to distinguish themselves in the maneuverable Civil War, and in general there were not enough of them, but they represented the most educated and thinking part of the command staff. Among them, former officers of the old army predominated. They considered the Budyonny-Belov-Tymoshenko group to be "routiners who do not understand modern military affairs enough", and Kulik was generally called a "fireworker".

In turn, Voroshilov and Budyonny could not stand the "handsome little liar" Tukhachevsky; it was on their initiative in May 1928 that Mikhail Nikolayevich was dismissed from the post of chief of staff of the Red Army and sent

to command the Leningrad district. A nobleman, a wise guy, writes little articles, plays the violin, hobnobs with foreigners, and besides, he is Trotsky's nominee.

Stalin, having begun to form his team for the future Great War (the Great Liberation Campaign in Western Europe), took the side of the closer, proven and understandable to him cavalymen. All other major military leaders, especially those who enjoyed authority in the troops, demonstrated independent thinking, dared to "have a military judgment", were subject to liquidation, according to the principle formulated by another of the ancient Greek tyrants: "No man - no problem."

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For the employees of the NKVD, who gained experience in preparing political trials of prominent party figures, it was not difficult to "blind" another case. All Trotsky's nominees, especially those who voted for him during the discussions of the 1920s, had long been filed with special folders, where all denunciations and every wrong word were neatly filed.

In the course of the investigation into the Kamenev-Zinoviev case, the Chekists far-sightedly prepared "compromising evidence" on the military with a "dubious political face." For example, participants in the "parallel Trotskyist center", the director of the Chamber Theater (!) Richard Pikel and the deputy director of the Magnezit plant Efim Dreitser, said that they allegedly united all the military who remained loyal to Trotsky into a single underground organization whose tasks were the murder of Stalin and Voroshilov, and the coup d'état in favor of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev. In addition, many useful materials could be drawn from the facts of the trips of the highest military commanders to Germany, Italy and other countries.

Actually, the case of the Faptist military conspiracy in the Red Army was already ready;

The very first in 1936, the Chekists arrested the commanders V.M. Primakov (August 14) and V.K. I'll scare. They were charged with participation in a certain Trotskyist-Zinoviev "fighting group".

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Vitaly Markovich Primakov was born in 1897. As a high school student, at the height of the World War, he distributed anti-war leaflets among the soldiers of the Chernigov garrison, for which he was exiled in the summer of 1915 to Eastern Siberia. After the fall of the monarchy, he returned home as an "honored revolutionary", joined the Kiev Committee of the Bolsheviks, and was elected a delegate to the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets. He arrived in Petrograd at the right time. In October 1917, Primakov commanded one of the detachments of the Red Guard during the capture of the Winter Palace and the liquidation of the Kerensky-Krasnov rebellion.

In January 1918, he formed a regiment of the Red Cossacks, which turned into a brigade, then into a division, then into the 1st Cavalry Corps. Fought on

Ukraine with Petliurists, Germans, Denikinists, Wrangelists, Polish legionnaires and Makhnovists; in Central Asia he "pacified" the Basmachi, then the bish, the peasants, who rebelled against the horrors of Sovietization. Having no military experience and military education, the undereducated schoolboy Primakov showed in battles "skillful command" and "personal heroism", marked by three orders of the Red Banner.

True, sometimes he was too cool, he even landed on the court of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the executions of his own Red Army soldiers. Of course, during the war, Commissar Trotsky introduced decimations in the Red Army (execution of every tenth), and the commissar of the 46th Infantry Division Mehlis even practiced flogging Red Army soldiers with ramrods. But this time it was not in a combat situation and not in Central Asia, but near Shepetovka, in the peaceful autumn of 1922. The prosecutor's check found out that the outrageous reprisals in the Red Corps are an everyday matter, a way to strengthen discipline. But everything worked out: the 25-year-old "Red Ataman", taking into account his revolutionary merits, was not judged, but was sent to study at the Higher Courses of Command Staff.

From the summer of 1924, Primakov commanded the Higher Cavalry School, in 1925

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went to China, then commanded the 1st Rifle Corps. He belonged to the Trotskyist military opposition, therefore, in 1927-33, he served as a military attaché in Afghanistan and Japan. On reflection, Vitaly Markovich "honestly, without double-dealing, without deceit" wrote a statement about the break with Trotskyism.

Then he commanded the 13th Corps in the Volga District, was an assistant to the commander of the North Caucasian District, an inspector of higher educational institutions of the Red Army, and in 1931 visited Germany.

In his spare time, he wrote memoirs about the glorious Red Cossacks and their heroic commander, poems about the wonderful life in the Soviet country, and fantasies about the "world fire". He was not fond of military-theoretical research. In 1935, Primakov was promoted to the rank of commander and appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District. He considered such an attitude towards himself unfair and, as a sign of protest, instead of three Komkor rhombuses, he wore the insignia of the commander of the 2nd rank.

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Vitovt Kazimirovich Putna (1893-1937) was from the peasantry. In the tsarist army, by 1917, he rose to the rank of an accelerated ensign, commanded a battalion, in which, of course, he "led revolutionary propaganda." He ended the Civil War as commander of the 27th Omsk Rifle Division. He fought on the Eastern Front against Kolchak and on the Western Front with the "White Poles", earned two Orders of the Red Banner.

The third order was awarded "for exceptional military prowess and courage shown during the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion." Participated in battles with "bandits" on the Lower Volga.

In 1923 he graduated from the Higher Courses of Command Staff. In 1924-25 he was a military adviser in China. Then he headed the Department of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army. In 1921 he became the commander of the 2nd Rifle Corps, but in the same year he left as a military attache to Japan, and from there to Finland. Participation in the Trotskyist opposition affected his career.

But Vitovt Kazimirovich repented in time. In 1931-34 he commanded a corps and the Primorsky Group of Forces of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. In July 1934, Putna was sent as a military attache to England. In August 1936, he was recalled to Moscow for an urgent report to the People's Commissar of Defense and was immediately arrested upon arrival.

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In September, they "took into circulation" commander S.A. Turovsky, deputy commander of the troops of the Kharkov district (comrade-in-arms of Primakov, former chief of staff of the Red Cossacks); division commander D.A. Schmidt, commander of the 8th mechanized brigade (also a red Cossack and an active Trotskyite); division commander Yu.V. Sablin, commandant of the Letichevsky fortified area (former Left Social Revolutionary, one of the organizers of the rebellion in July 1918); brigade commander M.Yu. Zyuk - commander of the 25th Chapaev division; Colonel I.L. Karpel, Chief of Staff of the 66th Rifle Division; Major B.I. Kuzmichev - Chief of Staff of the 18th Aviation Brigade (once he voted for Trotsky and was considered "unreliable" for a long time).

On the tenth day of continuous interrogations, Major Kuzmichev, twice an order-bearer, signed a testimony that in 1935 he, together with other Trotskyist

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" You were agents, participated in the preparation of a failed purchase on Voroptilov's life during his visit to the Kyiv Opera. This fairy tale was clearly invented by the Chekists following the example of the assassination of Prime Minister Stolypin. But she made an amazing impression on the marshal. So, indeed, all these Tukhachevskys and Yakirs are not just bastards and intriguers, but natural enemies!

Commander D.A. Schmidt, "a man of desperate courage," in 1927 publicly threatened to cut off Comrade Stalin's ears, but as soon as he was in a prison cell, he immediately sneered: "I belong with all my blood, with all my thoughts and are given only to the cause of the party, the cause of Stalin." Nevertheless, a month later he admitted that he was plotting to kill Voroshilov and the party general secretary himself!

Primakov, Turovsky and Putna did not at first realize their position and showed no inclination to cooperate with the "organs of Comrade Yagoda." The most they were willing to repent of was that they did not like Voroshilov and Budyonny and spoke hostilely about them.

The fact that the defendants were "not conscious", in conjunction with a number of blunders in the defeat of the "Grotskyist-Zinoviev center", confirmed Stalin in the opinion that the General Commissar of State Security Genrikh Grigoryevich Yagoda (1891-1938) "was not up to his task".

In the autumn of 1936, Yagoda was replaced as the main punisher of the country by the "iron commissar" Nikolai Nikolayevich Yezhov, and soft-bodied interrogators in April 1937 were replaced by shock investigators A.A. Avseevich and 3.M. Ushakov. Thanks to their efforts, already at the beginning of May, the commanders "split" and signed protocols on their participation in the conspiracy, naming the names of 60 accomplices, including Tukhachevsky, Dybenko, Gamarnik, former commander-in-chief S.S. Kamenev (fortunately, he will have time to depart to another world by that time) and the "deeply conspiratorial Trotskyite" Yakir.

One of the former employees of the execution department later recalled: "Avseevich's work was set as an example by other investigators by the leadership of the Special Department. Avseevich after that became the standard in working with the arrested.

Approximately on the same days, the former Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs G.E. Prokofiev and the head of the Special Department M.I. Guy, arrested as part of the purge of this department, gave the necessary evidence about the "criminal connections" of Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, Shaposhnikov and other military leaders with the vile poisoner Yagoda, who at night sprayed the offices of loyal Leninists with some kind of terrible mercury poison and managed to kill Vyacheslav Menzhinsky (in 1934), Valerian Kuibyshev (in 1935) and Maxim Gorky (in 1936) in such a villainous way. *

* It is now possible to read in any encyclopedia that Kuibyshev shot himself. A before everyone knew that he was poisoned

public Enemies.

A new wave of arrests followed. In April 1937, the head of the department of organization and mobilization of the Academy of the General Staff, commander M.I. Alafuso; in early May - a member of the military council of the North Caucasus Military District, an army commissar of the 2nd rank G.I. Veklichev and the commander of the Ural Military District three times order bearer commander B.S. Gorbachev, also a dapper commander with buttonholes. And in the neighboring cells of the Lefortovo prison for a month and a half the previous command of the district was sitting: commander I.I. Garkavy and his deputy commander M.I. Vasilenko.

The Chekists worked quickly, cheerfully, according to the methodology developed by the masters of the Detective Order and the Secret Office: "To begin with, the subject must be amazed." First of all, the insignia and orders were torn off the legendary brigade commanders, divisional commanders and commanders, after which they were immediately punched in the face.

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Regimental Commissar P.P. The investigator immediately explained to Lyubtsev: "Now you're not a commissar, but shit, if you want, kiss my ass, holding on to the investigator's legs, it all depends on us."

On May 12, they took the commander of the 2nd rank A.I. Crust. He broke down on the second day of interrogation and wrote a statement addressed to Yezhov: yes, there is a plan for a palace coup, an operational headquarters has been created consisting of Tukhachevsky, Putna, Uborevich, Eideman and August Ivanovich himself.

On May 15, a friend of Tukhachevsky, commander B.M., was arrested. Feldman, who had been appointed Deputy Commander of the Moscow Military District just three weeks earlier, and Commander I.K. Kutakov. Two days later, commander of the Air Force of the Far Eastern Army, Commander A.Ya. Lapinyp and the head of the armored forces of the OKDVA commander of the SI. Derevenov.

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Boris Mironovich Feldman was drafted into the tsarist army in 1913. In May 1918 he joined the Red Army. He ended the Civil War as commander of the 55th Infantry Division. Since 1926 - Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District. In 1927 he went to study in Germany. Since 1934 he was the head of the Directorate for the Commanding Staff of the Red Army.

Feldman, to whom the Chekists had no evidence, immediately demonstrated a desire for cooperation, "honestly admitting" that he was a participant in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy, a seasoned pishion recruited by Tukhachevsky in early 1932. In addition, he named other "members of the underground organization" - the chief of staff of the Transcaucasian military district Savitsky, the head of the engineering academy Smolin, the deputy head of the Armored Directorate, commander M.M. Olyshansky - more than 40 commanders and political workers.

After Yezhov's report on the progress of the investigation, Stalin authorized the arrest of the main defendants. On May 21, they took the head of the Combat Training Department, Commander K.A. Tchaikovsky. On May 22, commander G.P. was pulled out directly from the presidium of the All-Moscow Party Conference. Eideman, an associate of Primakov and Uborevich.

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Robert Petrovich Eideman was born in 1895, graduated from a real school, in 1916 - an accelerated course at the Kiev Infantry School, served as an ensign in a reserve regiment in Kansk, after the overthrow of the monarchy in the spring - summer of 1917, he made fiery speeches in the Council of Soldiers' Deputies, while stubbornly avoided being sent to the front.

During the Civil War, he commanded divisions on the Eastern and Southern Fronts, the 13th Army, the Right-Bank Group of Forces of the South-Western Front, which defended the Kakhovka bridgehead.

In 1921, as the head of the internal troops, he "directly" led the fight against "kulak-nationalist gangs" in Ukraine; in 1924-25 - by the troops of the Siberian Military District. In 1925-32 he was the head and commissar of the Frunze Military Academy.

In 1927-28. studied the experience of the Reichswehr, attended the course of the Higher Military Academy of the General Staff in Berlin, "without separation from his immediate

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works.

For the last five years before his arrest, he headed the Central Council of Osoaviakhim. In addition, Eideman was a writer and poet:

"In his works, Robert Petrovich sang the party, Lenin, the socialist revolution, the heroism and valor of Soviet soldiers in the civil war." It turned out stilted, but with beauty. Like that:

We don't know rest, we don't know peace...

From hot thoughts we burn like torches.

Where we demolish the old, there the new grows.
Another will fall 6 ways, but we go forward... In typhus
we burned, but did not burn out.

We were warriors - we became stronger. We
are strong. Iron and granite. ("Bolsheviks")

Therefore, Eideman, "a gallant military leader and a devoted fighter of the Great Revolution," was also a member of the Writers' Union and chairman of its Latvian section, where he nurtured poets to match. But he didn't guess to sing Comrade Stalin, and in his youth he managed to visit a member of the Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionary Party. When in 1929 Voroshilov's pamphlet "Stalin and the Red Army" was published, and it became clear to everyone who really was the organizer of all the victories, including the defeat of Denikin, Robert Petrovich responded with the article "Battle of Oryol" with a passage about Lenin's brilliant head, in which "politics and strategy, as it were, found their complete harmonious combination", but again, he did not remember anything about Stalin's genius.

On the same day, the head of the military communications of the Red Army, commander E.F., was arrested. Appog and the head of the Artillery Department, commander N.A. Efimov. The latter testified against his assistant brigade commander Ya.M. Zheleznyakov and 25 other subordinates whom he managed to "recruit". Komkor Lapinyn spoke about the conspiratorial activities of Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, Putna, Primakov and Meretskov. In the next office, helping the investigation, dictated the list of accomplices "patented German bastard", iron-granite Eideman.

Finally, on May 22, 1937, in Kuibyshev (Samara), Tukhachevsky was arrested, who had been transferred from the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense to the post of commander of the Volga Military District. Marshal was completed by Yezhov himself. Mikhail Nikolayevich, having resisted for one day, signed a confession that, firstly, he was still at the head of the "anti-Soviet Trotskyist-right conspiratorial bloc" and, secondly, pipionil in favor of Germany. Yagoda, Feldman, Alafuzo, Primakov, Putna, Eideman, Yakir, Kamenev, Uborevich, Kork, Gamarnik, Osepyan and many others took part in the conspiracy. Tukhachevsky even named former cavalrymen

Timoshenko and Apanasenko.

And the details? Yes, here you are: the commanders of the border districts, in collusion with Sablin, were going to surrender the Letichesky fortified area to the Germans. Uborevich created a partisan network and prepared sabotage groups, also on the instructions of the Germans. The late Kamenev "on his own line" developed measures aimed at disorganizing the air defense of the railroads in the BVO and KVO and thereby disturbing the strategic concentration of the Red Army. Tukhachevsky himself, knowing that there were not enough forces in the Western theater of operations, did not change the operational plan: "As a result, defeat is not excluded even without the presence of any sabotage."

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A week later, the army commanders of the 1st rank Yakir and

Uborevich, commander of the 4th Cossack Corps commander I.D. Kosogov. They too

gave confessions. Simultaneously with Voroshilov's parting words - "take all the scoundrels" - the cleaning of the Artillery Directorate began.

On May 30, the head of foreign relations of the headquarters of the Red Army, Commander A.I., was arrested. Gekker and Deputy Head of the Political Department of the Red Army Army Commissar 2nd Rank G.A. Osepyan.

On the same day, the Politburo decided to expel Gamarnik and Aronshtam from the Revolutionary Military Council and remove them from military work. On May 31, the country's chief commissar, "confused in his connections with anti-Soviet elements," shot himself. The head of the political department of OKDVA, army commissar of the 2nd rank L.N. Aronshtam did not want to shoot himself and was arrested. On June 1, having invited him to Moscow for a party conference, they took Blucher's deputy commander M.V. Sangursky.

After the first wave of arrests, Stalin and Voroshilov decided to hold an expanded meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and explain the situation to the military. The meeting was held from 1 to 4 June 1937 in the Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin.

First, the participants were introduced to the testimony of the arrested military leaders. Then Kliment Efremovich read out a report "On the counter-revolutionary conspiracy in the Red Army uncovered by the NKVD bodies". The ultimate goal of the conspiracy was the assassination of "leaders of the party and government", the liquidation of the Soviet Union, "the restoration of the yoke of landowners and capitalists."

Stalin spoke on the second day of the meeting. He confirmed that there was a "military-political conspiracy against Soviet power in the country, stimulated and financed by the German fascists." Further, in a simple, understandable language, the leader told about how easily red commanders are recruited by all kinds of intelligence and underground centers - "on the basis of the women's part" and unsatisfied ambition. How was it not to believe the leader and teacher, because "there are so many testimonies of the criminals themselves."

The military elite of the country surrendered their colleagues without hesitation. 42 military leaders spoke at the meeting. They all stigmatized the gang of arrested

enemies, called scoundrels and fascists, some demanded that they be shot immediately. It should be noted that soon 34 speakers themselves turned out to be "enemies of the people and ischions of foreign intelligence services."

Comrade Stalin respected order. He believed that no matter how bad the conspirators were, they still need to be tried first, and only then shot. They decided to bring to trial the "leaders of the traitorous gang" - Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Kork, Uborevich, Eideman, Feldman, Primakov, Pugna.

On June 10, an emergency plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR determined the composition of the Special Judicial Presence, chaired by an army military lawyer of the 2nd rank V.V. Ulrich. The judges appointed military leaders of the highest rank: marshals SM. Budyonny and V.K. Blucher, commanders of the 1st rank B.M. Shaposhnikov and I.I. Belova, commander of the 2nd rank Ya.I. Alksnis, P.E. Dybenko, N.D. Kashirin, division commander E.I. Goryachev.

Valiant Chekists, meanwhile, were forging iron until it cooled down. On the very eve of the trial, the leader of the Red Cossacks, Primakov, with the help of the tireless head of the Special Department of the NKVD, I.M. Leplevsky, composed

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testimonies against army commanders Kashirin, Dybenko, Shaposhnikov, commanders Kuibyshev, Gryaznov, Uritsky, Kovalev, Vasiliev and others.

The closed trial in the case of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Military Organization" began on June 11, 1937 and ended on June 11 of the same year. The judges during the interrogations showed an enviable activity. The defendants convicted each other of atrocities, all pleaded guilty, repented, confessed their love for the party and the leader of the peoples, Stalin, and were sentenced to "the highest measure of repression" with deprivation of military ranks and confiscation of property. They were shot right there, in the basement, on the night of June 12th.

Commander Belov outlined his impressions in a memorandum:

"The eyes of this entire gang did not express anything such that they could be used to judge the bottomless meanness of the defendants sitting in the dock. The seal of death was already on all faces ... Tukhachevsky tried to preserve his "aristocratism" and his superiority over others ...

Feldman tried to strike at complete frankness. He reproached his colleagues in the trial that, as college girls, they are afraid to call a spade a spade, they were engaged in the most ordinary espionage, but here they want to turn it into legal communication with foreign officers.

Eideman. This guy looked more pitiful than everyone else. The figure softened, he could hardly stand on his feet, he did not speak, but babbled in a dull, spasmodic voice.

The bottomless meanness of Belov himself, as well as other members of the judicial presence, also could not be distinguished by the eyes, but the stamp of death already lay on their faces. You shoot, they shoot you. They just didn't know it yet.

Other "treacherous carrion" from the Tukhachevsky gang - commanders Alafuzo, Garkavy, Gorbachev, Gryaznov, Vasilenko, Kutyakov and others - were wiped off the face of the earth in July 1937.

All this was done "for the good of the people", "in the name of the people" and with the people's blessing. In the course of numerous rallies that swept across the country, mechanics and tractor drivers, milkmaids and peasant women, directors of enterprises and cultural figures stigmatized vile traitors, tearing themselves up in hysterics: "Shoot! Like rabid dogs!"

By the way, the repressions necessarily extended to the wives and children of convicted persons. Family members of traitors (ChSIR) were arrested, the most humane court in the world gave them a term (usually 7-8 years) and sent them to camps. Children under 14 go to special orphanages.

"What do women and children have to do with it," Felix Chuev once asked Vyacheslav Molotov. "What does it mean? - the old ghoul was indignant. They must be isolated to some extent. Attacks, of course, they would be the distributors of all sorts of complaints ... And decomposition to a certain extent.

However, for greater reliability (so as not to complain and decompose), many of them were also later shot, for example, the wives of Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Gamarnik.

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Towards the end of the glorious meeting of the Military Council, Stalin invited everyone

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military personnel to join the process of exposing enemies:

"I think that among the napti people, both in the command line and in the political line, there are still such comrades who are accidentally offended. They told him something, they wanted to involve him, they frightened him, they took him by blackmail. It's good to introduce such a practice that if such people come and say everything themselves, forgive them."

The troops received a joint order of Voroshilov and Yezhov No. 082 "On the release from responsibility of military personnel, members of counter-revolutionary and wrecking Faptist organizations, who repented of their crimes, voluntarily appeared and, without concealment, told them about everything quite frankly and about their accomplices."

Of course, no one showed up voluntarily. But such appeals caused the Soviet people, who had been used to writing denunciations for twenty years, literally an explosion

enthusiasm. Statistics show that up to 80% of arrests in 1937-38 were initiated from below! This is the creativity of the masses that Lenin dreamed of.

Already nine days after the trial of Tukhachevsky, 980 commanders and political workers were arrested as participants in the "military conspiracy", including 29 brigade commanders, 37 divisional commanders, 21 commanders, 16 regimental commissars, 17 brigade and 7 divisional commissars. And from April 1 to June 10, 1937, 4,370 people were fired from the Red Army for political reasons.

On June 19, the head of the political department of the Kyiv military district, army commissar of the 2nd rank M.P. was arrested. Amelina; July 31 - Army Commissar of the 2nd rank B.M. Ippo, member of the military council of the Central Asian Military District; August 3 - Head of the Air Force of the Kyiv District Divisional Commander A.M. Bakhrushin; August 9 - Deputy Amelin, Corps Commissar M.L. Good.

On July 10, 1937, "Tukhachevsky's comrade-in-arms" in the conspiracy, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for the Navy, flagship of the fleet of the 1st rank V.M. was arrested. Orlov. In addition, in May, Vladimir Mitrofanovich traveled to the UK for the coronation of King George. There, of course, British intelligence recruited him on the fly. Orlov almost immediately recognized himself as a conspirator, but denied participation "in terrorist and sabotage work."

Already familiar to us, the "investigator-strike officer" Zyama Ushakov persistently urged the flag officer to completely disarm before the party. A week after his arrest, Orlov wrote a statement addressed to Yezhov:

"I am on the verge of insanity. In a short time I will be, as Jimmy Higgins was, a mindless dog. But this can only be in a capitalist country and cannot be here."

Lies! Everything is the best in the Soviet country. Even "Papa Muller" was jealous that he did not have such specialists as Yezhov had. And the real aces of the "bone-breaking business" met in the Gestapo as well.

Meanwhile, Stalin demanded the continuation of the purge in the armed forces. The understanding "iron commissar" gave a targeted instruction: "The fascist military conspiracy must have a number of branches." They tried on the ground and found "branches" everywhere. The case was put on stream: denunciation - arrest - interrogation - 20 minutes for trial - execution. A member of the "Special Commission for the Elimination of the Consequences of Wrecking in the Troops of the Kyiv Military District" Yefim Shchadenko, in full parka, drew a letter to his wife:

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"July 18, 1937 There is so much work that I don't get out of the headquarters before 2-3 in the morning. The wrecking bastard has been spoiling for years, and we need in weeks, a maximum of a month, not only to eliminate all the consequences, but also to move forward quickly.

Almost everyone agreed. With regard to "clear and undisarmed

enemies of the people" brazenly refusing to extradite the conspirators, the "method of physical influence" was successfully used. "Govarish" Stalin explained:

"It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use physical force against representatives of the proletariat. The question is: why should socialist intelligence be more humane in relation to the sworn enemies of the working class?

As a result, under the slogan. "You can beat anyone and in any way you like," testimonies were received on all military leaders.

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On August 5, 1937, Deputy Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army M.K. Aleksandrovsky testified against a whole group of enemies, including army commanders Kashirin and Dubovoy. On August 7, Commander M.Ya., Deputy Commander of the Leningrad District, was arrested. Germanovich; 9th - commander of the 1st cavalry corps division commander M.A. Demichev; 10th - army inspector of the Belarussian Military District commander E.I. Kovtyukh; August 18 - Yakir's deputy commander D.S. Fesenko.

After the trial of Tukhachevsky, Nikolai Kaptirin was transferred to Moscow for promotion. In July 1937, he headed the Combat Training Directorate of the Red Army, but on August 19, with the personal sanction of the leader, he was arrested. Three days later, he admitted his participation in the "right-wing Trotskyist conspiracy", which carried out subversive work in contact with Tukhachevsky's military conspiracy. Testimony against Marshal Yegorov was knocked out of Kashirin:

"A group has formed around Marshal Yegorov Alexander Ilyich. This grouping was a military group of the Rights, a special military center - and carried out its counter-revolutionary activities simultaneously with the group headed by 'Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Gamarnik and others.'

Kaptirin named Budyonny, Belov, Dybenko, Khalepsky and others among the members of the "right group". The commander was shot on June 14, 1938. Two of his brothers were also shot.

On August 15, Commander J.P., Commander of the Urals District, was arrested. Gailit, military adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mongolian People's Army, commander L.Ya. Weiner, Commander of the Central Asian Military District Corps Commander I.K. Gryaznov.

The latter in Central Asia led only two months. Prior to that, Gryaznov commanded the Trans-Baikal Military District for almost five years, where, as it turned out after careful questioning in the Lefortovo prison, he led a military-faptist organization, worked for Japanese intelligence and trained a terrorist group to kill the country's leaders.

An off-site session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme

court. In just one day, October 2, 1938, she sentenced to death 20 commanders of units and headquarters of the district. Participated in the "Transbaikal conspiracy"

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and commander of the 15th Cavalry Division K.K. Rokossovsky, but he managed to transfer to the Leningrad district, the punishing hand of the Soviet authorities overtook the divisional commander already there.

On August 21, the commander of the troops of the Kharkov military district, commander of the 2nd rank, I.N. Oak. He not only named a number of people who were in the conspiracy, but even remembered how in 1919, in order to get command of a division, he shot the people's hero Shchors. According to Dubovoy's testimony, 18 people were taken, first of all, his deputies. Of course, the "frank confession" did not save the commander from execution.

Only Epifan Kovtyukh, who served as the prototype of the protagonist in the novel by A.S. Serafimovich's "Iron Stream" (1924), courageously endured the torture and denied all charges to the end.

On August 30, a member of the military council of the Black Sea Fleet, army commissar of the 2nd rank G.I. Gugin; September 9 - head of the political department of the HVO, army commissar of the 2nd rank S.N. Kozhevnikov; October 5 - Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank I.K. Kozhanov and the head of the UVVUZ of the Red Army, army commissar of the 2nd rank I.E. Slavin.

Army Commissar of the 2nd rank A.S. Bulin, head of the command staff was arrested on November 5, 1937. He turned out to be the most dangerous conspirator. The circular letter of the Main Military Council of the Red Army stated:

"The enemy leadership of the PUR selected and placed their own people, hostile to our party, in leading positions in the Red Army. The Gamarniko-Bulinskaya gang wiped out tens of thousands of commanders and political workers, capable and infinitely loyal to the Lenin-Stalin party.

During interrogations, Bulin recalled the participation in the conspiracy of Commander Belov.

On the same day (November 5), the editor-in-chief of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, army commissar 2nd rank M.M., was arrested. Landa. Mikhail Markovich did not lock himself up for a long time: already five days later, on Stalin's desk, there was a list of 90 people, leading political workers of the Red Army, who were part of the "military conspiracy." Landa handed over all the employees of his editorial office, a number of members of the councils of military districts, heads of political departments and deputy chief of the General Staff commander K.A. Meretskov.

On November 13, they took the commander of the 2nd rank I.A. Khalepsky, who "turned over" more than a hundred of his accomplices in a conspiracy, and an army commissar of the 2nd rank of the AL. Shifres, head of the Military Economic Department of the Academy of the Red Army.

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In 1937, the shooting of another group of "outstanding revolutionary fighters" began - Latvian riflemen and other internationalists. Having applied a cold head and rather dirty hands to this case, the former head of the UNKVD of the Moscow Region, Alexander Pavlovich (Izrail Moiseevich) Ralzivilovsky testified:

"I asked Yezhov how to practically implement his directive on the disclosure of the anti-Soviet underground among the Latvians. He answered me that there was nothing to be embarrassed by the lack of specific materials, but that several Latvians from among the members of the CPSU (b) should be identified and the necessary evidence should be beaten out of them. with this audience

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do not stand on ceremony, their cases will be considered in landscape order. It is necessary to prove that the Latvians, Poles and others who are members of the CPSU(b) are spies and saboteurs...

No sooner said than done.

Commander of the 2nd rank Alksnis, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Aviation, was arrested on November 23, 1937. After intensive processing, he confessed to being a Latvian intelligence agent and leader of an anti-Soviet Latvian organization.

A person can remember a lot of surprising things about himself, especially if there are, for example, four sprats, and in their hands, for example, rubber hoses. Or if they diligently seat the suspect on a chair leg. Or promise to come to grips with his family. Former Commissioner Ya.V. Volkov, one of the few survivors of 1937, wrote much later:

"He asked me to be shot as soon as possible so as not to torment me and not waste time, but I won't go for a provocation, no matter what it costs me. To this, Uptakov answered me that it was not like me, the Faptist whore, that they split ... that they showed me only a preparatory class, in the future Moscow technology would be shown, and no one was born who would resist this technique and not split. .. For the first week, and maybe more, Ushakov personally brutally beat me with a frenzy until I lost consciousness with a rubber club ... then he handed me over to the "hammerers", who, on his instructions, beat me everywhere and everywhere in the next room.

On November 26, they took a member of the military council of the Belarusian Military District, commissar of the 2nd rank A.I. Mesis; November 27 - Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, freshly minted army commissar of the 2nd rank Ya. K. Berzin (1. Kyuzis), who had barely returned from a business trip to Spain; November 29 - professor of the Military Academy, commander of the 2nd rank I.I. Vatsetis, head of the Air Force OKDVA commander F.A. Ingaunis, inspector of the people's commissariat of defense commander Zh.F. Zonberg.

The turn came to the great theoretician and practitioner of the red terror Latsis (Sudrabs) and other Peters.

On December 1, 1937, a member of the military council of the Pacific Fleet, an army commissar of the 2nd rank ES Okunev, was arrested. December 2 - Head of the Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army Army Commander of the 2nd rank A.I. Sedyakin. He confessed to having connections with Tukhachevsky and also testified against Yegorov.

Commander of the 2nd rank Velikanov in June 1937 was appointed to the post of commander of the troops of the Trans-Baikal Military District, but he was already arrested on December 20.

The commissar department was cleaned with special care. Iosif Vissarionovich sent his former secretary, a proven, infinitely devoted and zealous cadre, to this responsible direction. At the end of 1937, by the Decree of the Politburo, the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army instead of P.A. Smirnov, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, who previously held the posts of head of the press department and editor-in-chief of the Pravda newspaper, was approved. At the same time, he was awarded the rank of army commissar of the 2nd rank.

By that time, all the army commissars of the "1935 model" had already been arrested, and subsequently shot, with the exception of the head of the political department of the Baltic Fleet, A.S., who committed suicide. Grishina and

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P.A. Smirnova. The latter was given the rank of army commissar of the 1st rank and made People's Commissar for Naval Affairs. He was shot a year later.

With the arrival of Mekhlis in the PU of the Red Army, all previous work to expose the enemies of the people was recognized as insufficient. For the whole of 1937, only 870 army political workers were arrested. Lev Zakharovich immediately set about further shaking up the apparatus of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, the political staff in the main and central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, military districts, and military educational institutions. It is clear that all these organizations turned out to be filled up to the very vents by foreign agents.

At the All-Army Conference of Political Workers in April 1938, Mekhlis stated:

"The peculiarities of the work of pests in the Red Army just affected the fact that many different isolated Ipsion groups were operating here. They acted on the principle: "go apart, beat together." Each group held a stone in its bosom against the other. But all of them were united by one thing - hatred for our Bolshevik Labor Party, for the working class and for the cause of socialism.

Mekhlis began the purge from the "scum" from the very Political Directorate, in the apparatus of which "right-wing Trotskyist ppies were sitting." The head of the personnel department, brigade commissar M.R., stayed with him for less than ten days. Kravchenko, and a month after his dismissal he was arrested as an accomplice of Bulin in a conspiracy.

The political directorates of the military districts were also launched. In the Transcaucasian District, the former head of the political department, Razdolsky, "in the act of ostentatious vigilance" fired over 700 people, and in fact he himself turned out to be an associate of Gamarnik and Yakir.

In the Siberian Military District, the "hardened pions" N.A. served for a long time as the heads of the political department and members of the military council. Jung, A.P. Prokofiev, G.F. Nevraev, I.D. Pavlov. Chekists "helped get rid of this dirt." In the Volga District, the head of the political department, Cheremin, turned out to be a "right-wing Trotskyite pshion." In the Kiev military district, Gornostaev, an active participant in the military-fascist conspiracy, worked with impunity for a long time as head of the political department.

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A member of the glorious Special Presence, Commander-in-Chief 1st Rank Belov headed the Belarusian Special Military District after Uborevich was sentenced by him. A "prominent figure of the Red Army", who turned out to be wearing an "iption from the Socialist-Revolutionaries", was arrested on January 7, 1938.

He was interrogated by Stalin himself with Yezhov. At the confrontation, Belov was convicted by Commissar of the 2nd rank Bulin and the former head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Corps Commander SP. Uritsky, who turned out to be "a full-time French ppion with a lot of work experience." At first, the commander denied everything, but after being persuaded with a hose, he repented that he was an agent of British intelligence, and signed everything that was demanded of him, including information about contacts with the conspirators of Marshal Yegorov.

The turn of one of the most faithful, it would seem, Marshal Yegorov, was approaching. Alas, at a friendly drinking bout of former cavalymen in December 1937, in connection with the appointment of ShShadenko to the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Alexander Ilyich relaxed and expressed aloud his hidden resentment that everyone

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victories in the Civil War are undeservedly attributed to Stalin and Vorotilov, and his role, Yegorov, is not appreciated. Drinking buddies = Shadenko and Khrulev - having barely finished dinner, they scribbled DoONOSSYY in the name of Voroshilov.

There were other "ignals". The Chekists presented "frank confessions" incriminating Yegorov by Kaptirin, Belov, Orlov and People's Commissar for Finance G.F. Grinko. For the time being, the slanders of the enemies were not allowed to move, but to conceal a personal grudge against Comrade Stalin!

On January 25, 1938, the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars stated: Yegorov ruined the work of the General Staff, was on friendly terms with conspirators and spies, even tried to organize "howling his own anti-party group, in which he involved comrade Dybenko and tried to involve comrade Budyonny in it". Egorov was relieved of his post as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and "as a final test" was appointed commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. The marshal held this position for less than two months.

By the same decree, Pavel Dybenko was removed from the post of commander of the Leningrad Military District, dismissed from the army, appointed deputy people's commissar of the forest industry and sent on a business trip to the Urals for suspicious connections with "some Americans who turned out to be intelligence officers", systematic drunkenness and moral decay.

In parallel, intensive development of Budyonny began. In February-March, the previously arrested army commanders Belov, Sedyakin, Kashirin testified against him. So, Sedyakin testified that the late Tukhachevsky "made some kind of defeatist calculations of Budyonny's cash." Kashirin said: "According to Yegorov's calculations, the anti-Soviet armed uprising will have to be supported by most of the cavalry of the Red Army, led by Budyonny himself."

Things were moving along in other directions as well. On February 1, 1938, they rowed up a member of the military council of the OKDVA commander G.D. Khakhanyan. In his testimony, for the first time, the name of Marshal Blucher surfaced. On February 2, commander Nikolai Kuibyshev was arrested, who had commanded the Transcaucasian Military District for only six months.

On February 8, 1938, Yegorov's wife, actress Galina Tseshkovsky, was taken, she turned out to be a Polish psion, which she confessed to. And who else could she be with such a surname? Alexander Ilyich, vibrating with every fiber of his subtle organism, immediately renounced the "vile traitor" and wrote a tearful letter to Kliment Efremovich, begging his old friend to arrange a meeting with Stalin:

"I want to tell him in a personal conversation that all that bright past, our joint work at the front, will continue to be the most precious moment in my life for me, and that I have never and no one allowed this past to denigrate, and even more so I have not allowed and cannot allow me to betray this past, even in my thoughts, and become not only in deed, but also in my thoughts, an enemy of the party and the people.

Did not help.

On February 23, the commander of the Primorsky Group of Forces of the OKDVA, commander of the 2nd rank M.K., was arrested. Levandovsky, February 26 - former commander P.E.

Dybenko.

Pavel Efimovich acknowledged the existence of an extensive group of military men closely connected with the "anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist bloc" Rykov-Bukharin and

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fascist conspiracy" Tukhachevsky:

"In the period of 1926, our group was formed and we began to select our supporters in the army at the beginning under the flag of a group struggle against Voroptilov ... the struggle began to become more and more aggravated and already in the period 1918-1929. Nata group becomes the center of the organization of the right in the Red Army.

At the head of the group, in addition to Dybenko himself, were Yegorov and Budyonny, who were "personally embittered against Voroptilov." But Dybenko denied the work imputed to him for the intelligence of the North American States for the reason that he does not know the "American language".

Mikhail Levandovsky gave similar testimony:

"For the first time I heard from Yegorov in 1931 that he and his friends had created an underground center for the military organization of the right, acting on the instructions of the right in the person of Rykov."

On March 27, 1938, two weeks after the trial of the "Trotskyist Bukharin saboteurs" Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda and others, the "politically tainted" marshal was arrested. A day later, he confessed:

"I, Yegorov, together with Dybenko and Budyonny headed the leadership of the anti-Soviet organization of the right in the Red Army, which had its members in military circles. This anti-Soviet organization of ours was on a particularly conspiratorial position"...

The conspirators made a special bet on Budyonny: in the event of an armed uprising, Semyon Mikhailovich was supposed to lead the "anti-Soviet elements of the cavalry of the Red Army" and therefore was actively recruiting his comrades-in-arms in the Civil War, who, in turn, prepared "counter-revolutionary formations" from the Cossack units.

Yegorov himself kept in touch with the Polish and German general staffs, supplied them with information and prepared "defeatist plans" in case of a future war. As Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense, Alexander Ilyich knew the entire command staff of the army. And he testified against everyone for almost two years, until, having squeezed him dry, they shot him on February 23, 1939, on the day of the anniversary of the Red Army.

Following Yegorov, they took his deputies in the General Staff, who worked in a Stakhanovite way in favor of the German, Polish and Italian intelligence services at once - commander V.N. Levicheva, commander S.A. Mezheninov. Within a few months, the heads of departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the heads of departments of the General Staff and the commanders of military districts were arrested. Then the repressions seized the army, corps, divisional level, spreading deep and wide. Following the military leaders, their family members were arrested.

A special department of the GUGB of the NKVD reported on almost four dozen conspiratorial groups and organizations "discovered" in the armed forces in 1937-38: "military Socialist-Revolutionary organization", "anti-Soviet right-wing conspiracy", "terrorist group in the Political Directorate of the Red Army", Chipion wrecking organization in Voengize", "terrorist group in the Central House of Arts", "officer-monarchist organization", "conspirators from the Sanitary Administration", "reserve Trotskyist center in the Political Directorate of KOVO", "terrorist group in the Academy of the General Staff", "Ukrainian military-nationalist organization", "branch conspiratorial organization in the 69th rifle division", "a group of Polish saboteurs in the system

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military communications KOVO "and others. Between the valiant Chekists, a social competition unfolded on the number of arrests and confessions received.

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In the meantime, commissar P.A., inspired by the confidence of the leader, Smirnov, who became the country's chief naval officer, smashed the fleet with his characteristic energy, signing arrest warrants in batches.

On January 10, 1938, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, the flagship of the 1st rank, G.P. Kireev, was arrested; March 19 - the commander of the Amur military flotilla, the flagship of the 1st rank I.N. Kadatsky-Rudnev. On March 25, the head of the Naval Forces, flagship of the fleet of the 1st rank M.V. was removed from his post and placed at the disposal of the RKKF command department. Viktorov. A month later they came for him.

On May 17, he was summoned from Polyarny to Moscow, but the head of the political department of the Northern Fleet, P.P., never returned. Bairakny. On May 23, on the way to Leningrad, the "railroad workers" arrested the commander of the Northern Fleet, a former sailor of the Aurora cruiser, a participant in the storming of the Winter Palace, the flagship of the 1st rank K.I. Dushenov and deputy head of the political department P.M. Klipp, called by the people's commissar "to resolve urgent issues." Soon the chief of staff of the fleet P.S. was taken into custody. Smirnov, chairman of the military tribunal Donchenko.

To Dushenov, the advanced "Moscow technique" was applied on the move and in full. In statement No. 267 addressed to Molotov, he wrote:

"After 22 hours of cruel physical methods of influence being applied to me, almost in an unconscious state, as a result of an internal hemorrhage, I wrote a false statement under the dictation of the investigation that I was a conspirator and a pest. 5 days later, after the same methods, I signed a pre-written protocol, which lists more than 30 people, allegedly my accomplices, who were later arrested without questioning me ... I ask you with all my heart if you can make sure that they don't beat me anymore. .. I ask you to shoot me, but do not beat me. If you do not find it possible to get involved in this matter, then I ask you to make sure that at least for this statement I will not be beaten. I fear that the investigation may consider it as a provocation."

Konstantin Ivanovich was "developed" (that is, beaten, other "advanced" methods of influence were used) for almost two years, and then he was awarded the long-awaited bullet in the back of the head.

On June 13, the head of the naval department of the Academy of the General Staff, the flagship of the 1st rank E.S. was arrested. Pantserzhansky and the head of the Naval Academy, flagship 1st rank I.M. Ludry.

In a memorandum addressed to Stalin and Molotov dated June 17, 1938, the naval commander-kromeshnik Smirnov reported on the results of checking the combat readiness of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla:

"The infestation of personnel in the Pacific Fleet is very large. The enemies of the people turned out to be the chief of staff of the fleet, four commanders of the main naval brigades, three commandants of fortified areas, the head of the air defense department of the Pacific Fleet, the commander of the Vladivostok military port, the commander and head of the political department of the fleet. In aviation, both the commander of the Air Force and the military commissar both turned out to be enemies of the people. In all parts, the enemies of the people practiced drunkenness as a way

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decomposition of personnel.

But by this time it became clear that Smirnov himself was an "enemy of the people." On June 30, they took him, accused him of preparing a conspiracy, and shot him six months later. In his place, having been awarded the rank of commander of the 1st rank, they appointed deputy Yezhov, commander of the NKVD troops M.P. Frinovsky.

Marshal Voropiltov also, tirelessly, mercilessly cleaned the army ranks, "ruthlessly cutting off the infected parts of the body, to living, healthy meat, being cleansed of the vile treacherous rot." After each "deplorable conversation with Comrade Yezhov's authorities," the people's commissar signed new and new execution lists.

The traitor Yakir was replaced as Commander of the Kyiv Military District in 1937 by Army Commander Ivan Fedko. In 1938, he was made First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and awarded the rank of Army Commander of the 1st rank. July 7 - arrested, he also turned out to be an "infected part of the body", involved in conspiratorial activities back in 1932. In September, Fedko testified against Blucher.

The cases of Alksnis, Belov, Berzin, Vatsetis, Velikanov, Gribov, Gryaznov, Oak, Dybenko, Ingaunis, Kovtyukh, Kutakov, Kireev, Kadatsky, Land, Levandovsky, Okunev, Orlov, Pogrebny, Sedyakin, Khalepsky, Khripin and others are all commanders, commanders, army commissars and divisional commanders - the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, under the constant chairmanship of Ulrich, considered July 28-29, 1938. Managed quickly. All of them were sentenced to the highest measure, which was executed immediately.

The day of July 28, 1938 should be called Chekist Day. In just one day, the "organs of Comrade Yezhov" shot down 9 army commanders, one flagship of the fleet of the 1st rank, two flagships of the 2nd rank, three army commissars, 9 commanders and six divisional commanders.

It is noteworthy that the "shock investigators" and executioners were lowered into the firing squad literally following, and sometimes simultaneously with the victims. But immediately, even more zealously, more and more heirs of Dzerzhinsky took up the matter. Since vacancies were regularly vacated, insofar as the NKVD

invariably felt the need for executioners. Well, "people of a new type", brought up in a country of liberated labor and an amputated conscience, were recorded in batches. This is because, reported a major Chekist Redens, that "our people love the Soviet government, love our party and love Stalin." The day was not far off when the organs of both Redens and Ushakov, and the "batyr Yezhov" himself, would be shot.

When those of them who survived all the purges, and even Comrade Stalin himself, were imprisoned in 1957, they, naive hammerers, desperately defended themselves: "Why are you judging me, and not judging Molotov, whose guilt has been proven and determined? He sent thousands of people to the next world with a stroke of a pen, but he is not judged.

Then, after serving fifteen years, they demanded their rehabilitation:

"We cannot be held responsible for violations of socialist legality, since we were only carrying out the task of our leadership and believed that we were fighting the enemies of the party and the Soviet state ... Why were we, a small group of Chekists, punished? We ask you to return our honest names to us, to return us to Soviet society so that we can join the ranks of the builders of communism.

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In this they were quite right, but Khrushchev and Gorbachev, having violated Lenin's precepts, made a fatal mistake: without such personnel and such methods, the building of communism inevitably expected a fiasco. When the repressions stopped, the first "hints" of political freedom appeared, socialism collapsed, because its bestial grin is absolutely incompatible with the human face.

In the summer of 1938, due to the aggravation of the situation in the region of Lake Khasan, the Politburo sent the tireless Mekhlis to the Far East. On July 28, he telegraphed the "Father of Nations": "He fired two hundred and fifty political workers, a significant part of them were arrested. But the cleaning of the political apparatus, especially the lower levels, is far from being completed by me.

The behavior of the commander of the Far Eastern Front, Blucher, did not inspire confidence in Lev Zakharovich either. Marptal, instead of following the Kremlin's instructions to defeat the "Japanese aggressors" without talking, launched his own investigation and argued that the Soviet border guards were responsible for the incident at Zaozernaya Hill.

At the end of the conflict, Blucher was summoned to Moscow. At a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, held on August 31, 1938, he was accused of "deliberate defeatism", inability or unwillingness to "really organize the cleansing of the front from the enemies of the people", "duplicity, indiscipline and sabotage of the armed rebuff to the Japanese troops." By order of the People's Commissar of Defense, Blucher was removed from command of the Far Eastern Front.

Vasily Konstantinovich was arrested on October 22 at the Voroshilov dacha "Bocharov Ruchey". Soon he, who took it into his head to deny everything at face-to-face confrontations with

"accomplices" Fedko and Khakhanyan, moved to Lefortovo and beaten for two weeks until they were muzzled to death. But they still managed to snatch out a confession that he had sold the Far East to the Japanese, that he was both in a right-wing conspiracy and in a military conspiracy.

Well, there seems to be almost no one left after that. In February 1939, Yegorov, Felko and Smirnov were shot. Anastas Mikoyan proudly noted: "The apparatus that conducted this investigation passed the Bolshevik test of truthfulness and accuracy."

From the cohort of "the best of the best, worthy of the worthy", the first in the country to receive the highest personal military ranks, only three survived - Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov.

"Comrade, Stalin, like a caring gardener, raises and educates these cadres," Nikita Khrushchev burst into a nightingale.

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At the Military Conference, the "caring gardener" encouraged the military leaders who fell into thought:

"I see gloominess and some confusion on your faces. I understand that it is very hard to hear such accusations against people with whom we have worked hand in hand for decades and who have now turned out to be traitors to the Motherland. But you don't have to be upset. Although an unpleasant phenomenon, it is quite natural, "and he called for bolder promotion of new cadres devoted to the Soviet system.

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What dizzying careers were made in those goals!

On the wave of repressions, the "Buddenovite" S.K. Timoshenko. In July 1937, he took command of the North Caucasian Military District with the rank of commander, in September, already commander of the 2nd rank, he accepted the Kharkov Military District, in February 1938 - the Kiev district, exactly a year later he received the rank of commander of the 1st rank. In May 1940, Semyon Konstantinovich became Marshal and People's Commissar of Defense.

Kombrig N.N. Voronov, sent to Spain from the post of head of the 1st Leningrad artillery school, upon his return received the diamonds of the commander and immediately became the head of the artillery of the Red Army. Colonel I.T. was appointed head of the Academy of the General Staff. Shlemin, who previously commanded the regiment. Another "Spaniard", Yakov Smushkevich, turned from brigade commander into commander of military aviation. Ivan Peresypkin in 1937 was a senior lieutenant, and in May 1939 he was already the People's Commissar for Communications of the USSR! Major I.T. A tall path from the battalion commander to the division commander overcame in three months !!!

Colonel M.P. Kirponos in 1934-39 was the head of the Kazan Infantry School. From there he was taken to the Finnish War to command a division.

In June 1940, Mikhail Petrovich headed the Leningrad Military District.

It took a little more than a year for V.F. Tributsu to move from the bridge of the destroyer to the office of the commander of the Baltic Fleet and receive the rank of vice admiral.

Squadron commander I.I. Kopets in 1938 was appointed deputy commander of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District, and before the start of the war - commander of the Western Special Air Force.

Inspired by the confidence of the party, they did not hesitate to occupy the highest posts, automatically turning into "outstanding commanders" in their own eyes.

Not the genius who was the 6th colonel, but whoever is the colonel is a genius.

Marshal Konev, in an interview with the writer Konstantin Simonov, said:

"Blucher was by the year thirty-seven a man with a past, but without a future, a man who, in terms of his knowledge and ideas, did not go far from the Civil War and belonged to the category that Voroshilov, Budyonny and some other former cavalymen represented at the beginning of the war, living with outdated, past views.

It is impossible to imagine that Blucher would have coped with the front in a modern war. Apparently, he would have coped with this no better than Voroptilov or Budyonny. In any case, Blucher failed such a small operation as the Hassan events.

It may well be that it is so. Only Blucher was shot not for military backwardness and not for his addiction to drinking. At one time, Stalin defended Blucher:

"Here he is drinking. OK then. What else? Here he does not get up early in the morning, does not go to the troops. What else? Outdated, does not understand new methods of work. Well, today he doesn't understand, tomorrow he will understand, the experience of the old fighter will not be lost ... Put people in command positions who don't drink and don't know how to fight -

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unpretentiously ... He, of course, is more reasonable, more experienced than any Tukhachevsky, than any Uborevich, who is an alarmist, and than any Yakir, who is no different in military affairs, "

Iosif Vissarionovich confidentially told the military:

"There are no people without flaws. One likes to drink. For others it turns into

disease. We treat such people, but we do not expel them from the party. We re-educate such people. Others love girls. This, too, is of little interest to us. Let them mess around with them as much as they like ... There is nothing wrong with that. ”

The leader treated such shortcomings condescendingly, he understood people who loved the simple joys of life. These people are easier to manage. But "very smart" he did not need. Blucher was killed for revealing his own opinion on the issue of the provocation started by the Soviet side near Lake Khasan, and for the desire to resolve the conflict in a civilized way instead of, as Moscow indicated, "to really fight the Japanese."

Konev, who graduated from three classes of a rural school and a "special group" of the Military Academy, was made commander of the military district not for military talents, but for his repeatedly shown "loyalty". Even in 1948, being a Marshal of the USSR, Ivan Stepanovich did not forget to indicate in his autobiography:

"I took an active part in the struggle against the Trotskyist-Bukharin enemies, agents of German-Japanese fascism, especially in Ukraine in 1923 and against the bandit Primakov and others. ".

Yes, and with the front in the "modern war" Konev at first coped no better than Budyonny: it was he who was one of the "co-authors" of the infamous Vyazemsky cauldron, along with the "nonsense" Eremenko (Stalin's definition), who in the reports smashed the "scoundrels of the Guderians" in bulk and in retail.

Lieutenant Colonel L. Simon, reporting to Paris on the Tukhachevsky case, noted:

"The first consequence of this lawsuit is that the Soviet army has lost its future leader His disappearance has created a void that will be difficult to fill, since Tukhachevsky's successor will, in all likelihood, be inferior to him intellectually. This assessment is applicable even to Marshal Yegorov "...

Well, one of the successors of Tukhachevsky and Egorov was G.K. Zhukov, who had 4 classes of elementary school in his luggage, 9 months of cavalry courses and "organically hated staff work." The entire depth of Georgy Konstantinovich's intellect can be measured by his resolution alone. When he, the Chief of the General Staff, was put on the table a description of the French campaign of the Wehrmacht with a detailed analysis of the reasons for the success of the "blitzkrieg" and the defeat of the French, Zhukov wrote: "I don't need this." It's not even "emptiness", it's a complete vacuum.

Instead of Belov, Commander of the 2nd Rank M.P. became the commander of the Belarusian Military District. Kovalev. Zhukov, who served in this district, claimed that Belov was weaker than Uborevich, and Kovalev was weaker than Belov. How "stronger" Kovalev was Pavlov, who replaced him, can be judged by the complete defeat of the Western Front in June 1941. Who today remembers the commander Kovalev, who guarded Transbaikalia throughout the war; he was not even entrusted with the army.

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Let's look at the commanders who were the first to meet the German invasion, how were they better than Budyonny or Voroshilov?

Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov (1898-1961), commander of the Baltic Special District. Prior to that, he had not commanded anything larger than a regiment, he was in teaching work. At the beginning of the war, he led the operations of the North-Western Front for only 11 days, completely lost track of the situation and found himself surrounded along with his headquarters. In early August, he managed to get out to his own, received a new front, then the 51st separate army, commanding which he surrendered Crimea to the Germans. They tried to attach Fedor Isidorovich for another year, transferring from one position to another, and, finally, they pushed him to lead the Military Academy.

Army General D.G. Pavlov (1897-1941), commander of the Western Military District. He graduated from two classes of the city school, courses and the Military Academy. In three years, he rose from the post of commander of a mechanized brigade to the commander of a border district. They say that Stalin had "great hopes" for him. In his autobiography, the general wrote: "I have never been a member of any Trotskyist and other organizations, I have never hesitated on any issues. There were no mistakes and deviations from the general line, and could not be.

But he turned out to be a traitor. Under Pavlov's command, the Western Front ceased to exist as an organized force after eight days of war. On the ninth day, the commander was removed from his post. The rapid rise ended with a "wall".

Colonel General M.P. Kirponos (1892-1941), commander of the Kyiv Special District. He graduated from the parochial school and the Frunze Military Academy. Commanding the most powerful of the fronts, having a multiple numerical advantage over the Germans, especially in technology (almost 9,000 tanks against hardly 1,000), he lost outright to Kleist and Guderian. He died in the Kiev "cauldron", otherwise he would certainly have been put against the "wall".

Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov, commander of the 8th Army. Former officer of the tsarist army plus courses for senior officers. He came to the army from the post of teacher of the Military Academy. The Supreme Court of the USSR "estimated" the commander's military successes as five years in labor camps.

Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov (1897-1964), commander of the 11th Army. Education had two classes of a rural school plus numerous courses. In the first two days of the war, his army was smashed to smithereens, since May 1943 Vasily Ivanovich himself taught others to fight in the rear.

Major General N.E. Berzarin (1904-1945), commander of the 27th Army. Education - primary, plus "Shot" courses in 1923, 1925 and 1927. From the post of regimental commissar in 1938 he was appointed division commander. Then he led the corps, then the army.

Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov (1894-1964), commander of the 3rd Army. Graduated from high school and various courses. His entire army remained in the cauldron near Volkovysk, but Vasily Ivanovich managed to get out and received the 21st Army, and then the 58th Army, and then the 1st Shock Army, and then the 63rd, and then the 1st Guards and, finally, in 1943 he headed the 1st Baltic Front.

Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev (1896-1956), commander of the 10th Army.

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Graduated from a vocational school, the Frunze Military Academy, and the Academy of the General Staff. He got to the post of commander of the most powerful army on the Western Front from the teachers of the academy. The army in 1941 in full strength was captured, Konstantin Dmitrievich left the encirclement. Stalin entrusted him with the 13th Army, after which the 43rd Army. But in May 1944 he was recalled from command and made authorized by the Council of People's Commissars for the repatriation of citizens.

Major General A.A. Korobkov, commander of the 4th Army. The army was defeated, at the end of July 1941 it was disbanded, Alexander Andreevich was shot in the "Pavlov case".

Major General M.I. Potapov (1902-1965), commander of the 5th Army. Education - three classes of a rural school and the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army. I. V. Stalin. From the post of commander of a mechanized brigade to commander, he rose in less than two years. Together with the army in September 1941, he was surrounded and taken prisoner.

Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko (1901-1970), commander of the 6th Army. General education - two classes of teachers' seminary, military - only courses. He rose to the army commander in six months from the position of a teacher of cavalry courses. In July 1941, he was taken prisoner near Uman along with the remnants of his army.

Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, commander of the 26th Army. He graduated from two classes of a rural school and, already in the rank of general, advanced courses for senior officers at the Academy of the General Staff. Fedor Yakovlevich "did not like to indulge in arguments if an order was received. He was highly appreciated for his firmness and accuracy in carrying out the decisions of the command." He died in 1942 in the Barvenkovsky "sack", where, together with Tymoshenko, he brought a quarter of a million of his subordinates.

Major General P.G. Ponedelin (1893-1950), commander of the 12th Army. Graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. Together with the army he surrendered in the Uman cauldron. For this, after the war, he was first imprisoned, and then shot.

Another cavalryman, Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko (1894-1976), commanded the 9th Army. In his autobiography, he reveals the "secret" of the special faculty of the Academy, which he graduated from, having two classes in a rural school: "in 1935 he passed for ten years at the Military Academy. Frunze. Since 1943 - rear general. In April 1945, the colonel-general was entrusted with "steer" the rifle corps in the Berlin operation.

In short, in 1941, ALL Stalin's "nominees" "failed". It couldn't be otherwise. Being just "cogs" and "gears" of the Soviet military machine, they were of interest to Stalin solely from the point of view of "reliability". Complete unification. We don't have any essentials!

In January 1938, Stalin posed a rhetorical question to a military audience, to which he immediately answered:

"What is the strength of the army? Others think that the strength of the army lies in good equipment, that technology decides everything. The second think that the army is strong and all its strength is in the command staff. This is also wrong. The main strength of the army lies in whether the policy of the government in the country is right or wrong ... With the right policy, even average commanders can do much more than the most capable commanders of bourgeois states.

Compared with the executed commanders, the new ones had only one

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advantage, and even then only from the point of view of the dictator - they knew their place, they were scared to death. Marshal Zhukov, who under Khrushchev told stories about how Stalin fought on the globe, and he, Zhukov, almost opened the door to his office with his foot, being retired, in a private conversation about the Supreme Commander-in-Chief honestly said: "he was scary" .

The red commanders now shied away from foreigners like the devil from incense. At a meeting of the commanding staff in April 1940, the commander of the troops of the Leningrad district, Meretskov, complained that the commanders were refusing to carry out reconnaissance missions abroad. They were not afraid of enemy counterintelligence and not enemy dungeons: "Commanders are afraid to go into such intelligence, because they say that they will then write down that they were abroad. The commanders are cowardly."

It became mortally dangerous to show any initiative. Initiative is a sign that you think differently than the boss, have your own judgment, and maybe even consider yourself smarter. Didn't your enemies make you think of distorting the "general line"?

As is usually the case in such cases, who did not have sufficient military experience, were not burdened by education, the precocious "Stalinist commanders", having taken general positions and received appropriate material benefits, in their overwhelming majority stopped in development. Believing that they deserved high positions, they did not want to learn anything, expressing contempt for the "educated" in every possible way. The more primitive the thinking of the strategist of the nugget was, the stronger the desire to assert himself played in him, humiliating the lower ones. For example, Zhukov "did not graduate from the academies", but with pleasure he threw in the face of the graduate who arrived under his subordination: "I knew it. Whatever the fool, then the graduate of the academy.

By the way, in November 1936, the Academy of the General Staff was recreated for the cultivation of commanders and employees of the headquarters of the highest command. However

the training of her pupils suffered from significant gaps. Firstly, due to the fact that, as before, it was necessary to take into account the "features" of the trainees. Secondly, in view of the mass early releases to fill the vacant vacancies. Thirdly, during the years of the Great Terror, more than three thousand teachers of military educational institutions were repressed, which led to a decrease in the quality of education.

For example, one of the students of the first set was enrolled without exams, the commander of the 29th cavalry regiment of the 5th cavalry division M.I. Kazakov (1901-1979), already succeeded with three classes of the parochial school to surpass all sciences at the Frunze Military Academy. It is curious that even after becoming an army general (in 1955), Mikhail Ilyich thought that the Bolsheviks had invented the Academy of the General Staff:

"There were no such educational institutions in other armies ... As I already mentioned, there were no such educational institutions not only in our country, but also abroad, so everything had to be started all over again, to go the unbeaten path."

He died without knowing that the Academy of the General Staff had existed in Russia since 1832, and in other countries even earlier.

Going "off the beaten path", in this educational institution they tried to create a department of strategy, but the idea was quickly abandoned due to the complete shooting of almost all military theorists in the country. In 1935, an attempt was made to organize a course of lectures on strategy at the Military Academy. Frunze,

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" IT, but it also failed. The deputy head of the academy, Shadenko, put the head of the military history department in his place: "What kind of strategy course is this? Comrade Stalin personally deals with the strategy, and this is not our business!

The first months of study "were spent on repetition and replenishment of knowledge on the military equipment of the Red Army." In the winter of 1936/37, Army Commanders Uborevich and Yakir managed to conduct two classes in operational art. They seemed too complicated and abstruse to listeners:

"Many expressed bewilderment: why did Uborevich complicate the operational situation so much and forced the troops of the Western Front to repel a counterattack by a powerful group of German troops from East Prussia? And in the classes that Yakir conducted, something completely incongruous happened: for example, the mechanized corps, which was part of the ERP, was unable to overcome the resistance of the German tank division. Why? .. Not everyone could understand: why on earth the leaders of the classes reduced the offensive operations of the troops to such an unsuccessful ending "...

Already after six months of study, in June 1937, they were released, because there were no commanders left in the troops: colonels A.V. Vasilevsky (1895-1977) and V.V. Kurasov (1897-1973) - to the General Staff! Colonel A.I. Antonov (1896-1962) - Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District; Colonel M.V. Zakharov (1898-1972) - chief of staff in the Leningrad military district. The rest were assigned only as deputies and heads of operational departments, but not for long.

So, Kazakov became chief of staff of the Central Asian military district already in March 1938.

As shown by the "unsuccessful finale of the offensive operations of our troops" in 1941-42, the Soviet General Staff officers still preferred not to "complicate the operational situation" and were only able to draw ingenious plans for defeating the enemy, regardless of his true intentions. So, on the night of June 28, 1942, the chief of staff of the Bryansk Front, General M.I. Kazakov was thinking hard about the plan for the Oryol offensive operation, and in the morning "everything suddenly changed dramatically": the Germans launched Operation Blau, a general summer offensive, and a week later they were in Voronezh. And why? The beaten strategist says:

"The main mistake was that until the very beginning of Operation Blau, few of us took seriously (did he even imagine the duties of the head of the front itab?) The possibility of the main German strike in the Kursk-Voronezh direction."

The main reason for the defeat "was the lack of experience in command and control in a complex operation." Difficult - this means that the Germans are advancing and with one division they are no longer beating the mechanized corps (as the "enemy of the people" Yakir admitted in his lecture), but the 5th tank army of A.I. Lizyukov. Why? Yes, because, in the words of Colonel-General L.M. Sandalov (1900-1987), who were members of all ranks of the 4th Army, could be considered ready to command troops in the event of a normal situation.

That is, they were ready to smash any adversary, but on the condition that he remains standing still and does not resist much in order to complicate, understand, the situation. How can one not recall the statement of Vatsetis, who was executed as unnecessary: "A stupid man decides for the enemy, and any military leader is obliged to imagine ten options for his possible actions."

In the five pre-war years (1937-1941), the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army produced more than 800 "highly educated commanders" who did not know how to manage

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troops.

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Why is there a strategy if the academies did not even study such a necessary thing as the organization of communications. The Soviet generals simply ignored radio communications, too tricky. They preferred to lead from a warm headquarters, by telephone. If a bomb or shell broke the wires, messengers were used.

There were almost no means of coding conversations, radio intelligence, encryption machines. They did not betray the development of communications, they did not like radio communications and were afraid of it. Therefore, the Soviet headquarters immediately lost control, as soon as the troops started moving. Sandalov testified:

"The command staff and headquarters of all formations, including the army headquarters, did not know how to control troops using radio and did not like this type of communication because of the difficulty of its use compared to wired COMMUNICATION."

In 1932, the commander of the artillery regiment of the Moscow Proletarian Division N.N. Voronov, as part of the delegation, visited Italy for military maneuvers:

"I was struck by the abundance of field radio stations in the Italian troops. I liked the clarity of staff work, which significantly reduced the time for preparing combat documents ... The division commander spent 50 minutes on compiling a combat order, and regiment commanders - 30-40 minutes. Such promptness had to be learned."

All the more interesting are the general conclusions of the Soviet delegation:

"The guns of the battery were of an old-fashioned type, from the time of the First World War, which did not represent any interest. The natya of the military mission had a very low opinion about the fighting qualities of the Italian troops, especially artillery. The Red Army has far outstripped them both in terms of the quality of weapons and the combat skills of the personnel.

In 1936, Nikolai Nikolaevich again visited Italy and was again "disappointed to the limit": "In general, there was little instructive for us in Italy. We were once again convinced that the Italian army is far from meeting modern requirements. At the same time, Voronov again noted: "I liked the wide use of radio stations by Italians for various purposes during maneuvers. It became a shame that we in our homeland have not yet reached such a high quality of radio stations for all branches of the armed forces.

The acute shortage of modern means of communication meant not only the loss of control, but also the absence of any interaction between the military branches. It's not scary, because we have outstripped everyone "both in the quality of weapons and in combat training", and the strength of the Red Army is in the "correct policy" of the country's top leadership.

You can, of course, again blame all the troubles on Tukhachevsky. But under him, Soviet developments in the field of covert communications and radar were at the forefront of the world. However, pest developers were repressed after the marshal. From the middle of 1936, the People's Commissariat of Communications was generally made a place of exile for high-ranking Chekists before their destruction. At first he was led by one of Yagoda's deputies - HER. Prokofiev, then Genrikh Grigorievich himself, then Khalepsky, dismissed from the army, after him, the "all-camp chief", the builder of the great canals M.D. Berman. They were the least interested in communications.

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But after all, the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, who was directly in charge of the Communications Department of the NPO, only with the outbreak of the war was surprised to find that he did not have a command post, did not have his own lines of communication, and at least some news about the enemy can be found out only by calling on the telephone of the village council: "Comrade! Are there Germans in the village?"

Already in the middle of the day on June 22, 1941, the commander of the Western Front reported that out of the three (!) Radio stations he had, two were broken, and the third was damaged. They promised to send him new ones, but they never did. In the future, Pavlov not only did not manage anything, but did not even know where the front was, and the General Staff did not know where Pavlov himself was. In Moscow, Zhukov sobbed out loud when Stalin asked him a simple question: "Do you manage the fronts?"

But with what enthusiasm they were preparing to fight "on foreign territory." In May 1940, the commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov said at a meeting of ideological workers:

"You can say that our army is preparing for an attack, and we need this attack for defense. This is absolutely correct... Based on the political conditions, we must attack, and the Government will show us what we need to do."

True, having occupied the chairs, apartments and dachas of the "strategists-vrelyets", Stalin's "nominees" did not come up with anything new. The "Considerations on the Basics of Strategic Deployment" developed by them practically copied the "invasion plan" written by Tukhachevsky - the main strike from the area south of Polesie - to the center of Polysh - only taking into account the borders that have changed as a result of the Liberation Campaign of 1939, and with a multiple increase in the forces involved .

In the summer of 1940, a decision was made to restore the mechanized corps. Under Tukhachevsky there were only two of them, 500 tanks each. They say that these formations had a number of shortcomings: little infantry (two mechanized brigades, and one rifle brigades), primitive means of radio communication.

Timoshenko (People's Commissar of Defense) with Meretskov (Chief of the General Staff) "for a deep shock to the enemy's front" ordered 29 mechanized corps of 1031 tanks each, but also without radio communications. How to manage them on the battlefield, no one thought. Most likely - to concentrate almost 30 thousand tanks into a "ramming mass" and indicate to it the general direction of movement: "Forward, to Warsaw! Forward to Berlin!"

The headquarters enthusiastically worked out "deep operations", completely neglecting the issues of organizing defense. Marshal Shapogovnikov instructed the district commanders:

"The whole system of our preparation next year should basically be saturated not with defensive tendencies, but with the idea of an offensive operation. Defense should be given attention insofar as.

During the exercises, the covering armies imitated the defense purely symbolically, "at the same time, they did not set up minefields, did not create trenches and communication passages, but only designated a cellular system."

Any operational games or maneuvers began with a standard introductory:

the encroachments of the "warmongers" to invade Soviet territory, the invincible Red Army repulsed and goes on a "counteroffensive". And here's what

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"the enemy will concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and abandon them on the very first day in compact groupings in all strategic directions", such meanness, according to Zhukov, "was not counted on". The 1939 field charter read:

"If the enemy imposes war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking of all the armies that have ever existed. We will wage an offensive war, transferring it to enemy territory. The Red Army will conduct military operations for destruction, with the aim of completely defeating the enemy.

The ease with which it was possible in 1939-40 to annex Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Belarus, Western Ukraine and Bessarabia to the USSR inspired new great achievements. The realities of the Finnish war somewhat spoiled the overall impression, but it was declared "wrong", atypical", and some shortcomings were eliminated. At meetings of the commanding staff, the marshals and generals assured the party and each other of their own invincibility. The commanders and commissars looked at potential opponents like whipping boys.

Here are a few excerpts from Mekhlis's speech at a meeting in the Kiev Special Military District.

"The country of socialism is dressed in steel armor and concrete. We do not feel weaker than our probable capitalist opponents and look boldly into the future... The second imperialist war, into which the Faptist aggressors and their admirers are dragging humanity, will bury the world of capitalist robbery in its ruins...

If the second imperialist war turns its edge against the first socialist state in the world, then we will be obliged to transfer military operations to enemy territory, fulfill our international duties and multiply the number of Soviet republics throughout the world ...

We can state that the so-called "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis" has many ambitions, but in a big war it will quickly be left without ammunition ... Puffy Japanese samurai, puffed up to failure, like a frog from Krylov's fable, can burst from stress. ..

While saber-rattling, the Hitlerite swindlers are afraid of a serious war, they are afraid and will not go to a serious war, to a war with a serious enemy. The Achilles' heel of the German army is an unreliable rear ... The Achilles' heel of the German army is the lack of money, the lack of a sufficient number of middle command personnel necessary for a big war ...

We will and must follow the German tricks in Romania

intently, and we must prepare so that in the event of a war being imposed on us, Romanian oil, on which the German Faptists are so covetous, will flow in the direction desired by us, and not by the Germans ...

We have been given the strictest order - to smash and destroy the enemy on his territory and with little bloodshed. We must work in such a way that the enemy cannot come to his senses, so that the initiative from the first hour of the war belongs and is entirely in our hands.

Well, the great English philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) wrote in his book The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism back in 1920 that those people

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who accept Bolshevism, "are immune to the evidence of science and commit intellectual suicide."

Stalin's generals, officers and commissars thought not about defending the Fatherland - the proletarians do not have it - but only about how they would bring happiness to the peoples of Europe and Asia on bayonets, how they would help the working people of Hungary to organize the work of the Cheka and "put into waste" hostile classes, the peasants of Rumania—to organize collective farms and state farms; the proletarians of Italy—to nationalize factories and expropriate the exploiters. A certain Major A. Solovyov fantasized from the podium: "After all, someday our commanders will occupy the position of British officers in the world. So it should be and so it will be. We will teach the whole world."

The distortion in the brains, caused by the animal fear of being enrolled in the category of "enemies of the people" and ideological pumping, did not allow the "red colonialists" to realistically assess the situation. Everything that did not fit into their ideas about the capabilities of the enemy, about the nature of the future war, they simply brushed aside as insignificant or non-existent. Thus, after the victorious campaigns of the Wehrmacht in Poland and France, Marshal Shaposhnikov remarked disdainfully: "In terms of strategic creativity, the experience of the war in Europe, perhaps, does not give anything new." What is there to think about if Comrade Stalin himself is "planning history"?!

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But it turned out that not only he planned the story,

In the very first days of the war, Soviet military leaders demonstrated a complete lack of professionalism, an inability to manage large military formations in real conditions, and a disregard for the elementary rules of command of hostilities. They threw troops into battles without information about the enemy, without artillery preparation, without air cover.

The troops, contrary to the requirements of their own charters, deployed and acted on broad fronts in arbitrary directions, without interaction with each other. The defense was built on the principle of a cordon line, without proper depth, without taking into account the nature of the terrain and the importance of the defenders.

directions, not to mention taking into account enemy tactics.

The operational formation of armies was almost always one-echelon, forces and means in formations were also distributed evenly along the entire front. There were no reserves. The generals did not care about providing joints and flanks, blaming this headache on their neighbors.

In the course of defensive operations, there was no wide maneuver of forces and means at the expense of other, less active sectors. The withdrawal of troops from one defensive line to another, as a rule, was forced by the situation and was carried out under strong enemy fire. Advance preparation of lines and the organization of a stable defense in the rear were rarely carried out. As a result, with a forced withdrawal and at a new frontier, it was not possible to gain a foothold.

Shaposhnikov's "In so far as" backfired, but basically there was simply illiteracy - ignorance of the elementary foundations of military art, inability to predict the actions of the enemy. For some reason, the "unreliable rear" of the German army did not collapse, the European proletariat did not create insurgent detachments, and everything turned out to be in order with the ammunition of the Germans.

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Marshal A.I. Eremenko (1892-1970), who missed the strike of a tank group

Guderian on Oryol and left without a front, after the war shook his head contritely:

"Looking back, now considering the situation with open maps, you are perplexed: how could we not then guess the intentions of the enemy? The way from there to Orel and Tula was the shortest. The gum does not need to be forced. The Bryansk forests remain to the north. However, the command and headquarters of the Bryansk Front could not decipher this easy cipher.

It remains to be concluded that in September 1941, Eremenko still did not know how to read a map. In the same way, other "nominees" did not know how to read maps and draw elementary conclusions. Once surrounded, the Soviet commanders fell into complete prostration, because they simply did not know what to do in such a situation, not provided for by the charters. The Olneys tried at all costs to hold the occupied area, others - chaotically and stupidly threw their fading forces into a breakthrough in various directions. Marshal Konev wrote:

"Our goal was not to allow the enemy to narrow the encirclement and, having a vast territory, to maneuver forces, to contain the superior forces of the enemy by active struggle. Of course, the fight in the environment is a complex form of combat, and, as the experience of the war showed, we had to prepare for this type of action, which, unfortunately, was not done before the war.

In the end, both those and others gave the order to the troops to break into small

groups and get out of the boilers on their own. Left without commanders, tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers surrendered, abandoned weapons and equipment. Commanders of various calibers infiltrated east, accompanied by the commanders closest to them and bodyguards, not trying to lead any unit: it was easier to slip through unnoticed.

Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov left the encirclement twice, and each time the "breakthrough group" consisted of the general himself, another field wife and a dozen personal guards. If there was such an opportunity, the military leaders simply loaded onto planes and flew away, conveying their fiery greetings to the remaining troops and the last order: "fight to the last opportunity" or "advance with an inverted front."

It is impossible to imagine Field Marshal Paulus, who abandoned his 6th Army in Stalingrad, and it did not even occur to Hitler to order his evacuation from the "boiler". When the Fuhrer gave the order to leave the deadly place to the commander of the 14th Panzer Corps, General Hube, he "categorically refused to obey. He sent a message to Berlin that he had brought his soldiers to Stalingrad and ordered them to fight to the last bullet. And now he intends to show them how it's done."

Compare this with the flight of the Soviet command from Sevastopol in July 1942. Defense leaders Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky and Lieutenant General I.E. Petrov, their headquarters, all division commanders, all the party leadership and ranks of the NKVD (about 500 people) boarded planes and submarines and escaped safely. They abandoned a 100,000-strong garrison, ordering him to "fight to the last opportunity, and then make his way into the mountains, to join the partisans." Greater cynicism is hard to imagine.

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So, the Stalinist generals were only preparing to attack, but, as it turned out, they also did not know how to attack. First, control was immediately lost; secondly, "there was not enough experience", and thirdly, the enemy interfered, creating a "difficult situation" by his actions. There are countless examples

May 1942. The war has been going on for a year, the German army was defeated near Moscow, but survived. Perked up, Stalin ordered the end of the war in 1942. The two armies of the Southwestern Front, advancing on Kharkov, themselves climbed into the "bag" organized for them by the Germans. At the last moment, Marshal Timoshenko gave the order: to turn around with part of the forces and with joint blows to defeat the enemy who had come out to the rear. General K.S. Moskalenko (future marshal), who commanded the 38th Army, writes:

"You can't say anything, the idea was bold, and the authors seemed simple and real. In fact, everything was not so simple. First of all, it was necessary to regroup the large masses of troops scattered over a large area. And we didn't know how to do it properly then."

June. Moskalenko himself was given a tank corps and ordered to counterattack:

"The gank brigades struck in the forehead. Meanwhile, detour maneuvers were quite possible, which would undoubtedly have given the best result ... Unfortunately, during the period of the war we are describing, we still did not always possess such a skill and were still only accumulating precious experience ... Yes, we learned a lot in during the May and June battles in 1942. They began to see and predict the enemy's intentions better, better plan and manage military operations.

Early July. Three Soviet tank corps in the area of Stary Oskol enter into battle with the enemy's 48th tank corps and are defeated. General A.M. Vasilevsky (also a future marshal) explains: "the commanders of the tank corps did not yet have sufficient experience" ...

THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO DO ANYTHING except to pound with their fists, demand "Stand to the death", threaten a tribunal, "inspire courage" in the troops with the help of barrage detachments and throw the enemy with the corpses of the Red Army.

In the summer of 1942, Stalin was finally convinced that he did not have "Hindenburgs". They couldn't be. For that Great War, which he prepared amateurishly, he did not need them. He had to personally train the generals during the war itself, gradually mastering military affairs. It was Stalin who wrote instructions for them: on the need to use radio communications and have reserves, on the use of engineering obstacles, on the "artillery offensive" and concentration of forces, on interaction, on reconsidering tactics, and even on the need to take the initiative.

I had to pay for ignorance for a long time and with a lot of blood. Not mine, of course.

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On August 22, 1944, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov wrote to the head of the Main Directorate of Personnel:

"What can our experience teach us?

First, we did not have pre-selected and well-trained

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commanders of fronts, armies, corps and divisions. The fronts were headed by people who failed one thing after another (Pavlov, Kuznetsov, Popov, Budyonny, Cherevichenko, Tyulenev, Ryabyshev, Timoshenko, etc.), little-studied people were also placed in the army.

It could not have been otherwise, since there were no candidates trained in peacetime for the fronts, armies and formations. The people were not well known. People's Commissariat of Defense in

peacetime not only did not prepare candidates, but even did not prepare commanders to command fronts and armies ... In short, each of us knows the consequences of commanding these people, and what our Motherland experienced, entrusting its fate into the hands of such commanders and commanders ... All these commanders learned war in war, paying for it with the blood of our people.

Thus, Zhukov confirmed in writing all of the above. What impresses me in the character of Georgy Konstantinovich is his modesty. In the list of military leaders, "who failed one thing after another," he identified himself under the pseudonym "et al.>.

Judging by the number of soldiers he expended, the "Marshal of Victory" was one of the most stupid. Still ahead of him was the Berlin offensive, which in terms of the rate of losses (16 thousand killed and wounded daily) surpassed the bloodiest summer battles of 1943 (11-12 thousand per day). The war was almost over, and Zhukov was in a hurry to fill in the gaps in his "education", paying in full with the blood of his compatriots, whom he deeply despised both wholesale and retail.

However, they were all like that. It's just that Zhukov was the most Stalinist among all the nominees: the most cruel, the most energetic, the most "strong-willed" in the Bolshevik way. In a word, he was a real "jolly monster of Bolshevism", in no way inferior to the same Atarbekov. Only his field was somewhat different ...

Part III

Commanders and fighters

"Sending people to war without training is betraying them"

Confucius

In July 1918, the Congress of Soviets, having approved the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the introduction of universal military duty, specifically emphasized that the right to defend the Socialist Fatherland with arms in hand is granted only to working people. But in the chaos of the Civil War unleashed by the Bolsheviks, class purity of the ranks could not be maintained.

Trotsky wrote:

"The army was built under fire. Construction techniques dominated by improvisation were immediately tested in practice. The army grew in numbers extremely rapidly. This was explained, on the one hand, by the extreme length of the fronts, and, on the other hand, by the looseness of the military organization. Insufficient preparation caused, naturally, an excessive expenditure of human power. The rapid and semi-chaotic growth of the army was caused by the fact that in order to solve each new combat mission, new regiments and divisions had to be built from nothing ...

We were strangers to pedantry and stereotypes, resorted to all sorts of combinations and

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experiments, looking for success. In one army, a former non-commissioned officer under the chief of staff of former generals commands. The other army is commanded by a former general with an assistant from the partisans. One division is commanded by a former soldier, in the next division by a colonel of the general staff. This "eclecticism" was imposed by the whole situation.

By the end of the Civil War, the strength of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army reached 5.5 million people. One by one, the fronts were liquidated. However, the revolution did not take place in Europe, the country lay in ruins, and the Bolsheviks could not afford to support and feed such an abyss of young, healthy and nothing-producing men. Instead of fanning the "global fire", they had to deal with the problems of restoring the economy and "socialist transformations". Fortunately, external enemies - the entire capitalist world - licked the wounds inflicted by the world massacre, and did not plan a new intervention.

Therefore, from the beginning of 1920, they began to turn the victorious armies - one after the other - into labor. According to the plan of Lenin and Trotsky, the soldiers of these armies, with a rifle in one hand and a shovel in the other, were supposed to deal with the aftermath of the Civil War, at the same time fight against the "internal counter-revolution" and, in general, be on the alert. In January - April 1920, eight labor armies were formed: the 1st Revolutionary Labor Army (former 3rd Army), Ukrainian Soviet (from the troops of the Southwestern Front), Petrograd Revolutionary (former 7th Army), 2nd special railway (former 4th army), Donetsk and Siberian labor armies ...

The various labor formations included 2.5 million Red Army soldiers, that is, about half of the armed forces. They were mainly engaged in unskilled labor: they restored mines and railways, procured fuel and food, and were involved in endless loading and unloading. In general, they did everything that has since become the constant and main occupation of Soviet soldiers in peacetime. At the same time, by personal example and fiery speeches, the Labor Army members carried out cultural and educational work among the natives.

But when all the ditches were dug, 460,000 wagons were loaded or unloaded, and 66,000 cubic meters of firewood were procured, it became clear that the labor armies were not profitable either. In 1922 they were disbanded. At the same time, a global reduction in the armed forces began. First of all, former officers of the tsarist army and unrepentant Trotskyists were removed from the command corps.

On August 8, 1923, by decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, a confused recruitment system was introduced, which made it possible to reduce the size of the army by an order of magnitude and cut expenses on it to a minimum. The essence of the idea was that only a small part of the military formations remained personnel (for example, until 1931 the entire Far East was covered by 6 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry brigades and aviation squadrons, and only 42 thousand people), the rest were transferred to the territorial-militia recruiting system .

In the territorial formations in peacetime, the permanent composition was reduced

to the minimum number of regular military personnel (mainly commanders) who were engaged in military training of the variable composition assigned to these formations. With such a system, reservists who were registered and lived in the areas of deployment of military units were regularly called up for training camps for military training and advanced military training. Upon mobilization, all of them were obliged to arrive in their units, thus staffing them according to the wartime states.

The conscription of the rank and file was carried out on the basis of the Law on Compulsory Military Service, adopted on September 18, 1925. It established that the defense of the USSR is the duty of all citizens, but the defense of the country with arms in hand is trusted

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only to working people, "non-working elements are entrusted with the performance of other duties for servicing the defense of the USSR." The army enrolled fit citizens for health reasons who had reached the age of 21, who were supposed to "rattle off" in the armed forces for five years.

In personnel units, these years were made up, firstly, from continuous service for a period of 2 to 4 years (depending on the type of troops and specialty) and, secondly, from vacation for a period of 1-3 years, with the obligatory involvement during vacation on training camps with a total duration of no more than two months. The variable composition of the territorial militia formations was regularly called up for training camps, with a total duration of 8-12 months. During the period between training sessions, reservists were listed in military units on vacation and could participate in the construction of socialism.

That part of the rural youth who wanted to break out of the village and move to the city willingly went to the personnel service. They tried to train junior commanders from the most literate Red Army soldiers at accelerated courses in battalion schools. At the same time, their service life was extended from two years to three. In military schools, where "red officers" were trained, they tried to recruit workers.

In 1926, military training was introduced in general education schools, but it was of little use. In addition, "defense weeks" were held annually in the summer throughout the Soviet Union with the obligatory participation of the entire able-bodied population of the country. At the same time, a number of defense patriotic societies were created, united in January 1927 into the Osoaviakhim.

The total number of armed forces in the period from 1924 to 1931 did not exceed 640 thousand people, and the number of commanding officers - 40 thousand.

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Throughout the 1920s, the army simply fought for its survival. So, on January 20, 1924, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council Efraim Markovich Sklyansky (1892-1925) reported to the Council of Labor and Defense:

"With the maximum salary for the junior command staff - 18 rubles, for the middle one -

40 rubles and for the elder - 60 rubles, i.e. for the predominant category of military personnel, the maintenance they receive does not even amount to a living wage. Under modern market conditions, the salary cannot provide not only families doomed to all the hardships of a half-starved existence, but themselves.

The summary of the Political Directorate of November 15, 1926 stated:

"The financial situation of the command staff, especially the family, remains unsatisfactory. The maintenance salary received barely covers the cost of food, rent and purchase of firewood. The most painful place in the life of the command staff is the housing problem. The Bolsheviks live in private apartments and pay 10-20 rubles a month. Such a high cost forces the family commanders often with a family of 3-5 people to huddle in one room. Municipal funds are often not enough to pay for an apartment. Many apartments are uninhabitable...

The indebtedness of command personnel, especially family ones, is growing. Most of the content received is not enough. The acquisition of clothing and essentials inevitably puts the commanding staff in front of the need to get into debt. Some commanders, when receiving a salary, only sign ... some command personnel are credited from private merchants. In the 191st regiment, part of the commanding staff wears their belongings as a pawn to the usurer ...

Difficult living conditions, insecurity create a depressed mood

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command staff, reduce efficiency. There is talk of a "beggarly existence".

Colonel General I.M. Chistyakov (1900-1979), who in 1922-24 commanded a platoon in the 37th Rifle Regiment, recalled:

"A Red Army soldier was supposed to receive a pound of bread a day, but he was given only two hundred grams, because the remaining two hundred were allocated to orphanages ... The country did everything possible to alleviate the plight of children, and therefore the Red Army soldiers steadfastly endured a half-starved life. We ate plenty of nettles. They will boil her full cauldron,

throw a mug of cereal or cornmeal there, that's welding!

(By the way, the established norms for the rations of a Red Army soldier invariably exceeded the rations of a worker. Another thing is what kind of food and in what form it reached a real soldier. So, in the Western Military District, "corned beef was given out, which was salted along with intestines and feces and emitted a disgusting smell. In many parts, raw bread was given out with an admixture of sand, surrogates, and often rubbish." At the same time, the film "Battleship Potemkin" was shown in the barracks, showing how the sailors started a riot and threw all the officers overboard just because they were given wormy for lunch meat! - V.B.)

I, the commander, like my subordinates, at that time walked in bast shoes. Proudly walking!

Nagant on one side, field bag on the other - the girls were watching! Come to the barracks, rather bast shoes in the water, you know that the starptina is strict. He told the Red Army soldiers: "Whoever wears out bast shoes before five days, I won't give new ones - trample on puddles. Indeed, we are marching in formation, and when we see a puddle, everyone is in a herd - we will trample, the bast shoes will get wet, which means they will not crack earlier than time, they will last longer. There were six commanders in a machine-gun company ... All of them had one pair of boots. We took the largest size so that they fit everyone. They made a schedule for when someone would go to the city in them."

At the plenum of the Central Committee in April 1928, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov complained about the difficulties in training command personnel: "It is not easy to develop a commander from a peasant, because we have to politically work on him for so long and so seriously that this task sometimes becomes beyond our strength. We almost never get real proletarians into military schools. Living and other conditions in the Red Army are such that they can in no way serve as a bait for good proletarian cadres.

Gradually, the material situation of the military, primarily the commanding staff, improved, but the housing problem remained "the most painful place in the life of the commanding staff." The Soviet Motherland never spared money for the world's largest nuclear submarines and ballistic missiles, as well as for other "iron", but at the same time it invariably saved on its defenders, at the same time assuring that the people took off their last for their sake.

The thesis was widely promoted that the new army was fundamentally different in spirit from the old one: "In the Red Army, the antagonistic class stratification that existed between the bars - commanders and "serfs" - soldiers, with all the ensuing consequences, has disappeared.

However, class demagoguery could not hide the fact that the belligerently ignorant masters of the new life, who had risen to the top by virtue of their proletarian origin alone, as soon as they seized power, were able in many respects to surpass the pre-revolutionary "bars". This began to manifest itself especially clearly in the late 1920s, as the screws were tightened against the peasantry.

The OGPU informed the "tops" in its "Review of the political and economic state of the USSR:

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"A serious reason for the dissatisfaction of the Red Army is the growth

old-officer habits of the command staff (rudeness, drunkenness, swearing and clericalism), which have taken root in relation to the Red Army even on the part of the political staff ...

The exploitation of Red Army soldiers for personal needs is a mass phenomenon, observed in almost all districts; there are frequent cases of sending messengers at the disposal of wives, mothers and tat. to do housework...

The rudeness of the command staff increases every month, taking the form of complete disregard for the Red Army masses, preferences for repressive

measures instead of moral influence on the Red Army soldiers and subordinates, as well as the exploitation of the Red Army soldiers ... "

Meanwhile, in the "class stratified" tsarist army, since the time of Peter the Great, it was forbidden for an officer to give orders that were not related to official business. Moreover, the soldier was not obliged to carry out such orders, but instead had to report the officer to the court. According to the Military Article of 1715, "the command of an officer no longer applies to soldiers, only as much as His Majesty and His State needs; and what does not concern His Majesty's service, then the position of a soldier does not require repair.

Scuffle and total drunkenness bloomed in a riotous color in the Red Army:

"Drunkenness in the units is progressing and is becoming characteristic of the life of the army command staff in a peaceful environment. In many cases, it is accompanied by debauchery and drunken revelry in restaurants, up to street shooting. In some parts, drunkenness undermines any authority of the command staff and represents a serious

danger...

The attitude of the command staff to their duties is negligent. The commanders do not attend classes for several days and are cut off from the Red Army masses. In places, the command staff represents a caste that is completely alien to the interests of the Red Army ...

The decadence of mood among political workers of the army is especially observed in parts of the Caucasian army, where cases of suicide have recently become more frequent. From an anonymous questionnaire conducted by the party collegium of the 3rd division, it turned out that up to thirty percent of the communists of the division think or thought of suicide as a way out of a difficult situation ...

In the Volga Military District, the assistant company commander, in a drunken stupor, undressed himself, undressed a prostitute with whom he began to dance Russian. The rest started firing their revolvers, making a lot of noise...

In the Urals military district, drinking parties were in the nature of an orgy, where some of the wives of the command staff danced almost naked. There was a women's drinking party, which was attended by all the wives of the commanders of the 20th regiment. The booze continued with dancing, leboosh, swearing, and it got to the point that the commander who accidentally fell on the floor was knocked down, his trousers were pulled down, and it cost him a lot of work to escape from there without being raped.

(from the same "Overview of the OGPU")

Despite this, as well as the dissatisfaction of the majority of the Red Army soldiers with the collectivization unfolding in the countryside, Voroshilov assured that "the army is strong, combat-ready and is a reliable support for the dictatorship of the proletariat." However, instead of combat training, the main emphasis was placed on the political indoctrination of personnel, whose morale was extremely low due to the robbery of the village and the introduction of the ration card system. Of the ten hours of working time, almost half was spent listening to political instructors' fairy tales about the wonderful life in the Soviet country.

"Happy is the man who was born in the 8th Soviet century" "Great victories await us ahead under the rays of the red star"

"Soldier's honor and glory are more expensive than bread and lard"

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General P.N. Krasnov (1869-1947) stated in 1927 in his work The Soul of the Army:

"The higher the ideals for which the army fights, the more valiantly it behaves in the war... Everything spiritual is forbidden for the Red Army. He has no memories of a glorious past, no hope for a brighter future. Life is today. Live and enjoy them... We cannot imagine what hopeless darkness, what violent horror reigns in the soul of the Red Army. This is such a void that no moonshine can fill up, you can't drown out with any violence against women, no revelry. Their new songs are rough and wild, their entertainment is low, they have nothing ahead of them. There is no future. Their glory is a dark, bloody glory, without a radiant fusion with the bright glory of their ancestors, without justification in the future. This is the courage of many of them and their military strength. This is the courage of despair, this is the strength of consciousness, terrible in its emptiness: "there is nothing left to do but fight and die ...

In the very methods of military education, the Communists did not come up with anything new. They used the old methods of influencing the human soul: religion, patriotism, banners, slogans, close formation, music, singing, the appearance of the boss. Their religion is "Leninism", the precepts of "Ilyich" are their commandments."

Thus, in the 1920s and early 1930s, the Soviet Union had a small, technically backward, illiterate, poorly funded, entangled in political control, and little combat-ready army. Some of these shortcomings were later corrected, but congenital malformations remained incurable.

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

A radical change in Soviet military-political doctrine occurred in 1932 after Stalin's protracted response to Tukhachevsky's note. Iosif Vissarionov, in particular, wrote:

"There is no doubt that the character of the army, which has changed in recent years, the growth of military transport technology and the development of aviation, the appearance of mechanized units and the corresponding reorganization of armies create a completely new situation, depriving the old disputes about a large number of divisions of their decisive significance I think you will agree with me, that an army of 6,000,000, well-equipped with equipment and organized in a new way, will be quite enough to defend the independence of the motherland on all fronts without exception. And we are more or less capable of such an army."

For the Headquarters of the Red Army, the wishes of the Leader were a guide to action, although such an army was not needed to solve defensive tasks (In 1930, it was recognized that it was enough to deploy an army of 3-3.5 million people to confront the "Western Bloc").

At the beginning of 1933, the total number of armed forces reached 800 thousand people, by the beginning of 1934 it had exceeded one million. The 1938 mobilization plan already provided for the deployment of an army of 8.6 million men.

In August 1936, the draft age was set at 19.

On September 1, 1939, an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a new law on universal military duty. Since the exploiting classes had been physically destroyed by that time, to the extent that the law proclaimed service in the ranks of the Red Army an honorable duty and a sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR, regardless of his social origin and position. New terms of service were established: in the ground and internal troops for the rank and file - 2 years, for the junior commanding staff - 3 years; in aviation, coastal defense units and border troops - 4 years; on ships and in parts of the Navy - 5 years.

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To provide the armed forces with command personnel of all specialties

developed a wide network of educational institutions. So, if in 1937 in the country

there were 75 military schools and schools, including 7 naval and 18 aviation, then on May 1, 1941 there were already 255 of them, including 16 marine and 100 aviation.

When recruiting schools, preference was given to conscripts and over-conscripts under the age of 25; for civilian youth, the age limit was limited to 22 years. The contemporaries of the Revolution, who had grown up and educated under the Soviet system, now went to military service.

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It must be said that the Bolsheviks attached paramount importance to the creation of a "new man", who was the only one capable of living under the communism they conceived. As you know, their bearded classic for the "production of comprehensively developed people" suggested using the factory labor of adolescents in combination with "teaching and gymnastics." Lenin, dreaming of "teaching communism" to all young people, proposed educating them from the age of 12 "in a conscious and disciplined way" and developing in them "communist morality" subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.

Meanwhile, long before 1917, the brilliant Russian writer F.F. Dostoevsky prophetically pointed out the most characteristic features of the society of "victorious socialists":

"Each member of society looks one after another and is obliged to denounce. Everyone belongs to everyone, and everything belongs to everyone. All slaves are equal even in slavery. In extreme cases - slander and murder, and most importantly equality. First of all, the level of education, sciences, and talents goes down."*

* It should be noted that the future horrors of the revolution and "the construction of socialism in one, individual country" Dostoevsky anticipated in his novel "Demons" (1872). Having become acquainted with the theories and practices of the then Russian revolutionaries - Nechaevites, Chaikovites, Narodnaya Volya and others - he surprisingly accurately described the psychology of these

"Kromeschnikov". It is no coincidence that the novel was not republished during the years of Soviet power.

Recall that it was the "Nechaevites" who killed ("executed," as they deigned to put it) their comrade, student I.I. Ivanov on mere suspicion of betrayal. Thus was the beginning of the tradition. After 1917, their spiritual heirs - the "jolly monsters of Bolshevism" - executed hundreds and hundreds of thousands of fellow citizens: some "on suspicion", others

- "for the origin"!

and just as soon as they conquered the country, the newly-minted "enlighteners" began to burn BOOKS.

In general, as historical experience shows, all revolutionaries, having come to power, become obscurantists. Having seized power by force, they lead the people to obedience by terror, after which they lead the "exhausted mass" to universal happiness, waving a carrot of a bright future in front of their noses and putting a gun to the back of their heads. And in order to fool the people with their ideas as soon as possible, it is necessary to protect them from the pernicious influence of the ideas of outsiders.

In solving this problem, an important role was assigned to the People's Commissariat of Education, within which, on November 12, 1920, the Main Political and Educational Committee of the Republic was formed. The permanent chairman of this committee until 1930 was N.K. Krupskaya - Lenin's wife, who suffered from Graves' disease and hysteria. The famous historian Yu.V. Gauthier* was once invited to a meeting of this institution, after which he made an entry in his diary:

* Gauthier Yuri Vladimirovich (1873-1943), from 1922 corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, from 1939 - academician. His main works: "The Moscow Region in the 10th century", "Essay on the history of land ownership in Russia", "The history of regional administration in Russia from Peter I to Catherine II", "Essays on the history of the material culture of Eastern Europe", "Iron Age in Eastern

Europe".

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"I was taken to the Commissariat of Public Education for a meeting of the collegium of the Commissariat ... N.K. was present at the meeting. Krupskaya-Ulyanova, 5 minutes to the Russian empress; I didn't expect to see her the way she is - old, stubborn,

with the stupid face of a stupid fanatic, and her ugliness is emphasized by a clearly expressed Basel's disease; the rest of those present were Pozner, Shapiro, Marx and other representatives of the ruling tribe...

It turned out that I did not need to come at all. However, I do not regret that I lost time here, a picture of squalor and inability to do anything, except to drown

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in words, was so bright that it left an indelible impression on me and convinced me once again that these creatures, having only an image from people, cannot create anything.

Nadezhda Konstantinovna, who in her youth unsuccessfully tried to enlighten the workers with the ideas of Marx, finally found something to her liking. The instruction approved by her ordered to immediately begin work to cleanse the libraries of "harmful literature." Krupskaya's instruction formed the basis of the secret directive of the People's Commissariat of Education, signed in 1923.

According to it, the literature of the "following "gips" was subject to seizure and destruction: patriotic, Black Hundred, hostile to progressive ideas, religiously moral, historical fiction, idealizing the past, preaching Meptanian morality, sentimental, "pale, not artistic", decadent mood, vulgar humor, "literature of anguish and decadent mood", mysticism, adventure novels, etc.

The document further elaborated:

"Since almost all old literature can be subsumed under these headings, the Glavpolitprosvet develops approximate lists of the literature being withdrawn, which will be sent periodically in the near future so that the places have more specific ideas about what is acceptable in libraries ... These lists are approximate and therefore, they will by no means exhaust everything that needs to be withdrawn.

Persons "guilty of concealing stocks of books" were subject to the revolutionary court.

Almost all philosophers, psychologists, sociologists were the first to be included among the authors hindering the "Soviet construction": Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, Hume and Berkeley, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Spencer and Mach ... They were replaced by Marxism, supposedly accumulating in itself the entire body of human knowledge. Leo Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Dumas père and Mine-Real, Lazhechnikov and Zagoskin, Senkevich and Averchenko were banned next... Instead, pamphlets like "World October" and "Destroy the Louse", portraits of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov were to be distributed.

As you know, Caliph Omar once said: "Why do we need all these books, if there is a Koran" ?!, after which he ordered the library of Alexandria to be burned. To paraphrase his words, the essence of the position of the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and 1930s can be expressed by the words - "Why do we need libraries if we have Capital ?!

The entire old school was to be destroyed, according to Lenin, "producing servants necessary for the capitalists," and the old universities, which the people's commissar

Lunacharsky declared "a pile of rubbish." By the way, in 1923, when "Ilyich" had already fallen into insanity and decided to start breeding rabbits, books on rabbit breeding had to be ordered from Germany for him.

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In pedagogy, the task of forming a class consciousness in the younger generation, almost from the cradle, was put forward in the first place. Recall that in the 1920s

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kindergarten teachers and school teachers demanded a "correct class policy" and the inculcation of "hatred of socially alien elements" in children. Even kids as young as 3-4 were explained the essence of the class struggle and the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie.

In schools, the commissions checked whether all the students had given a signature not attending church, how the anti-Christmas campaign was going, whether "individual processing of children negatively minded by the socio-political" was being carried out. Shkrabs (teachers were renamed "school workers" - "ikrabs"), brought up in the pre-revolutionary era, were blamed for excessive "enthusiasm for general educational tasks to the detriment of the interests of the proletariat." Statements like "a teacher should teach" were regarded as enemy sabotage and "kulak" propaganda. Teachers were required not to teach, but "ideologically to instill in students enmity towards a class alien to them."

An employee of the People's Commissariat of Education, a certain V. Shulgin wrote:
"In fighting for the pace of communist education, we must free ourselves from traditional excesses ... It is necessary to throw out everything superfluous from the programs, we must revise them from the point of view of accelerating the pace."

And reviewed and discarded. The Bolsheviks, having put forward the slogan of the elimination of illiteracy, did not at all intend to engage in enlightenment, which always poses a threat to dictatorship. Lenin, posing for the painter Yu.P. Anennkov, spoke quite definitely:

"In general, as you know, I don't have much sympathy for the intelligentsia, and the slogan "eliminate illiteracy" should by no means be interpreted as a desire for the birth of a new intelligentsia. "Liquidation of illiteracy" should be done only so that every peasant, every worker can read our decrees, orders, appeals on his own, without the help of others. The goal is quite practical, that's all."

As early as April 1918, a program of proletarianization of universities began to be implemented. To begin with, in August of the same year, the need for secondary education was abolished by a separate decree. From now on, everyone over the age of 16 received the right to enter higher educational institutions without presenting a diploma, certificate or certificate of graduation from any school.

In October 1920, Lenin formulated the principles for the reform of higher education:

1) science is only for the poor; 2) no freedom of teaching;

3) improving the material support of employees devoted to the Soviet authorities.

The tasks of the Soviet student were voiced in 1924 by the fighting friend of the leader - Krupskaya: 1) to study Marxism and Leninism;

2) to supplement the proletarian origin with the assimilation of the proletarian ideology; 3) armed with ideology, transform life.

And let us lose in the qualification of the "red specialists", but we will have "a strong guarantee that the train will go on reliable rails and will not go downhill somewhere."

Applicants were selected on a class basis, regardless of their level of training and abilities. "Regulations on higher educational institutions of the RSFSR"

V. Beshanov "Cadres decide everything" 187 prescribed to accept workers and peasants with referrals from party, Komsomol and trade union organizations to universities of all years.

The circular of the Central Committee of the Komsomol pointed out: "The main task of the universities should be the training of specialists devoted to the party and the Soviet government. This main task can be achieved if the sending organizations conduct a thorough selection of candidates for universities."

On June 8, 1922, at a meeting of the Politburo, the proposals of the Deputy Chairman of the GPU I.S. Unshlikht on the development of measures on the issues of "filtering students by the beginning of the next academic year", establishing "strict restrictions on the admission of students of non-proletarian origin" and "establishing evidence of political loyalty". Soon, an addition was made to these points: "Before the start of the academic year, all students (except for members of the RCT and the RKSM) are required to submit a review of the GPU at the location of the university about their loyal attitude to the Soviet authorities."

Entrance examinations now had no meaning. Important were the "purity of the questionnaire" and the blessing of the party-Chekist apparatus. In the presence of the first two conditions, a "proletarian" appearance and demeanor could become a big help. As M. Moskvina recalled:

"The more 'proletarian' you look, the rougher the way of speech and the dumber the answers, the more chances that you will gnaw at the granite of science."

It is also important to be able to swear, hit "on the sops", wear proletarian clothes and "know that rudeness is not a vice, that violence is a virtue, And only THEN

a candidate
for higher education becomes a particle of the material that universities proletarianize.”

Yes, this is a finished portrait of a “red officer”!

By the beginning of 1925, in the country's universities, the proportion of graduates of the so-called workers' faculties (workers' faculties) among students was already 43 percent. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in July 1928 demanded that this figure be raised to 65 percent. At the same time, educational institutions were regularly purged of "foreign elements." In 1925 alone, 40,000 "socially unnecessary" students were expelled from higher education.

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

Curricula had to be adapted to catastrophically illiterate young proletarians. So, at the Moscow Higher Technical School (MVTU) the course on the strength of materials (Sopromat) was withdrawn from the program so as not to burden students with the complexities of higher mathematics; faculties of physics and mathematics were abolished in a number of universities. As "outdated and useless for the dictatorship of the proletariat" the faculties of law, history and philosophy were liquidated. In vain appealed in his appeal to the Council of People's Commissars on February 8, 1922, the team of teachers of the Moscow Higher Technical School:

“The admission to schools of a mass of unprepared, sometimes almost illiterate persons, forced such a small number in Russia and, therefore, especially for her foamy staff of scientific workers, to squander their strength on the elementary training of accepted persons, and, moreover, undoubtedly with a worse result than a correctly set secondary school could do” .

The old-fashioned professors, who imagined themselves to be "valuable personnel", were replaced by "red professors". The wild confusion and darkness that reigned in their heads is clearly evidenced by an excerpt from the brochure of the then-famous “pedologist” A.B. Salkind "The Twelve Sexual Commandments of the Revolutionary Proletariat"

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published in 1924:

“The proletariat has every reason to intervene in the chaotic development of sexual life... All those elements of sexual life that harm the creation of a healthy revolutionary change, that plunder class energy, fester class joys, spoil intra-class relations, must be mercilessly swept aside.. Sexual attraction to a class-hostile, morally opposite, dishonorable object is the same perversion as a person's sexual attraction to a crocodile, to an orangutan ... Then came the nonsense about the “class anti-sex pump”, with the help of which it was proposed to “suck back values” stolen from the proletarian organism.

The level of education, quite naturally, was steadily declining, but even in the simplified version, the quality of assimilation of the material remained low. Yes, in

MVTU in 1926, 38 percent of students did not have time to score, and out of 378 graduates, 262 were repeaters. In technical schools, repeaters accounted for more than 55 percent of all students. The leaders of the Soviet system of education themselves admitted: "universities train "defective" engineers and doctors, and their defectiveness is not noticeable because these engineers do not build anything, and doctors work in conditions of epidemics that mow down people."

Engineers who build nothing, doctors who do not treat anyone, military men who do not know how to fight - all this has become another persistent Soviet tradition.

Selected youth cadres were naturally sent to military educational institutions. After all, they received weapons in their hands, studied "the best in the world" and "the most secret" technique. Therefore, the purity of the questionnaire was given special great importance, and the concealment of "alien origin" was considered a serious crime and was severely punished. Those who were unlucky with their origins had the opportunity to enter the service only under the condition of a strongly expressed love for the Soviet regime and a public break with their parents, as, for example, did the son of a priest, the future Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky.

Only in December 1935, after the famous Stalinist dictum "The son is not responsible for the father", the CEC and the Council of People's Commissars lifted the restrictions "related to the social origin of persons entering educational institutions, or to the restriction of the rights of their parents." But formally. Since almost simultaneously a secret circular of the NKVD was issued, noting that the children and grandchildren of "former people" are a "counter-revolutionary reserve." In addition, now it was much more urgent not to fall into the category of "enemies of the people" or "family member of the enemy of the people."

Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks managed to achieve general literacy. In 1939, the bulk of young people entering military educational institutions (43.9%) had an education of 7 classes, 17% had a certificate for 10 classes, and 14.5% graduated from workers' faculties or technical schools. But 25% of the cadets received general educational training in the amount of 4-6 grades.

zhzhzhzh

For the huge number of military schools and schools deployed in the country, neither the material part nor the teaching staff was enough.

So, on January 1, 1941, the air force schools and flight schools were staffed with teachers only by 44.1%. In the same educational institution, instead of the 1276 SB bombers required by the state, there were only 535, there were only 217 dual-control cabins instead of 743. Despite the fact that thousands of aircraft were built annually in the country, Stalin's falcons were taught to fly on outdated technology.

(This situation did not change during the war. The emphasis was not on the high level of training of military personnel, but on their mass character. Former commander D

air army margtal K.A. Vershinin recalled how he received reinforcements in the course of preparations for Operation Bagration: "Three air divisions arrived from the 1st Air Army. We learned that the 309th IAD was 60% staffed by young pilots who had arrived from schools. 22 of them completed the flight program only on the GPO-2 aircraft and did not fly on a combat aircraft at all. Things were no better in the 233rd shad. It consisted of 22 young pilots. That is, fighter pilots who had never seen a fighter, and attack pilots trained in a similar way, were sent directly to the front).

Flight schools were provided with fuel at 41.4% of their needs, tank schools too.

The three-year term of study in almost all schools was reduced to two years, and its quality was constantly deteriorating, reaching in simplification to complete primitivism. Early releases were widely practiced. Thanks to measures of this kind, in the three years before the war (1939-41) the military schools produced 48,000 red commanders.

Together with the executed military leaders, the textbooks and instructions written by them disappeared. CM. Elizarov recalled: "In officer schools, we were taught the techniques of "beating off cavalry on the right and left," meaningless stepping. And we have not seen the textbooks created by the revolutionary commanders."

In April 1940, at a meeting of the highest commanding staff dedicated to the results of the Soviet-Finnish War, a fact was voiced that perfectly characterizes the quality of training of command personnel: in the 142nd Infantry Division from the commanding staff, only 17% knew the compass, map and knew how to walk in azimuth!

But in the curricula of all military and military-political schools, courses, military academies, divisional party and Komsomol schools, a special course was introduced "On methods of combating espionage, wrecking, sabotage and terrorist activities of the intelligence services of the capitalist countries and their Trotskyist-Bukharin agents".

As of January 1, 1941, the payroll of the commanding officers of the army and navy was 579,581 people, including 427,000 in the ground forces and 113,000 in the air force. Of these, 7.1% had higher military education; 55.9% - average military; 24.6% had an accelerated military education, and 12.4% (71,868 people) had no military education at all!

Due to frequent movements, many officers before the war held their positions for a short time and did not have time to gain the necessary experience. Up to half of the entire command staff of the armed forces had practical command experience from 6 months to one year. In all districts, due to the shortage of 77,000 career officers, 30-40% of the middle-level commanders were reserve officers with insufficient military training.

In 1944 G.K. Zhukov suddenly "saw the light": "Our academies, schools and courses taught command personnel incorrectly, namely:

1) Theoretical training was clearly at the expense of practical training. The experience of the war showed that only those commanders turned out to be good commanders who grew up in the field, and not in the offices ...

2) Our commanders knew and know the equipment very poorly (aviation, artillery, tanks, etc.).

3) The strong-willed qualities of our commander - initiative, the ability to take on

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responsibility - clearly insufficiently developed, and this had a detrimental effect in the course of the war in the first period "...

Meanwhile, six days before the German attack on the USSR, the staff of the US military attache in Moscow compiled a report for the Military Intelligence Department with an analysis of the state of the Red Army, in which, in particular, they wrote:

"The leadership of the army consists of uneducated and even ignorant people. As a result of the purge of 1938, capable military leaders were expelled from the army, which made its current senior command staff qualitatively inferior.

The officer corps as a whole can be characterized in the same way, with the exception of the younger officers. The increased importance given over the past ten years to the military school system has raised the general educational level among half of the young officers, but much remains to be done in this regard.

Undereducated, not flying, not shooting, "incorrectly trained" freshly baked commanders went to combat units to receive equipment and "class-conscious" personnel ...

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

The Soviet "military doctrinaires" believed that an individual Red Army soldier was initially superior to any fighter of any capitalist power: "Class selection, the class principle of educating the army and the class goals of the war of the proletarian state make the Red Army an incomparable force in political and moral terms, and our tactical art develops" on the core of a high political and moral level, based on mobility, courage and pressure. The force of class education carried out by our Party is a mighty force, and, moreover, the force of the Red Army alone.

True, M.V. Frunze, in addition to class education, also insisted on the "maximum mental development of the Red Army", and M.N. Tukhachevsky wrote that "a modern fighter must be highly cultured, must have the ability to expediently and productively use advanced

technology."

But where was this "highly cultured fighter" to come from?

The main part of the Red Army masses were still made up of peasants who managed to go through the "collectivization stake", survived dispossession, the terrible famine of 1932-33, the famine of 1936 and 1937, intimidated by terror and forever assigned to collective farms. "Respected grain growers" were turned into disenfranchised slaves working for the notorious "bread days", that is, for free.

They grew up in a country where the writing of denunciations was elevated to the rank of high prowess, where the heirs of Pavlik Morozov - the "pioneers-lozorn" - gathered for rallies and told how they put their relatives in prison for a spool of thread stolen from work, where doctors called: "in challenge the OGPU to the competition in the case of disclosure of sabotage.

The Pravda newspaper wrote in an article dated December 21, 1937: "Let Comrade Yezhov know that the Chekists of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs are not only those who work in punitive detachments, but also millions of working people who have learned Bolshevik vigilance, who have learned to expose the enemies of the people and who make up reserves NKVD.

From the point of view of foreigners, the happy Soviet collective farmers were reduced to a bestial state. Here is an example of a curious situation. With the forcible entry of the Baltic countries into the Soviet Union, some natives,

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infected with the "bacilli of communism" actively contributed to this: they met the "liberators" with flowers, sought out class enemies, helped the NKVD in carrying out deportations and other socialist transformations. In the summer of 1941, many of them managed to escape, together with their families they were sent to the rear. Not to a polar concentration camp, but to ordinary regional centers and villages - to correct shattered nerves. Once in the "international homeland", they experienced a new shock:

"Dear comrade Malenkov. On HU! Party Conference You have mercilessly exposed the shortcomings of industrial life. The same merciless attitude must be applied to collective-farm life. If you, comrade. Malenkov, if you lived on such a collective farm as I have to live in, your hair would probably stand on end - instead of a real socialist economy, some kind of ugliness would turn out. The mass of the peasantry lives in great poverty (the main subsistence is bread and water, and even that is not enough) because of the slovenliness, and, one might say, criminal leadership. I'll tell you the truth - in fascist Latvia, the workers lived in much better conditions than the local collective farmers.

We, the arrival of Latvians, active workers for Soviet power in the Latvian SSR, were so deeply disappointed that our faith in the viability of the socialist system received a significant bruise ... After all, here, in the Gorky region, the land is fertile, and with proper leadership, profitability can be quite multiply tenfold. There is no need to refer to crop failures—the culture does not know such things... Isn't it a screaming fact that the collective farmers during the more than ten years of the existence of collective farms have not achieved more than 1 kilogram of bread per workday? And the appearance of our village is such that its people are preparing for death rather than for life.

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

And these are the ideals and such everyday practice "on steel bayonets and Voroptilov volleys" they were going to bring to the peoples of Europe. These "liberators" from birth to death themselves lived in a concentration camp under the vigilant supervision of "guards", often not even understanding the abomination of their miserable existence.

(I remember how, during the passage of Soviet ships through the Black Sea straits, political officers and special officers organized a "vigilance watch": sailors were driven into cockpits, and officers and midshipmen with machine guns were posted along the perimeter of the upper deck so that no one escaped from the socialist paradise - in some places it was only a hundred meters; and it was in 1989).

The real successes of the Bolsheviks in the cause of the "cultural revolution" were greatly exaggerated. In the 1937 census, it turned out that even among young people aged 18-19 there were 8.5% illiterate, and among 30-year-olds one in four was illiterate.

In the spring of 1936, the commander of the Belarusian Military District, Commander Uborevich, reported:

"Each call of fighters from the village brings to our barracks 35 semi-literate per hundred. But these "illiterate", in fact, people are completely illiterate: they can hardly write a surname and read two pages in an hour. These are people who do not know who Stalin is, who Hitler is, where is the West, where is the East, what is socialism.

And in the army we suffer, we teach literacy for months. We have engineers, technicians who don't know what sauce they eat thermodynamics with, they don't know fractions, because the devil knows what was done in high school.

By 1939, 8.2% of workers and only 1.8% of collective farmers had an education in the volume of 7th grade school and above. The liquidation of illiteracy gave the overwhelming majority only a formal education, the ability to "read decrees" and

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scribbles: "We are not slaves, we are not slaves."

Alexander Bazarov, having examined the documents of medical commissions stored in the State Archives of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, published the anthropometric data of recruits of the "1941 model":

"I study the documents for all 279 people called up from my native region in the Trans-Urals: there the average height was 153 centimeters, the average weight was 52 kilograms. Throughout the region of the Urals and the Northern Ob region, the anatomical parameters of conscripts are approximately the same. A rare conscript goes beyond the dimensions of 160 cm and 50 kg.

Meanwhile, "comrade" Mekhlis was speaking from the podium: "With such replenishment, you can move mountains and twist your cheekbones to all big and small boogers."

We note in this regard that the weight load on an ordinary Red Army soldier, taking into account full combat equipment and winter uniforms, was 33.3 kilograms.

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It goes without saying that in the 1930s, only the most superlatives were supposed to speak and write about the Soviet armed forces, created by the tireless cares of the party, the government, and Comrade Stalin personally. The country of victorious socialism surpassed all capitalist states, and its army was "the best in the world, the most organized, the most cultured and physically healthy." It created "all the conditions that ensure a high standard of living and life of all fighters and commanders."

The main press organ of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, wrote: "A fighter of the Red Army who knows what he is fighting for, who feels the love and care of his homeland, cannot but be the best, most disciplined fighter in the world."

It was reported about exemplary barracks and canteens, the best units, excellent students in combat and political training, remarkably organized classes and magnificent maneuvers that plunged foreign delegations into amazement: "The Red Army is stronger than ever!"

In 1936, the assortment of the Red Army regiment was ripped apart. From now on, each fighter was supposed to have 600 grams of rye and 400 grams of bread, 150 grams of cereals, 10 grams of pasta, 175 grams of meat, 20 grams of animal fat, 30 grams of vegetable oil, 35 grams of sugar, 30 grams of salt, 735 grams of potatoes and vegetables per day. , 1.6 grams of tea. And in total - 2 kilograms 186.6 grams of food.

Propaganda emphasized the virtues of the diet and its high calorie content. She claimed that "almost all young

Boys during their stay in the ranks of the Red Army gain weight and volume of the chest, acquire a "heroic" become.

However, "in a number of parts" there were still "numerous facts" of individual "shortcomings".

These facts, cited, in particular, in Natalya Kuleshova's study of 1938-39 goals, reveal a picture of the usual Russian mess, Asian savagery, Bolshevik indifference to an individual, completely refuting nostalgic assertions that "there was order under Stalin."

"First of all, the difference between the prescribed and real assortment of products received by military personnel is striking [For any Soviet citizen,

who served 8 in the Soviet army, 8 this is just nothing amazing). For example,

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In the Belarusian Special Military District, soldiers complained about interruptions in the issuance of rations:

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butter, which they "should receive daily, was issued immediately in 23 days," and at courses for deputy political instructors, cadets invariably received mashed potatoes for lunch, dinner and breakfast.

The same constancy, however, in a different food variation, was also practiced in the 1st Separate Red Banner Army. There, in the morning and in the evening, buckwheat porridge was given for 10-15 days in a row, then salted fish for 10 days in a row. "The soup from this fish is boiled in the morning and in the evening, salty and very liquid, if you find a potato bite in the soup, this is happiness. In a word, bad food.

The lack of onions, carrots, tomatoes and the lack of potatoes in the dishes were reported from the Volga Military District. It was stated that the fighters were dissatisfied with such food, but "no one takes any action on all signals ...". From the Kiev Special Military District, the Red Army drew attention to the fact that the food was prepared tasteless and monotonous: "Borscht is liquid, there is absolutely nothing in it, with the exception of pickles" (Well, we are familiar with this matter).

Often, instead of "pickles" or potatoes in food, one could find a wide variety of items and "nutritional supplements". So, from the Moscow Military District in the summer of 1938 they reported: "On June 10, rotten sausage was served as the second course for dinner. Neither the commander nor the commissar paid any attention to this fact. On June 11, they served potatoes in kerosene for dinner, despite the fact that the day before the canteen on duty had forbidden potatoes of the same "quality" to be served for dinner. Nothing has changed. On June 15, glass was found in the second potato. A day later, a nail was found in the bread. On June 17, the sanitary commission found that the meat delivered for the canteen was smeared with manure.

Pieces of barbed wire, wood chips, rags and other hardware goods were systematically found in food in Kalinin MD. The same situation took place in the Leningrad Military District: "Bread is brought in 4 days earlier, it is given to the canteen in a frozen form ... this can still be put up with. But when the fighters find glass, horse teeth in bread, it already becomes intolerable."

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It would seem that here they are the machinations of "saboteur agents." However, everything is much simpler.

Red Army soldier N.N. Chernovol, describing the state of the catering department, reported to his favorite newspaper: "What kind of canteen I had to imagine when I read a book about barge haulers - dirty, untidy. Moss has appeared where food is stored. And from here insects appear, such as, for example, cockroaches, which very often swim in food (borscht, soup, etc.).

And in all the districts, everywhere it was the same thing: "There is a growth of dirt on the floor on

two centimeters", "tables are dirty, stools are dirty, bowls are served dirty, potatoes can be planted in mugs... Dinners are served in dirty vats."

The dirtiest "place" was the catering workers themselves: "Not only is there dirt in the dining room, the assistant to the head of the dining room always walks himself dirty, without a bathrobe, he himself has to wash himself for 24 hours in a bathhouse and wash the dirt on his hands."

Canteens were often located in unusable areas. While eating, plaster or water poured from the ceiling into the plates. Canteens were sometimes not heated, and in winter the temperature in them fell below zero. Fighters from the Kyiv district wrote that the cold "reached 12-15 degrees, so

that without gloves it was impossible to eat. The same signals came from the Volga IN.

There was no elementary order in the canteens, neither the commanders nor the commissars who followed the commanders were completely interested in the "trifles" of soldier's life.

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Many of the fighters just stayed hungry. Because of the flea market, for example, in the rifle regiment of the Kharkov district, meals lasted 2-3 hours, for a mug of tea, the Red Army stood in line for about an hour. In many parts there were not enough lunches and dinners. So, from the Belorussian district it was reported that on January 5, 1939, "there was not enough dinner for 80 people - the soldiers. They had to wait until 12 o'clock at night, when the second stage dinner was prepared. In the Kalinin VO: "Breakfasts from breakfast to lunch at 10-11 o'clock, people often go without lunch."

To avoid cases of food shortages, cooks simply reduced the portions, and if there were surpluses, the "saved" was thrown into the trash. Half-starved fighters, leaving the dining room, said: "When will we eat our fill?", And demanded "to end the callous attitude towards the happiest boy of the Red Army." The newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda responded to such "individual manifestations" of dissatisfaction with another editorial about the methods of "vile activities of fascist intelligence agents."

Theft flourished at all levels of the food chain. Fathers-commanders did not hesitate to feed themselves and their families at public expense, later writing off the food as spoiled. It was all the more simple because the food festered in tons during storage and transportation:

"There are frequent cases when a wagon of flour or cereals is piled up in a place where a wagon of scrap raw materials, alabaster, paints, etc., has just been lying, or in close proximity, close to similar goods. It also happens that cereals that have arrived at the warehouse of NGOs and are not infected with grain pests are placed next to cereals infected with these pests.

The absence of glaciers in a number of military units for storing perishable products and their careless attitude led to the fact that meat was lying on the dirty floor, or "torn overcoats, skis and other things" were thrown next to food supplies.

In addition to the constant shortage of food, the fighters suffered from the lack of the right amount of dishes in the canteens: spoons, bowls, teapots, plates. There were cases when there were only 25-30 spoons per 100 people or there were none at all, and the fighters "ate all the thick and liquid foods over the edge of the bowl. Because of these spoons, the Red Army began to arouse discontent against the command of the unit. A correspondent from the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, reporting on the shortage of spoons and bowls, noted that "you have to come to life for a long time and, after you wait, you take unwashed spoons. For if you give to wash, you will not receive more. Similar letters were received by the editors of Krasnaya Zvezda on a daily basis from all military districts. Head of the Political Administration L.3. Mekhlis, speaking on April 4, 1939 in front of the activists of the Kiev Special District, gave an example when "there were 150 spoons for a whole regiment, and the Red Army stood in several lines to get a spoon, literally a spoon was taken from the battle."

Unsanitary conditions led to the fact that many soldiers suffered from stomach diseases. According to the Political Directorate, only in January-February 1938, "twenty-one poisonings" were registered in parts of the border districts, as a result of which 1963 Red Army soldiers fell ill. Command,

instead of taking measures - to stop theft, provide conditions for food storage, glaze windows, clean rooms and wash canteen workers - they preferred to shut the mouths of complainers in a universal way.

Mekhlis said: "Some of the bunglers, when the Red Army men turn to them about an ugly cooked dinner, bring this matter under the collective, teach the Red Army men to be punished for this, and not those people who treat the Red Army men ugly."

All this happened in peacetime, not in German captivity, but in

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"organized army". During the Patriotic War, the supply chain simply starved the soldiers. Treating their duties with the same disregard, and the people just as callously, "some of the bunglers" actually helped the Germans organize the Leningrad famine. What is there blockaded Leningrad, if the soldiers of the Kalinin and Stalingrad fronts were dying of dystrophy, without any blockade. For example, the soldiers of the 66th army of General A.S. Zhadov in October 1942 goals:

"Due to poor nutrition and depletion of boys, 23 deaths were registered in 587 and 692 SPs, 212 SDs. There were 9 deaths in 62 SDs. Medical commissions established that death followed from exhaustion and overwork of the body. Despite the presence of signals, neither the command of the army nor the command of the front took the necessary measures through the rear institutions to organize normal supplies.

The command drove the army into daily attacks on German machine guns, and it was not used to taking care of the "organization of supply" of subordinates. Although the generals themselves loved to buy.

Let's take a look at the application for the release of food products for the Military Council of the Western Front dated September 29, 1941:

"For the holding of a number of events by the Military Council of the Western Front, I ask for your order on leave:

1. Various fruits (grapes, pears, apples, oranges, tangerines and canned fruits).
2. Fish products (balyk, salmon, teshka, stellate sturgeon), caviar.
3. Canned fish (sprats, sardines, sprats, gobies).
4. Wine and vodka products for 3,000 rubles.
5. Confectionery products in stock.
6. Beer and fruit waters.

Secretary of the Military Council of the Western Front, battalion commissar Astapov.

Exactly one day remained before the start of the German operation Gaifun, during which the entire Western Front of General Konev would be completely destroyed, and his headquarters planned "events" with caviar and wine and vodka products (the enemy, specifically General Erich von Manstein, complained in his memoirs that at his age, it was difficult to gnaw on the dry sausage given out in rations, and he was not supposed to have balyks).

The unpretentiousness of a cheap Soviet fighter aroused the surprise and envy of foreign generals, and was considered his strength, largely compensating for shortcomings in training:

"In the Red Army, the rear services do not have to worry about providing military units with uniforms, tents, blankets and other items that are so necessary for the soldiers of the armies of the West. During the offensive, they can afford to forget about the supply of troops even with food, since the troops are on the "pasture". The main task of supply is reduced to the delivery of fuel and ammunition, but even in this case, combat maps are often used for transportation. In a Russian motorized division, a soldier has no other "baggage" than what he has with him, and he manages to move around on an automaptin, perched on boxes of ammunition or barrels of fuel.

This lack of vehicles has important tactical and psychological implications. Because the number of cars

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motorized divisions in the Russians are much smaller than in the same formations of the Western armies, the Russian division is more mobile (!). Such a division is easier to manage, it is easier to camouflage it and transport it by rail."

A no less bleak picture was observed when the fighters came to their

barracks, which the Soviet press compared to "palaces", in which "there is a lot of light, it is always warm and cozy." Thus, an inspection of the Oryol military district, carried out in 1938, showed:

"It is dirty in the dorm rooms, on the stairs, in the corridors, the washrooms are out of order. For several hundred people, there is one washbasin with eight taps, and 30 taps are clogged and do not work. There are not enough stools in the dining room, and the fighters dine almost standing up. The stools were used to make beds in the hostel."

The situation was no better in the Moscow District, where the roof was leaking in the barracks, the walls were damp and the personnel slept on trestle beds. An inspection carried out in December in all parts of the Leningrad District showed that the barracks "are not insulated ... the doors do not close, and, as a result, people are freezing." In the Kiev OVO: "For four months now, the soldiers of two units have not been able to properly wash themselves. All fighters have 5 washstands. In the morning, In crowded and crowded, trying

Not

be late for duty, the Red Army soldiers barely have time to wipe their eyes with water. They don't have the ability to brush their teeth."

At the same time, we can safely say that these soldiers were still very "lucky" - far from all military units had barracks.

In the Leningrad Air Defense Corps, the fighters "lived in dugouts, without lighting, etc." But even such conditions seemed like a luxury to the soldiers of the Trans-Baikal District, who slept in torn tents, without blankets and without bunks, on bare ground at 12 degrees below zero. The Soviet grouping in the Far East only from 1932 to 1934 increased fivefold in numbers. Divisions and brigades arriving from the European part of the country were unloaded in an open field or at deaf taiga stopovers. General I.M. Chistyakov recalled:

"In these places, as we said, it rains once. It starts in May and ends in August. Moreover, by August such downpours break out that it washes away both roads and bridges - you can't get through, you can't pass. Boots, if left for two days without treatment, were covered with greenery.

Generally healthy climate.

They settled on the spot on their own, as best they could. It looked something like this: "The divisional commander parted the bushes with a stick: "That's what ... You will be here, Chistyakov, commanding a regiment ..." which regiment? Where to command? Nothing around except bushes and grass and weeds. However, the commander was not joking. I had to accept the regiment, build temporary housing, a dining room and stables on a bare spot. The Red Army soldiers dug dugouts, put up sheds. They dragged stones, made a barracks for five hundred (!) People.

Horses began to arrive in autumn. And suddenly (!) severe frosts hit. The horses were covered for the night with peculiar blankets woven from reeds, but they still froze. I had to do this: when it was especially cold at night, I went to the secretary of the Komsomol organization of the regiment, Spiridonov, woke him up: "Raise

komsomol "He already knew why. Our Komsomol members mounted a horse and drove them for several hours to warm up, all measures were taken to save the horses, and I must say that not one of them fell (What kind of "clothing blankets" his fighters hid, the regiment commander does not mention) ... Food We didn't have much, but the fish saved us a lot. In the autumn, chum salmon and pink salmon went along the river to spawn, and then we made large stocks.

At the end of the summer of 1937, Major Chistyakov, a leader, was appointed commander of the 105th Infantry Division: "The village where the headquarters was located stood on a bare spot by the river,

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even the hills here were empty, treeless... The shelves were badly placed. Some units did not even have dugouts, fighters and commanders lived in "fox holes".

And they continued to live in them in the autumn, and in the winter, and in the spring of 1938, when Marptal Blucher arrived at the division and asked to show him the location of the 314th regiment: "We got out of the car with him. All around the steppe, only pipes stick out of the ground.

Where is the regiment? - In "silent holes". - Well, play "alarm".

As soon as the first sounds of the trumpet were heard, the Red Army soldiers and commanders jumped out of the ground, like gophers, and instantly lined up. Blucher clutched his stomach and began to laugh. Indeed, the spectacle was very estimable "...

With a good owner, the dog lives better, and the marital has fun, he is not worried that the troops entrusted to him mow down colds, in the spring - scurvy. The marshal gave a lecture on the international situation, urged them to "be patient", then ordered the "gophers" to make a march on the hills, checked the shooting training and departed, very pleased. Then he set the 314th regiment as an example to others. From this we can conclude that the conditions in which the regiment was stationed were not considered extraordinary, that there were enough such formations of red-star "Neanderthals" in the Far East. People in holes - it was considered quite normal.

The head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army cited completely wild examples from the life of the Blucher province. So, a Red Army soldier sent to guard a non-existent training ground "lived alone in a dugout for 13 months ('), everyone forgot about him and during this time no one visited him." Or sent for two days to ensure the upcoming exercises, the guard stayed in place "for 17 days without hot food and provisions, as a result of which there was an attempt to sell uniforms and protected property."

True, they had nothing special to sell: the cast-offs of the "Chonkin soldiers" forgotten by God and the authorities did not jump potential buyers. Many were given overcoats of the wrong size, worn, torn, even "sewn from multi-colored pieces of material", as well as holes in shoes and canvas boots. Often there was no winter uniform. In particular, after an inspection of the 5th motorized mechanized brigade at the end of January 1938, it was noted that 60 people did not receive winter uniforms: "who did not receive trousers, tunics and go in torn trousers and tunics ... to which the fighters show their displeasure" .

An audit of the Leningrad Military District showed that the ptgab of the district did not even know how many military personnel were in the district: "Then according to some data, there are a shortage of 8,000 fighters, according to other data, in excess of a set of 12,000 fighters. Therefore, in a number of units there is excessive uniforms in warehouses, and in a number of units some of the fighters walk around scattered.

The fact of the presence of clothing items in the warehouses did not mean that the personnel would receive it. Uniforms fell into disrepair in rooms with leaking roofs, often they simply rotted in the open air, were stolen, sold or used "for other purposes". There was no control and accounting of material values, first of all, on the part of commanders and political workers, the people's money was thrown to the wind.

On August 17, 1940, a group of fighters and commanders sent an anonymous letter to the first secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee:

"Gov. Zhdanov!

The situation in the Red Army became completely unbearable.

1. The service life has become the longest, for 333-4 years they are kept for the purpose of drilling ..

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2. Food has become the most disgusting - equivalent on the battleship "Potemkin" in the old days.

3. We dress like partisans, we walk around in whatever. 4. Our families are also starving.

5. Order and discipline as in the old army, only one is missing, they don't hit the sea.

6. We work for 13-15 hours, but we have not yet been deprived of sleep for 6 hours.

Thanks to this, the Red Army and ml. the morale of the commanders is the most disgusting, this was shown by the war in Finland, where our army showed its helplessness, many napti comrades surrendered to the enemy. The same mood and lannoe time. The fighters openly protest and pour out their indignation in front of the average commanders, they are silent and don't gossip to anyone, because they themselves are aware of this and sympathize ...

They as a person, humiliated to the point of impossibility, for the slightest - they give a guardhouse and don't listen to the fighter, the dressers, political instructors, because they are considered empty-handed, talkers, no one believes in their agitation.

We are aware that the economic situation in our country is difficult, therefore we ask:

1. let us go home;

1. shorten the service life, maybe. a long term is worse for morale,

3. equate a fighter to a person; 4. radically change the diet; 5. put on good uniforms;

6. release from the location of the unit for at least three hours, you see what the results are when they do not release,

7. reduce the working day; 8. to rendezvous with relatives.

Believe me, Comrade Zhdanov, if this is done, then all the shortcomings in the army will be eliminated and morale will be high, and the soldiers will fight. We kindly ask you to do these things. You yourself know very well from the experience of the tsarist army that repressions and punishments will not restore order."

Having passed the war as an infantryman and artilleryman, now professor of art history N.N. Nikulin wrote in his memoirs:

"If the Germans had filled our headquarters with options, and the troops with saboteurs, if there had been massive sabotage and the enemies had developed a detailed plan for the collapse of our army, they would not have achieved the effect that was the result of the idiocy, stupidity, irresponsibility of the authorities and the helpless humility of the soldiers."

zhzhzhzh

So maybe, having despised the little things of life and the scarcity of rations, the Red Army soldiers and commanders devoted all their time to preparing for the war against "brutal fascism"? Not at all. The Red Army practically did not engage in combat training, but only occasionally imitated fuck.

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The cost of combat training in the estimates of the People's Commissariat of Defense was extremely low - 0.34-0.41 percent. They spent twice as much money on political, cultural and educational work, because: "the moral forces of the Red Army are the best means in organizing modern combat." Therefore, the time of political studies has always been a sacred time.

Personnel political worker, General of the Army E.E. Maltsev (1910-1981) recalled how hard he had to work as commissar of the 72nd Infantry Division:

"Each commander and chief, no matter what post he occupies, is obligatory

In order, he was supposed to attend classes in Marxist-Leninist training and, according to a certain program, pass tests and exams, which were conducted very strictly. Their results were recorded in the personal files of the servicemen, and this gave the ideological and political hardening of the command cadres a strict plan and focus ...

To be honest, it was not easy for me, as the division commissar. It was necessary to carry out qualified control over all forms of political study, to prepare for lectures for command personnel and fighters. Literally whole nights I had to sit over the study of the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, books, magazines, newspapers.

And yet, the most important occupation of Soviet soldiers has always and everywhere been chores. Plus, they are on duty. Even in the publications of the open Soviet press, attention was systematically drawn to the loss of study time due to the distraction of the Red Army for construction, household, loading and unloading work.

For example, in March 1938, in the battery of the 60th Artillery Regiment, "out of 134 training hours allotted for combat training, only 42 hours were used"; in platoons of the 49th regiment of the 17th rifle division of the Moscow Military District, "out of the 150 hours allotted for study in June, less than 50 hours were used for their intended purpose." As a result, "the training program in tactics, bayonet fighting, fire training was poorly mastered."

In December 1938 L.3. Mehlis at the Military Council reported on the state of affairs in the Far Eastern armies:

"The combat training of units of the 1st and 2nd armies and troops of the ZABVO is still at a low level ... Until now, many people in the units are distracted by all sorts of auxiliary work not related to combat training. Some districts are slowly liquidating subsidiary farms, especially ZABVO. One of the divisions of the ZABVO has up to 67 yards of sowing, there are cows and a thousand sheep.

The Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper was forced to state that the result of such combat training was "everywhere the same - failure to fulfill the training program." In one of the parts of the Belorussian district, to the question of the Red Army men, "why do we still not have combat training classes?" the political instructor who conducted the political information answered: "First we need to work, and then we will study."

According to unpublished letters from war correspondents, combat training in many units was unorganized and inefficient: sometimes firing began 3-4 hours late due to the lack of duty officers and signalers, then only 2-3 people managed to shoot back in 3-4 hours, then instead of three prescribed cartridges each fighter was given one at a time. It also happened that it was not possible to start shooting at all due to the fact that at the firing line it suddenly turned out that they forgot (!) To take cartridges or the weapon was faulty.

From the Kharkov district it was reported that during the stay in the camp there was only one shooting lesson, and even then from a small-caliber rifle. Consequently,

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Red Army soldiers "do not know how to shoot, they do not know rifles and gas masks." There were parts where, after a year of service (!) The soldiers did not know how to properly saddle a horse, could not shoot. From the 1st OKA they wrote indignantly that the commissar's wife went to the shooting range, and the Red Army soldier was forced to wash the floors in their apartment, although in the unit some fighters "have never fired a shot in a year and a half."

In September 1938, a permanent correspondent of the newspaper in the Leningrad Military District wrote: "It is ridiculous to say that the soldiers on the front line, where tomorrow they can be the first to fight, do not know how to shoot, throw grenades, and wield a bayonet. And they don't do it. There are no necessary weapons and ammunition there to immediately open fire."

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The situation with the training of junior commanders was no better. Cadets of regimental schools were sent to work that took up about 80% of the training time. So, in the regimental school of the 50th rifle regiment, "out of the time provided for by the program for the training of cadets, only 23 percent were used directly for classes! ... The same was the case with the organization of studies in the regimental school of an artillery regiment ... at junior courses reserve lieutenants in the 63rd regiment.

When classes were held, as a rule, more than half, or even up to 70% of the fighters were absent from them. Often, Red Army soldiers "as part of entire platoons break away from their studies." In the 37th Artillery Regiment, the winter training plan "absolutely did not include such a "little thing" as ... combat training of the regimental school."

In one of the parts of the Kharkov district, the radio operators of the artillery regiment were not engaged in special training for five and a half months, in the other part - eight, in the third, classes with junior artillery commanders were not held for about a year.

So it was everywhere and so it has always been. tankers did not study "the theory and practice of NEW technology", other specialists did not study "engineering, light machine guns and hand grenades." Numerous appeals of the cadets themselves to the commanders and commissars did not give any effect. The answer was: "what else are you doing, time
No"

1

If this happened in combat units, then what can be said about the rear and business executives? One of them confessed: "I joined the ranks of the Red Army on October 1, 1937, and during this time I have never been in combat and political training.

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not only did he not improve his level of knowledge, but he also forgot what he knew before joining the unit.

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Against this bleak background, the German army looked completely different, quickly

building up muscles and relying on high professionalism. Having visited the Reichswehr maneuvers in August 1928, R.11. Eideman, in his report noted:

"The officer is physically hardy, well trained, sixty-year-old generals jump around the field like fandricks. Very hardy in the field. Always clear and minted (exceptions are rare) in his orders ...

Relations between ourselves and with the soldiers, especially in the field, are simple, to a certain extent even democratic, there is not even the slightest trump card. Discipline is high...

The basic requirement for an officer is knowledge. The manifestation of backwardness, violation of elementary requirements in the leadership of troops leads to retired...

The design of the training fields in Germany deserves attention; training fields (they also serve as shooting ranges) are equipped with communications, roads, towers

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On October 7, 1930, I.P. Belov wrote from Germany to Voroshilov:

"When you look how brutally the German officers work on themselves from second lieutenant to general, how they work on the preparation of units, what results they achieve, it hurts inside from the consciousness of our weakness. I would like to shout with a good obscenity about the need for the most intense study - a decisive alteration of all weak commanders.

On November 8, 1931, commander B. S. Gorbachev took part in a field trip to Silesia:

"Truly, every German officer can be called a highly qualified specialist ... Also very instructive is the conscientiousness and clarity in the performance of their duties by all levels of the command staff and the greater responsibility for the assigned work. Especially, what requires our closest attention is the organization and system of training in the German army and exceptional attention to the commander and student, and careful attitude to the material part "...

However, in their homeland they decided to "remake" the commanders themselves, taking it into their heads to adopt the experience of the "class alien" Reichswehr. They were put to waste, and the reports and reports were put away in folders marked "secret" and were not shown to anyone for sixty years.

The level of combat training of the Red Army fell even more as a result of the hunt for "pests" carried out in the army. In 1936-1940, about 10,000 commanding officers were repressed. And this despite the fact that, as follows from the report of Voroshilov at the February-March plenum, at the beginning of 1937 there were only 107 thousand of them.

Here is what S. Sharonov said:

"Before the Khasan events, I served in the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division. There was little combat training. In 1937-1938, many commanders were taken away. The command of the division was completely taken away: division commander Vasnepov, commissar Rudenko, chief commander Stahl, chief of artillery, chief medical officer and his wife, a medical officer, were arrested. In the shelf - the same picture.

We, ordinary fighters, sometimes did not know who to believe. They were drawn only to the political instructor Matveev, a real Bolshevik, still of the Red Guard temper. He was also taken away, and then returned. We spoke with him, when are we going to throw combat grenades, all wooden and wooden? You could ask him such questions, we knew. And Matveev answered: "To throw a grenade for you, but for the state it will cost a cow." He thought and added: "Yes ... you will still fight ..."

In all districts, a drop in military discipline was recorded. Ordinary Red Army soldiers showed disobedience to "enemy orders."

In a local note to the People's Commissar of Defense, Mekhlis wrote:

"Some party organizations misunderstand criticism and self-criticism, and instead of directing it to improving combat training and strengthening military discipline, they contribute to undermining the authority of the commanding staff.

There are even wild cases. Party organizations of the transport company of the 301st regiment of the 48th

The

202nd Infantry Division, discussing the state of the horse stock, passed the following resolution: "Our horses are in poor condition, the stables are not covered, oats are falling on the ground, horses are getting diseases and combing. Are there any enemies of the people here on the part of the commanding staff of the company?"

The commanders were at a loss and could not restore order. I had to introduce a new provision into the Disciplinary Regulations:

"In case of disobedience, open resistance or malicious violation of discipline and order, the commander has the right to apply all measures of coercion, up to the use of weapons. The commander is not responsible for the consequences if he is forced to use force or weapons to compel those who disobey the order and restore discipline and order.

True, at the same time, on the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, personal weapons were confiscated from the command staff.

Drinking and unauthorized absences became a mass phenomenon in the army. The All-Army Conference of Political Workers in April 1938 stated: "Drunkenness has become widespread, in fact, an everyday phenomenon. The commissars and political workers are not waging any serious struggle against him."

This is quite natural: it is extremely difficult to organize the salvation of some alcoholics by the hands of others:

"If until 1939 the main types of offenses for which the party was held accountable were political crimes, then in 1939 two types of offenses stand out sharply: official crimes (4,261 people were brought to party responsibility) and moral decay (3,138 people were brought to justice). Among those held accountable for these types of misdeeds, the majority are persons in command...

Drunkenness continues to be the scourge of the army. Especially ugly forms are taken by drunkenness among command personnel. The commander does not consider it shameful to appear drunk on the street, in the park, theater and cinema, which is incomprehensible to the population, which makes high demands on the Red Army and its command staff. In restaurants, bosses and Red Army soldiers sitting nearby drink vodka infrequently.

The prevailing types of violations of military discipline are: skirmishes with superiors, violation of the combat regulations, regulations of the internal and guard service, careless attitude to the conservation of weapons and ammunition, unauthorized absences and desertion.

The number of suicides, all kinds of accidents, emergencies and catastrophes has increased significantly. The French ambassador in Moscow remarked about the Great Terror: "In the West, such a situation would quickly lead to a revolution. Here, the people use the weapons of the weak - they do not work well.

Some of the commanders, trying to strengthen discipline, began to widely practice the "use of force", that is, to beat their subordinates. Others simply waved their hand at everything. The repressions caused in the commanding staff self-doubt and fear of any responsibility.

The future army general A.I. Gribkov (1919), who was released early from school in 1939, recalled:

"Poorly trained commanders were placed in POSITIONS of different heights, many of whom did not meet the requirements of their position, but they knew how to keep quiet. Such concepts as "to think", "discuss" have disappeared from military use, and the phrases "it's none of your business" or "it's none of my business" have turned into

formula of life.

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The festive parades and demonstration maneuvers held with pomp could not serve as an indicator of the actual STATE of the Red Army, as well as proof of its high combat readiness, smart people understood this.

General P.N. Krasnov wrote back in 1927:

"The communist government arranges ostentatious maneuvers in front of a large crowd, a crowd of several tens of thousands of people. Gases are released, people in gas masks are rushing about, tanks are moving creaking and rattling, airplanes are flying in the sky, chains are sneaking in a smoke screen, cavalry is galloping, huge cannons are pulling. All this is so absurdly staged that from a military point of view it is an unworthy farce. But this booth has an effect on the crowd, it instills in them the idea of Soviet power and the invincibility of the Red Army.

In the crowd they say: "Did they show this under the kings? Have we seen this under the kings?"

Communists are great connoisseurs of crowd psychology. They tirelessly inspire the society of Russia, which they have enslaved, that they are invincible, that their army is magnificent, that if they were defeated, then all who have land will lose it, will be punished for everything they have done, and this fear of responsibility and even worse, inspired by the masses, will who makes her patiently endure all the horrors of the present.

The French military attache assessed the January exercises of 1935 as being organized for purely propaganda purposes and full of tactical optics, and a visit to the communications school in Leningrad in 1936 as a show specially organized for him.

Marshal Tukhachevsky, in his notes on the large maneuvers of the Moscow Military District, taking place in September 1936, noted that neither the training of the troops,

neither

the work of the headquarters, nor the interaction of the troops were not at the proper level:

"The mechanized corps broke through the enemy's defensive lines from the front without artillery support. The losses must have been huge... The actions of the mechanized corps were sluggish, the control was poor... The actions of the mechanized corps were not supported by aviation... The aviation was not used purposefully enough... Communications did not work well... The landing of airborne troops should have been provided by fighters. ... Skydivers jump without weapons. This must be changed ... The work of the ptgab, in particular intelligence, is very weak in all

parts..."

But nothing has changed for the better after Tukhachevsky. Rather worse.

During the conflict in the region of Lake Khasan, the "hot phase" of which fell on July 29 - August 9, 1938, both the neglect of combat training and

Blucher's economic experiments. At a meeting of the command and political staff of the Posyet border detachment, dedicated to the results of the operation, Brigadier Commissar K.F. Telegin recorded for the speakers:

"We stretched out along the front, and during the battle they grouped in unequipped positions. Communication was only telephone, after losing it, a lot of manpower was used up ... There was no link between divisions, they even fired at their tanks ... The military commissar of the 40th rifle division was afraid to take responsibility for the mobilization of floating units to drop cargo to the front ("and if I thwart Putin?"). The district sent F-1 grenades, but they could not use them The binoculars were 40 percent unusable ... At first, the field units worked without a code. There is no direction-finding service... The field units from Novaya village to Zaozernaya abandoned their satchels and machine guns. They neglected the bayonet fight. They did not engage in combat training, because they turned into economic commanders. We harvest hay, firewood, vegetables, we carry out construction, we wash linen."

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In the order of the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroptilov No. 0040 dated September 4, 1938

it was stated that "combat training of troops, headquarters and command and command composition were at an unacceptably low level. Troops moved to the border

completely unprepared, the Soviet units were "torn apart and unfit for combat", their supply was not organized:

"The heads of the departments of the front and the commanders of the units did not know what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other combat equipment were available. In many cases, entire artillery batteries ended up at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unshot, and many fighters and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division arrived at the front without rifles and gas masks at all.

A company of the 118th Rifle Regiment of the 40th Division arrived at the scene of hostilities with blank cartridges and wooden grenades. When combat grenades were delivered, it turned out that neither the rank and file nor the commanders knew how to use them. All branches of the military showed a complete inability to act in a real combat situation. The gunners did not know where to shoot, the tank units were used ineptly and suffered heavy losses. In addition, despite "huge stocks of clothing, many fighters were sent into battle in completely worn out shoes, half barefoot."

By the same order, Marshal Blucher was removed from command of the Far Eastern Front, and the front itself was disbanded into two separate armies. In Voroptilov's order, of course, there was no mention of the fact that immediately before the start of the fighting, brigade commanders and battalion commanders were arrested - the Chekists worked according to their own plan.

Mekhlis, speaking in early December 1938 at a meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissariat of Defense, said that during the events on Lake Khasan, shooters "who did not know how to shoot a rifle and even open a lock" were assigned to the front lines, many Red Army soldiers arrived to smash the Japanese military " in such a torn

uniforms that, in fact, they remained in their underwear.

In the game, in the course of a small collision with an enemy that was motionless on the defensive, with a fivefold superiority in manpower and absolute superiority in equipment (for example, on the Soviet side, in addition to the tanks of the 2nd mechanized brigade, 250 aircraft were involved, from the Japanese - not a single) the casualties of the Red Army amounted to 3,500 people killed and wounded, the losses of the Japanese troops - 500 people killed and 900 wounded. The loss of command and political staff turned out to be "unnaturally large" - about 40 percent.

At the same time, it was not possible to dislodge the Japanese units from the Zaozernaya and Bezmyannaya hills, the conflict was resolved through diplomacy, after which the Japanese themselves cleared the heights.*

* Note that the official Russian military history to this day claims the exact opposite: "August 6-9, formations and units (2 rifle divisions and a mechanized brigade) of the Far Eastern Front (Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher) with

supported by 250 aircraft drove the Japanese from these heights. See "Military encyclopedic dictionary", volume I, M., 2001, p. 722.

In the final part of the order, the People's Commissar of Defense set the standard task for the armed forces - to always be in a state of full combat readiness, and the head of the Political Directorate demanded that the commissars "turn around" to combat training:

"There is no more important matter for a commander and commissar than military and political training. If comrades do not want to quarrel with the district command, they must remember: everyone must be present at combat training classes, everyone without exception — all commanders, all commissars, all political workers, every single Red Army soldier, because combat and political training is ours.

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sacred duty.

The guidance was accompanied by the sounds of victorious fanfare and the usual praises for wise leadership:

"The victory at Hassan made the strongest impression all over the world. The test of strength of the Japanese military clique, which was determined to test the firmness of the Soviet Far Eastern borders ... ended in a shameful failure. Select units of the Kwantung Army were defeated and thrown out of Soviet territory.

True, at closed meetings it was admitted that "there were also negative moments," but in general, "our fighters and political workers showed the unsurpassed quality of Soviet patriotism and combat training," and the Japanese "shed three times as much blood as we did."

At the 17th congress of the CPSU (b) in March 1939 commander G.M. Stern (1900-1941), who replaced Blucher in the Far East (who was beaten to death by guardsmen), and then led the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, cheerfully reported:

"I must say a few words about our commanders. All sorts of hack writers abroad, for reasons that are understandable to you and me, are trying to portray the matter in such a way that because you and I destroyed a bunch of all sorts of rubbish - the Tukhachevskys, the gamarniks, the oboreviches and similar bastards, we don't have a good one in the Red Army command staff.

The Red Army has a sufficient number of remarkable people who command a platoon, a company, a battalion, a regiment, a division, and many other military formations. The command staff of the Red Army was forged under the direct supervision of Comrade Stalin, Comrade Frunze, Comrade Voroptilov (Applause). All these people know their business, it has been tested not only in peacetime combat training and not only on Hassan. These people are devoted to their Motherland to the end, ready at any moment to give their lives for the cause of the Party, for the cause of Lenin-Stalin (Applause) and will be able, if they need to give their lives, to make sure that they get ten lives in one life of ours. precious person (Applause).

VOROSHILOV. Ten is not enough, you need twenty (Laughter, applause). STERN.
I accept the correction. Please put it on the transcript (Laughter)"

Grigory Mikhailovich himself was enrolled in the "drag" in June 1941, and was shot on October 18.

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The invasion of the Red Army into Poland in September 1939 turned out to be "a cakewalk" from a military point of view, the Polish state, according to Voropgilov, "at the very first military clash shattered like an old rotten cart." But even in

During this "walk" 1475 Red fighters and commanders died or went missing. One of the participants, specially called up from the reserve to participate in the Liberation Campaign, recalled:

"We crossed the border around September 20 without any weapons at all. They didn't give it ... That's when doubts arose. In terms of our preparation. I don't know how it was in other divisions, but even if it was so in only one, then
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already talked about trouble in the army. It's good that we didn't meet anyone."

The Soviet leadership perceived the Polish campaign as a convincing confirmation of the combat power of the Red Army and a good rehearsal for the future Great Pokhol.

At a meeting of the commanding staff in April 1940, devoted to the analysis of the actions of the Soviet troops in Finland, the commanders and commissars directly raised the question of the lack of training of the personnel. So, the military commissar of the 50th rifle corps Semenov said:

"I believe that poorly trained commanders were placed in positions of different heights, that it was absolutely abnormal that untrained fighters were sent to the front, their composition was high, reaching 20-30%. Such fighters were sent who did not have combat training, did not know how to handle a rifle. During the period of preparation for breaking through the fortified area, 874 people received such unprepared people in two divisions, and later in the 100th and 123rd divisions 4314 untrained Red Army soldiers received untrained people.

The commander of the 142nd Rifle Division [Shpennikov reported on the results of the verification of the reinforcements received:

"It turned out that up to 47% of the Red Army personnel did not know the material part of the weapons assigned to them. This mainly applied to heavy machine gunners and light machine gunners The division was completely unprepared for battle.

The meeting noted the complete disregard of fighters for camouflage, their ignoring or non-observance of discipline on the battlefield, their inability to hide from enemy air raids, and the poor physical and tactical training of all personnel. The headquarters worked poorly, they got lost in a combat situation, they did not know how to organize reconnaissance, they did not know the situation at the front. All management was carried out by telephone in clear text. Combined-arms commanders had little idea how to use armored vehicles; the pilots were trained to fly only in good weather.

Rylov fighters did not understand the war started by Moscow, were prone to panic and often fled from the battlefield, dropping their weapons. Voroshilov was indignant:

"The infantry does not act at the front as an organized force, but dangles back and forth, like a mass almost uncontrolled by anyone, which, at the first broken shot, scatters in disorder through shelters and into the forest."

It turned out that the armed forces do not have accurate data not only about the enemy, but also about the number of their own fighters and commanders, which was confirmed by the head of the Supply Department A. V. Khrulev:

"With Comrade Tymoshenko, we had differences literally by two hundred thousand eaters (!). We kept to our smaller figure. But I, comrades, had no confidence that I was right.

And, finally, the Red Army entered the Winter War in summer uniforms.

However, all this is trifles, individual shortcomings and miscalculations of individual

"headheads". The main thing is that a new brilliant victory has been won, and not only over Finland, God bless her with the "Finnish booger", but almost over all of Europe. In his closing speech, Stalin stated:

"Finns to defeat is not God knows what a victory. We also defeated their European teachers - we defeated the German defensive technique, we defeated the English defensive technique, we defeated the French defensive technique. Not only the Finns, but also the equipment of the overfished countries of Europe. Not only technique, we defeated their tactics, their strategy. This is our victory!"

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However, in May 1940, Stalin removed Voroshilov from the post of people's commissar and appointed Timoshenko in his place, while conferring on him the rank of marshal. Since there were reasonable suspicions that Kliment Efremovich had fallen out of favor, a completely devastating "Act on the admission of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR" was drawn up, which, in particular, stated:

"The quality of command staff training is low, especially at the platoon level. - a company in which up to 68 percent. have only a short-term half-monthly half-training of the junior lieutenant course.

The training of commanders in military schools is unsatisfactory, due to the poor quality of the programs, the lack of organization of classes, insufficient loading of study time, and especially weak field practical training. The improvement of the command staff of the cadre is not properly organized ...

Combat training of troops has major shortcomings. The orders issued annually by the People's Commissar on the tasks of combat training for a number of years repeated the same tasks, which were never fully carried out, and failure to comply with the order remained unpunished. Military discipline is not up to the mark and does not ensure the exact fulfillment by the troops of the combat missions assigned to them.

The main shortcomings in the training of troops are:

- 1) Poor training of the middle command staff at the company-platoon level, and especially poor training of the junior commanding staff.
- 2) Weak tactical training in all types of combat and reconnaissance, especially small units.
- 3) Unsatisfactory practical field training of the troops and their inability to do what is required in a combat situation.

4) Extremely weak training of the military branches in interaction on the battlefield: the infantry does not know how to cling to the fire shaft and break away from it; artillery cannot support tanks; aviation does not know how to interact with ground troops

5) The troops are not trained in skiing. 6) The use of camouflage is poorly developed.

7) Fire control has not been worked out ... So on and so forth.

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The order of the new people's commissar No. 120 of May 16, 1940 on the combat training of troops for the summer period required its radical restructuring: "Teach troops only what is needed in the war, and only as it is done in the war."

But, although disciplinary battalions were established in the Red Army on July 15, things did not get better from this. At the December meeting of the senior command staff, Semyon Konstantinovich stated: "On the whole, fire training did not give the proper growth and is assessed poorly." Head of the Combat Training Directorate, General V.N. Kurdyumov (1895-1970) called the main reasons for this situation: a) the lack of leadership and control on the part of senior commanders and their headquarters; 6) a significant separation of personnel for economic work; c) systematic non-fulfillment of curricula "in all military districts inspected", d) constant disruptions and transfers of classes "in most formations and units."

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In general: "The dog barks, but the caravan goes on its way."

During the autumn inspection of 1940, only a few units were able to receive a positive assessment. For example, in the Western Special District, out of 54 units tested for firepower, only three received a positive assessment, in the Leningrad District - only five out of 30. The same picture was observed in other military districts.

Deputy Commander of the Moscow Military District, General I.G. Zakharkin

(1889-1944) noted:

"There are cases when the commanding staff goes to fire training personally unprepared. Often there are no training cartridges. They are not there, not because they are not enough. They are not there because they were not taken from the warehouse. The unit commander does not know that he has thousands of rounds of ammunition in stock. When he gets to the warehouse, pulls them out, he wonders: "Where is this from?"

General I.S. Konev, commander of the troops of the Trans-Baikal Military District, was forced to admit that there were facts "when the Red Army soldiers walk badly and untidy

dressed, not trained, do not know how to shoot, and the commander does not take the necessary measures, does not do what the service requires of him - to restore elementary order in his unit.

Pilot-General Ya. V. Smushkevich (1902-1941) made public the fact that the entire bomber aviation of the Leningrad Military District in total flew the norm of only three pilots !!!

The commanders who commanded these districts and aviation saw the main reason for all the shortcomings in the low qualifications of the overwhelming majority of the command staff of the Red Army.

After the meeting, a new order on combat training for 1941 followed. Nevertheless, combat training in the Red Army continued to "limp on both legs."

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People's Commissar Timoshenko made military pilots his enemies for the rest of his life, ordering them to be released from schools not as officers, but as sergeants. At the same time, Semyon Konstantinovich, a desperate grunt, in one fell swoop reptile the sore housing problem.

Present at the meeting in December 1940, the commander of the 43rd Aviation Division G.N. Zakharov recalled:

"I said that, although the division passed all inspection checks, its combat readiness leaves much to be desired due to the extremely difficult living situation of the personnel. In the air town, located not far from the airfield, at that time lived numerous families of military personnel who in the fortieth year had nothing to do with the division.

At the same time, the pilots were forced to settle in the surrounding villages, scattered around within a radius of five to six kilometers. There is no reliable communication with them. It is impossible to meet the standards set aside for bringing the division on combat readiness. The pilots arrive at the airfield with a great delay, and in winter they run through the forest on skis, get into the cars sweaty, hot, many, of course, catch a cold. Often there is a situation in which the machines are ready to fly, but the pilots are not. The division command cannot change this situation, therefore, as a commander, I am asking for assistance ...

I summed it all up in one fell swoop. Stalin nodded and immediately interrupted me with a gesture ... Similar difficulties were experienced by the commanders of many others again

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formed units and formations.

Shortly after we left for our units, a special order was issued, the number of which I remember to this day. It spoke in particular about

the need to transfer personnel to the barracks position.

The leaders of the Air Force, unlike ordinary pilots, were delighted to learn this news. General Ya.V. Smushkevich said:

"The order of the People's Commissar is the main condition for the improvement of the Air Force naptih ... The only and, perhaps, the main reason why the combat training of the Air Force is at a low level is that there were actually no privates in aviation (7), all were commanders. Pilots at the age of 17-19 started families, and all the attention of the flight crew went not to the growth of combat training, but to family and domestic issues.

He was echoed by Aviation General P.V. Rychagov (1911-1941):

"The young pilot and technician, burdened with a family, lost all maneuverability in the event of movement of the unit. In addition, a pilot connected by a large family loses combat effectiveness, courage and wears out physically prematurely (!. The order of the People's Commissar of Defense eliminates the existing shortcomings in this regard, creates normal conditions for the operation and growth of the air fleet, which, with a common understanding of use, will bring many victories " .

Brilliant! Only one signature on the order - as soon as the combat readiness was raised, they saved on officer salaries and uniforms, and the women of the pilots were no longer worn out."

It must be assumed that generals Yakov Smushkevich and Pavel Rychagov were shot in 1941, also exclusively "for the improvement of the air force."

In this regard, we note that the French military psychologist Mokor identified five dangers that threaten to reduce the "ability to win" for an individual soldier:

1) sexual abstinence;

2

separation from family;

distrust of their superiors;

4) skepticism towards military establishments; 5) fear of death.

According to bourgeois experts, the development of a set of measures to reduce the impact of these factors on the psyche of a soldier made it possible to increase his stamina in battle. All five dangers acted on an ordinary Red Army soldier and a sergeant at the same time.

LJ

Stalin was absolutely not interested in the sophistication of psychologists and the subtleties of an individual approach, he needed a submissive, obedient, non-arguing mass. Psychology, including military psychology, was strangled in the USSR back in 1930. It was declared that "psychology is a part of pedagogy." True, the rest of the world for some reason persisted in their delusions, believing that, on the contrary, psychology is the foundation for pedagogy.

A little later, in 1939, commander G.D. was shot. Khakhanyan, who wrote a clearly wrecking book, Questions of Military Psychology. After that, in the USSR for a long time

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only the psychiatric hospitals remained.

Since the beginning of the war, the main emphasis in the fight against the "fifth danger" was made on the education of the fighters "contempt for death" and the imposition of "iron discipline":

"Such unrelenting military discipline — which I am sure no other army could have endured — has turned the disorganized mob into an unusually powerful weapon of war. Discipline is the main trump card of communism, the driving force of the army.

But it was impossible to foresee how the Red Army would act in the absence of traditional Soviet "disciplining factors" - commissars, special officers, tribunals. The Germans later recalled:

"You can never say in advance what the Russian will do: as a rule, he shied from one extreme to another ... There were times when Russian units, selflessly repulsing all German attacks, unexpectedly fled in front of the small assault groups."

And what is the use of a "disciplined" fighter pilot, if he only saw his "horse" at the front for the first time.

In the Soviet Air Force, due to the haste and simplification in the training of pilots, the highest level of accidents remained throughout the pre-war decade. So, on June 21, 1932, Voroshilov wrote to Stalin:

"Now I literally can't find a place due to accidents in the Air Force. Not a day goes by without receiving information about accidents and even grave catastrophes with human casualties, first in one district, then in another. Suffice it to point out that only from June 5 to June 20, eleven aircraft were destroyed and thirty people died ...

The cadres of the flight and technical personnel have grown, although they are staffed by our own, politically reliable personnel, they are extremely young, inexperienced (which is natural), and most importantly, truly undisciplined. dashing

manners, flaunting their flying exploits, the low authority of the young commanding staff - these are the main sources from which all misfortunes come from ... "...

And it has always been like this: either the composition is young, or "rapid growth", or the development of new technology.

On April 9, 1941, a resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars

"On accidents and catastrophes in the aviation of the Red Army" was issued. The decree stated that "due to laxity, two or three aircraft perish daily in our country in accidents and catastrophes, which amounts to six hundred to nine hundred aircraft a year." It would be interesting to calculate: if we produce six hundred fewer planes (and without that there were already two cars for each crew), how many smart pilots can be normally with this money

teach?

In 1944, losses in combat aircraft amounted to 24,800 aircraft, the maximum for the war. But something else is shocking: of this number, only 9,700 died in battle, and 15,100 are non-combat losses. On the one hand, Soviet military acceptance at factories turned a blind eye to marriage, so real "flying coffins" often arrived at the front. For example, the "best fighter of the Second World War" Yak-3, due to the fragility of the structure, pieces of upholstery were torn off by themselves or wings were broken off, and the 40-kilogram motor-gun often recoiled directly into the chest of the pilot. On the other hand, the extremely low level of flight training of pilots affected.

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

German aircraft factories in 1941 and in subsequent years produced two to three times less combat vehicles than in the USSR, and the Luftwaffe had enough of them to

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to gain air supremacy.

And why do you need so many planes if there is nothing to refuel them. A special order introduced restrictions on the consumption of fuel intended for combat training.

As a result, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, in the first three months of 1941, the pilots of the Baltic Military District managed to fly an average of 15.5 hours; Western - E hours, Kyiv - 4 hours. For comparison: German pilots underwent flight training in the amount of 450 hours, after which they went to the front, but did not take part in the battles yet - at first they watched from the side and gained experience.

Meanwhile, during the war, Soviet pilots were prepared even faster: "takeoff landing" and - into battle.

Soviet pilots, as a rule, did not know how to operate in difficult weather conditions, had a low level of fire and reconnaissance training ("most crews do not know how to find targets even at large points"), did not know the silhouettes and combat characteristics of either German or their own machines (the latter applies to all

armed forces: anti-aircraft gunners recklessly fired at everything that flew, artillery and infantry shot and threw grenades at their tanks or, on the contrary, greeted German tanks with red Nazi flags on their towers).

In addition, due to frequent accidents, the engines of some types of aircraft were forbidden to use at full capacity. V.F. Golubev testified:

"On a number of series of I-16 and "gulls" (I-153) fighters, pilots had the right to fly only if the bank was not more than 45 degrees, the speed did not exceed 400 kilometers per hour, the dive angle was not more than 35 degrees. Aerobatics and air combat were strictly prohibited. I had to limit myself to flying in a circle and shooting at a cone.

On aircraft of new designs, many pilots have never taken to the air at all. Not every "falcon" had enough qualifications for this. General G.N. Zakharov shared his impressions of the MiG-1 and MiG-3 fighters that entered service in 1940:

"Meanwhile, this aircraft had a number of properties that, in the end, were identified as design flaws ... The Mig was too heavy for a fighter. He did not forgive mistakes during piloting, he was designed only for a good pilot. The average pilot on the "flash" automatically passed into the category of the weak, and even the weak simply could not fly on it.

By the beginning of the war, in the neighboring division at the airfield in the Bialystok area, "there were already about two hundred MiGs, but, except for the regimental commanders and some escalrile commanders, no one had yet flown them. The machine was slowly mastered in other formations.

Both old and new cars did not have radio equipment. So, on the first 1000 serial "Yaks" radio stations were not installed at all, and on subsequent transmitters only every 15th aircraft had transmitters, the rest - only receivers.

zhzhzhzh

Soviet pilots, in accordance with pre-war theories, were trained mainly in striking ground targets and were poorly prepared for air combat. The squadrons went in tight formations, which corresponded to the tasks of the infantry unit, and in addition, it was due to the lack of radio communications. For air combat, these "swarms" were of little use, in the confusion of the battle, the pilots quickly lost visual contact with each other and acted independently, without interaction and mutual cover.

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The main tactical unit in fighter and attack aviation was

trio. Having no communication with each other, the pilots kept in flight

compactly, wing to wing, carefully observing the actions of the flight commander. He

he managed subordinates on the principle of "do as I do." Such a system fettered the maneuver, did not allow continuous monitoring of the air situation, limited the initiative. The opponent later noted:

"In air battles, Soviet pilots showed themselves to be aggressive, brave, but they often acted recklessly and straightforwardly, they lacked flexibility. As an individual fighter, the average Soviet pilot lacks personal initiative.

German pilots acted in pairs - leader and follower. The presence of airborne radio stations allowed them to diverge over considerable distances and quickly approach if necessary, exchange information about the situation, carry out complex combat maneuvers, interact with each other and other pairs, provide assistance - act meaningfully and tactically competently in battle. Ground guidance points helped them to quickly find the enemy in the air, to take a more advantageous position in relation to him.

The fighters kept in touch with the bombers during joint actions with them, the bombers - with the ground forces. All Me109s were equipped with a shortwave radio station with a range of up to 100 km, and Me 110s had two stations, one of which was longwave, covering a distance of about 300 km. The Germans also had VHF stations that allowed access to the landline telephone network.

All this - both technical equipment, and a well-functioning organization, and adequate tactics, had yet to be created in the Soviet Air Force, and during the fighting, at the cost of the lives of many pilots who were trained in a completely different way and for a completely different war.

Only at the end of August 1942, a GKO decree was issued on equipping all manufactured fighters and attack aircraft with transceiver radio stations and receivers at the rate of 1: 5 (i.e. one station for five machines), and later 1: 3. The decree still had to be implemented, and the pilots had to be trained to use the radio correctly, ensuring secrecy of control. Meanwhile, even the Air Force Headquarters published a book of call signs only in the middle of the war.

The German General F. Mellenthin wrote about the combat activities of Soviet aviation in the following way:

"The effectiveness of the actions of Russian aviation did not correspond to its numbers. Losses in experienced personnel suffered in the first months of the war were never made up, and mass-produced aircraft were much inferior in quality to their counterparts. Aging officers, apparently, could not learn the principles of aviation combat operations in modern conditions.

The Russians had virtually no strategic aviation, and the few strikes that their long-range aircraft inflicted did not cause us any damage. Reconnaissance planes sometimes penetrated 50-100 km into our position, but fighters and bombers rarely flew more than 3 km beyond the front line.

This was a great relief for us, since even in the most difficult periods of the war, the movement of troops and cargo in the rear areas was unhindered.

Russian aviation was used mainly for tactical tasks, and since the summer of 1943, Russian aircraft hung over the battlefield from morning to evening. The organization of interaction between aviation and ground forces was continuously improved; at the same time, the qualitative superiority of German aviation was gradually disappearing. But in tactical terms, the Russians were always inferior to us, and their pilots did not

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could be compared with our pilots. Zh

* It's funny, but true: a significant mass of domestic readers, brought up on
fabulous writings about the Soviet
pilots, like the novel "Baltic Sky", still believes that at least half of the "Stalin's falcons" could fly

and fight like Pokryshkin and Kozhedub.

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

Similar problems were experienced by all branches of the armed forces. For example, tankers had radio stations only on command vehicles, and there were none on the line ones, which made it much more difficult to control the battle.

There were not enough crews for the newly formed tank formations. Commanders and soldiers from other branches of the ground forces were urgently retrained as tankers. At the same time, only 5 hours were allotted for practical training of a driver, but many had only 1.5-2 hours of driving practice, while in the Wehrmacht - at least 50 hours.

As a result, due to the inexperience of the crews in forced marches, there were frequent breakdowns that no one could fix; in short breaks between battles, officers had to teach tankers the most basic skills, such as driving a combat map and firing a cannon. In the USSR, the production of tanks was tirelessly increased, and the Germans raised the level of crew training.

If samples of armored vehicles were removed from service, the production of spare parts for it immediately ceased. In general, it was unprofitable to produce spare parts in Soviet production, and they didn't ask for it. For this reason, many combat vehicles had to be abandoned.

The combat regulations provided for only one type of combat for tank units, both in the offensive and in defense - attack. Shooting from a place in the defense was allowed in extremely rare cases. As a result, hundreds of light tanks rushed into the oncoming battle or under the aimed fire of anti-tank artillery. Soviet armored vehicles were used without reconnaissance of the area, without the support of artillery, infantry, aviation, without taking into account their combat capabilities and purpose.

Thus, the situation dictated appropriate tactics for the weakly armored BT-7 - conducting firefights from ambush, using natural and artificial shelters, which made it possible to reduce the likelihood of enemy shells hitting, while simultaneously allowing enemy tanks to get closer, at a distance, when from 45- mm would not have been saved by 30 mm armor.

This was the tactic the British used in North Africa. And the conditions were similar: the same tanks from the Germans and practically analogues of the BT-7 - cruiser tanks - from the British. The latter even had a number of advantages over the Soviet machine: a larger crew, good observation devices and communications. However, the Germans were superior to the British in the same armor protection. The British used shelters made of sandbags, heaps of stones, sometimes they simply buried the tanks in the sand up to the tower and got the desired effect - they suffered significantly fewer losses in defense. To the tactics of tank ambushes. Soviet commanders only crossed in the fall of 1941, after 90% of Soviet tanks had been knocked out.

General Mellenthin left a description of the tank battles of the initial period of the war:

"In 1941 and 1942, the tactical use of tanks by the Russians was not flexible, and the units of the tank troops were scattered along the entire huge front ... Junior and middle commanders showed a particularly poor understanding of the methods of conducting tank battles and insufficient skill. They lacked the courage

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tactical foresight, the ability to make quick decisions.

The first operations of the tank armies ended in complete failure. Tanks were concentrated in dense masses in front of the front of the German defense, in their movement one felt uncertainty and the absence of any plan. They interfered with each other, ran into anti-tank guns, and in the event of a breakthrough in their positions, they stopped moving and stopped, instead of developing success. During these days, individual German anti-tank guns and 88mm guns operated most effectively: sometimes one gun damaged and disabled over 30 tanks in one hour. It seemed to us that the Russians had created an instrument that they would never learn to master."...

As a result, the Soviet mechanized corps were unable to replicate thoughtlessly assigned tasks and were defeated in the very first days of the war.

The army entered the war with outdated charters. During the course of study, such types of combat operations as withdrawal and combat in the environment were not practiced. The soldiers did not know how to dig in, the commanders - to choose convenient positions, taking into account the peculiarities

relief.

In the offensive, dense battle formations in depth were used - all the same ramming attack of infantry masses. Veritina battle to the red generals

I saw a bayonet fight: "The German is afraid of the bayonet." One of these frontal attacks in August near Kiev, undertaken by the 37th Army of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, captured by a German officer in a letter to his family:

"From a distance of 600 meters, we opened fire, and entire squads in the first wave of attackers fell to the ground ... The surviving loners stupidly walked forward. It was terrifying, unbelievable, inhuman. None of our soldiers would move forward. The second wave also suffered losses, but closed ranks over the corpses of their comrades who fell in the first wave. Then, as if on cue, the chains of people began to run. As they approached, they heard a discordant booming: "Hurrah-ah-ah!"

..The first three waves were destroyed by our fire... The onslaught of the fourth wave was slower: people made their way over the carpet of corpses... The machine guns became hot from continuous fire, and often it was necessary to stop firing to replace the barrels... Number, duration and fury these attacks completely exhausted us and brought us to a stupor. I will not hide, they scared us ... If the Soviets can afford to spend so many people trying to eliminate even the insignificant results of our offensive, then how often and with what number of people will they attack if the object is really very important?

Such attacks, designed to exhaust the enemy, to overwhelm him with the corpses of the attackers, were a common occurrence in the 41st year, and in the 42nd, and after. Often, crowds of conscripts were driven into battle without even giving them uniforms and weapons. So, on the Volkhov front, the Red Army soldiers stormed the enemy's strongholds with sticks, on which bayonets were attached, and with wooden three-shots. The slogan became relevant: "You will get weapons in battle!"

Naturally, such attacks led to huge losses. In mid-January 1942, German intelligence issued the bulletin "War Experience in the East", which summarized the main features of Russian attacks:

"The attacks of the Russians, as a rule, take place according to a once and for all pattern - by large masses of people and are repeated several times without any changes. The advancing infantry leaves their infantry positions in compact groups and rushes to the attack from a long distance with a shout of "Hurrah". Officers and commissars follow behind and fire on the stragglers. In most cases, an attack is preceded by reconnaissance in force on a broad front, which, after a breakthrough or infiltration into our position, turns into a reproach attack from the rear and flanks.

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Artillery preparation for an attack is rarely used, but the Russians are very willing to use at night, before an attack, a short but strong harassing FIRE from long distances, constantly changing their firing positions.

The Russians begin their attacks at dusk or at dawn. Taking advantage of the darkness, fog, blizzard or rainy weather, the Russians take up starting positions for the attack. Repulsed attacks are repeated again, sparing no effort and changing nothing. It is difficult to assume that during one day of fighting the advancing unit will in any way change the scheme of the attack. Thus, to repel Russian attacks, strong nerves and the consciousness that our fine small arms are able to withstand a massive Russian offensive are needed.

For the Germans, such tactics were beyond comprehension, so the Russian attacks ran into the memory of literally every front-line soldier:

“The conduct of hostilities by the Russians, especially in the offensive, is characterized by the use of a large amount of manpower and equipment, which the command often brings into battle recklessly and stubbornly, but succeeds. Russians have always been famous for their contempt for death; the communist regime has developed this quality even more ... The attack twice undertaken will be repeated for the third and fourth time, regardless of the losses incurred, and the third and fourth will be carried out with the same stubbornness and composure.

Until the very end of the war, the Russians, not paying attention to losses, threw infantry into the attack in almost close formations. The instinct of steel and the inability of junior commanders to act independently always forced the Russians to attack massively, in dense battle formations. Due to the superiority in numbers, this method made it possible to achieve many major successes (60 hence this is the main tactical technique of all Soviet commanders, there was no time to learn everything else) ...

The area in front of the defending front was suddenly filled with Russians in the blink of an eye. They appeared as if from under the ground and it seemed impossible to contain the impending avalanche. Huge brepti from our fire immediately filled; waves of infantry rolled in one after another, and only when the manpower was exhausted could they roll back. But often they did not retreat, but rushed forward uncontrollably. Repelling this kind of attack depends not so much on the availability of technology, but on whether the nerves can withstand it. Only battle-hardened soldiers were able to overcome the fear that gripped everyone.

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

Only in October 1942, the Supreme Commander (Stalin) issued an order that provided for changes in the tactics of battle:

“The practice of the war with the German Faptists shows that some paragraphs of the statutes have already become obsolete and require revision. Of course, regulations as a whole bring and will bring great benefits to the Red Army. But a number of points in these statutes are so outdated that they will bring great harm to the Red Army if they are not abolished immediately. We are talking about the shortcomings of our charters on such issues as the formation of battle formations during an offensive, the provision of subunits and units with fire weapons, the organization of fire, the role of commanders in an offensive.

What are these shortcomings? Here are the main ones:

First drawback. In accordance with the requirements of the Napti Regulations, the Napti troops, organizing an offensive battle at all levels from a rifle platoon to a division, build their battle formations in depth. As a rule, a rifle division, having received a strip of one or one and a half kilometers along the front for the offensive, builds its regiments in two echelons, of which two regiments in the first and one in the back of their heads; rifle regiment advancing

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in the strip 750-1000 m, it is also forced to have, at best, two battalions in the first and one in the second echelon, most often three battalions to one another in the back of the head; exactly the same echelon arrangement of subunits is provided for in the battalion, company and platoon.

Thus, a rifle division built for an offensive is forced to have only 8 rifle companies out of 27 in the first echelon to attack the front line of the enemy's defense, the remaining 19 companies, located behind the first echelon to a depth of 2 km, cover the battlefield with solid battle formations and are completely deprived of the opportunity to use their firepower.

As a result of this, we have, firstly, exceptionally large, unjustified losses in personnel and firepower from the fire of artillery, mortars and enemy aircraft, which are carried primarily by subunits of the second and third echelons even before they enter battle, which is why an offensive often bogs down in our country at the very first stage, and, secondly, the forced inactivity of more than a third of all infantry fire weapons of a division - machine guns, light and heavy machine guns, mortars and REGIMENTAL artillery, not to mention rifles.

At the same time, units of the second and third echelons will be forced to remain inactive and take on the main fire of the main fire of mortars, artillery and enemy aircraft; in order not to suffer heavy losses, they are forced to cuddle up to the forward echelons, and then, for the same reason, join their battle formations. And this leads to the inevitable mixing of the battle formations of the first echelon with the subsequent ones, to turning them into a crowd and making it impossible to control them.

According to the charter, Soviet commanders were obliged to raise and lead their fighters into the attack. Often, the staffs and commanders of battalions and regiments were in full force in the chain, obliged by personal example to ensure the fulfillment of the task at any cost. On the Nevsky patch, even the generals had to personally lead divisions into battle. Hence the disproportionately large, senseless losses in the officer corps, and in its most competent part. In 1941 alone, 50,000 commanders were killed, and another 80,000 went missing.

They tried to fill the shortage that had arisen by training junior lieutenants at a three-month course, although before the war it was believed that even six months was not enough to train a platoon commander. Military schools churned out accelerated graduations, the training program for infantry officers fit into the "pirosky range" from drill to bayonet combat. Former cadet of the Ordzhonikidze Military School, Colonel A.Z. Lebedintsev, released in December 1941, recalled:

"We did not have a single lesson in organizing enemy units and formations, their weapons and tactics, we did not even know the organization of our own rifle regiment. We didn't see a tank or a plane. There weren't even pictures to show. And this is in the school, which in the pre-war years challenged the primacy of the Moscow and Odessa infantry.

And more idiocy was the formation of cadet regiments, which

“Second flaw. According to the requirements of our regulations, the commanders of a rifle platoon in an offensive battle must be in front of their battle formations and personally lead their subunits into battle. In addition, cases are often observed when the commanders of rifle companies and battalions, from the beginning of the offensive, also stand in front of the battle formations and from here try to organize the control of the battle of their subunits.

his own and attached firepower, loses contact with the battalion commander, and all company control is reduced to giving them the command "company, follow me, forward", which, moreover, as a rule, is perceived only by that part of the company's battle order, with which the commander is located. At the same time, we incur unnecessary losses in commanders, which often leads to disruption of battle formations.

The provisions of the much belated Stalinist order were absolutely correct, but with the "extensive" method of warfare adopted in the Red Army, they were practically impossible to implement. The dismemberment of battle formations required a well-trained initiative fighter and competent management. Meanwhile, any replenishment was immediately thrown into battle, despite the fact that it sometimes did not even know how to shoot and did not know its commanders. Therefore, the units could only operate in the formation of the "crowd", to which the chief indicated the direction of movement, and the machine guns of the barrage detachment "gave courage". Management, for a long time, was limited only to setting a combat mission: "forward" and "any foam"

"Place the entire officer corps in battle formations and pass through the forest in a chain, appointing non-flawed detachments to smoke submachine gunners out of their nests ...

It's better for us to be killed today , than not to complete the task "... Zh

* Even about this "genius of military art", shot in 1950, the authors "Military Encyclopedic Dictionary"

sigh ruefully: "Unreasonably repressed."

They didn't know how to fight any other way. In addition, various Gordovs and Maltsevs did not know how to learn from mistakes. Stalin was capable of this, his generals - in their majority - were not.

During the four years of the war, the irretrievable losses of the commanding staff exceeded one million people, it would be enough to complete 10 officer armies of 100 thousand people each.

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

"Enemy of the people" M.N. Tukhachevsky, although he also dreamed of "an era of wars and revolutions", however, in his report "Issues of Modern Strategy", he warned: "we must prepare for a long war", a stubborn and bloody war, which, quite possibly, will be accompanied by "individual failures of our Soviet Union".

But could such prospects inspire the people for the Great Liberation Campaign? In the second half of the 1930s, the Soviet mass media and proletarian artists enthusiastically propagated the impending war "for the freedom and happiness of all working mankind", for the World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This war was sung in verse and prose, novels were written about it, films were made, shouted through loudspeakers, they dreamed about it: "As soon as the enemies climb on us," we with a cheerful song and a drum

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"Let's go on a glorious journey." And we will definitely win, "because history is behind us and we have millions of people who know what they are fighting for, and who know that they are defending the right to happiness." The war was depicted as fleeting, white-bearing, without any special victims and difficulties, almost bloodless.

The plot of all these masterpieces of surrealism was the same. at first, the enemy treacherously invaded Soviet soil and immediately got hit in the teeth, then the Red Army delivered a crushing retaliatory blow, red-star aviation smashed the airfields and headquarters of the German and Japanese aggressors to dust, popular revolutions broke out in their rear, and Soviet paratroopers dropped on European capitals immediately took command of the rebel forces.

V. Kirshon in the play "The Big Day" defeated Germany in two days, N. Shpanov in his story "The First Strike" repulsed the enemy attack in a few minutes and finally dealt with the "fascists" within 12 hours. All battles were fought exclusively on the territory of other countries and ended with the widespread establishment of Soviet power. Shpanov's "science to win" was published in mass circulation in the "Officer's Library" series.

In the public mind, an idea was formed of the war as a relatively safe and, moreover, heroic occupation, the confidence was laid that the war would begin when we wished and end when we wanted it.

A military psychosis was inflated in the country, lured troubadours simply languished with impatience: "When will Comrade Stalin send us into battle !?"

zhzhzhzh

The war broke out suddenly, like winter, like a sowing or harvesting campaign. Not at all what you dreamed of...

All plans collapsed overnight. On the fifth day of the war, German tanks ended up in Minsk. 1,200 "world's best" planes burned down at the airfields, and German pilots continued to shoot them down by the hundreds. The bulky and senseless 1000-tank corps disappeared as if they had never existed. Entire armies perished in giant cauldrons. Red Army soldiers in tens of thousands, throwing down their weapons, deserted and either surrendered or scattered through the villages and towns. Lithuanians and Latvians, Western Ukrainians and Estonians "made happy" by the Soviet government shot at the back of the Red Army. Komsomol members and party workers went to serve the invaders. And no revolutions broke out in the German rear.

The Red generals, Stalin's nominees, fully demonstrated their mediocrity and complete lack of professionalism, which they tried to compensate for by the Bolshevik firmness in achieving the assigned tasks, that is, ruthlessness towards their own troops.

"And only one method of war is known to them - to crush with a mass of bodies. Somebody will kill the German. And slowly but surely, the regular German divisions are melting away. But it's good if the colonel tries to think over and prepare an attack, to check that everything possible has been done. Often he is simply mediocre, lazy, often drunk. Often he does not want to leave the warm shelter and crawl under the bullets ... often the artillery officer did not identify the targets enough, and, in order not to risk it, shoots from a distance, at the squares, horopto, if not

By

his own, although this happened quite often ... Sometimes the major went astray and, according to the compass, led his battalion to the wrong place at all ...

Confusion, confusion, imperfections, eyewash, failure to fulfill duty, so characteristic of us in civilian life, here, in war, are manifested more clearly than ever. And for all one payment - blood. Ivans go on the attack and die. And he who sits in the shelter drives everything And drives THEM.

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By December 1941, the regular Red Army practically ceased to exist: only 8% of its personnel remained. The rest died, became disabled, were captured, deserted ... By the summer of 1942, they turned into

dust

and those 8 percent. During the year of hostilities, almost all tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and artillery pieces that were available on June 22, 1941, were lost. The reservists entered the war and it was they who won it.

And they fought on tanks and planes supplied by the allies under Lend-Lease. The massive supply of military equipment of domestic production to the troops began only in 1943.

Zhzhzhzhzhzh

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov on November 7, 1945, in a report dedicated to the 28th anniversary of the October Revolution, said: "It is our happiness that in the difficult years of the war the Red Army and the Soviet people were led forward by the wise and experienced leader of the Soviet Union - Great Stalin."

It was the "great Stalin" who framed the country like no one else. Nearly a hundred years before June 1941, French General Antoine Jomini wrote: "It is difficult to imagine that an army in view of the enemy did its duty so badly that it would allow the enemy to attack itself by surprise." Intoxicated with unlimited power, blinded by his doctrine, Stalin himself created the conditions under which the German attack became sudden.

He also created a gigantic feudal-serf army, which turned out to be incapable of fulfilling its duty and was completely exterminated by the enemy in less than one year. It was "comrade" Stalin who brought the people to such a moral state that at first the people did not know whether it was worth fighting for the power of "merry monsters", for the advantages of the "slave-owning socialist system" and even for their own

country.

So, in fact, it is necessary to erect a monument to "Comrade Stalin on Poklonnaya Hill, as some of our contemporaries suggest. Only with a bloodied ax in his weary hand, with a broom and a dog's head at his belt.

In the process of creating the layout of the book, for technical reasons, I had to sacrifice the list of used literature. — Approx. ed. CONTENTS Introduction aaa e Part 1. Vaklyeva vivavivanannye

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